

Representative or Not: Perspectives on Majority- Minority Districts

Chris Kirkwood

Faculty mentor: Shauna Reilly

Political Science

KEYWORDS:

legislative redistricting, majority-minority districts

Chris Kirkwood

Chris Kirkwood is a double major in political science and sociology at NKU. He is grateful to have worked under Dr. Reilly, who in part has inspired him to go to grad school. Chris plans on pursuing a Ph.D. in political science, and hopes to pursue more research on the topic of political geography and legislative redistricting.

Abstract

People have questioned the effectiveness and practical purpose of majority-minority districts since their inception, however, recent research suggests that majority-minority districts are important in creating descriptive policy representation for minorities and ensuring electoral fairness for all. While previous inquiry has found various impacts of majority-minority districts, this is not necessarily true. The extent of majority-minority district impact has largely been up to question. This paper explores majority-minority districts, creating hypothetical new districts through fair methods, and shows how majority-minority districts can increase descriptive policy representation significantly, as well as how minority distribution affects the electoral success of parties.

Introduction

Often times, people complain about legislatures being unrepresentative of the people they represent. There is a perception of old, white men dominating politics disproportionately, but one way to fix this functionally is through the creation of majority-minority districts, or districts with a majority non-white population. People have questioned the effectiveness and practical purpose of majority-minority districts since their inception, however, recent research suggests that majority-minority districts are important in creating descriptive policy representation for minorities, and ensuring electoral fairness for all (Preuhs, 2006). Previous inquiry has found various impacts of majority-minority districts, but more often than not found this to be true (Overby and Cosgrove, 1996), however, the extent of majority-minority district impact has largely been up to question. In regards to majority-minority districts, those created through fair methods of redistricting increase the representativeness of an area through electing someone best fit to the area, however, the question becomes whether or not the representation is more ideological or descriptive.

In this literature review, this question will be answered: Do majority-minority districts result in descriptive policy representation? The main subjects explored in order to answer this question are the redistricting and gerrymandering aspects of majority-minority district creation, individual voting patterns of constituents, legislation passed, and actions of individual representatives. This subject is significant because the creation of majority-minority districts has been questioned from both sides of the isle, and due to this questioning, the worthwhileness of the practice is worth examining. Democratic fairness is of relevance to all, and if some are being disadvantaged by the creation of majority-minority districts, be they whites or minorities, there needs to be a remedy to the situation.

Disctricting

The method of creation for majority-minority districts, be it solely on the basis of minority interests or for political gain, is of importance. To begin, an important term to know in regards to majority-minority districts is racial redistricting, which is essentially the creation of majority-minority districts, without the charged connotation attached. Majority-minority districts are districts in which whites comprise less than 50% of the electorate, making non-whites (minorities) the majority group in the district, group being a loose term, as various minorities do not all have the same interest, so much so as their interest differ from those of whites. However, most majority-minority districts have one majority non-white group (50%+ of the district's population), commonly African Americans and Hispanics. Majority-minority districts are created, and as such are important, due to the fact that they enable minority groups

to elect their preferred candidate by making said minority the dominant electorate.

There are various complexities involved with redistricting itself, which is complicated by racial factors. Compactness is a prized standard among proponents of fair redistricting, however, there is more to compactness than it seems, and race is a component of this (Niemi et al. 1990). The components that Niemi et al. outline are natural borders, compactness in size (the stereotypical method of compactness sought by fair redistricting proponents), quantitative measures of the area, and of course, racial composition (1990). Part of redistricting's goal is to give specific groups and areas a voice in their government, and ignoring minorities in redistricting goes against this principle. Previous and current gerrymanders have cracked and packed minorities (and liberals, of which there is some overlap (James 2011)), which means breaking them up to dilute their influence, and concentrating them to limit their influence, respectively (Shotts 2002). This packing, in turn, benefits minority needs by creating a substantive base in which to gather policy preferences from, which would be of benefit to minorities (Shotts 2002). However, the dilution mentioned is not something to ignore because of any resulting benefits, as a sizeable minority population (even with lack of a majority-minority) can swing an election based on their interests.

This points to the fact that redistricting is an inherently tempting process, with these multiple avenues of redistricting in regards to minorities, and with the power to choose laying many times in the hands of legislatures. Often, when unchecked, the mapmakers use mapmaking to further their political interests. Illinois is cited as a prime example of this (Herron and Wiseman 2000). Politics in the state are dominated by the Chicago urban area, which is majorly Democratic, and has large minority populations, and as such, districts are drawn in order to spread the liberal and minority influence across as many districts as possible, as well as utilize smaller, liberal urban centers downstate, such as Rock Island, Rockford, Normal, Champaign, East St. Louis, and Carbondale (Herron and Wiseman 2000). Were it not for the electoral influence of minorities, Illinois's bold gerrymanders at both the state and federal level would not be possible.

Impact

However, there is a debate in the literature as to the extent of the impact that racial redistricting and race-conscious gerrymandering has on elections. Shotts describes racial redistricting as something that moves policy to the left, as minorities are typically more Democratic as a group than white people, and says that the number of left leaning representatives increased after racial redistricting in the South (2003 A). Lublin and Voss counter his argument, saying that this racial redistricting in the South resulted in the election

Kirkwood and Reilly

of minorities and far-right Republicans, resulting in more conservative legislation and the suffering of black and other minority interests (2003). Shotts then wrote to counter this argument, saying that the Democrats elected were more liberal, but conceding that more research needs to be done on the subject (2003 B). This debate within the literature is important because it signifies that there is more research that needs to be done to determine the impact of majority-minority districts and racial redistricting on policy, and on elections within a system that utilizes majority-minority districts, as well as signifying that impacts that majority-minority districts have are subject to different interpretations.

There are several things that can be concluded from this. The first is that there is a direct correlation between minority votes and party for the most part, and most majority-minority districts elect minority Democrats (Lublin and Voss 2003). Another somewhat obvious point is that packing minorities/liberals into a district results in a more liberal policy preference of the elected representative (Shotts 2003 A), but the overall impact this has on policy is up to debate. Overall, Shotts has more solid reasoning in that majority-minority districts created through racial redistricting and gerrymandering results in the election of more liberal representatives (2003 A), and Lublin and Voss have more solid reasoning in that racial gerrymandering specifically moves policy to the right because of the cracking and packing of minorities, resulting in more far-right representatives being elected (2003).

Voting Patterns

The actions of individuals in relation to majority-minority district creation are of significant interest for various reasons. African American voting patterns stand out in particular. A candidate's support for black interests leads to increased black voting, and black population size in a constituency leads to more black-favoring legislation (Hutchings, McClerking, and Charles, 2004). Furthermore, the trio finds that Democrats in the modern era have been more responsive to black interests as a whole (2004). However, this responsiveness is more apparent in the South than in the North (where there are sizable black populations), but also finds that black support for candidates is not always consistent for different races and during different election years (Hutchings, McClerking, and Charles 2004). As a whole, the Northern states are much more Democratic than Southern states, so it is reasonable to infer that the North's left-leaning partisanship is seen by minorities as inherently beneficial to their interests, although their interests could likely be furthered more descriptively by a nonwhite representative.

There are also direct applications of minority interests to the government that function in tandem with majority-minority districts. Increases in minority populations have had effects beyond the local level of government (Preuhs, 2006). Specifically, minorities create more favorable policies in regards

to themselves, with political allegiances aside, and minorities holding leadership positions often offsets bias against them (Preuhs 2006). In tandem with this, districts losing minority votes are less sensitive to minority interests, specifically if the representative of the area is a Republican (Overby and Cosgrove, 1996). Overall, this points to the conclusion that minorities are the best representatives of themselves, and minority elected officials will do the most to further minority needs.

Furthermore, individuals are more likely to vote in relation to the ethnoracial context they find themselves in. People as a whole are more likely to vote for someone that looks like them, and they are more likely to vote if they reside in a district that matches their demographics, with the sheer power of a force like this is equivalent to a voter mobilization campaign (Fraga, 2016). This information directly leads to the research of Davidson and Korbel. They find that at-large elections take power from minorities, thereby limiting their influence (1981). Furthermore, elected minority officials do not always guarantee substantive policy representation for minorities; however, officials that run with a running mate often chose minorities in order to capture the minority vote, as was the case of the Maryland 2002 gubernatorial election with Michael Steele, an African American, as lieutenant governor (Davidson and Korbel, 1981) (James 2011). What can be concluded from this is that minorities need to feel empowered, or at least feel equal to whites, in order to reliably vote. This is also important because it shows that, to some extent, statewide elections do limit minority power due to their at-large nature, and traditional geopolitical boundaries should be reconsidered.

Legislation

Legislation passed in regards to minority interests is also key to understanding the impact of majority-minority districts. Based on much of the previously mentioned research, racial constituencies should be prioritized for minority representation, and that majority-minority districts are beneficial if the minority would otherwise be too small to effect policy decisions (James, 2011). This supports the idea that minorities themselves best come up with policies that work to their benefit, not those necessarily associated with political parties (Preuhs, 2006). Furthermore, Overby and Cosgrove find that minorities tend to elect minorities, likely because of the aforementioned sensitivity of the candidate to minority interests, and due to districts with a greater minority population electing representatives better suited to minority needs as a whole (1996). Gay supports this, demonstrating that the votes of California legislators respond directly to concerns of their constituencies (2007). However, it is noted that there is competition amongst minorities for representation, as at times majority-minority districts are such because of a large number of minority residents in an area are present, with none constituting an outright majority of

the district's population. The primary elections (for the most part) would determine which groups would have the chance to represent the population of interest (Gay 2007).

What the legislation signifies is that once in office, minority representatives, be they themselves minorities or not, respond well to the needs of their constituents, with minorities best being able to understand and legislate minority priorities. This would point to majority-minority districts being critical for the legislation of minority needs. However, as aforementioned, there are barriers to the creation of majority-minority districts that incorporate well into a fair map, as isolating minorities in districts may limit their overall say, as other representatives may have other priorities for legislation (Shotts 2002) (Overby and Cosgrove 1996).

Representatives

Lastly, the individuals elected as representatives for minority groups in majority-minority districts, or even minorities representing mostly whites, effect the impact that minorities have on legislation. As mentioned previously, Gay's accounting for constituency preferences of California legislators' votes highlights the impact that majority-minority districts and minorities as a whole have on legislation (2007). Even with the highlighted competition among minorities for representation, this shows that representatives have to be mindful of their minority constituents (and constituents as a whole), or else they may face a serious primary or general election challenger. This connection with one's representative goes further, with Banducci, Donovan, and Karp finding that majority-minority districts with minority representatives increase the amount of contact that voters have with said representative (2004), and additionally increase minority turnout (2004) (Fraga 2016). Individual candidates can tip racial and political balances of power in the districts in which they run, however (Canon, Schousen, and Sellers, 1996). These individual candidates can utilize "politics of commonality," which is essentially the candidate and the constituents, being of whatever race or ethnicity they are, having similar interests that can be worked towards, and thereby benefitting from diversity. It is also acknowledged that racial redistricting can have negative impacts, such as limiting minority power by cracking and packing (Canon, Schousen, and Sellers 1996).

This "politics of commonality" (Canon, Schousen, and Sellers 1996) is of interest because of Fraga's research on voting and ethnoracial context (2016). Were this concept to be widely accepted by the people, then Fraga's conclusions would have no basis, which means "politics of commonality" (Canon, Schousen, and Sellers 1996) is not something that is fully put into practice. Fraga concedes this to some extent, as he says that not all candidates embody it (2016). Voters for the most part do not see or vote for the collective interests of their country or

district so much as they vote for their own interests, under the presumption that it is the best thing for everyone that they vote how they do. Under ideal circumstances, this would render majority-minority districts obsolete, as the natural diversity of any racial terrain would be irrelevant, with constituents and representatives being in a mutually beneficial relationship that resulted in descriptive minority policy representation, as well as representatives maintaining the favor of their whole electorate.

In conclusion, the literature suggests that the impact of majority-minority districts on descriptive policy representation is varied. The solid conclusion that can be made is that minority groups do promote policies specific to their interests, however, the extent to which they are able to do this because of the creation of majority-minority districts is very much up to question, coming to head with a heated debate within the literature (Shotts 2003A) (Shotts 2003B) (Lublin and Voss 2003). In the past, attempts have been made to exclude minorities (African Americans predominantly in the literature) from governance, as is evident from a great deal of Southern gerrymandering and/or racial redistricting (Lublin and Voss 2003), and with the advent of specific majority-minority districts, many wonder what the impact will be. The creation of majority-minority districts will be irrelevant unless safeguards for fairness are put in place, such as those mentioned by Niemi et al (1990). Fairness in this sense is letting the people choose their representatives, and providing them with a bias-free method of doing so. Without this, the United States will turn into a land of nepotism, not democracy.

Summary and Implications of Theory

What can be solidly concluded from the research presented above is that minorities do create representative policies for themselves. Banducci, Donovan, and Karp find that when minority representatives take office, they cause an increase in minority constituent interaction, which increases policy representation (2004). This is a fairly widely acknowledged conclusion, also being represented by Niemi (1990), James (2011), and Fraga 2016). Legislators do respond to the needs of minority constituents, as Gay finds (2007), however, this comes second to a minority representative being the voice of other minority constituents.

The more complicated part in regards to outcome is the method of majority-minority district creation and the resulting impact. Many majority-minority districts are created through gerrymandering, which does result in a district that represents minority needs; however, this could limit the impact of a party, or crack and pack minorities in order to limit their impact to one or as few districts as possible (Overby and Cosgrove 1996). There are also the questions of if the Democratic Party is more representative of minority constituents overall, and if the creation of majority-minority districts functions to dilute

Democrat's influence on a district-by-district basis. The current conclusion to the first question is in some cases yes (James 2011), and others no (Herron and Wiseman 2008), and the second question is up in the air.

The aforementioned research thereby leads to the question: Does minority distribution impact the electoral success of any party? Overby and Cosgrove cite the protections and semi-incentive of majority-minority district creation in regards to the Supreme Court ruling on the Civil Rights Act (1996), and in practice, this may function to favor minority over party. Party, however, is an acceptable method of redistricting discrimination up to this point in time, and the question arises if parties suffer electorally as a result of this. In places where one party is in power, they may be inclined to use majority-minority districts (or other districts with high minority populations that are not in the majority) in a way that works beneficially to them, be it through utilizing or disadvantaging minorities.

Knowledge and Importance

There are two concepts necessary to know in regards to racial redistricting. The concept of electoral success is defined to the extent to which a party exhibits the characteristics of winning elections. The concept of minority distribution is defined to the extent to which minority populations exhibit the characteristic of spatial distribution. This paper will examine how electoral success is impacted by minority distribution.

Based on the current state of the knowledge, the current hypothesis of this section will be: If there is an increase in minority spatial distribution, then there will be a decrease in Democratic success. Democratic success is used as the basis for this hypothesis because of the stronger minority affiliation with the party (James 2011), so changes in minority populations spatially and numerically would be most evident in their performance. Herron and Wiseman's examination of Illinois best shows the impact minorities have on the Democratic party, at least in that state (2008), as much of the Democrat-created gerrymanders rely on a minority base on which to expand their legislative majority.

There is more important information to know about racial redistricting in regards to the basis of this hypothesis and further investigation. According to Nall, Democrats have begun to find more urban success, with their power increasing as population density increases (2015). Conversely, Nall finds that Republicans find more electoral success in rural areas, where population density is much lower (2015). Urban and rural areas form the backbones of Democratic and Republican support, with suburbs and exurbs deciding elections. Minority population within these areas may well also cause swings in elections.

The importance of racial in redistricting is paramount in how redistricting is done and the maintaining of electoral fairness. As Niemi et al. point out, there are multiple things that contribute to forming a fair and "compact" district (1990), and the racial makeup of an area is something that they say needs to be considered. Race should not be used as a tool for either side, just a variable that has to be accounted for, just like a district's population equality with other districts of the body they comprise. Currently, the usage of minorities to further partisan goals is functioning the opposite of how fairness should be.

As individuals, people may not care about this. Some people do not understand the ramifications of what redistricting does, much less the role that race plays in the process. Some people do not think it matters to them, since the process is seemingly out of their control, they are not a minority that is being taken advantage of, or they feel they benefit from the process. However, some people understand and care about this issue. People want the people that they support to be in power, and at the end of the day, the best way to do that is to ensure a level playing field so that everyone has fair, equal, and representative chances in their representation.

Data in Action

Examples of comparison between redistricting in favor of Democrats, redistricting in favor of minority representation, and fair partisan representation in the state of Virginia are presented in Figures 1 – 3, respectively. Regions in Virginia that will be referred to are NOVA (the greater D.C suburbs in Northern Virginia), the Hampton Roads (comprised of Portsmouth, Norfolk, Newport News, and Hampton in the southeast), and Tidewater (Chesapeake and Virginia Beach, south of Hampton Roads). The district creation and data are a result of using Dave's Redistricting Atlas (DRA), a website made for the purpose of redistricting for use by the general public (Bradley 2019). People are able to make maps of all states (and DC), and these maps have multiple dataset overlays, which include racial statistics, partisanship of multiple measures, and population per each precinct.

Additionally, these maps do prioritize the compactness and uniformity of districts in parts of the map where elections would be non-competitive. The districts are shaded by partisan lean (the DRA Composite of multiple elections in order to give the best indication of overall partisanship), with shades of reds and blues darkening for Republicans and Democrats respectively, with lighter shades indicating a fairly even district.

As the map for a Democratic gerrymander (Figure 1) shows, urban areas are key to Democratic success, and they happen to have higher minority populations. NOVA is broken amongst four districts (with districts there taking in rural area surrounding the city and liberal Charlottesville as well), Richmond among




Figure 1. Districting map that results in a Democratic gerrymander.




Figure 2. Districting map drawn for maximum minority representation.




Figure 3. Fair partisan representation districting map.

two, the Hampton Roads area amongst two as well, and a swing district snaking through the south of the state and the mountain cities. These areas all have high minority populations, and this map utilizes them and population density in order to maximize the benefits for Democrats, giving them an 8-3 majority, while only having one majority-minority district, due to the African American population in the Hampton Roads.

The majority-minority district map (Figure 2) is less advantageous to Democrats than the previous map, giving Democrats only a 6-5 advantage, although the Tidewater district is closer to a swing district than it is Democratic-leaning. Majority-minority districts are created out of the NOVA population, Richmond

and Southeast Virginia, and Hampton Roads. The geographic compactness of the districts is less prioritized, but it is still achievable. This method of minority distribution functions to decrease Democratic power, as urban areas are taken less into consideration than the previous map, and racial cohesion is prioritized.

The fair map (Figure 3) raises an interesting point. The majority-minority district map contained three majority-minority districts, and while this map was not drawn using racial overlays, this map produced two majority-minority districts, and other districts in it have significant minority populations. This map is reflective of the partisan and racial breakdown of the state, ideally putting Democrats at a 6-5 advantage, with Democrats also controlling the two majority-minority districts. What this indicates is that districts drawn to the Niemi et al. fairness specifications are reflective of the state they represent. African Americans represent a significant population of the state of Virginia, and this is reflected in the congressional maps drawn.

Maps for Mississippi (Figure 4) show how powerful minorities can be in less politically variable areas. The state has a high African American population, although it is known as a bastion of Southern conservatism. These maps contain an arbitrary 30 seats, and one is gerrymandered in favor of Democrats (Figure 4A), to the extent to which that is possible, while the other is made for minority benefit (Figure 4B).

These maps bring up interesting points about minorities and Democratic party success. In Mississippi and other Southern states, there is such a strong correlation between minorities and the Democratic Party that they compose the majority of the party. Democrats drawing the maps in their favor or maps being drawn in favor of minorities will produce similar maps in these situations. The Democratic gerrymander only gains an




Figure 4. Districting maps that result in a Democratic gerrymander (A) and majority-minority districts (B).

extra seat (10/30) compared to the majority-minority district map (9/30) is proof of this.

In regards to the urban areas, Mississippi functions under a sort of primate-city rule for states, meaning the largest city is much larger than the others. This city is Jackson, and in each map, at least six districts are used to represent of the city's metro area. Other cities, namely Tupelo, Biloxi, and Hattiesburg, are of the size or African American population to warrant either a Democratic or majority-minority district. African Americans do comprise the majority of the population in the west of the state along the Mississippi River, which is where most of the Democratic districts are as well.

Conclusions and Future Potential

In conclusion, the answer to the question, "Does minority distribution impact the electoral success of any party?" is yes, at very least in the states redistricted as a part of this research. An important distinction to be made is that majority-minority districts do not have to be formed for electoral success to be impacted, though this can be the case. As was the case with the Virginia districts, the presence or lack of a sizable minority population can be enough to swing the election towards a party, with Democrats benefitting electorally from minorities, and Republicans being disadvantaged electorally. As such, districts as a group should be made to represent states in partisanship, racial makeup, and by geographic distribution of population.

The basis of Democratic support is in urban areas and among minorities, and some of the support in urban areas is from minorities, meaning these groups are not entirely separate entities. As the Virginia maps show, the Hampton Roads area is densely populated, and this dense population is comprised largely of minorities (namely African Americans), which keeps the district solidly in Democratic hands. As of right now, conservatives do not have significant minority support, and this shows in gerrymanders produced by conservatives that crack and pack minority populations (Overby and Cosgrove 1996).

Future research on this topic may delve into the effect that different minorities have on elections. As James says in his writing, African Americans provide a mostly uniform voting block that benefits Democrats, and while the majority of minorities are Democratic leaning (2011), the exact lean of this groups is of interest, as this is data that could be used in fair redistricting. Additionally, further research could examine if minorities vote the same down-ballot as they do for president, or where minorities vote differently from the partisanship of their districts.

References

- Banducci, Susan A., Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey A. Karp (2004). "Minority Representation, Empowerment, and Participation." *The Journal of Politics* 66, no. 2: 534-56. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00163.x.
- Bradley, Dave, Terry Crowley, Mike Mathieu, and Alec Ramsay (2019). "Dave's Redistricting Atlas." DRA 2020. Accessed November 8, 2019. <https://davesredistricting.org/pages/index.html>.
- Canon, David T., Matthew M. Schousen, and Patrick J. Sellers (1996). "The Supply Side of Congressional Redistricting: Race and Strategic Politicians, 1972-1992." *The Journal of Politics* 58, no. 3: 846-62. DOI:10.2307/2960450.
- Davidson, Chandler, and George Korbel (1981). "At-Large Elections and Minority-Group Representation: A Re-Examination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence." *The Journal of Politics* 43, no. 4: 982-1005. DOI:10.2307/2130184.
- Fraga, Bernard L (2016). "Redistricting and the Causal Impact of Race on Voter Turnout." *The Journal of Politics* 78, no. 1: 19-34. DOI:10.1086/683601.
- Gay, Claudine (2007). "Legislating Without Constraints: The Effect of Minority Districting on Legislators' Responsiveness to Constituency Preferences." *The Journal of Politics* 69, no. 2: 442-56. DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00542.x.
- Herron, Michael C., and Alan E. Wiseman (2008). "Gerrymanders and Theories of Law Making: A Study of Legislative Redistricting in Illinois." *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 1: 151-67. DOI:10.1017/s0022381607080115.
- Hutchings, Vincent L., Harwood K. McClorking, and Guy-Uriel Charles. "Congressional Representation of Black Interests: Recognizing the Importance of Stability." *The Journal of Politics* 66, no. 2 (2004): 450-68. DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2004.00159.x.
- James, Michael Rabinder (2011). "The Priority of Racial Constituency over Descriptive Representation." *The Journal of Politics* 73, no. 3: 899-914. DOI:10.1017/s0022381611000545.
- Lublin, David, and D. Stephen Voss (2003). "The Missing Middle: Why Median-Voter Theory Cant Save Democrats from Singing the Boll-Weevil Blues." *The Journal of Politics* 65, no. 1: 227-37. DOI:10.1111/1468-2508.t01-1-00011.
- Nall, Clayton (2015). "The Political Consequences of Spatial Policies: How Interstate Highways Facilitated Geographic Polarization." *The Journal of Politics* 77, no. 2: 394-406. DOI:10.1086/679597.
- Niemi, Richard G., Bernard Grofman, Carl Carlucci, and Thomas Hofeller (1990). "Measuring Compactness and the Role of a Compactness Standard in a Test for Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering." *The Journal of Politics* 52, no. 4: 1155-81. DOI:10.2307/2131686.

- Overby, L. Marvin, and Kenneth M. Cosgrove (1996). "Unintended Consequences? Racial Redistricting and the Representation of Minority Interests." *The Journal of Politics* 58, no. 2: 540–50. DOI:10.2307/2960239.
- Preuhs, Robert R (2006). "The Conditional Effects of Minority Descriptive Representation: Black Legislators and Policy Influence in the American States." *The Journal of Politics* 68, no. 3: 585–99. DOI:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00447.x.
- Shotts, Kenneth W (2002). "Gerrymandering, Legislative Composition, and National Policy Outcomes." *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 2 (2002): 398–414. DOI:10.2307/3088384.
- Shotts, Kenneth W (2003). "Does Racial Redistricting Cause Conservative Policy Outcomes? Policy Preferences of Southern Representatives in the 1980s and 1990s." *The Journal of Politics* 65, no. 1 (2003): 216–26. DOI:10.1111/1468-2508.t01-1-00010.
- Shotts, Kenneth W (2003). "Racial Redistrictings Alleged Perverse Effects: Theory, Data, and 'Reality.'" *The Journal of Politics* 65, no. 1 (2003): 238–43. DOI:10.1111/1468-2508.t01-1-00012.