

Perspectives
in
HISTORY

ALPHA BETA PHI
CHAPTER
PHI ALPHA THETA

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CHAPTER OF PHI ALPHA THETA

**Perspectives
in
HISTORY**

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LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

As president of Alpha Beta Phi chapter of Phi Alpha Theta, I have the thrill of reflecting on all that our chapter has accomplished over the past year. But perhaps even more thrilling than the substance of all that our chapter has achieved are the warm memories of working with the dedicated faculty, students, and friends who bring excellence to the chapter and uphold our high standards. People are the substance of Alpha Beta Phi. The awards our chapter has earned this 1995-96 year, including the Gerald D. Nash Student Journal Award as well as numerous commendations, all reflect the hard work and sincere hearts of the people who have made this a great year for Phi Alpha Theta and Northern Kentucky University.

The past year has brought expansion to the activities of Alpha Beta Phi's already substantive base. Representation at the 1995 Phi Alpha Theta National Convention in St. Louis made a positive nationwide statement for our chapter as we received recognition and praise from national officers. *Perspectives in History* volume XI represents the continued push for scholarship on the part of students. Fall and Spring field trips along with numerous lectures and presentations, connect our chapter with the local historic community and with scholars in history and related fields which have sharpened and refined our base of knowledge. The production of the "Alpha Beta Phi Newsletter" and the creation of an on-line home page have expanded our involvement and have better established us in the current technology-driven arena of history. The spring fundraising book-sale was a tremendous success as it was one of the largest and most profitable sales to date. Scholarly debate has further expanded our horizons as the National History Standards forum addressed current political issues concerning education in history for future generations. Finally, our chapter continues to be active in Kentucky history as we traveled to the Phi Alpha Theta regional conference at the University of Louisville in March to present papers and enjoyed the company of our fellow Bluegrass chapters.

Indeed, Alpha Beta Phi has had a busy and successful year. Many thanks need to be given for the cooperation and selfless devotion which has made this year so special. I would like to give an extended thanks to Dr. Michael C. C. Adams for his accommodations as Chair of the Department of History and Geography and for his good cheer in any situation. A special thanks is due to Alissa Ogle and Jan Rachford for their hard work and warm enthusiasm, even when their workload was nothing to be enthused about. I want to thank and commend Doug Knerr for his selfless outpouring of time and knowledge of computers, without which, there would be no newsletter. When the computers failed to cooperate, Doug was always there to perform his software magic and calm the rest of us down. Thanks is due to Charles Heffner, whose computer expertise has been crucial in establishing the Alpha Beta Phi Home-Page. Thanks to Dr. Frank Steely, Dr. Larry Borne, Dr. Jeff Williams, Dr. John Alberti, Scott Merriman, Sean Fields and Craig Bohman for participating in the history standards forum and for the giving of their time and effort which greatly

exceeded the call of duty. Jason Hall deserves a special commendation as editor of *Perspectives in History*, no small task. Finally, but most importantly, I don't believe that words can adequately express the appreciation that the officers and I have for Dr. Jim Ramage. His giving heart, scholarly expertise, countless hours of hard work, and warm, loving spirit, not only make Alpha Beta Phi chapter the high caliber that it is, but also make serving as president a sheer joy. Sincerely, thank you Dr. Ramage.

Steven M. Watkins
President

FOREWORD

It was with great pride that I served as editor of the 1996 edition of *Perspectives in History*. To have my name associated with a history journal of such caliber is an honor indeed. Last year's 1994-1995 journal was awarded the Gerald D. Nash Student History Journal Award and trying to match that success, of course, has been kept in mind. I feel that the 1996 edition of *Perspectives In History* is a great success regardless of any awards that may or may not be received by this year's effort. As with any journal or publication, a collection of writings is only as good as the pieces themselves. I am very pleased to report that the entries published in this year's *Perspectives In History* are of top quality.

Thanks to all who submitted entries for consideration for this year's journal and congratulations to those whose work appears in this year's journal. It is my personal philosophy that a historian is only as good as the historical writings and works he or she shares with the public. Just as a hidden flame gives no light to be appreciated by those who are capable of seeing it, an unpublished historian gives nothing of himself or herself.

Many people deserve mention or special thanks for their work with this year's journal but none more than Dr. James Ramage, advisor to Alpha Beta Phi Chapter. I give special commendation to Dr. Ramage for his help in making this year's edition of *Perspectives In History* possible. Nobody, not even I, has put more work into the culmination of this journal than Dr. Ramage. Without his dedication and invaluable "steering" I do not think this year's *Perspectives In History* would exist; he saw to it that Volume XI was a success. We are grateful to Dr. Michael C. C. Adams, Chair of the History and Geography Department, for his enthusiastic support, especially in upgrading our computer equipment and software, keeping us on the cutting edge of technology. Dr. Rogers Redding, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, encouraged the editors and the Chapter with enthusiasm. Alissa Ogle and Janice Rachford, our departmental assistants, assisted with keying papers onto computer disks, providing valuable technical advice, and helping in countless ways, always with a willing and cheerful attitude. Adjunct History Professor Douglas Knerr provided indispensable assistance by installing the new computer and software, translating the various disks submitted to a format that we can read, and giving a great deal of time teaching and advising the editorial staff. Finally, we are grateful to Kathy Stewart and University Relations and Kathy Dawn and the staff in Printing Services for their fine professional work in producing and printing the journal.

Jason Everett Hall
Editor

The Battle of Agincourt

by

Steven M. Watkins

During the Hundred Years War (AD 1337-1453) few battles achieved the fame of the Battle of Agincourt, a decisive English victory in which casualties were extremely high for medieval warfare. The thesis of this paper is that although the English Long Bow was an important factor in determining English success, it was not the direct implement of destruction which resulted in 6,000 dead Frenchmen. One of the great lessons in military history is never to underestimate the enemy's strength and resourcefulness. At the outset of the confrontation between the English and French at Agincourt, the French felt assured of victory. In William Shakespeare's *Henry V*, the French Constable exclaims: "Then let the trumpets sound—The tucket sonance and the note to mount; For our approach shall so much dare the field—That England shall couch down in fear and yield."¹

King Henry V invaded France in the late summer of 1415. Historians generally agree that he sought to gain Poitou, Aquitaine and nearly all the land east of Bordeaux.² Aquitaine was important to the English since it was viewed as a "rightful possession," as delineated in the Treaty of Calais. The land east of Bordeaux had been lost as a result of the Treaty of Bretigny. There is speculation that he may also have desired to recapture the Duchy of Normandy. The Duchy had been disinherited from King John in 1204. John Keegan asserts that Henry V probably did not plan an extended campaign across the country. Rather, he intended a plundering raid and to establish an English stronghold.³

When Henry V crossed the English Channel, he and his men disembarked on the French coast approximately three miles west of the town of Harfleur on August 14, 1415. Immediately the English laid siege to Harfleur and after a short but largely unopposed effort, the doors of Harfleur opened to the English on 22 September.⁴ Briefly, Henry's men resupplied themselves and rested. On October 8, the English army set out for Calais, a 120 mile trek. The march probably spent most of the energy and spirit of the cold wet English men-at-arms and archers.

Henry V and his men crossed the Bethune river on October 11 and pushed on to Arques. As they moved toward the Northeast, they passed through the town of Eu until they had come to the Somme River. In search of a place to cross the Somme unopposed, Henry's men moved Southeast in direction as they paralleled the Somme on their left flank. Henry may have received word that he was being shadowed by the French men-at-arms on the other side of the Somme at this point. Finally, Henry discovered unguarded causeways at Bethencourt and Voyennes and was able to cross the Somme at those locales. After crossing the Somme and having

Steven M. Watkins, 1995-1996 President of Alpha Beta Phi Chapter and Assistant Editor of *Perspectives in History*, delivered this paper at the 74th Anniversary Convention of Phi Alpha Theta in St. Louis, December 29, 1995.

traveled over 200 miles in twelve days, Henry declared a day of desperately needed rest. Henry's army was low on food, sickly and exhausted.⁵ At this time, Henry most likely sensed that a confrontation with the French was imminent. The men moved North toward Calais passing through Miramont and Acheux.⁶ On October 24, Henry received word that the French were deploying for battle across the road near the town of Agincourt. The battle occurred the next day on October 25, 1415.




Diagram A. Henry V's traverse from Harfluer toward Calais.

Henry's troops were greatly outnumbered by the French forces. The French men-at-arms numbered from 20,000 to 25,000, of whom 1000 had horses. The English numbered 1000 men-at-arms and from 5-6000 archers. The men-at-arms on both sides were armed with spears, swords, and some back-up weapons such as daggers and hatchets. The men-at-arms at Agincourt were heavily armored with the common, weighty and inhibiting steel sheet armor. Men-at-arms in this era were members of the upper class nobility. Adhering to the codes of chivalry, the knights and men-at-arms were the focal point of medieval warfare.

Much of the fame at the Battle of Agincourt is appropriately attributed to the flexible and resourceful English archers. Armed with the famed English Long Bow, Henry's archers were of the peasant class. They were mostly regarded as low-life criminals and scoundrels by the nobility and fraternization between the two classes of soldiers was rare. The English Long Bow had a maximum range of about 300 yards. The arrows were fitted with 'bodkin-points,' which proved most effective against armor. John Keegan claims that the 'bodkin-point' could penetrate up to one inch of solid oak at maximum velocity.⁷ The archers had no armor and only light secondary weapons such as daggers, mallets, and hatchets. The French had no weapon with a range and rate of fire comparable to the English Long Bow.

As stated earlier, the bows were not actually the direct reason for the high casualties inflicted by the archers. The reason for the lack of deadly effectiveness on the part of the bows and arrows was due to the range at which the English engaged the French with the arrows. At very close range, twenty-five yards or closer, a 'bodkin' tipped arrow fired from a long bow could penetrate most parts of the armor, but usually not at ranges of over 100 yards. At the outset of the battle, the arrows served mostly as harassing fire. So why were the archers so devastating? The reason will be obvious as the story of Agincourt unfolds.

The French deployed across the road to Calais; thereby forcing the English to take up a position facing the French in the bottom of a flat wheat field. At the time of the original deployment of English troops, the two armies were separated by about 1000 yards. The field had been freshly sown with winter wheat and the previous few days of rain had caused the field to become a mucky trap.⁸ The English originally deployed at 6:40 a.m., but as the French nobles argued about who would lead the charge and whose plan should be implemented, Henry took the initiative to move his men up about 5-600 yards. This second position accomplished a tight defensive posture, strategically sandwiched between two wooded hills.⁹ This put his archers at a maximum bow shot of approximately 300 yards from the French troops. The archers also drove huge wooden stakes into the ground at an angle aimed at hitting a charging horse at chest level. These log sized stakes formed a fairly tight wall with only enough distance between stakes for the archers to squeeze through sideways. Once the stakes were hammered in place, they were sharpened to a deadly point. Now, with the armies separated by a few hundred yards, the battle began.




Diagram B. A simplistic layout of the positions when the battle commenced.

The French were provoked into charging the English due to a volley of Long Bow shots from the lowly archers. The French nobles probably resented the thought of the “underclass scoundrels” shooting their wretched arrows at the men-at-arms. So the French made the foolish mistake of advancing. The charge was led by the cavalry followed by two divisions of dismounted men-at-arms. Leading the French forces were Boucicault, d’Albert, Orleans, Bourbon, Eu, Richemont, and the Dauphin who were some of the greatest Lords in all of France. In the progression of the troops, the cavalry charge turned toward the archers when they realized that they must stop the incoming missiles. That action was a miserable failure as most of the horses instinctively refused to charge the densely situated stakes and turned around without yielding to the rider’s commands. As the horses retreated, a panic broke out. The horses were being hit in the rump and riders were stung in the back by the seemingly endless barrage of arrows. In a mad, uncontrolled stampede, the horses collided with the oncoming French men-at-arms who were already weighted down by the armor and off balance in the deep mud. The result was a disaster! One historian provided an analogy to the scenario at Agincourt where stampeding cavalry met the men-at-arms head on.

Of what happened in consequence we can get a clear idea, curiously, from a cinema newsreel of the Grosvenor Square demonstration against the Vietnam war in 1968. There, a frightened police horse, fleeing the demonstrators, charged a line of constables on foot. Those directly in its path, barging sideways and backwards to open a gap and seizing their neighbors, set up a curious and violent ripple which ran along the ranks on each side, reaching policemen some good distance away who, tightly packed, clutched at each other for support, and stumbled clumsily backwards and then forwards to keep their balance.¹⁰

Imagine walking through a slippery, muddy wheat field, covered in heavy sheet armor. It would be an arduous enough feat to manage alone, not to mention being charged head on by stampeding horses.

Medieval warfare consisted chiefly of maintaining unit cohesion and integrity. Once a charge was broken up, it lost its effectiveness. Conversely, if a line was broken or flanked, it was usually split and rolled up, and thus the enemy was pretty much defeated at that point. The oncoming French men-at-arms were split into three basic lines by the charging horses and their momentum was almost completely lost. Meanwhile, the English men-at-arms were preparing themselves and bracing for the oncoming French troops. The French attack was completely ineffective and no significant damage was done to the English line. Further, the English men-at-arms had not wasted precious energy by trudging through a mud field for 400 yards.

The decisive point in the battle came, surprisingly, when the English archers ran out of arrows. It was at this time that the archers laid down their bows, squeezed themselves through the stakes and commenced to pour out onto the dismal wheat

field. Using mallets, daggers, and hatchets, the archers began to attack the French lines, easily defeating the clumsy armor-clad men-at-arms. In his brilliant book *The Face of Battle*, John Keegan put forth a vivid image of the scene in which the lightly armed and mobile archers assaulted the exhausted French men-at-arms:

‘Setting about them’ probably meant two or three against one, so that while an archer swung or lunged at a man-at-arms’ front, another dodged his sword-arm to land him a mallet-blow on the back of the head or an ax stroke behind the knee. Either would have toppled him and, once sprawling, he would have been helpless; a thrust into his face, if he were wearing a basinet, into the slits of his visor, if he were wearing a closed helmet, or through the mail of his armpit or groin, would have killed him outright or left him to bleed to death.¹¹

The result of the English archers’ agility, due to the lack of heavy armor, coupled with the French advance which had lost most, if not all, of its cohesion at that point, was a massive slaughter of French men-at-arms on the wheat field. The grim result was approximately 6000 French soldiers dead and 2000 taken prisoner.

The long bows were only the tools which provoked the French advance; the slaughter took place when the archers laid down their bows and used daggers, mallets, and battle axes. Perhaps the long bow was the ultimate tool of success in the end anyway. If the long winded argument between the French nobles, which gave Henry V time to position his troops in a more strategic point, was all about whether or not to charge or starve the English and if the shots from the archers provoked the French charge, then the long bow may have been as significant as any one factor in English success.

After Henry V had gathered the 2000 French prisoners, he ordered them killed. But the men-at-arms refused to carry out such a ruthless order, because they were chivalrous, hence gentlemen and such a barbarous order was unbecoming. So the lower class archers gladly agreed to carry out the order. Fortunately, Henry called off the order to execute the prisoners when he observed that the French third reserve division was preparing to leave the area. Had the French third division remained, Henry would most likely not have repealed his previous order, because he still felt threatened by the presence of the French division. He was probably edgy also because of an attempted raid carried out by some of the French villagers and led by some of the French commanders who had managed to escape the carnage on the wheat field.

Lessons learned and reasons for English success are numerous. The determinant factors fit naturally into two broad categories. Those categories consist of speculative reasons and concrete reasons for English victory. One speculative reason for English success is that the French had indulged in “strong drink,” to put it in the Biblical vernacular. The English were on half rations and did not have extra supplies or they would probably have been a bit wobbly themselves. A second speculative

reason is that morale tends to be higher among troops in the presence of their King.¹² These factors may have played a part in overall English success; however, evidence does not prove either speculative factor to have been decisive.

Several more conclusive reasons for English success can be seen rather clearly in a macroscopic analysis of Agincourt. First, Henry V had a sound and innovative tactical mind. Without his foresight in moving his men-at-arms forward to a more channelized location early on, it may have been possible for the French to out flank him and the archers would have been out of range, even for harassing fire. A second reason is due to the strong defensive posture of the English, including the mud, the more secure second position, and the surrounding hills which channeled the French into a tough, tight English front line. The tight wall of stakes planted by the archers also falls under the aegis of defensive posture. The stakes were completely defensive in nature. A third, often overlooked point, is that the French were provoked into attacking by the archers. If the French had held their ground, they could have starved out the English and it is very unlikely that the 1000 English men-at-arms would have been able to put a dent in the first French line, much less the third. For a good idea of the positional arguments, see Diagram B, noting that the wooded areas are hills which would have been extremely hard to effectively charge. Fourth, the range of the long bow and the effectiveness of the archers can in no way be minimized when looking at English success. The arrows may have been the very reason the French were provoked into the first charge, but the slaughter was due to the light, agile archers whose lack of armor was their saving grace at Agincourt.

Ultimate success on the part of the English at Agincourt is the sum of many elements, planned and unplanned. The resourcefulness and flexibility of the archers was essential for success. The Battle of Agincourt was a glimpse into the future in one sense. Until the seventeenth century, the dominant battles revolved around the men-at-arms, with relatively few exceptions. Projectile weapons would become the focus of military tactics, rather than the tightly packed bands of men-at-arms.¹³ Agincourt showed a dimension to battle which was rarely evident on any large scale throughout medieval times. That dimension was that light, mobile and long range (long-bow) fighting was sometimes more important than a tough cohesive formation. The sweeping reforms of Gustavus Adolphus in the seventeenth century were based, to a degree, on this concept. Adolphus reduced the number of pikemen and increased the ratio of muskets to pikemen.¹⁴ Although muskets were not in use at the time of Agincourt, the English Long Bow was a parallel of sorts in that it was a projectile weapon with even greater effective range than that of early muskets. This is an over-simplistic analogy and a coincidental one at that, but Agincourt was a preview of things to come. Eventually, warfare transitioned from emphasis on the pike to dependence on the musket.¹⁵

Agincourt stands today as one of the last "great" medieval battles of the chivalric code. By the sixteenth century, most armies were transformed into mercenary forces as the modern era dawned and warfare "came of age." Paralleling this transformation in armies was the emergence of the "common man" theme as individuals were

slowly proving their inherent worth in all social strata, just as the archers had proved their worth on the wheat field. Gradually, armies existed in peacetime and wartime as conscription promised to fill the ranks. As capital increased, armies grew and important soldiers came from all walks of life. Agincourt's ragged, victorious archers stand as a foreshadow of the "common man's" increasing importance in the wars of the future.

Endnotes

1. William Shakespeare, *The Life of King Henry the Fifth*, (Chicago, 1952), Act IV, Scene II, lines 34-37.
2. John Keegan, *The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme*, (New York, 1976), 79.
3. Edouard Perroy, *The Hundred Years War*, (New York, 1965), 237.
4. Keegan, *The Face of Battle*, 80.
5. Kenneth Fowler, *The Hundred Years War*, (London, 1971), 87.
6. Sir Harris Nicolas, *History of the Battle of Agincourt*, (New York, 1970), 25 (map).
7. Keegan, *The Face of Battle*, 98.
8. Desmond Seward, *The Hundred Years War*, (New York, 1978), 165.
9. Archer Jones, *The Art of War in the Western World*, (New York, 1987), 169.
10. Keegan, *The Face of Battle*, 97.
11. Ibid., 103.
12. Ibid., 114.
13. Michael Howard, *War in European History*, (Oxford, 1976), 56.
14. Ibid., 56.
15. Ibid., 56.

Mobilization for War in Early Elizabethan England: The Newhaven Expedition of 1562.

by
Frederic Krome

In October 1562, an English army occupied the French port of Le Havre, known to the English as Newhaven, in support of rebellious Huguenots. Although the “Newhaven Adventure” was a disaster for the English, the process of mobilizing and organizing the Newhaven Army provides an excellent opportunity for examining the role of the military in a state not known for its military prowess. Indeed, a detailed study of the creation, organization, and deployment of the Newhaven Army reveals how the English state, which lacked the structural edifice for a standing royal army, was able to wage war at a time when European military affairs were undergoing fundamental transformations.¹

Despite a general understanding of the patterns of English military affairs for the sixteenth century as a whole, specific military developments, such as the mobilization and deployment of an army to Newhaven, have received scant attention.² This lacuna is surprising considering the significance of the “Newhaven Adventure” of 1562 to the formation of Elizabethan foreign and domestic politics. Although the political and diplomatic details of the Newhaven Adventure are well known, few historians have considered its military dimension, despite the fact that it is the first English army of that period whose composition can be reconstructed in any detail.³

It is an historical truism that the military innovations of the sixteenth century, the so-called “Military Revolution,” largely bypassed England. By the second half of the sixteenth century continental armies were largely permanent institutions that were supported by bureaucracies that provided for troops whose loyalty was to the state and sovereign. In addition, continental armies were rapidly adopting gunpowder weapons.⁴

Conversely, the sixteenth century English state lacked virtually any permanent military structure.⁵ Thus the army that set sail in October 1562 was in many ways an example of the improvisational nature of English military organization. Indeed, the Newhaven Army was mobilized according to institutions dating from as far back as the twelfth century. Despite the reliance on ancient institutions for its military preparations, the Newhaven mobilization also revealed signs of modern innovations. For example, the utilization of a very small percentage of gunpowder weapons. Ironically, the deficiency of firearms, at least compared to continental armies, did not bother some Elizabethan military thinkers who continued to insist that the longbow remained a better weapon than the Arquebus.⁶

Dr. Frederic Krome, initiated in Omega Iota Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta at Wilkes University, is Instructor of History at Northern Kentucky University.

Although most English expeditions to the continent failed to strike fear in the hearts of an enemy, it would be a mistake to regard the English military as inflexible, or even out of touch with the changing methods of warfare. Despite the absence of a strong military authority the Elizabethan state not only survived, it extended its power. Indeed, during the first decade of Elizabeth I's reign the English government was able to muster a credible military presence for foreign intervention, such as at Newhaven in 1562, as well as to suppress the threat to domestic peace, such as that posed by the Northern Rebellion of 1569.

It is important to understand that to speak of "Elizabeth's Army," as C. G. Cruickshank did, is anachronistic.⁷ The Elizabethan government had no single army. Instead, the ad hoc administrative structure of English government was used to create a new army whenever one was needed. Elizabeth had approximately seven armies over the course of her reign, each created to serve a specific foreign or domestic contingency. Cruickshank's seminal work paints a composite sketch of all those armies. Although his picture of Elizabethan military organization is informative, especially about the later Elizabethan era, it does not illuminate the Newhaven campaign of 1562 in any significant detail. It also does not provide an understanding of the process of assembling an army in early Elizabethan England.⁸

Certainly, their are consistent elements to be found during the entire reign. The Newhaven army reflected the military thinking of Elizabethan England. No army, be it despatched to Newhaven in 1562 or gathered to meet the Armada at Tilbury in 1588, was meant to be permanent. Each army was mobilized with the knowledge that it would be demobilized as soon as possible. Its military structure was therefore formed in such a way as to meet the military needs of the moment with the least cost and effort to the national and local government as possible. To accomplish this the structural emphasis of the Newhaven Army was focused around the basic military unit, the Band. Normally numbering between one hundred and three hundred men, the band was raised in the shires under the direct authority of the Privy Council. The modern equivalent of the Band is probably somewhere between the Company and the Battalion.

As for the men who actually comprised the rank and file of the Band they are, at this stage of history, still somewhat obscure. The military obligation of able bodied Englishmen was inscribed in national tradition dating from Anglo-Saxon times. By the late twelfth century the obligation of all freemen to military service was formalized by Henry II's Assize of Arms.⁹ Yet, by the sixteenth century specific military obligations had become somewhat vague. In fact, it was unclear if men could be required to fight in anything but home defense. Certainly, the northern nobles were able to muster men against the Scots, yet this was often part of home defense. Indeed, most of the general musters conducted during the Elizabethan era were to determine the resources necessary for home defense.¹⁰

Since the Newhaven Adventure was an overseas expedition it is unlikely that the soldiers were landowners, or even leaseholders. Barring any positive evidence that the Newhaven Army was staffed by mercenaries it is likely that many of the men

levied for overseas service were either vagrants — “masterless men” — the poor, unemployed, or young men with dreams of adventure.

The actual levying of the Bands for the Newhaven Expedition took place between August and September of 1562. Since the actual process of levying troops would take several weeks, the late date of the commissions guaranteed that no military action would occur before October. The implementation of a military action so late in the year was unusual and an analysis of the timing of the Newhaven Campaign further elucidates the ad hoc process of military planning.

Negotiations for English intervention between Elizabeth’s Principal Secretary, Sir William Cecil, and the Huguenot leader, the Prince de Conde, were begun in the Spring of 1562. Although some planning for the campaign was begun in July, 1562, it was not until August, 1562 that Elizabeth decided to accept the Huguenot offer and intervene in the civil-religious war.¹¹ Once the decision was reached the Privy Council set into motion two processes. The first was the levying of men from the shires while the second, begun weeks later, was the creation of an infrastructure— i.e. equipment and leadership — that would turn the men into an army.

Timing in any sixteenth century military operation was critical. To levy troops and then march them to ports of embarkation earlier than an actual agreement was to risk stranding men and material, and worse, wasting money. Elizabeth was apparently more willing to delay mobilization until the fall than risk spending money. The delay, however, meant that it was almost winter before the troops actually arrived in France.

The geographic origin of the soldiers of the Newhaven army also corresponds with the temporary nature of the Elizabethan military. Two commissions for the raising of troops, both dated September 16, survive to provide insight into both the timing and geographic factors.¹² The first commission was addressed to the Earl of Arundel, a Privy Councillor. It ordered him to levy 400 men throughout the shire of Sussex. The second commission was sent to Lord St. John, a member of the local gentry, who had run a general muster for Bedford in 1560.¹³ Both men were expected to use their local connections to secure the requisite number of men. The two shires were likely chosen because of their proximity to the two ports designated for embarking the Newhaven Army. Lord St. John’s levy was to march to Portsmouth in Hampshire, while Arundel was ordered to send his men to Rye, in Sussex.¹⁴ Mustering men as close to their embarkation points as possible would save time, as well as lessen the chances for desertion.

Each of the Bands raised in 1562 were commanded by a Captain. In addition the command structure of the Band usually contained one Peticaptain and four other officers. Many of the Captains of 1562 were appointed directly by the Privy Council, which also dealt with men who wished to avoid service.¹⁵ Each Captain was responsible for the conduct of his men as well as for distributing Coat and Conduct money. Coat and Conduct money was paid in a lump sum to the Captain, who then acted as paymaster to his command. It included the daily wages of men serving the crown, and a per diem allowance to purchase supplies. Since the

Elizabethan government had no permanent logistical support it was incumbent upon the individual soldier to buy his own supplies. Interestingly, Coat and Conduct money was apparently calculated on a per diem and per mile basis, another reason for the council to muster men as close to the embarkation point as possible.

Throughout the duration of service Captains were paid Coat and Conduct money based on the number of men mustered into their Band. Given the chronic shortage, or frugality, of the early modern English government, it is reasonable to assume that some Captains had to pay the initial expenses for their Bands out of their own pockets, and would expect to be compensated by the expedition Treasurer when his men arrived at their embarkation point. As such, Band Captains often had a vested financial interest in maintaining the integrity of their units.¹⁶

By the end of September 1562 approximately 2,200 men were assembled at the two ports of embarkation and were ready for transport to France. None of the men apparently marched, according to government calculations, more than sixty miles from their muster points.¹⁷

Table 1: Troops of the Newhaven Army

At Portsmouth

Point of Origin

London

Portsmouth

Kingston-upon-Thames

Winchester

Dorchester

Total Number of Men:

1,600

Total Cost in Coat and Conduct Money:

£320

At Rye

Point of Origin

Canterbury

Kent (Shire wide Levy)

Total Number of men:

600

Total Cost in Coat and Conduct Money:

£28 17s 4d

At each port a treasurer and victualler were appointed by the Privy Council to oversee preparations for the expedition. The mayor of Rye was also ordered to help prepare the ships that would transport the men to France.¹⁸ The use of both Royal and local officials underscores the improvisational nature of the expedition. Since the government contained no standing Commissary or Quartermaster-General, the Privy Council was forced to rely on local officials to provide the necessary logistical support.

The culmination of the process of turning the diverse Bands into the Newhaven army was reached on September 28, when Sir Adrian Poynyngs, the Marshall and Executive Officer of the Newhaven Army, published the "Order to be observed by y^e English solders Nowe serving the Quenes Ma^{te} of England. . . ."¹⁹ As Marshall, Poynyngs supervised the administration of Justice and the maintenance of discipline in the Newhaven army, rather like a modern Provost Marshall.

Poynyngs's decree of September 28 is an important document for understanding how the Newhaven Army began to assume its final structure. There were fifteen separate clauses in his order, most mandating the code of conduct that were to be followed while serving the Queen in a foreign land. While specific emphasis was placed upon maintaining cordial relations with the denizens of Newhaven, more than half of the articles dealt with the proper deportment of the soldiers. Of particular relevance to the nature of military organization was article fourteen, which ordered that "no captayne taeke or retayne into his bande anye that is already entretayned by any other Captayne or for any disorder discharged wth oute the consent of his laete captayne."²⁰

- There are several likely explanations for this order. The first was to limit financial malfeasance, as well as administrative chaos. Soldiers moving from one Band to the other without permission would increase the chances of two or more Captains claiming them on their pay lists. The resulting "double-dipping" would quickly deplete the army's treasury, while the discrepancy in the reported number of soldiers against the actual total could seriously impair military effectiveness. It also likely reflected the draconian discipline that many Late Medieval and Early Modern Armies placed upon their men.²¹ Although ultimate responsibility for maintaining order lay with the Marshall, in practical terms a heavy reliance was placed upon the Captain of a Band to maintain discipline. Were a soldier to chafe under the discipline of one Captain, and then depart for a more lenient Band, it might spark a general exodus from officers with bad reputations.

Certainly Poynyngs's order reflects the nature of English military organization. The Bands were autonomous financial, administrative, disciplinary, and probably tactical entities. As long as the Bands remained intact they could more easily be marched from shire to port of embarkation; from port to ship; from ship to garrison duty in Newhaven; and from duty in Newhaven to demobilization. Were the autonomy of the Band to degenerate then the failure of discipline might be the least of the commander's worries, as the basic unit of the army disintegrated. The importance of the Band is underscored by the fact that there were few instances, at

Newhaven or later, where Bands depleted by death or desertion were reinforced by new cadres, or joined to another decimated Band to form a new unit.²²

By the beginning of November, 1562 the English held the port of Newhaven, and the original 2,200 men were reinforced by an additional eight hundred soldiers. Furthermore, the Privy Council had already ordered additional levies throughout southeastern England.²³ Yet, even after nearly a month the final command structure, and indeed the organization of the Newhaven Army, were not yet complete.

Throughout September the Privy Council appointed officers to the various posts necessary to command the army. The first appointment was not the expedition commander-in-chief, a move which might seem surprising. In fact, we must remember that the first officials appointed for the Newhaven adventure were the shire officials responsible for the levies. The Privy Council as a group was responsible for coordinating the various shire levies, a task that was handled with reasonable efficiency, especially if the musters at Portsmouth and Rye are any indication.

Privy Council orders to local officials, and the appointment of the various Captains, also ensured a relatively smooth preparation at the embarkation ports. In order to provide the necessary equipment for the army the Privy Council sent requisition orders to the Lieutenant of the Tower, which served as a royal arsenal, who then forwarded the required material. At Portsmouth and Rye local officials were ordered to help the royal officials in their preparations. For example, the mayor of Rye was ordered to help Armigal Waade, one of two Treasurers appointed to the expedition, to prepare victuals for the transport ships.²⁴ The second Treasurer, Sir Maurice Denys, was at Portsmouth and probably received similar assistance. Denys was also to be the sole Treasurer to accompany the army to France.²⁵

Despite all this preparation the expedition commander had yet to be officially named. Yet, this is not a surprising development when viewed in the context of military mobilization. Simply put, the major tasks before the end of September were mustering, marching, victualling, and then transporting the men of the Newhaven Army. The process of taking at least eight diverse groups from different shires and making them into an army ready to sail did not require the presence of an overall commander. The more important officers were the Treasurer(s), to manage finances, and a Marshall, to maintain discipline. The ad hoc nature of English military planning made an overall commander unnecessary until the army became a coherent physical and operational unit. Until the Newhaven Army left for France the commander was superfluous, for in the Tudor military he had no administrative function to fulfill. Ironically, while the mobilization and organization of the Newhaven Army was carried out relatively efficiently, the Crown and Privy Council marred its own accomplishments by delaying overly long in appointing a commander.

When Denys was appointed Treasurer on September 21, he was informed that Ambrose Dudley, Earl of Warwick, would be the army commander.²⁶ Warwick was the brother of the Earl of Leicester, one of the Queen's favorites. Although Warwick

was named Master of the Ordnance in 1560, a post which gave him valuable administrative experience, he had no experience in field command. His sole qualification was that he came from the aristocracy. His appointment was in the time honored tradition of what Ian Becket calls the "amateur military tradition."²⁷ Warwick was given his patent to command the Newhaven Army on October 1, just two days before it embarked.²⁸

While Warwick's presence was not necessary for the actual organization it is likely that he waited too long to take personal charge of what was by October a functioning military machine. In fact, Warwick did not arrive in Newhaven until October 29. Meanwhile, his army had taken the port of Newhaven and Dieppe, sent a token force to aid the Huguenots in defense of Rouen, evacuated Dieppe, and prepared Newhaven for a siege.²⁹ Since the Newhaven army survived, the absence of a commander was not a total disaster. Indeed, given the record of the English military throughout the century Warwick's presence was unlikely to have made a dramatic difference.

Warwick's arrival in Newhaven, however, made the structure of the army complete. The army chain of command is reconstructed on Table 2:

Table 2: Chain of Command³⁰

Ambrose Dudley, Earl of Warwick
Commander-in-Chief

Sir Adrian Poynyngs (Also spelled Poynings)
Marshall and Executive Officer

Sir Maurice Denys
Treasurer (Probably Third Officer)

In addition to the three senior officers Warwick had what appears to be a "Staff" made up of the following men as listed on Table 3.

Table 3: Additional Staff³¹

Cuthbert Vaughan
Comptroller

William Bromefield
Master of the Ordnance

William Robinson
"Water Bayliff"

John Fisher
Gentlemen Porter

The number of officers and the diversity of their positions indicates a high level of sophistication, belying some generally held assumptions about sixteenth century English, and continental, military organization. Poynyngs as Marshall was responsible for the maintenance of order, with aid of a Provost Marshall, who was his chief policemen. Denys the Treasurer was in charge of financial affairs for the Newhaven Army on a macro level. It was Denys who paid the Captains the Coat and Conduct money based on the muster of each Band. Whether the musters were daily or weekly is unknown.³² As Comptroller, Cuthbert Vaughan was the chief administrative officer of the Newhaven Army, responsible for running the daily business and controlling expenditure. Vaughan would supervise the musters of the individual Bands to insure their accuracy and prevent fraud. Obviously, the responsibilities of Vaughan and Denys overlapped, a situation which was likely intended to insure smooth operation and limit financial malfeasance among the army's top echelons.

Bromfield as Master of the Ordnance was in charge of the army's heavy weapons. Considering the skill required to operate artillery it is likely that Bromfield was chosen as much for his knowledge as his connections at court. Skill and trustworthiness were both essential considering the difficulty Elizabeth had in obtaining heavy weapons, and certainly a fair percentage of the available ordnance was sent to Newhaven. The Newhaven Army had an ordnance train consisting of:

- 10 Culverins
- 15 Demi-Culverins
- 10 Sacres³³

Were these weapons lost to the enemy, or damaged due to carelessness, the financial loss to the English crown would be severe.

The remaining two officers, Water Bayliff and Gentleman Porter, are examples of how Cruickshank's composite picture of the Elizabethan military fails to take account of the specific contingencies generated by each campaign. As part of the agreement with the Prince de Conde the English assumed responsibility for managing the port of Newhaven, and the assumption on all profits generated. As Water Bayliff, William Robinson took over the duties of collecting customs, searching ships for contraband, and managing the affairs of the harbor. Since English expeditions to France had a long tradition of attempting to be self-sufficient, and self-funding, it is also likely that Robinson would place money earned from port control into Denys's Treasury.³⁴

As for the final official, John Fisher, his role is somewhat mysterious. His title might suggest that he was responsible for the maintenance of Warwick personal affairs. Yet, as Table 4 reveals, Warwick brought part of his household staff with him to France. It is possible that Fisher was responsible for maintaining communications with London, and indeed a more detailed examination of the command structure and organization of the army will give credence to this supposition. (See Table 4.)

Table 4: Field Officers, their Positions, and Men.³⁵

Ambrose Dudley, Earl of Warwick, Commander in Chief

60 Household Servants

20 Horsemen

1 Surgeon

2 Trumpets

1 Drum

1 Fief

2 Ministers

3 Curates

3 Men (servants?)

1 "Purcevant" and his servant

Sir Adrian Poynyngs, Marshall

2 Peti-captains

8 Officers

200 Soldiers

16 Servants

2 Clerks

Sir Maurice Denys, Treasurer

2 Peti-captains

8 Officers

200 Soldiers

10 Servants

2 Clerks

Cuthbert Vaughan, Comptroller

2 Peti-captains

8 Officers

200 Soldiers

10 Servants

2 Clerks

William Bromfield, Master of the Ordnance

1 Peti-captain

4 Officers

4 Quartermasters (In charge of ammunition)

45 Gunners

50 Solders and Artificers

100 Pioneers

2 Clerks

John Fisher, Gentlemen Porter

1 Peti-captain

4 Officers

100 Soldiers

6 Yeoman Porters

William Robinson, Water Bayliff

10 Servants

These six men, and their positions, represent most of the major administrative functions of a "modern" army. Indeed, they might even appear to be a nascent General Staff over two hundred years earlier than previously identified.³⁶ Upon closer examination, however, it becomes apparent that they do not represent such an innovation. General Staff planned, administered, and advised an army commander while serving in a primarily non-combatant role.³⁷ While each of these five men likely advised Warwick on a course of action, their responsibilities within the Newhaven Army were not strictly non-combatant. In effect, each man wore more than one command hat. Furthermore, beyond Poynyngs there is little clarity as to each officer's relationship to the commander, or even his place in the chain of command. Warwick's "staff" was a temporary structure, much as the army itself, created for the local circumstances of the Newhaven expedition.

The detailed reconstruction of the chain of command reveals that with the exception of Warwick and Robinson each man was also commander of a Band. Bromfield commanded what was probably the most skilled men in the army: the gunners and quartermasters. The artificers and pioneers were likely the manual laborers used to prepare entrenchments for the cannon. As for the other skilled men, in particular the drummer, fife, and trumpeters, were under Warwick's direct command. Musical instruments provided commands in war as well entertainment. Also of interest are the twenty horsemen, which were the only combat troops Warwick led personally.³⁸ It is possible that the horsemen acted as Cavalry, and were used for scouting or communication. They may even have been young nobles eager to win fame in war. They were certainly too few to act as an independent combat arm. The presence of 60 household servants indicates that the noble Earl did not intend to let war interfere with a gentlemen's lifestyle. In this he was also harkening back to a long tradition whereby his class saw campaigning as a natural extension of life.

In addition to exercising distinct Staff and Command functions each man's pay was calculated according to the different functions they viewed. For example, Poynyngs was paid 20s per diem for his services as Marshall as well as 8s a day as Captain of his Band. Each Captain of the twenty-one additional Bands serving in the Newhaven Army was paid the same per diem as Poynyngs.³⁹

The structure of the Newhaven Army made allowances for flexibility. In November, 1562, the Privy Council ordered additional levies in the southeast of England in order to augment the troops already in France.⁴⁰ The Band raised in Essex during the first week of November followed a similar pattern of formation and embarkation as those of the previous months. Two separate groups of three hundred men were dispatched to the coast and eventually integrated into the Newhaven Army.⁴¹ Denys merely had to add the name of each new Captain and the number of his men to his records.

While this simple structure had versatility, it also had weaknesses. Bands reduced by death or desertion could not receive new drafts from home, nor be integrated into other Bands. As a unit the Band was not apparently subdivided into

platoons or squads. As such, the tactical efficiency of the early modern English army was extremely limited. In addition, there was apparently no procedure for removing an incompetent officer so, as in any age, the Band was only as good as its leadership, weapons, and esprit de corps.

Despite the structural weaknesses the actual process of raising, equipping, embarking, and garrisoning the Newhaven Army in the space of two months is quite impressive, especially given the physical limitations on early modern warfare. A standing army, with its permanent infrastructure and chain of command, was certainly more efficient, as Geoffrey Parker's detailed study of the Army of Flanders revealed.⁴² Yet this analysis of the creation and composition of the Newhaven Army of 1562 also reveals that the English, without the mechanisms available to the Spanish, were able to create and field an army in a relatively short time. In late August the Privy Council ordered mobilization. By November 1, there were over two thousand troops in France and reinforcements were already being levied. The great irony of the Newhaven adventure is that by the time the English arrived the first phase of the French civil war was already over, and the people they came to help had already lost. Yet, the fact that the Newhaven Army went home defeated in no way detracts from the accomplishment of its creation.

Endnotes

1. See Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800* (New York, 1988).
2. See Ian Roy, "Towards the Standing Army, 1485-1660," *The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army* (New York, 1994). (Hereinafter *OIHBA*).
3. See Wallace MacCaffrey, *The Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1968), Chapter 6, "The Newhaven Adventure" for the political-diplomatic chronology.
4. See Brian M. Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe* (Princeton, New Jersey, 1992).
5. *Ibid.*, Chapter 7.
6. Thomas Esper, "The Replacement of the Longbow by Firearms in the English Army," *Technology and Culture* (Summer, 1965), 382-393.
7. C. G. Cruickshank, *Elizabeth's Army* (New York, 1948; 2d ed., 1966).
8. As will be demonstrated there are several officies in the Newhaven Army of 1562 that Cruickshank does not make reference to in his book.
9. Michael Prestwich, "The English Medieval Army to 1485," *OIHBA*, 3-6.
10. Lindsay Boynton, *The Elizabethan Militia, 1558-1638* (Toronto, 1967).
11. MacCaffrey, *Elizabethan Regime*, 93-94. Sir William Cecil, the Queen's Principal Secretary, apparently began planning in July, 1562, but could not physically begin implementation until August. Great Britain, Public Record Office, State Papers, Elizabeth 12/23/55 (hereinafter P.R.O. S.P.).
12. P.R.O. S.P. 12/24/26, 12/24/35; *Acts of the Privy Council of England, New Series Vol. VII, A.D. 1558-1570* (London, 1893) (hereinafter *A.P.C.*), 116, 120-21, 123.
13. A General Muster was a military survey which ordered all able bodied Englishmen to participate with the required weaponry. See Lindsay Boynton, *The Elizabethan Militia, 1558-1638* (Toronto, 1967).

14. P.R.O. S.P. 12/23/47.
15. *A.P.C.*, Vol. VII, 129. The Shire Bands of 1562 must not be confused with the later Trained Bands, which were a post-1572 innovation.
16. For the workings of the system as a whole see Cruickshank, *Elizabeth's Army*, 61-62; for specifics on the Newhaven Army see P.R.O. S.P. 12/23/27 and 12/23/37.
17. P.R.O. S.P. 12/24/27.
18. *Ibid.*, 12/24/30.
19. *Ibid.*, 12/24/55 fol. 1r. Poyning's appointment as Marshall is mentioned in *A.P.C.*, Vol. VII, 115-116.
20. *Ibid.*, fol. 2r.
21. See Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659* (New York, 1972), Chapter 8, "Mutiny," for the nature of discipline in the Early Modern Spanish Army.
22. Cruickshank, *Elizabeth's Army*, Chapter 10. "Discipline."
23. P.R.O. S.P. 12/25/32.
24. *Ibid.*, 12/24/30 and 12/24/56.
25. *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series of the Reign of Elizabeth, Vol. II*, No. 886 (London, 1958) (hereinafter *C.S.P.F.*).
26. *Ibid.*
27. Ian Beckett. "The Amateur Military Tradition," *OIHBA*, 402.
28. S. L. Lee. "Dudley. Ambrose, Earl of Warwick," *Dictionary of National Biography*, XVI, 97-98. For his appointment as Master of the Ordnance, see *Calendar of Patent Rolls, Elizabeth, Vol I, 1558-1560* (London, 1958), 320.
29. *C.S.P.F.*, II, No. 913.
30. P.R.O. S.P. 12/25/17.

31. Ibid.
32. C.S.P.F., II, No. 886. See also Cruickshank, *Elizabeth's Army*, Chapter 3, "The Chain of Command."
33. P.R.O. S.P. 12/24/31.
34. Cruickshank does not mention the offices of Water Bayliff or Gentlemen Porter. The definition of Water Bayliff can be found in the *Oxford English Dictionary* whose etymology lists the Newhaven campaign as one of its sources.
35. P.R.O. S.P. 12/25/17, fols. 1R-2v.
36. D. D. Irving, "The Origins of Capital Staff," *Journal of Modern History* (1938), 6, 161-179. Irving argued that "modern" General Staff's did not appear until the eighteenth century.
37. Martin Van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, 1985), "The Stoneage of Command."
38. P.R.O. S.P. 12/24/60, fol. 1r.
39. Ibid., 12/25/17, fols. 1r and 2r.
40. Ibid., 12/25/32.
41. Ibid., 12/25/37.
42. See Parker, *Army of Flanders*.

Monkey Crusade: William Jennings Bryan and Anti-Evolution

by
Sean A. Fields

In the early twentieth century, many variables were at play in the clash between scientific evolution and Biblical creationism in the United States. It has been said that the debate was a confrontation between two different world views. A modern, cosmopolitan view tended to emphasize the application of scientific principles to all phases of life. On the other side of the argument were dogmatic believers. In rural communities, many subscribed to the tenets of evangelical Christianity.

The early twentieth century was a perplexing time for many people. Anti-evolution was another cause in a long line of crusades taken up by disgruntled Americans. World War I produced an erosion of optimism. Along with this, changes in social mores were occurring at an alarming rate; in fact, the face of the country was changing. The 1920 census showed that the population of cities outnumbered the rural population for the first time. The United States was becoming urbanized.

The pattern which emerged revealed a nation moving from a rural sensibility to an urban one. The perceived implications of this were a threat to certain established cultural mores. The rural sensibility had its appeal throughout the country. However, it found an incredible amount of support in the Midwest and the South. One cannot examine the cultural and political implications of these areas without considering the role of religion. We can define religion not by a particular denomination, but by certain beliefs.

Fundamentalists can be roughly defined as those who subscribed to a very strict, literal interpretation of the Bible. They believe the Bible is inerrant. Other beliefs include the virgin birth and personal atonement for one's sins. Their reliance on the Bible as absolute truth in all matters distinguishes them from more moderate Christians. Fundamentalism has more to do with belief than denomination or doctrine. It is possible for members of the same denomination to be divided into moderate and fundamentalist camps.

The importance of the church as an institution in the South cannot be overstated. Due to the rural nature of the South, it often became the focal point for social activity. After the trauma of the Civil War, the church became a haven for Southerners. A fundamentalist interpretation of Christianity reinforced the security of religious comfort. It has been noted that other institutions in the South were ineffective in balancing theological dominance.¹ Religion was the one stable thing the Southerner could count on.

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The anti-evolution movement had its roots in societal and cultural concerns. These concerns were similar to the ones which championed causes like temperance and the nativist movements of the 1920s. People realized the country was rapidly changing. World War I had confirmed the suspicion of many that the world was in deep trouble. Americans had the desire to turn the clock back to a simpler time.

The movement already had a sympathetic ear in a segment of the population; all that was required was a spokesman for the cause. Anti-evolutionists found their crusader in the person of William Jennings Bryan. Bryan was a political giant in the annals of American history. He served in the United States House of Representatives, and as Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson, and ran for the presidency three times. With the leadership of Bryan, the movement not only gained political clout, but a representative who was legendary for his oratorical skills. Many people stood in awe as Bryan's booming voice seemed to confirm his status as a prophet and politician of the people.

Some have suggested that Bryan's involvement in the evolution issue was an attempt at reviving his declining political career. A look at his lifelong convictions reveals the reasons behind his commitment to the cause. It is true that Bryan was never one to shy away from a crowd. However, Bryan was more than a symbol of common people. He did not have to identify with his followers—he was one of them.² Bryan had the same core values as the people he was representing.

William Jennings Bryan was born and raised in Salem, Illinois. A few years after his birth, his father built a manorial country home. Silas Bryan, William's father, had a farm but left many of the chores to his children. Young William spent a great deal of time doing work around the farm. He was educated at home and attended public school until his preteens. The curriculum was based on rote memorization and basic reading, writing, and arithmetic.³

When William got older, his father decided that he should attend school in Jacksonville, Illinois. Instead of staying in the dormitories, Bryan spent the next six years with Dr. Hiram K. Jones and his wife. He never asserted his independence from his father. Indeed, Bryan's career was simply an extension of his father. Biographer Louis Koenig states: "Throughout his life Bryan never faltered in his imitation of his father."⁴

William's father was a devout Baptist and his mother was a Methodist. In a rare example of individuality, William became a convert of the Presbyterian church. This was a likely compromise to choosing between the religion of his mother and father. The difference in these churches was not significant. They all tended to be very pious with an evangelical flavor.

Bryan's background accounts for his identification with the rural masses. His moral training and intellectual frame of reference were based on similar experiences. Discipline in the Bryan household was reinforced with Biblical authority. Silas Bryan was a stern man who instilled two very strong influences in his son. One was the need for religious piety. The other was an absolute faith in the integrity of the democratic process.⁵

Bryan failed to see any need to segregate his religious views from his politics. He once remarked: "I was never more interested in politics . . . and never more interested in religion. There is no conflict between them."⁶ The logic of Bryan always had some kind of theological basis. For Bryan, his role as a politician was to do the Lord's work here on earth. This explains why he had endorsed aspects of the social gospel, and took a position as a pacifist during World War I. It also explains his attitude toward temperance. The ultimate aim of Bryan's politics was to put Christian principles into action.

It should be noted that not all fundamentalists agreed with Bryan's viewpoint. There were many who felt it was not the role of a church to go out and save the world. A sentiment existed which distrusted the world. Many evangelicals believed man's salvation was Christ instead of a social agenda.

The fundamentalist camp agreed with Bryan that subversive ideas like evolution could undercut the fabric of society. According to Robert Cherny:

The key to understanding Bryan is to approach him on his own terms rather than with the expectation of finding a carefully worked out analytical system. As an Evangelical Protestant, his concepts of Christian duty and service and his belief in perfection led him to seek to rescue people from industrial oppression and immorality.⁷

Bryan's background was heavily influenced by the power of politics. His father, Silas, was an extremely active member of the Democratic Party. Bryan had an optimistic belief in the ability of the political process to solve the evils of the world. If there were a problem debasing the state of man or society, political action could make it right. The peaceful coexistence of religion and politics was characteristic of Silas Bryan's household.

The distrust Bryan had in the individual to solve his own religious dilemma represents a paradox in his thinking. On the one hand, he had an unshakable faith in the wisdom of the majority. At the same time, his dedication to the fundamentalist creed gave him an outlook that was extremely narrow. Fundamentalism did not place a great deal of faith in the wisdom of individuals.⁸ Fundamentalists were in direct opposition to secular humanism and the spirit of man's improvement outside the influence of God.

The root of Bryan's paradoxical thinking is probably in his audience. In a sense, Bryan was simply voicing the concerns of a significant percentage of the population. However, Bryan had the rhetorical gift to voice these concerns in an eloquent manner. Louis Koenig asserts that Bryan's belief was "that all men were equal before the throne of God and before the ballot box."⁹ Bryan perceived no contradiction between democracy and fundamentalism by reasoning that if Christians constituted a majority, then Darwinism or any other idea that undermined Christian doctrine should be eliminated. The inconsistency of this view is the lack of tolerance for a variety of opinions within democratic and religious institutions.

This concept of majority supremacy was an effective tool for Bryan. To be an agnostic or an atheist was bad enough. If you could paint them as a minority, then it became easier to think of them as a fringe group. This idea was stretched to its limits to the point where Christians who did not believe in fundamentalist theology were verbally attacked. From the point of view of Bryan, if you were an evolutionist, you were wrong for two reasons. First of all, you were not subscribing to Biblical inerrancy. Secondly, you were part of a troublesome minority which made you wrong on all counts.¹⁰

Bryan made no distinction between materialistic evolution and theistic evolution. The viewpoint of the materialist perspective would emphasize evolution as a natural process without the intervention of a creator. Theistic evolution was an attempt to reconcile the teachings of the Bible with modern science. Bryan compared theistic evolution to an anesthetic—it killed the pain while undermining religious faith.¹¹

Bryan's view of science may have had something to do with his education. From the time of his early boyhood, most of his learning centered on classical training in order to become the great politician and polished orator that he was. But in his study of Greek, Latin, and Rhetoric, he never developed a keen sense of critical thinking. Bryan saw no morality in scientific inquiry. Like St. Thomas Aquinas, Bryan considered all virtues inferior to the Christian virtues of love, faith, and hope.¹²

Bryan's problem with evolution was not merely a matter of truth. It was a recognition of the consequences of certain beliefs for people who accepted them.¹³ There was a fear that the destruction of faith by science would leave humanity without a sense of hope. This fear was confirmed by the carnage of World War I and a rapidly changing society. If religious faith was the most important thing in life, then all other considerations would have to be relegated below it. Bryan once said: "It is better to trust in the Rock of Ages than to know the age of rocks; it is better for one to know that he is close to the Heavenly Father, than to know how far the stars in heaven are apart."¹⁴

Another aspect of Bryan's thinking was a projection of the fears of his followers. It was a paranoid distrust of foreign ideology. Bryan favored isolationism and was opposed to the entry of the United States into World War I. The war was perceived by many as a European problem which had nothing to do with Americans. The country was struggling to come to grips with its changing role in the world. Americans wanted to separate themselves from the brutish nature of international conflicts.

The war and other social concerns were blamed on foreign ideology. There was a perception that the ideas of Darwin, Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud contributed to the decline of Western civilization. Multiply this factor by increased immigration and the urbanization of the country, and it is easy to see why Americans had a tendency to revert back to a nativist position of intolerance. Bryan and the people he spoke for were caught in the winds of change. They were hanging onto an American culture that was rapidly disappearing.

Bryan believed that many international problems could be attributed to turning away from Christ in Western nations. In his mind, Darwinism emphasized the brutish nature of man. This idea was further advanced by Nietzsche. Bryan thought that Nietzsche turned men away from worship of Christ and toward a worship of the "superman". He attributed German militarism to this.¹⁵ Bryan could find no other reason for men brutally killing their fellow man.

Bryan's pacifist leanings were consistent with his Biblical point of view. The problem was not Bryan's application of the Bible as a book of morality. It was a problem of not being well informed on what he was opposing. The comparison of Darwin to Nietzsche, for instance, was a misapplication. Darwin's theory is not based on "a will to power". In his lack of critical analysis, Bryan failed to separate the ideas of Herbert Spencer, Darwin, and Nietzsche. They were all classified as pernicious influences. There is a great question about how much Bryan actually knew about evolution. He was not an intellectual or skeptical thinker. Bryan complained that he had little time for contemplation or study.¹⁶ His life was immersed in public engagements and he never had sufficient time to research the subjects on which he spoke.

Bryan's lack of scholarly inquiry and his complete faith in the democracy of the common man poses an interesting question. Was Bryan a leader or follower? Nobody can doubt his conviction. At the age of twenty-five in a letter to his wife, he wrote: "I would dread to be compelled to set forth upon this sea with nothing but the light of my reason to aid me. What a blessing it is that we have that guide, the Bible."¹⁷

It is apparent that Bryan did not get involved in the evolution issue simply because of his political decline. He had always opposed Darwin's theory. His toleration of it had simply evaporated.¹⁸ Bryan was besieged with letters from concerned parents, who complained that the faith of their children was destroyed by exposure to evolution in college. This heightened Bryan's sense of awareness and urgency on the matter. This was a chance for him to use his abilities to defend those beliefs which he cherished most.

Bryan pursued his cause in three different ways. His methods included writing books and articles, attacking modernism within the Presbyterian church, and using his political contacts to promote state legislation.¹⁹ Bryan's books included *In His Image*, *Orthodox Christianity vs. Modernism*, and *Scientific Proofs of God's Existence*. In 1921 he published weekly Bible talks which reached an estimated 15 million readers.²⁰ And finally, he took his message to the people by becoming very active on the lecture circuit.

In May of 1923, Bryan campaigned for moderator of the Presbyterian General Assembly. At the meeting, he introduced a resolution which called for the withdrawal of church support for schools which taught the theory of evolution. Bryan lost his bid for moderator but succeeded in polarizing the division between modernists and fundamentalists. Presbyterian ministers pleaded with him to devote his time to winning people to Christ instead of attacking theistic evolution. Bryan

responded by contending that no person should remain within the denomination who endorsed theistic evolution.²¹

There is a general historical perception that all Southerners endorsed the views of Bryan. However, there is evidence to show otherwise. The state of Kentucky is a good example of some misgivings among Southerners. Despite the state's predominance of evangelical Christians, the Kentucky General Assembly defeated an anti-evolution bill by one vote. Bryan's effort to promote the bill by touring the state failed to gain enough support for passage.

It is likely that fear and apathy were responsible for the lack of vocal opposition to Bryan's views in the South. Sprague L. de Camp contends:

Most evolutionists in the South took refuge in prudent silence. Silence was the usual defense of advanced Southern thinkers whenever the Southern White masses were stirred by some real or fancied threat to their folk ways or tabus. The Southern Caucasoid bore the repute, not wholly undeserved, of being a violent and dangerous man who slew his fellow beings over minor breaches of courtesy or petty differences of opinion.²²

In January of 1925, John Washington Butler, a representative to the Tennessee State Assembly, introduced an anti-evolution bill. This bill made it illegal to teach any theory which contradicted the Biblical account of creation. When the law was passed, it planted the seeds of the famous Scopes trial. The issue was headed for a heated debate in a legal forum.

The irony of the Butler Act is that it was passed with no intention of enforcement. Teachers continued the use of state approved textbooks which contained the theory of evolution. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Butler Act was more of a cultural gesture instead of an issue of law enforcement. It was an outgrowth of a threatened population asserting its values through the legislative process.

What started out as an attempt of the citizens of Dayton, Tennessee, to bring attention to the town, ended up being one of the greatest spectacles of twentieth century jurisprudence. John Thomas Scopes, a young school teacher from Kentucky, was persuaded to be arrested for violation of the Butler Act. Little did he know, the trial would grow to such an immense proportion.

As time went on, it became apparent the trial was not about Scopes, but a battle of ideals. In the corner of fundamentalists was William Jennings Bryan. Though he had not tried a case in over twenty years, the citizens of Tennessee were honored to have him assume the position of lead prosecutor. The avowed agnostic and defender of lost causes, Clarence Darrow, represented Scopes. Darrow was a prominent attorney from Chicago who had an interest in geology and anthropology.

The strategy of Bryan was to concentrate on the Butler Act itself. Consequently, scientific testimony for the defense was not allowed by the court. At the trial, Bryan was in his element with the spotlight and people to listen to his words. The film

Inherit the Wind does not do justice to the trial itself. The film makes a caricature of Bryan and the people of Dayton.

The citizens displayed hospitality to both Darrow and Bryan. Banquets were held in their honor. Many thought this event would put the town on the map. With the intense heat of media attention, the Scopes trial took on a carnival atmosphere. The perception that Scopes was seized by a Bible-thumping mob is false. While the South was frequently intolerant, it can hardly be described as a place where religious heretics were burned.

The depiction of Dayton as the place where William Jennings Bryan had his tragic fall is overstated. The fact that he died five days after the trial adds to the mythology and aura of tragedy. The idea that a towering political figure was ridiculed and died of a broken heart is an oversimplification. In fact, Bryan's stature had already declined. In many ways, time had passed Bryan by. At one time in his life, Bryan's views seemed visionary. By 1925, he had become an anachronism. His arrogance and self righteousness supported the perception that he was a tired old windbag. It is likely that the physical strain of the trial was more of a factor in Bryan's death than humiliation. He had suffered from diabetes for years and had been repeatedly warned to control his voracious appetite.

One of the most memorable exchanges in American judicial history was the cross examination of Bryan by Darrow. In his questioning, Darrow exposed Bryan's greatest weakness. Bryan was a consummate politician who was oblivious to critical thinking. For Bryan, this trial was a matter of unquestioned faith. During the confrontation, two eloquent men were engaged in a war of ideals. This is evident in the following exchange during Bryan's testimony:

Darrow: Do you think the earth was made in six days?

Bryan: Not six days of twenty-four hours.

Darrow: Doesn't it (the Bible) say so?

Bryan: No sir.

Stewart: I want to interpose another objection. What is the purpose of this examination?

Bryan: The purpose is to cast ridicule on everybody who believes in the Bible, and I am perfectly willing that the world shall know that these gentlemen have no other purpose than ridiculing every Christian who believes in the Bible.

Darrow: We have the purpose of preventing bigots and ignoramuses from controlling the education of the United States and you know it, and that is all.²³

The trial concluded with Scopes being convicted and fined \$100. The case was later appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court where it was overturned on a legal technicality. This allowed the state to diffuse the issue without having to defend the Butler Act. An unfortunate result of the trial was the vilification of the South.

Some have suggested that the Scopes Monkey trial and Bryan's death destroyed the influence of fundamentalism and creationism. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Bryan's fellow believers considered his defense of the Scriptures at the trial a victory and today the belief that God literally created the earth in six days is as strong among Protestant fundamentalists as it was when the "silver-tongued orator" stood up to Clarence Darrow in Tennessee.

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The Life and Good Times of Jack Johnson

by Michael Hils

The heavyweight boxing championship has been regarded as the pinnacle of athleticism and manhood by many Americans. Boxing is viewed as the ultimate test of brute strength, of man-against-man in head-to-head combat in a legally sanctioned environment. Championship fights are so popular today that people are willing to pay thirty-five dollars to watch Mike Tyson or Evander Holyfield fight on pay-per-view television. African-Americans dominate the sport today, but there was a time when black Americans were discouraged and legally prevented from competing with whites in boxing and other professional sports. Jack Johnson broke the color barrier in boxing by winning the heavyweight championship of the world in 1908 and aroused as much anger and emotion and had as great an impact on the country as any sports figure in American history.

John Arthur Johnson was born to Henry and Fanny Johnson on March 31, 1878 in Galveston, Texas.¹ He dropped out of school after finishing the fifth grade and learning how to read and write.² He took a job on a shipping dock in Galveston at age thirteen and learned how to fight. Even as a young teenager he repeatedly whipped "some of the toughest and hardest-boiled men imaginable."³ Within a few years Johnson became known as the best black boxer in Galveston.⁴

As Johnson grew older, he increasingly became known as a rebel. He roamed around the country by freight train, taking whatever jobs he could find, and worked as a sparring partner whenever possible.⁵ He was usually broke, and "there were many days when [his] stomach shouted angrily for food."⁶ However, he kept fighting and by 1902 he had become recognized as a good heavyweight boxer who was exceptionally quick and had a good right uppercut.⁷

By defeating Denver Ed Martin in a twenty round decision in early 1903, Johnson claimed the Negro heavyweight championship and began to set his sights on the world title, held by Jim Jeffries.⁸ Jeffries refused to consider such a match, and when told of Johnson's challenge, he said, "When there are no white men left to fight, I will quit the business I am determined not to take a chance of losing the championship to a negro."⁹

Jeffries retired from the ring undefeated in 1905, and voluntarily relinquished his title to another white heavyweight named Marvin Hart. Hart was quickly defeated in his first title defense by Tommy Burns in 1906. During the next two years Burns defeated several mediocre white challengers. Johnson repeatedly challenged the champion and finally, with the persuasion of promoter Sam Fitzpatrick, who realized the possible financial rewards from a match between a white champion and a black challenger, Burns accepted the challenge.¹⁰ Johnson was so eager for the title shot that he even consented to let Burn's manager referee the match.¹¹

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The fight took place on December 26, 1908 in Sydney, Australia. The total purse was \$35,000, of which Burns received \$30,000 and Johnson, \$5,000.¹² Burns weighed in at 168 pounds, and Johnson at 192 pounds. From the outset of the fight, it was obvious that Burns was badly overmatched. Johnson toyed with him for thirteen rounds before the fight was stopped.¹³ *The New York Times* reported that "the Canadian (Burns) fought a game battle and showed indomitable pluck, but he was no match for the big black Texan."¹⁴ Johnson himself later wrote that, "The fight was one of the easiest and most important fights of my career. At no time did Burns have a show with me."¹⁵

Most white newspapers reluctantly reported the fight results. *The Raleigh News and Observer* wrote that a "Texas Darky" had won the world title but had only one paragraph about the fight. Other newspapers such as the *Dallas Morning News* were openly and viciously racist in their depiction of the fight. They ran a cartoon showing Johnson holding a watermelon and the championship belt proclaiming, "Golly, old Santy sho' was good to me."¹⁶

The hunt for a "great white hope" to defeat Johnson was begun almost immediately. People began to take a closer look at the new heavyweight champion of the world and were appalled by what they were seeing. He wore flashy clothes and drove big, bright cars. He enjoyed the night life and reportedly went on drinking binges in which he stayed drunk for days at a time. Most of all however, he was not afraid of appearing in public with white women.¹⁷

Many whites were not alarmed that Johnson had the title because they felt that Tommy Burns was a mere custodian of the title rather than the real champion. The real champion, they felt, was Jim Jeffries, the retired and undefeated champion. In the year following the defeat of Burns, Johnson easily defeated five "white hopes," including middleweight champion Stanley Ketchel, whom Johnson easily defeated by a knockout in the twelfth round.¹⁸ Jeffries repeatedly said that he would not return to the ring under any circumstances. Besides, he was old, fat (80 pounds over fighting weight), and out of shape. He was well past his prime. The pressure on Jeffries to return from retirement was intense. The *New York Herald* pleaded:

But only one thing now remains. Jim Jeffries must now emerge from his alfalfa farm and remove the golden smile from Jack Johnson's face. Jeff, it's up to you.¹⁹

Jeffries finally gave in to the public's demand and agreed to fight for his race. Contracts were signed in December, 1909 for a championship match to be held in San Francisco on July 4, 1910. The promoter was a shrewd businessman named Tex Rickard. Rickard immediately began a publicity campaign of playing up the racial aspects of the fight. This approach capitalized on the racial fears and hostilities of white Americans. Soon the stories of the approaching fight began appearing not just on the sports pages of newspapers, but on the front pages as well.²⁰

The Johnson-Jeffries match probably generated more interest than any fight in boxing history. Johnson's defeat of Tommy Burns for the title two years before was only a warm-up bout compared to the hype that went into his match with Jeffries. This was a contest which was supposed to symbolize once and for all which race was superior. Johnson was seen by many as not being the legitimate heavyweight champion because Jeffries had voluntarily retired undefeated five years before. It was "civilization versus savagery. Humanity needed Jeffries. He had inherited the White Man's Burden and he could not plead retirement to cloak his weariness."²¹

The fact that Johnson happened to be black was incentive enough for most white Americans to despise him as the heavyweight boxing king. But there was much more about Jack Johnson's personality and lifestyle which brought about feelings of utter contempt in most people. Johnson was a man at a time when blacks were not allowed to be "men." He refused to allow anyone, whether they were white or black, to dictate his place in society or how he was supposed to live. The policy of racial segregation in this country was based on the assumption that blacks were physically and mentally inferior to whites and were therefore not really full human beings. Blacks were strongly discouraged from challenging their position in society and those with no economic resources who did, particularly in the South, were often burned and lynched or taken away and never heard from again.²²

Jack Johnson was one of those who refused to accept the place given to blacks in American society. As heavyweight champion, he was able to achieve tremendous material wealth at a time when most blacks lived in poverty. But that material success was not at the core of the American public's hatred of Johnson. In most states during the days of segregation it was illegal for black men to marry white women. Social custom strongly forbade it in many others. Johnson married two white women and had affairs with several others.²³ His biographer said, "There was no getting around it, Johnson had women in his personal entourage and they were always white and blonde."²⁴

Johnson's preference for white women was central to his image as the quintessential "bad nigger." According to biographer Al-Tony Gilmore, Johnson qualifies for all of the characteristics that the term connotes. Another important quality is "an utter disregard of death and danger." Johnson's life was in danger every time he stepped into the ring in front of predominantly white audiences to fight a white man. It was not an unlikely possibility that angry spectators might storm the ring. Johnson always knew of this possibility, but it never seemed to worry him.²⁵

The stage was set for the "fight of the century." The fighters were guaranteed a total of \$101,000 for the fight with 75 percent going to the winner and 25 percent to the loser. In addition, each fighter was guaranteed additional money through percentages of the film rights and vaudeville contracts. It was estimated by a newspaper that if Jeffries won the fight he would earn a total of \$667,750 compared to Johnson's winning share of \$358,250.²⁶ It should be kept in mind that this was during a period when many people worked for a \$1 or \$2 a day.

Many whites felt that Johnson did not possess the mental ability to win such a significant bout. One periodical went so far as to run an article entitled "The Psychology of the Prize Fight" which claimed that Jeffries would win because the brain of the white man was superior to that of the African-American. As long as the fight lasted more than a few rounds, Jeffries' intellectual ability would enable him to win because blacks were more emotional than whites, and thus Johnson's possible physical superiority would not be able to offset the pressure of a long bout.²⁷

The fight was originally scheduled to take place in San Francisco, but California Governor James Gillett, apparently giving in to the 200,000 letters of protest, disapproved. He gave no reason other than to say, "I considered it my duty as Governor to stop the fight, and that is all I will say."²⁸ Johnson was not fazed one bit by the governor's action. He said, "I don't care where the fight takes place. I would rather it come off in San Francisco, as I am training here, but if we cannot fight here I am willing to go any place."²⁹ The promoters eventually agreed upon Reno, Nevada as the site. Nevada Governor Denver Dickinson refused to give in to protests and allowed Reno to hold the bout.³⁰

By July 4, 1910 the focus of the nation was Reno, Nevada. *The Chattanooga Times* reported the significance of the event:

Whether or not we admit it, and however much its truth may be deplored, the interest of the majority of the ninety-odd millions of people in these United States is centered on Reno today.³¹

A crowd of 20,000 sat in ninety degree heat to watch the fight. All over the country crowds gathered in theaters, ball parks, and outside newspaper offices to hear the returns relayed through the wire services.³² No other event so captured the nation's attention until the Charles Lindbergh flight seventeen years later.³³

Johnson's mood in the days leading up to the fight was always laid back, and this easy-going attitude was viewed by some as an indication of his inferiority. Jack London reported that the champion's "happy go lucky attitude resulted from his concern for the moment and inability to plan for the future."³⁴ Another reporter named Alfred Lewis agreed:

(He) feels no deeper than the moment, sees no farther than his nose and is incapable of anticipation The same cheerful indifference to coming events has marked others of the race even while standing in the very shadow of the gallows. They were to be hanged, they knew it. But having no imagination, they could not anticipate.³⁵

The reality of the situation was that Johnson simply knew with absolute certainty that he would win. To a *New York Times* reporter the day before the fight he said, "I never felt better in my life. If I felt any better I would be afraid of myself."³⁶

Johnson later wrote in his autobiography: "I was in the best condition of my life. I had trained conscientiously and meant to do my very best."³⁷

As Johnson entered the ring, he was greeted by a bombardment of racial slurs and a brass band's rendition of "All Coons Look Alike to Me."³⁸ He had every right to be unnerved, but he never lost his composure. He was able to withstand all of the death threats and everything else. He later explained:

Despite the sun and the jeering mob and the occasional thought that there might be a gunman somewhere in that vast array of humanity, I do not recall that I was greatly disturbed.³⁹

As with most events that are accompanied with tremendous anticipation and hype, this fight failed to live up to its billing. Johnson knocked Jeffries around the ring at will. Most of the reporters felt that Johnson could have knocked Jeffries out in an early round. But Johnson was smart enough to realize the bad business of such a brief fight. A short fight would have ruined the possibility of getting any money from the film of the fight and Johnson knew this.⁴⁰

The New York Times reported that it "was a poor fight as fights go Scarcely ever has there been a championship contest that was so one-sided."⁴¹ For fourteen rounds Johnson laughed and taunted Jeffries before knocking him out in the fifteenth. The "great white hope" had failed.⁴²

The newspaper headlines the day after the fight were larger than any used since the last presidential election. *The San Francisco Examiner* read: "Jeffries Mastered by Grinning, Jeering Negro." *The El Paso Morning Times* read: "White Man's Burden Not For Jim Jeffries."⁴³

Riots sprang up all over the country as a result of the fight. *The New York Times* reported many of these riots. Some of the headlines from July 5, 1910 read: "Pittsburgh (sic) Negroes Riot;" "Outbreaks in New Orleans;" "Dozen Hurt in Wilmington."⁴⁴ The number of actual deaths that occurred as a result of the bout is unknown. There was no question, however, that the fight was the cause of the disturbances.⁴⁵

Since many whites had proclaimed that Anglo-Saxon supremacy would be proven by a Jeffries win, these people either had to repudiate those views or else admit that the notion of white supremacy was no longer valid. Most chose to say that the outcome of the fight meant nothing in terms of which race was superior. A prime example was an editorial in *The Los Angeles Times* entitled "A Word to the Black Man:"

Do not point your nose too high. Do not swell your chest too much. Do not boast too loudly You are the same member of society today that you were last week No man will think a bit higher of you because your complexion is the same as that of the victor at Reno.⁴⁶

As a result of Johnson's victory in Reno, the next few years saw a significant decline in the popularity of the sport of boxing. After Jeffries, there were more "great white hopes" but each one turned into a "great white joke."⁴⁷

Because of his ring earnings and other business activities such as his Chicago nightclub, Cafe de Champion, Johnson became not only one of the most popular, but also one of the wealthiest black men in America. Some black intellectuals were fearful that Johnson's lifestyle might undermine the efforts of Booker T. Washington, who was famous for urging blacks to be thrifty and accommodating toward whites. Johnson remained a hero to most blacks, however. He had lifted the spirits of many who were in hopeless situations. His lifestyle convinced many Southern blacks of what the good life could be like "up North."⁴⁸

Johnson continued his hard-living free-spirited lifestyle. He had technically married a white woman named Etta Duryea around 1910. He was never committed to one woman however, and he regularly traveled with two or three prostitutes who usually happened to be white as well.⁴⁹ Etta Duryea committed suicide in September, 1912. A few weeks later, Johnson began an association with a young white woman named Lucille Cameron. Johnson claimed in his autobiography that Cameron was his traveling business secretary whose association with him "was purely of a business nature and devoid of undue intimacy."⁵⁰ This relationship with Cameron led to Johnson's first serious brush with the law. The woman's mother tried to have Johnson charged with abduction of her daughter. She succeeded in getting an indictment, but Cameron refused to substantiate the charges and later married the champion. Eventually the charges were dropped. This was the beginning of a nation-wide call to get Johnson by any means necessary.⁵¹

On November 7, 1912, Johnson was charged by the federal government with a violation of the Mann Act. The Mann Act was the unlawful transportation of women across state lines for immoral purposes. After investigating Johnson's past, the authorities were able to link him with a white prostitute named Belle Schreiber, a traveling companion of Johnson's whom they claimed was nothing more than an unlawful traveling prostitute for Johnson. After a one day trial, Johnson was convicted of violating the Mann Act.⁵² Rather than submit to a lengthy prison term, Johnson fled the United States and eventually took refuge in Paris, France. White Americans were generally pleased that Johnson was no longer an American concern. One newspaper published a cartoon of Johnson with the caption: "There is only one place we know of where Jack might establish popularity-Mars!"⁵³

Johnson's first priority in Paris was to regain his financial status which was lost due to legal costs, the cancellation of his theatrical appearances, and the closing of the Cafe de Champion nightclub. He fought a couple of championship bouts in Paris in 1914 but there was such little interest in boxing in Paris that Johnson made very little money from these bouts.⁵⁴

Eventually, Johnson was able to get a fight with yet another white hope challenger named Jess Willard. The Willard-Johnson bout was scheduled for April 5, 1915 in Havana, Cuba. Johnson later explained in his autobiography that he was

given clues to the effect that if he lost the bout on purpose the prejudice against him “would be wiped out and the (Mann Act) charges dropped, and (he) could again be with (his) folks” in the United States, rather than go to prison.⁵⁵ He maintains that he lost the championship bout on purpose by being knocked out in the twenty-sixth round by Willard. Whether or not Johnson actually threw the fight is still debated today. However, the loss did not give him free access back to the United States as he maintained. When he finally did return in 1920, Johnson immediately surrendered to authorities and served a year and a day in the federal prison at Leavenworth, Kansas for the Mann Act violation.⁵⁶

Lucille Cameron divorced Johnson in 1924, charging him with infidelity. In characteristic fashion, he remarried in 1925 to Irene Pineau who was also white, beautiful, and blonde like his two previous wives and numerous girlfriends. Johnson continued fighting until 1945, at the age of sixty-eight. He died in an automobile accident on June 10, 1946.⁵⁷

Jack Johnson’s impact on American society was explosive. His championship and hard-driving lifestyle lifted the spirits of millions of downtrodden black Americans and at the same time enraged millions of whites. His relationships with white women so incensed many politicians that laws banning interracial marriage were proposed in some states where it was not already illegal. Although none were actually passed, the movement demonstrated the tremendous impact that one black sports figure had on the psyche of white America.⁵⁸

Jack Johnson is not as well known as some of the other great heavyweight champions in history, but that may be because history would just as soon forget him. Joe Louis once said in his autobiography that his backers told him never to go out with a white woman and “never get your picture taken with one - that would be the end of your career.”⁵⁹ Perhaps that is why people have heard of Joe Louis and do not know of Jack Johnson. Whatever the reason, the “Galveston Giant” will always be one of the most significant, if not popular, black sports figures in American history.

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The Battle for Civil Rights in the War for Peace: African-Americans in World War II

by
Laureen Norris

For African-American soldiers during World War II, the war became not a two-front but rather a three-front war, encompassing the Pacific and Atlantic campaigns along with the campaign for civil rights. Healthy, white American males could automatically expect to enter military service with no difficulty, but for African-American males who saw military service as a way to prove themselves and open doors to opportunity, military service was difficult to enter and a struggle once admitted. White soldiers, along with the government, launched a series of racial attacks on their black counterparts, intending to kill both their desire to enter the military and to further the demand for civil rights. African-Americans responded by becoming more assertive in their quest for participation in the war, forming another layer on the foundation of the modern civil rights movement.

In 1939, two years before the United States entered the war, only 3,640 African-Americans were in the army. There were only five black officers and three of them were chaplains.¹ Blacks were prohibited from entering the Marine Corps and Army Air Corps and had only limited duties in the Navy. The overt preference of the military authorities for white soldiers placed black men in the difficult position of fighting for the right to fight for their country.

The editors of the black newspaper *Pittsburgh Courier* and others created the Committee for the Participation of Negroes in National Defense to combat discrimination in the military and in industry.² Led by Rayford W. Logan, a veteran of World War I, the committee organized local branches and pressured government personnel departments. In 1940 Logan and representatives of the NAACP and staff from the *Pittsburgh Courier* appeared before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Military Affairs to request "an increase in the number of black military personnel and for full utilization of Afro-Americans in all branches of the armed forces."

In September, 1940, the Selective Service Bill was amended to accommodate this request and Section 3a required that draftees be impartially admitted into the military, while Section 4a prohibited discrimination in selection and training.³ On paper, African-Americans had made progress, but in reality racial barriers still remained firmly in place.

In October, 1940 President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with Walter White, Executive Secretary of the NAACP, A. Philip Randolph, head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, and T. Arnold Hill. The three representatives of African-

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Americans requested a seven-point program of government intervention. They requested "that black officers and men be assigned duties according to their abilities; that provision be made for the training of black officers; that Afro-Americans be allowed full participation in all branches of the Army Air Corps; that blacks take part in the administration and operation of the selective service system; that black women be permitted to serve as nurses in the army and navy as well as in the Red Cross . . . 'that existing units of the army and units to be established should be required to accept and select officers and enlisted personnel without regard to race.'"⁴ Although Roosevelt said that he supported and sympathized with the black cause, he refused to incorporate the seven points into policy. Instead, only a few of the suggestions were adopted, with reservations, such as the policy that black officers had to be assigned to all-black units. Segregation in the military continued, "as it had been proved satisfactory over a long period of years."⁵ African-Americans had taken a step forward with the amendment to the Selective Service Bill, but realized after Roosevelt's response that they would be permitted to enter the military and fight and die for their country, but only beside a fellow black soldier. Military leaders feared that desegregation would threaten white morale and ultimately the war effort.

Nevertheless, blacks continued to make slow progress toward advancement. Roosevelt promised more black army regiments and the introduction of black aviation units. In June 1941, he issued Executive Order 8802 "which forbade racial and religious discrimination in war industries, government training programs and government agencies."⁶ Intended to help blacks, it lacked the power to end discrimination which persisted through the war. William H. Hastie was appointed civilian aide to the Secretary of War and Colonel Campbell C. Johnson became the Negro Advisor to the Director of Selective Service. Black admission into the army increased from 97,725 in November, 1941 to 467,883 in December, 1942, although the proportion of blacks in the military was nothing near the proportion of blacks in the population.⁷ From December, 1941 to August, 1945, 920,000 blacks served in the armed services. This figure appears quite substantial until compared with the 11,380,000 whites who served from December, 1944 to August, 1945, a period of less than one year. Neither were blacks equally represented in each branch of the military.

A few African-Americans openly protested discrimination. In January, 1941 Ernest Calloway wrote a letter to his draft board stating that he could not accept military service based on the practices of the military. The draft board failed to agree and sentenced him to jail. New Yorker Lewis Jones declared that he preferred "to serve his country as a citizen unsegregated and unhumiliated in a Jim Crown Army." He too was sentenced to jail and was not released until 1945. Bayard Rustin refused military service on religious and racial grounds and was given a three-year sentence that he completed in 1947.⁹ Willie Harris from Gary, Indiana committed suicide a few hours before his induction into the army. He stated in his suicide note that "there was no future for Negro soldiers."¹⁰

The military screened prospective inductees with a series of physical and educational criterion that resulted in the admission of significantly less blacks. Between May 15, 1941 and September 15, 1941, only 1.1% (60,001) of whites were rejected due to educational deficiencies, whereas 12.3% (83,466) of blacks were rejected for the same reason. Two years later, in 1943, 30.3% of all whites were rejected compared to 46% of all blacks.¹¹ Venereal disease and educational deficiencies accounted for most of the rejections of prospective black soldiers. Venereal disease was curable, but education was a different matter. African-Americans lacked the educational advantages available to whites and found it much more difficult to pass the examinations. The military upgraded the standards and even less blacks could qualify. As of May 15, 1941, inductees had to possess "the ability to read write and compute 'as commonly prescribed in the fourth grade in grammar school.'"¹² Furthermore, if a prospective soldier had not finished fourth grade, he was required to pass the War Department's Minimum Literacy Test. In August, 1942, the Army began accepting illiterates, with the requirement that no more than 10% of whites or 10% of blacks per day be accepted.¹³ Once a black passed the entrance requirements, he was classified according to learning ability. The classification tests were designed to separate the fast learners from the slow learners, with Grade I being those with the most rapid learning ability and Grade V the slowest. The Army expected Grades I, II and III to produce the military's future officers, specialists and technicians. Grades IV and V were expected to be semi-skilled and unskilled laborers. Not surprisingly, between March, 1941 and December, 1942, only .4% of 440,162 enlisted black soldiers or 1,580 were classified Grade I. Grade II had 3.4%, Grade II, 12.3%, Grade IV, 34.7% and Grade V, 49.2%.¹⁴

For whites, the picture looked brighter. Grade I had 6.6% of 4,129,259 enlisted whites or 273,626, Grade II, 28 %, Grade III, 32.1%, Grade IV, 24.8% and Grade V, 8.5%.¹⁵ In Grade I there were over one-half as many whites as there were blacks. Blacks could expect to be outnumbered by whites, have whites as superiors and be placed in semi-skilled positions while their white counterparts enjoyed more opportunities for advancement and more respect. Since African-American units had more Grade IV and Grade V men to absorb than white units, black morale was lowered and a psychological barrier was placed between black soldiers and proper training. The service oriented jobs blacks held in their civilian lives followed them into the military. With the majority of blacks falling under the Class IV and V categories, or the semiskilled divisions, they found themselves routinely placed in service positions. Most blacks were prohibited from entering training schools so many were placed in labor and supply divisions. Blacks were trained to be "the physical backbone of the armed forces."¹⁶ Consequently, they were often given menial tasks.

Fed up with poor treatment and no advancement, the 328th Aviation Squadron and the 908th Quartermaster Company wrote a letter to the Richmond *Afro-American* complaining about wrongs made against them. The grievances included

K.P.'s who were given absolutely no opportunities for advancement even though some had completed training at cooking and baking schools. Trained black mechanics were assigned as truck drivers with no opportunities to work on the trucks or use their trade skills. Black men who had passed the entrance exams for Officer Candidate School and aviation school had not been sent to receive training. "We are still slaves, laborers and flunkies for the white personnel here," the letter concluded.¹⁷

Even if a black advanced to the rank of an officer, he could still expect to encounter racism from white officers and enlisted men. The military felt that black officers could not be taught to take charge or exert effective leadership, that those qualities were not inherent in the black personality. Black officers were viewed as "past the stage of youthful daring and initiative, short on education, without self-confidence or any reason for it, poorly selected and inadequately trained" for their positions in the Army.¹⁸ consequently, by 1945 black officers made up less than 1.9% of all officers in the armed services.¹⁹

Army policy stated that black officers were strictly prohibited from being in charge of fellow white officers. Only on rare occasions were they placed in command of white enlisted men, and then only when absolutely necessary because it was considered detrimental to white morale. Black officers had to wait for a command post specifically for a black officer, whereas white officers, upon graduation from officer training school, were automatically given command of white enlisted men.²⁰

Black officers were routinely denied promotions, though in many instances they proved themselves far beyond their white counterparts. The experience of two officers in the 93rd Division, black Second Lieutenant Martin Winfield and white First Lieutenant Raymond Grube brings to light the overt discrimination practiced by the Army. Winfield graduated second in his class in infantry school and first in his class in communications school. On every assignment after graduation he earned high marks for "exceptional skill and high proficiency."²¹ By February, 1945 he was still a second lieutenant. In contrast, Grube illegally ordered a motor installed in his private automobile, was court martialled and found guilty of embezzlement of government property and fined \$300. Apparently the army saw no harm done in these offenses because just twelve months later he was promoted to captain and given a command position.²²

Black soldiers stationed at training camps experienced segregation and discrimination in both the South and the North. In Northern society they were discouraged from even conversing with white women; they were refused service in many restaurants; and they were segregated in movie theaters and other entertainment facilities. Blacks found it difficult to find other blacks with whom to associate simply because blacks were far outnumbered. In grievance letters they complained that segregation and discrimination ran rampant throughout their camps and since the North was supposedly less prejudiced, they asked why were black soldiers segregated and assigned inferior living quarters? One black soldier wrote to the

NAACP asking why the base theater discriminated against blacks when the local city theaters did not. He pointed out that the military was openly practicing discrimination against men fighting for their country and nothing was being done to stop it.²³ The military could wage war against an enemy country and win, but it refused to conquer the racism that ran rampant throughout its entire organization.

Though the North was no haven for blacks, the South was a living nightmare. Blacks soldiers faced extreme verbal and physical abuse that ranged from being called the derogatory term “nigger” to being beaten and hung in uniform. Some Southern whites became so agitated with black soldiers that they requested that black troops not be stationed in their community. There was so much violence that the War Department issued a new policy that “where feasible black southern troops would be assigned to units in the South and black northern troops would be assigned to units in the North.”²⁴ This new policy was instituted on the grounds that Northern blacks were accustomed to more civil freedoms than Southern blacks and were causing Southern whites to feel affronted by their presence. The policy also stated that the Planning and Liaison Branch of the War Department would station white troops in white communities and black troops in black communities, further strengthening the bonds of segregation.²⁵

In 1938 the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) began teaching college students to fly. The Civilian Pilot Training Program (CPTP) had the goal of training 400,000 pilots, 2,700 of whom were to be African-Americans.²⁶ In April, 1939, with Public Law 18, Congress approved the loan of aviation equipment to black pilot training schools. Training was approved for West Virginia State College, Tuskegee Institute, Delaware State College, Hampton Institute, Howard University and the North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State College. Tuskegee Army Air Field was the only location where black pilots were trained.²⁷ In the first year ninety-one of the first one hundred black students graduated, a ratio equal to the white students.²⁸ Every member of the first Tuskegee class passed the examinations, many with high marks, an accomplishment that sparked national attention. In May, 1940, the first Tuskegee class completed their flight tests and received their pilot licenses. Tuskegee was approved for secondary flight instruction on July 1, 1940.²⁹ One indication of the path-breaking nature of their accomplishment is the comment by Assistant Secretary of War for air, Robert Lovett. He disapproved of blacks in the CPTP and did not believe that blacks had to ability to fly. When he was informed by flight training officers that there were no scientific grounds for such a conclusion, he stated that “there should be some emotional reason” to exclude them.³⁰ Nevertheless, on July 19, 1941 the first black pilots entered the United States Army Air Corps. It was segregated—some blacks called it the “Jim Crow Air Corps”—but it was a step in the right direction. The combat record of Tuskegee airmen speaks for itself. Out of 992 graduates, 450 went overseas, 95 earned the distinguished flying cross, 14 received the bronze star and 744 received air medals and clusters.³¹

Despite the many oppressions African-American soldiers faced during the war years, their determination to succeed in attaining equal treatment spurred them on

to make substantial accomplishments. For example, on October 16, 1940, former Spanish-American War soldier, Colonel Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., was promoted to brigadier general, the first black officer to achieve such a distinction.³² The General's son, Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., and the Ninety-ninth Pursuit Squadron which he commanded, won commendations in the European Theater.³³ On June 21, 1945, Colonel Davis, Jr. became the first black commander of an Army Air Force Base, Godman Field in Kentucky.³⁴

In 1942 the Navy and Marine Corps opened their doors to African-Americans for general service on a segregated basis. In 1945 Navy Secretary James Forrestal saw the benefits of an integrated Navy and appointed the head of the National Urban League, Lester B. Granger, as adviser on racial policies. Therefore in 1947 African-Americans no longer were restricted in naval assignments, and in 1948 Executive Order 9981 integrated the Navy.³⁵

African-Americans made contributions to the war effort not only as soldiers but in other essential capacities as well. For example, Dr. Charles Richard Drew, a black scientist, "set up and ran the pioneer blood plasma bank in Presbyterian Hospital in New York City."³⁶ Drew's blood bank became the model for the blood banks of the American Red Cross. In 1941 he headed a project responsible for collecting blood plasma at newly established donor stations for the armed services. In August, 1944 he received the Spingarn Medal.³⁷ Two other African-Americans received Spingarn Medals: A. Philip Randolph in November, 1942 and William H. Hastie in December, 1943. A total number of 1,154,720 blacks served in the armed forces during World War II, 7,768 of whom were black officers. The Women's Army Auxiliary Corps had 3,902 black women, and 115 of them were officers. The WAVES, the Navy auxiliary, had 68 black women. Harriet M. West and Charity E. Adams were Majors.³⁸

African-Americans endured a segregated military throughout World War II. Despite limitations, they persevered and went on to make substantial contributions to the fight for civil rights as well as the war effort. Until President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 9981 in July 1948, blacks soldiers were segregated from their white counterparts though they fought and died in the same battles for the same causes. The tide began to turn after the war with the integration of blacks into the armed services and later with the rise of the modern civil rights movement. In spite of discrimination and brutality, African-Americans proved to the military and to the American public that they deserved to be treated as equals and not as second class citizens.

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27. Ibid., 9-15.
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29. Ibid., 12.
30. Ibid., 10.
31. Charles E. Francis, *The Tuskegee Airmen* (Boston, 1988), appendix.
32. Bennett, *Before the Mayflower*, 535.
33. Ibid., 541.
34. Ibid.
35. Wynn, *Afro-American*, 37. Truman made great progress in integrating the armed forces but the last segregated unit was not abolished until 1954.
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The Results of Operation Rolling Thunder: Did It Work?

by
Thomas A. Roose, Jr.

Preface

I first became interested in Operation Rolling Thunder after reading a fictional book of the same name. I read it for pleasure; then became more interested in the human aspect. The pilots were subjected to one of the most harrowing experiences any person could every have, and they did not receive proper support from their own government. Being told time and time again to return to the danger zone and risk my life would probably be too much for me. That is why I feel that these pilots were the heroes of Vietnam. They gave their lives for a government that could not make a commitment. Therefore, I have come to the conclusion that had these pilots been given the authority to attack their own targets, and not ones dictated by the Oval Office, the United States attrition rate may not have been as high as it was, and we might have won the war.

Unfortunately, I know that my background influences my judgements. My father had several terrible experiences in Vietnam, and the stories that I have heard did nothing to glamorize the war. In addition, my love for military fiction may have distorted my view; my writing probably betrays my bias.

My primary source for this project was an oral interview with Colonel Stephen A. Nichols (Ret.), USAF. His stories of flying F-4 Phantoms during the Vietnam War not only provided me with a unique insight, but held me spellbound. The interview provided me a first hand account of just what the sky warriors accomplished in Southeast Asia. Nichols's testimony supplemented a wide range of history books, scholarly journals and contemporary periodicals.

I would like to thank Colonel Nichols for taking time out of his busy flight schedule to assist a poor college student. Also to be included in my thanks are Lisa Nichols, who is the Colonel's daughter (my girlfriend), my father, and of course, my roommates who put up with a very stressed out, and at times almost insane, "room dog." Finally, I would like to thank the librarians in the Northern Kentucky University Library for their much needed assistance.

Thomas A. Roose, Jr. served as Secretary of the Chapter and Assistant Editor of Perspectives in History in 1994-1995. During the Regional Meeting on campus on April 8, 1995, President Brian Houillion presented this paper for Thom, who was on ROTC duty. Thom graduated in May, 1995 and is now a United States Army lieutenant serving in Bosnia.

Operation Rolling Thunder

Early in the morning of September 6, 1967, an F-4 Phantom of the United States Air Force lifted off the runway at Da Nang Air Base and rapidly climbed to an altitude of three-thousand feet. From this height, which was only a fraction of that which the Phantom could attain, Colonel Stephen Nichols, then a major, was able to see the horizon just beginning to glow. This was his 75th combat mission over North Vietnam since he first arrived in country about three months before.¹

Nichols remembers the day well. After unsuccessfully raiding a suspected truck park south of Hanoi, he was shot down in North Vietnam. He and his Radio Intercept Officer (RIO) were rescued, but many of their fellow airmen were killed, and today Nichols believes that they died in vain.² Historians and government officials have debated for almost thirty years whether the bombing raids over North Vietnam were worth the cost in American lives, and indeed, whether the raids were productive at all.³ In the quantitative sense, the extent is mind-boggling; over three million tons of bombs were dropped at the cost of over four-hundred aircraft lost.⁴ Did restrictions placed on pilots detract from the strategic mission? Were the political motives behind the bombings accomplished? Did the bombing work at all?

The heaviest bombing took place between 1965 and 1968 in Operation Rolling Thunder. Before 1965, any United States bombardment of Vietnamese forces was considered in retaliation for North Vietnamese Army (NVA) aggressiveness. This form of reprisal was strictly reactive and defensive in nature. Rolling Thunder was designed to take the offensive and attack troop concentrations, interdict troop movements, and limit sanctuaries from the NVA.⁵ The Lyndon Johnson administration held that in order to keep the Chinese and Soviets out of the war, it had to remain a "limited" conflict.⁶ Pilots were therefore sent on missions that included bombing railroads and highways, port facilities, ammunition and supply depots, and industrial centers outside populated areas.⁷ However, other important targets, such as weapons plants and headquarters positions, were located within heavily populated areas such as downtown Hanoi. Although these were not the initial objectives, the Johnson administration eventually put Rolling Thunder through six separate phases and seven bombing halts before it drew to a close on October 31, 1968.⁸

It is therefore important to examine the military and political missions of Rolling Thunder. The military's concern dealt primarily with dropping the bombs on target and carrying out the orders of the politicians. The political goals and motives, however, were different and proved instrumental in the failure to achieve each individual objective. Few of the goals were fully accomplished due to the fact that the guerrilla campaign on the ground was largely immune to conventional air attacks.⁹ Finally, the results of Rolling Thunder sadly show a complete failure on the part of the United States to accomplish any substantial military or political goals.

"The Gooks would raid a forward firebase, then we would be sent out to blow up a dike on some river not even remotely close to the firebase," said Colonel Nichols in an interview. "At first it seemed ludicrous. Then it became habit."¹⁰

Almost all of the missions, especially before Rolling Thunder, were this type of “tit-for-tat” bombing raids. As Major Hugo E. Marek stated in 1968, “We are exacting a penalty from North Vietnam for promoting and directing an aggressive war.”¹¹ Targets of these reprisals often included civilian roads, bridges and dikes. Although these were also targets of interdiction, the fact that it required a great deal of manpower to rebuild them meant that the workers were not making some other contribution to the war effort.¹²

The reasoning behind these reprisals was that if the civilian economy and social well-being could be damaged enough, their spirit would eventually break, allowing for substantial gains at the political bargaining table. Unfortunately this never occurred. The bombing of the North Vietnamese actually ended up working *against* the United States policy to bomb Hanoi into submission. Whereas the administration believed that constant bombing would degrade civilian morale, it actually added to the people’s resolve and decreased the possibility that the air assaults alone could win the war.¹³ An identical misconception has been discovered within the governments of both the Axis and Allied leadership during World War II. The Germans attempted to bomb England into the stone age, with “Terror Bombing,” during the Battle of Britain. The same occurred when United States and British bombers raided German cities of no military value. In both cases, civilian morale and discipline held firm and usually became more resolute.¹⁴ The same reality would eventually hold true during the Vietnam War.

When it seemed that no progress was being made politically, the bombings would be increased. After March 15, 1965, the first day of Rolling Thunder, sorties were gradually increased from just five per day to almost three hundred by the end of the campaign on October 31, 1968.¹⁵ However, these additional attacks did nothing to change the negotiating position of Hanoi. What it did accomplish was to turn more pilots and crews into prisoners of war. Because Hanoi correctly believed that the American POWs were its best negotiating issue, the increase in sorties and the consequent increase in POWs actually weakened the American position even more at the bargaining table, as well as across America.¹⁶

In addition to the frustration at the bargaining table, the frustration in the cockpits grew proportionally. Pilots were increasingly sent on missions that had no tactical or economic value at all, just so something could be bombed. Of the 106,000 sorties flown over North Vietnam in 1966, only 1000 were against the 22 fixed targets authorized by the White House.¹⁷ This highly uneconomical misuse of high performance aircraft and valuable lives to attack a lone truck stalled somewhere in the jungle prompted Nichols to state: “I was a regular. Nobody drafted me, and I expected to risk my life for this country. But I’d be damned if I was going to do it in a multi-million dollar airplane a couple of times a week bombing an empty barracks or a bus.”¹⁸

The will of the Vietnamese to survive and continue to fight was another important factor for the unsuccessful campaign. It was their courage and strength that kept them fighting. It took resolution to rise out of the mud, rebuild the bombed

bridge connecting their community to another, then attack an American installation that night.¹⁹ But because the determination to win was so strong on both sides of the bomb rack, both the United States pilots and the Vietnamese people would not give up, creating a repeating cycle of bomb, repair, attack, and reprisal.

One of the primary objectives of Rolling Thunder was to limit the number of locations employable to the NVA to conceal equipment and weapons. By cutting down on the number and size of the places they could openly and freely marshal their resources or concentrate their war materials, the United States Air Force would have a much easier time of locating, then destroying, the NVA supply lines.²⁰ Targets of these missions included warehouses, villages and valuable terrain features. This was perhaps the most costly aspect of the air war in terms of civilian lives, considering that many times the NVA would hide trucks or large amounts of supplies in a village, forcing the pilots to attempt to surgically strike these targets. This reminds Nichols of one particular night mission when he was to bomb a supply depot located next to a small village:

I remember the approach. My wingman and I were screaming down a small valley at 300 feet, looking for our target located somewhere in the dark patties in front of us. We couldn't have been more than three miles from the objective when we started to take small arms fire—not a lot, but just enough to be annoying. It was then that our target came into view: two small dark disks on the plains below. I lined up on one, thinking it was the depot. I had a good drop, as did Snowy [the wingman]. But we came to find out during the debrief that it was the village we hit.²¹

To keep civilian casualties to a minimum, or if possible, nonexistent, the White House took responsibility in selecting targets for any particular week.²² Authorization of targets had to come from this source, and even when authorization was given to attack, restrictions were placed on them anyway. It was a complex chain of command, devised in the hope that civilian casualties could be kept low. Unfortunately for the pilots, if a target was missed or casualties inflicted, it would come down on their heads, as the government was not willing to have anything to do with the killing of “innocent civilians.”²³ Simply, the NVA were using their people as human shields against air strikes on their equipment and the American pilots were the scapegoats.

However, thus far civilians had only been considered victims. To combat the air war, North Vietnamese officials encouraged the population to become involved. It became a national duty to study aircraft silhouettes and identify planes by their sounds. By arming the country people and instructing them on how to use a rifle, the government made many farmers into mobile and unpredictable anti-aircraft guns.²⁴ Colonel Jack Broughton, an F-105 pilot, commented on the inability to fly low to the ground because of annoying “peasant fire:”

Don't ever think that a handgun can't knock down a big bird if it hits the right spot. When the bugle blows and thousands of people lie on their backs and fire small-caliber personal weapons straight up in the air, woe be unto him who is unfortunate enough to stray through that fire.²⁵

This was yet another example of how difficult it was for the United States, a technologically superior power, to combat the civilian morale and resolution of a third world country.

In addition to a civilian factor, the bombing of North Vietnam raised the international political stakes as well. The day after United States planes first went "downtown" into Hanoi, the Soviet Union released a statement denouncing the "new, open act of aggression," by "barbarous pirates." Hanoi stated, "the North Vietnamese will deal these war seekers heavier blows." Washington's response? "Continuing action against continuing aggression."²⁶ Even on the last day of the bombing, October 31, 1968, a Community "Unity" meeting denounced the "barbarous bombings of populous centers."²⁷ These statements of condemnation did nothing to ease the tensions of an already nervous world.

Perhaps one of the most important goals of Operation Rolling Thunder was the mission to interdict NVA resources and to stop the flow of arms and supplies into South Vietnam. On March 3, 1965 the *Wall Street Journal* reported that over 160 planes had bombed a North Vietnamese Naval base and supply depot.²⁸ This was the opening act of Operation Rolling Thunder. Over the next forty-three months, pilots would finally be put on the offensive, attacking troop concentrations, supply depots, modes of transportation, and generally attempting to halt the communist aggression.²⁹

Interdiction can be defined as "destroying or interrupting an enemy line of communication by firepower so as to halt an enemy's advance."³⁰ This objective of the United States Air Force was deemed one of the most important by President Johnson. Pilots were to destroy bridges, roads and equipment along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and other routes leading south used by the NVA to supply both their troops and the VC. It was therefore necessary to attempt to cut this artery and shut off the valve supplying the VC with their life blood. Unfortunately, this proved impossible.

At the onset of Rolling Thunder, targets within thirty miles of Hanoi were off-limits. Pilots were restricted to the Ho Chi Minh Trail and other supply routes leading south. However, once it became obvious that the North Vietnamese would not be backing down soon, Washington authorized the bombing of individual targets in downtown Hanoi.³¹ This opened an entire new series of problems, including the deaths of innocent civilians, the escalation of the war, and the increasingly more dangerous missions allotted to the pilots.

As stated earlier, civilian casualties were virtually unavoidable, a necessary risk when bombing targets just a few meters from someone's home. This was to increase threefold once the bombing of Hanoi began, due to the close proximity of dwellings

to military targets. Primarily, when American bombers went "downtown," it was to attack industrial centers, bridges, or warehouses; they were still following the original policy of interdiction.³² It became unavoidable, however, that once the factors of enemy planes, night, poor weather, extreme high and low altitudes, and heavy anti-aircraft fire were added to the equation, it became very difficult for pilots to distinguish a school from a warehouse. This led to heavy casualties, both for the civilians, and for the pilots.³³

Attacks on supply routes continued, of course, even while Hanoi was being attacked. In fact, at the urging of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Johnson authorized the bombing of supply routes within the Laotian borders.³⁴ Though the bombing of Laos was not publicized at the time, many reporters speculated that the target was primarily the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the main supply route for the VC.³⁵ Commanders in the theater later justified it as necessary because "that was where the reinforcements were coming from."³⁶ If the supply route could be cut off, the NVA and VC might be defeated.

Apart from the Ho Chi Minh trail, the term "supply route" also includes railroads and canals. These were considered very important targets because although there were many of them, they were very difficult to repair once destroyed.³⁷ Trains were easy prey, and therefore presented excellent targets. Broughton explained that "railway yards were easy targets. The gooks knew it too because every one we attacked was like a mini version of Hanoi."³⁸ He refers to the fact that train yards were considered important to the NVA and were therefore defended accordingly, much as Hanoi was, but on a smaller scale. Canals and rivers were no different. A primary mode of transportation in the jungle was by water, so the NVA tended to utilize barges frequently. Though a less frequent target, they were bombed with relative ease due to the absence of anti-aircraft defenses in the area.³⁹ These, as well as train yards, were very important targets and thus received the proper attention from United States bombs.

Unfortunately, despite the interdiction attempts, equipment still got through, enabling the North Vietnamese to carry on the fight. For example, it was relatively unsuccessful in limiting the Petroleum, Oil and Lubricant (POL) assets of North Vietnam. Although initial statistics were impressive and militarily successful, (18,200 sorties, 70 percent of bulk storage facilities destroyed, 2,314 railroad vehicles destroyed or damaged, 122 ports damaged, and 8,304 buildings destroyed or damaged) substantial stocks still survived.⁴⁰ Very little of the POL which the North Vietnamese used was imported from China and the Soviet Union.⁴¹ A study by the Institute for Defense Analysis concluded that "since less than 5 percent of North Vietnamese POL requirements are utilized in supporting truck operations . . . NVA and VC forces do not require POL supplies from the North." In addition, it became common practice to distribute and disseminate POL resources among small hamlets and villages. In some cases, oil drums were lined along a winding road or placed in a bomb crater to make it that much more difficult for pilots to locate and destroy them.⁴² The report stated that "no critical denial of essential

POL had resulted.”⁴³ This seemed to be the general case among the entire interdiction campaign. Although the military was successful in destroying its targets, it had little or no effect on the overall supplying of NVA and VC troops from the North.

Today historians debate whether or not the pilots and commanders in theater were given substantial target lists to attack. A target could be bombed several times in one week just because the “frag list,” a daily list of objectives for a unit to bomb, included the site.⁴⁴ Since the list was created by people who supposedly had no real grasp of what was going on (the White House and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara) many military historians believe that the pilots should have been given free rein to attack what *they* thought was important.⁴⁵

After receiving the desired targets from the White House, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would put together “route packages,” several geographically divided sub-lists, each of which would be sent to a particular bombing element. For example, Route Package I was assigned to 2nd Air Division; it covered an area from the DMZ to just above the 18th parallel. The Navy received Route Packages II, III, and one-half of IV, all of which covered the south and eastern portions of North Vietnam. The Air Force was assigned the remaining territories.⁴⁶ Within these packages pilots were assigned specific targets which they were expected to bomb.

In the early stages of Rolling Thunder, from opening day to mid-1966, bombing was restricted to the countryside and small cities. NVA air defenses were rather weak in these outlying regions and presented few problems to United States pilots. However, by July, 1966, bombing targets were expanded to include Hanoi and Haiphong in an effort to coerce the North Vietnamese at the bargaining table.⁴⁷ Life became more difficult for the pilots when attacks on Hanoi were authorized. The immense anti-aircraft system that the NVA had deployed around downtown Hanoi rendered it the “most dangerous airspace in the history of flight.”⁴⁸ Defense in and around Hanoi included Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs), Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA or “flak”), and numerous incidents of small arms fire. Night after night, week after week, pilots flew along “Thud Ridge,” a safe corridor along which attacking aircraft could fly into the Hanoi region almost undetected, and attempt to strike a building or structure considered important to someone in Washington.⁴⁹ Due to these defenses the government claimed that one-half of its aircraft losses were in missions to Hanoi.⁵⁰

Since Washington selected all targets to be bombed, the pilots had virtually no say in what they were attacking. In order to circumvent this concern, commanders—just as frustrated as the pilots—requested and received permission to fly “armed reconnaissance” missions.⁵¹ This usually consisted of F-4 Phantoms reconnoitering NVA positions with a partial bomb load and attacking any target of opportunity.⁵² However, this still did not give pilots the opportunity to destroy that one particular SAM site that was consistently firing at them or to negate the search radars operating in areas off-limits to attack. Pilots were increasingly watching their comrades fall from the sky because these targets were not on the “frag lists.”⁵³

Therefore military historians have pointed out that had the pilots had authority to bomb the targets they deemed important, the United States casualty and POW rate may not have been as high.

Rolling Thunder was a program designed to stop the flow of arms into South Vietnam and to bring the North Vietnamese to their knees. Unfortunately, for both the pilots and the politicians, neither goal was completely accomplished. It is easy for laymen to make exaggerated conclusions on how well air power worked in this situation. Fliers must work in percentages when conducting interdiction campaigns—to reduce the flow of an enemy's supply line to zero is virtually impossible so long as he is willing to pay an enormous price in lost men and supplies. To reduce the flow as much as possible and to make his price unbelievably high, however, the focus of the campaign should be to immediately strike factories, refineries, marshaling yards, and the transportation lines that carry bulk goods.⁵⁴ To wait until he had distributed his supplies among thousands of smaller hiding places, and then to send our multi-million dollar aircraft after those locations was how to maximize our cost, not his.

The will of the North Vietnamese was next to impossible to break, even under the intense bombings. This fortitude obviously carried over to the political bargaining table, as they rarely made any concessions to the United States. In fact, both Presidents Johnson and Richard Nixon called off the bombing after they saw it was not succeeding.⁵⁵ It was this resolve that kept the United States from achieving its goals in Southeast Asia.

Finally, as technological advances make warfare ever more complex, and political leaders are tempted to exercise direct control at the lower levels of leadership, it seems inevitable that those at the tip of the spear, the soldiers and airmen, will pay an extremely high price for their ability to exercise the wishes of their political masters. My conclusion is that Rolling Thunder did not succeed, and at the rate that unfortunate events were happening, it was good that it was called off when it was. It seemed ludicrous at the outset that the bombing campaigns could fail but, perhaps unavoidably, they did. Many sources have dissected this catastrophe to the point that every number could be interpreted in a different sense every time one looked at it. It can only be hoped that the concentrated analysis of these numbers can create a lesson that both the political and military decision-makers can understand—peace through superior firepower is not always victorious.

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The Bell Curve: An Informal Essay Review

by
Michael A. Flannery

Science may not be considered a separate discourse from ideology.
— Stanley Aronowitz, *Science as Power*, 1988

The recent publication of *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life* (New York: The Free Press, 1994) has unleashed some sweeping assertions about group characteristics and the implications of those characteristics for this country and its public policy. Resting much of their argument on historical data, Charles Murray and the late Richard J. Herrnstein, two Harvard-bred social scientists, have produced a book that should force every historian to take notice. Couched in a sea of obfuscating statistical analysis and festooned with a mind boggling array of citations to the professional literature, it might serve us all well to step back, drop the academic formalities, and demystify this very thought-provoking book. I therefore present my opinions in the first-person singular and casual verbiage that this approach allows.

To begin I must admit that I defer a considerable portion of my quantitative analysis to Stephen Jay Gould, professor of zoology at Harvard University and leading Darwinian scholar. His "Mismeasure by Any Measure" (see bibliography) gives one of the best technical critiques of *The Bell Curve* in print. As he points out, *The Bell Curve* rests largely on two arguments: first, is a rehashing of social Darwinism merely replacing the old wealth equals worth argument with what Herrnstein and Murray call "the cognitive elite." This cognitive elite, as it were, rests upon a hierarchy of measured intelligence determined by IQ scores — i.e., the elite of society today are there because they are the brightest. Their second argument is that this cognitive stratification in society is based upon genetic differences and those differences have a racial correlation that can be statistically demonstrated. These two arguments are then used to support the notion that since IQ is genetically heritable, social programs based on equalitarian goals are ineffective and misplaced. In response to this general thesis, "disingenuous" is a word that Gould uses early and often.

Let's take up the second part of their argument first — namely that any given trait within a group can be used to explain average differences between groups. Gould points out the weakness(es) of the authors' use of statistics by an analogous example of a known trait that is universally acknowledged to be heritable — height. If heights

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for poor natives in a village beset by nutritional deprivation, poor health care, rampant contagions, and a host of environmental impediments to good health are averaged, it may for argument's sake be 5' 6". Heritability within the village is quite strong (i.e., these natives will continue to have offspring that average out at 5' 6" tall). But this high heritability does not mean that better nutrition, better health care, better public sanitation, or other environmental controls might not raise the average height to 5' 10". Similarly, the 15 point difference in IQ between blacks and whites in America which will continue to be highly heritable allows no automatic conclusions to be drawn. It might be that a truly equalitarian society (or a society more nearly equalitarian than present) might produce black IQ averages equal to or exceeding that of whites.

Thoughtful analysts like Princeton University's Alan Ryan have taken earlier studies of IQ and immigrant Russian-born Jews and other eastern Europeans by H. H. Goddard and Carl Brigham during the early years of this century and noted the vast fluctuations over time witnessed by these groups. Comparative examination of this data shows no innate racial differences in intelligence. "What it does suggest," concludes Ryan, "is that either relative cognitive abilities change more rapidly than Herrnstein believed or that our estimates of them are less reliable than he thought." Mike Walter makes a similar argument in his delightfully simple essay "Get Smart" which will be taken up a bit later.

In sum, then, the authors of *The Bell Curve* engage in false extrapolation. Herrnstein and Murray move from an arguably "true" A (IQ scores) and "true" B (IQ is inherited) to an essentially unproven C — that heritable traits are unalterable by environmental or other external factors. But this is only the beginning of Herrnstein and Murray's troubles. Their methodology is poor, not to mention their use of statistics. In the words of one reviewer, the authors turn "every straw [of evidence] in their favor into an oak, while mentioning but down playing evidence to the contrary." Nowhere is this shown better than in the discussion of Spearman's so-called "g" which purports to show that there is a "general factor in intelligence" which is positively correlated. In other words, if you do well on one kind of intelligence test, you will do well on others. Gould calls *The Bell Curve's* handling of this topic "an illustration of its vacuousness." The g factor is crucial to Herrnstein and Murray's argument if IQ correlations are to mean anything. Yet they are forced to admit on page 3 that the "The evidence for a general factor in intelligence was pervasive but circumstantial, based on statistical analysis rather than observation. Its reality therefore was, and remains, arguable."

Why? Because it's been shown by L. L. Thurnstone that g was based upon factor analysis to find a single dimension of intelligence. By rotating other dimensions on multidimensional graphs, Thurnstone could make this g factor disappear, suggesting that there are multiple intelligences (verbal, spatial, mathematical, artistic, melodic and rhythmic, etc.). Other researchers like J. P. Guilford and Howard Gardner seem to reach a logical conclusion by insisting that g cannot have any real meaning because it is apparent in some correlations and is absent from others.

Yet after admitting the controversial nature of the Spearman g factor early on in their book, Herrnstein and Murray proceed throughout the remainder of its 660 pages to treat it as if it were a universally agreed fact — a fact that only a fool would argue against, a fact something on the order of the diameter of the earth or the boiling point of water.

The Bell Curve also uses its terminology with surprising imprecision. For example the authors discuss “cultural bias” and IQ testing and proceed to confuse the usage of bias in a statistical sense with bias in its vernacular sense. Statistical bias, as Gould explains, “means that the same score, when it is achieved by members of different groups, predicts the same thing; that is, a black person and a white person with identical scores will have the same probabilities for doing anything that IQ is supposed to predict.” While Herrnstein and Murray adamantly insist that these tests are not biased (technically quite correct), they do not address the fact that the tests may have been biased in a vernacular sense. In other words, does the 85 IQ score in blacks in some sense represent a manifestation of social bias versus the 100 IQ score in whites? We don’t know, or at least the authors do not present any data that would give an answer to this question. But one thing is certain: Herrnstein and Murray are engaging in statistical nonsense in confusing bias in its technical sense with bias in its vernacular sense. It’s like confusing a mode with a mean, or worse, a measure of central tendency with a measure of dispersion and then treating them as if they were the same things.

The book’s application of statistics is no better. As Gould again indicates, “all its data derive from one analysis — a plotting, by a technique called multiple regression, of the social behaviors that agitate us, such as crime, unemployment, and births out of wedlock (known as dependent variables), against both IQ and parental socioeconomic status (known as independent variables).” While they find a higher correlation with IQ than socioeconomic status, Herrnstein and Murray do not address the strength of that relationship. Engaging in a series of special pleadings for their evidence, the authors ignore contradictory data and elevate numbers which support their theory to the status of holy writ, or perhaps more accurately they present the strength of their theory as equivalent to Nature herself. Since their regression curves show only the plot but not the scatter variations around it, we have no way of knowing the true *strength* of the relationship. It is revealing to note that in Appendix 1, “Statistics for People Who Are Sure They Can’t Learn Statistics” (the best thing in the whole book) that scatterplots *are* given for illustrative purposes but *not* in the textual support of their own arguments (with one minor exception on p. 68 which shows education and annual income levels). This is especially unfortunate because it shows that Herrnstein and Murray not only applied a double standard to the presentation of their data but even more disturbing — they knew full well what they were doing! Special pleadings can sometimes be the honest mistake of being too close to one’s subject, but an error of this caliber must be classed as intentionally deceitful. Gould’s use of the term “disingenious” is very appropriate indeed.

Even still, Herrnstein and Murray's own data indicates that IQ is *not* a major factor in determining variation in their study. They write, "[Cognitive ability] almost always explains less than 20% of the variance, to use the statistician's term, usually less than 10% and often less than 5%. What this means in English is that you cannot predict what a given person will do from his IQ score" (p. 117). Nevertheless, the authors open their very next paragraph with this: "We will argue that intelligence itself, not just its correlation with socioeconomic status, is responsible for these group differences. Our thesis appears radical, judging from its neglect by other social scientists." It's not neglect but understandable avoidance to steer clear of the obvious contradiction revealed in this non sequitur. Herrnstein and Murray, in effect, declare their thesis to be an overwhelming exception to the received wisdom on IQ variance. In other words, in spite of the fact that cognitive ability explains very little, the authors are going to exempt themselves from this and argue its significance anyway.

But the problems don't end there. In Appendix 4, p. 593, Herrnstein and Murray state, "In the text, we do not refer to the usual measure of goodness of fit for multiple regression R^2 , but they are presented for the cross-sectional analyses." Gould accurately points out that this should have been stated up front in the text rather than an appendix. When you look at this carefully you can see why. Coefficient correlations are a commonly used measure of the association between two variables, -1 for variables that are purely negative (e.g. times that the sun shines during midnight) and +1 for variables that are purely positive (e.g. times that there is at least some daylight during noon). Both numbers are more theoretical than actual since no researcher worth his/her salt would accept correlations remotely resembling these extremes for real study projects. Most of Herrnstein and Murray's correlations range from 0.2 to 0.4. Now in general correlations of $<.30$ are not highly regarded by researchers as significantly correlated.* A correlation of 0.4 therefore appears strong, but the point is R^2 is *the square* of the correlation coefficient (remember by their own admission the usual measure of goodness of fit for multiple regression), and the square of any number between 0 and 1 must yield a number less than itself, in this case a correlation of 0.4 gives an R^2 of .16. In order to even begin to be considered worthy of notice, the authors would have needed a correlation of 0.55 yielding an R^2 of 0.3025. Thus one finds out (buried deep within Appendix 4) that by conventional measures of goodness of fit for their own data, the results are insignificant in the extreme.

*See William Buchanan, *Understanding Political Variables* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), p. 277.




fig. 1) Note the low percentages for Herrnstein and Murray's correlations @ ≤ 0.40 . Also notice that R values do not have a one-to-one correspondence with their proportionate influence shown on the verticle axis.

This is an important point and it becomes even clearer in figure 1. Herrnstein and Murray's correlations of .20 to .40 are quite weak when they are compared against the percent of variation for which they account between variables. This variation measure (called the coefficient of determination) is the square of the coefficient or R^2 , and it is what separates meaningful correlations from spurious ones. This is precisely what Gould was referring to in his criticism against "relegating to an appendix" what was essential to the strength of *The Bell Curve's* statistical argument. In other words, if race and IQ are related significantly, it should be expected that the one variable (race) would have a comparatively high proportionate relationship to variation in the other variable (IQ). We need to ask if measures showing 16 percent or less of variation in intelligence directly related to racial variation are sufficient to warrant a thesis which asserts that "ethnic differences in cognitive ability are neither surprising nor in doubt. . . . That they do is confirmed by the data on ethnic differences in cognitive ability from around the world" (p. 269)? Data from where? Certainly not from data yielding correlations of only .40! Stated another way, according to Herrnstein and Murray's own correlations, at least 84 percent of the variance in IQ performance tests can be attributed to variables *external to and independent of* race. Now of course they don't say this, but it is a logical conclusion — indeed the only conclusion — to be drawn from their study.

But even if their correlations *were* significant, another major problem with *The Bell Curve* is the authors' apparent confusion of correlation with causation. The mere fact that there is a correlation between IQ and race doesn't mean that race is a causative factor in IQ. As Allen Paulos, the Temple University mathematician has demonstrated, he can show a correlation between math scores and shoe size; ergo, big feet make smarter students? Of course not. The point Paulos is making is clear:

“The truth is,” he states, “you can make a correlation between almost anything.” This is fundamental to all statisticians and it is a lesson taught early on. Loren Haskins and Kirk Jeffrey’s *Understanding Quantitative History* (see bibliography) states this unequivocally: “It is up to the researcher to say whether he or she believes that the two variables are related in a cause-effect way, and the researcher needs to have some other compelling reason for making this claim besides a large value for R.”

I can put it more personally. I have a pair of gray sneakers that I wear when I mow the grass in my yard. Sometimes I wear them while doing other outdoor chores, but their unsightly condition precludes them from much else. Of course it doesn’t take a masters degree in statistics to tell you that any systematic analysis of wearing these sneakers and the activity in which I am engaged will yield a high *and* strong correlation between my gray sneakers and mowing the grass. Now it is one thing to say that my gray sneakers are highly correlated with grass mowing and quite another to say that my gray sneakers *cause* me to cut the grass. I wear these shoes because I’m cutting the grass; I don’t cut the grass because I’m wearing these shoes. To extend Herrnstein and Murray’s argument, however, we must conclude that my gray sneakers are indeed a singular catalyst to my grass cutting!

Finally, there is the very cogent historical argument that the mere fact that blacks in America may be 15 points under their white counterparts in IQ scores says nothing about *why* that might be the case nor about what those scores might become in the future. In Mike Walter’s analysis, these score differences may not be hereditary at all but due to “historical sidetracks” (to borrow his phrase) which may include everything from antebellum slavery, to the emergence of Jim Crow legislation, to socioeconomic inequities continued into the twentieth century even after the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* decision. The mere recording of IQ variance tells us nothing of potential IQ at all because, even assuming they are measuring something real and quantifiable, they’re essentially symptomatic.

I, therefore, indict *The Bell Curve* on the following grounds:

- 1) By ignoring data that conflicts with their interpretation they commit the fallacy of special pleadings. Herrnstein and Murray also continually ask us to hold one set of data opposed to their theories by one set of standards, and their own data which supports their theories by another;
- 2) In suggesting that IQ is a genetically driven trait unalterable by any environmental factors they commit a false extrapolation;
- 3) By making correlation synonymous with causation the authors commit yet another false extrapolation;
- 4) By confusing statistical bias with vernacular bias they engage in what amounts to statistical nonsense;
- 5) IQ variance between groups, something which consumes a considerable portion of *The Bell Curve*, tells us virtually nothing about why that might be (genes simply won’t do) or where the respective groups might

be headed. It might very well be, for example, that white Americans have peaked while black Americans despite the historical impediments to a variety of social and economic advantages may have great growth potential. We just don't know from Herrnstein and Murray's data, and even if we did, Stephen Jay Gould and L. L. Thurnstone have given strong indications in favor of *multiple intelligences* which leaves *The Bell Curve's* single IQ scores of questionable value at best. This reliance upon single IQ scores amounts to statistical insufficiency, much like the scientist who made sweeping generalizations about rat behavior on the basis of one laboratory rat. Here the insufficiency is not in the sample size but in a rat of a different kind — technical and methodological insufficiency. Herrnstein and Murray make sweeping generalizations on the basis of one type of analysis (IQ test scores) and more specifically Spearman's "g" factor of general intelligence. Such generalizations are based upon an extremely narrow construction of IQ; and last

- 6) In general, I would say that Herrnstein and Murray engage in statistical impressionism. That is, they create an impression of "hard science" in their massing of data but most of it is either flawed, incomplete, or doesn't support their own conclusions. The impression of rigorous testing and thorough analysis is in reality a house of cards that quickly collapses under the weight of careful review.

My conclusion is fairly blunt: social Darwinism has shown itself to be amazingly resilient in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Given that fact, its restatement here should raise questions not about public welfare, IQ, racial differentiation, or the supposed rule by the best and brightest, but rather about the sociopolitical milieu in which these issues are raised. Herrnstein and Murray's data is so flawed, so spurious and yet so ardently insisted upon by the authors that I am led to wonder how the book passed a jury of peer review (assuming that it was even put through such scrutiny).

Nevertheless, the manuscript did pass some editorial scrutiny and the result is a book that is not only exasperating but infuriating. Perhaps most infuriating of all is the assertion that blacks are relegated to an intellectual determinism from which they cannot escape and for which society can and should do nothing. American society is stratified, say Herrnstein and Murray, no longer by wealth but by intelligence. Disregard the fact that status in this country rests upon a historical continuum (i.e. descendants of Americans of moderate to high wealth tend to rank commensurately in social and political status by virtue of their family contacts, schooling, business associations, etc.); disregard the fact that social mobility is contingent upon a variety of factors only one of which is intelligence; disregard the fact that, if indeed true, Herrnstein and Murray's own brand of genetic determinism precludes saying or doing anything about it; disregard the fact that many social

scientists argue against this kind of determinism; disregard the obvious tautology embedded in survival of the smartest (on par with Spencer's "survival of the fittest" — the smartest survive because the survivors are the smartest); disregard the unbridled materialism of a sweeping theory of society based upon brain tissue and neurological synapse.

Most infuriating of all are not these many exceptions Herrnstein and Murray ask of their readers but the suggestion that a truly equalitarian society is little more than a pipe dream. In all honesty it must be admitted too that those who would seek a radical cultural diversity and racial separation do have something in common with the authors: both would suggest that the kind of equal rights and integration agenda put forth by Martin Luther King, Jr. and others are at best misguided and at worst counter-productive. Those putting forth their respective race-based programs have steadily opposed the now beleaguered "melting pot" idea of American society. Yes, I believe Herrnstein and Murray would share some fundamentally common ground with Louis Farrakhan. In my opinion the definitive statement on the subject of multiculturalism has been given in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s *The Disuniting of America* (1992). Herrnstein, Murray, and Farrakhan would not like the book. It says that America should be (even if it has not been in fact) a nation defined by *e. pluribus unum*, and that this concept is more than just elementary school civics rhetoric — it is a real albeit elusive ideal, one that is both unique in the annals of history and quite fragile. Racial separatism is not new and can be traced in this country to extremists of all colors, notable examples of which include the fire-eater Edmund Ruffin's white supremacist fanaticism and Marcus Garvey's exclusionary United Negro Improvement Association. More recently the assault on the notion of integration and social equality has gained new voices, and is probably the outgrowth of a political milieu (both right- and left-wing) which has shelved the tenets of democratic liberalism upon which this nation was based. To claim that these Enlightenment ideals have yet to be fulfilled *is not nor should it be* an indictment against them.

It should come as no surprise, then, when Herrnstein and Murray chide John Locke as "strikingly indifferent to the source of cognitive differences" (p. 530) and immediately follow with an interpolation of this greatest of seventeenth century English thinkers as proclaiming essentially negative rights. This is utter nonsense. Locke's prime message in his influential *Two Treatises of Government* (1690) was that all men have natural rights to life and liberty which he viewed as conferred by a law of nature — *these are hardly negative rights!* The contractual consent under which the rulers and ruled should operate, according to Locke, imply that government has an obligation to protect these rights. Thus Herrnstein and Murray's assertion that Locke insisted upon a proscription against government action — in their words, natural rights that "give all human beings the right *not* to have certain things done to them by the state" — is only half right. It is equally true (and indeed more common historically) that when those in authority who are charged with the duty of protecting life and liberty see those natural rights jeopardized in the public or private sector, they are obligated to intercede in behalf of those citizens' rights.

These are the tenets upon which this country was founded, and despite these learned social scientists' insistence that "The Founders wrote frankly about the inequity of men," Locke's ideas have been the cornerstone of liberalism in modern society. So concerned were America's Founders with liberty that they intentionally allowed for an amendment process to the Constitution; such concerns lie at the heart of the 13th through the 15th amendments and a host of civil rights legislation and judicial rulings too numerous to mention here. Even with their eighteenth-century sensibilities for gentlemanly rank and propertied status, to the enduring credit of those who attended the Constitutional Convention in 1787 they admitted and allowed that ideas and constitutions should change. Thomas Hobbes, a far more negative thinker than Locke ever was and a political philosopher with whom the authors of *The Bell Curve* are more sympathetic, in his *Leviathan* (1651) calls "the life of man, solitary, nasty, brutish, and short." The implication throughout *The Bell Curve* is that life is precisely that for all but the self-defined "cognitive elite."

It is unfortunate and a bit frightening that men the caliber of Herrnstein and Murray need to be reminded of the basic tenets of American democratic thought; but it is indicative of the degree to which this nation's fundamental principles are being assailed, particularly from right-wing elements in society. It should come as no surprise that Charles Murray is a Bradley Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, one of the most conservative think tanks in the country.

Be that as it may, the authors tell us at the very beginning that they designed the book to be read on three levels: 1) the reader can simply assume they've done their homework and read the short précis at the beginning of each chapter; 2) they can read the text in its entirety; or 3) they can read the book in its entirety — chapters, appendices, and citations. This book evokes a three tiered approach that is more than procedural, however. On one level this book was written to be admission into Herrnstein and Murray's private club of the cognitive elite, for if you read them and agree with them then surely you must be (as I'm certain the authors must view themselves) one of the chosen few of God's brightest. After all you read their book! On another level it is exclusionary, for it plainly states that if you're not one of the chosen few then you deserve your status and very little can or should be done about it. Thus on this level the book serves to validate present social stratifications as the product of nature. On still another level the book can be read as a work that says much more about the social attitudes which spawned it than it does about intelligence and class structure in American life. I opt for the last reading.

The Bell Curve is bad statistics, bad history, bad narrative, bad scholarship. Yet how could a book that bases its arguments on special pleadings for its data, that makes two huge false extrapolations, that engages in a surprising degree of statistical nonsense, that rests on insufficient technical and methodological analysis, and that generally supports its conclusions impressionistically rather than empirically get into print in the first place? The answer has already been suggested: It is indicative of a general social and political direction that has been pointing backward since the Reagan years. The reasons for this trend are complex and open

to debate, but simplistic answers and superficial accusations are more likely be the product of false extrapolations (i.e. confusions of correlation and causation) than based upon solid analysis. Yet this trend is real and is in serious need of being recognized and addressed. The reading public should be alert to the fact Herrnstein and Murray merely put academic window dressing on ideas at least as old as Herbert Spencer and as new as David Duke. Those who applaud the publication of such a work, the success enjoyed by the American Enterprise Institute which supported it, and the Free Press which has marketed it should reflect on the popularity of *Mein Kampf* (another book which contained large doses of social Darwinism) during the flagging years of the Weimar Republic. Now there's a correlation worth noting!

Bibliographic Note

For those who would like to delve into this topic in greater detail, I suggest the collection of essays in *The Bell Curve Debate: History, Documents, Opinions*, edited by Russell Jacoby and Naomi Glauberman (New York: Times Books, 1995). Besides the articles by Gould and Walter already mentioned, Alan Ryan's "Apocalypse Now?"; K. C. Cole's "Innumeracy"; Leon J. Kamin's "Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics"; and Nell Irvin Painter's "A Large and Enduring Market" are especially informative.

For a general framework of analysis see David Hackett Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), especially his section on fallacies of generalization, pp. 103-130.

Finally, all scholars (especially Herrnstein and Murray) would benefit from familiarizing themselves with some basic quantitative concepts and principles. Toward that end, Loren Haskins and Kirk Jeffrey, *Understanding Quantitative History* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990) is highly recommended.

Herbert Aptheker,
Anti-Racism in U.S. History:
The First Two Hundred Years
(Westport, 1993).

by
Eric R. Jackson

During the past twenty years, the amount of literature on the history of racism in the United States has expanded greatly. Many of these works claim that racism has gone virtually unchallenged by European Americans. In rejecting this assertion, Herbert Aptheker explores the existence of anti-racism sentiment among European Americans, from the 1600s to the 1860s. Aptheker defines racism as the "belief in the inherent, immutable, and significant inferiority of an entire physically characterized people . . . [both] emotional and ethical[ly]" (p. xiv). These notions have been applied to other races and people. However, this book asserts that within the history of the United States, the central focus of these characteristics has been directed toward persons of African descent.

Aptheker presents three main themes: anti-racism sentiment is more common among the lower classes; anti-racism activities seem to appear among groups of European Americans who have had extensive contact with African Americans; and anti-racism attitudes are more likely to be held by women than men. These generalizations, the author contends, support the claim that "anti-racism among white people in the United States . . . has been significant beginning in the colonial epoch and continuing through the twentieth century" (p. xiii).

The book explores several intriguing topics. For example, the author describes the various episodes of interracial slave and indentured servant rebellions that occurred in both the colonial and antebellum periods. He discusses a joint resistance slave revolt in Virginia in 1663, Nathaniel Bacon's rebellion of 1676, a slave rebellion in Mississippi in 1835, and the participation of European Americans in several slave revolts in Maryland, between 1800 and 1860. Aptheker concludes that these types of joint struggle "persisted throughout the era of slavery" (p. 37).

The author also examines the attitudes and actions of European Americans who espoused anti-racism sentiment between 1770 and 1820. Individuals such as Anthony Benezet, Samuel Hopkins, John Jay, Thomas Paine, James Oglethorpe, and Benjamin Rush continuously spoke out on the question of slavery and racism. These Americans set the tone for others to follow. But more important, the activities and writings of these individuals indicate "how widespread . . . the rejection of racist postulates" ventured (p. 105).

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The author next explores the early years of the abolition movement. He notes that in the 1820s and the 1830s many European and African American abolitionists found themselves, directly and indirectly, involved in a joint struggle to end slavery and racism. This occurred partly because most of these abolitionists believed that an attack on slavery often meant a commitment "to the rejection of racism" (p. 125). However, racist attitudes persisted even among the whites who participated in the abolition movement. Among those committed to the elimination of slavery and racism were people—both famous and obscure, men and women—such as Lyman Beecher, Maria Child, William Lloyd Garrison, Angelina and Sarah Grimke, Laura S. Haviland, William Jay, Lucretia Mott, Charles Olcott, Charles Sumner, and Theodore Weld. Despite the persistence of racist attitudes, these European Americans were fully "committed to [the] struggle against racism" (p. 129).

Aptheker's book ends with a discussion on the interplay of race and politics in the 1850s and the 1860s. He notes that, in these years, racism played a very significant role in the political and social crisis of the nation. In the first few years of the Civil War, anti-African American sentiment intensified, in both the North and South. However, several European Americans continued their campaign to end slavery and racism. Aptheker concludes that those who participated in this struggle, either believed "that a positive outcome of the war required the ending of slavery" or were part of a "radical" group in cities such as Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, and St. Louis that saw the linkage between slavery and racism (p. 177). In addition, many of these individuals believed that they were involved in a class struggle, between the city's rich and poor.

This is a well researched and lucidly written book on a subject that has received only scant treatment. It covers a wide range of important issues, from the origin of racism in the United States to the racial attitudes of white abolitionists. The author also explores the interplay of racism and politics before and during the Civil War. However, there are occasional repetitions and Aptheker fails to examine the economic dimension of racism and racist attitudes.¹ Also, more attention is needed on the application of racist notions toward Native Americans. Despite these shortcomings, in general, this unique and highly significant book adds much to our understanding of the origins of racism in the United States, a subject that is very relevant today, to both scholars and the general public.

Endnotes

1. For a more economic based definition of racism see Manning Marable, *How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America* (Boston, 1983); and Cornel West, "Marxist Theory and the Specificity of Afro-American Oppression," in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, eds. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana, 1988), 17-29.

Vine Deloria, Jr.,
Custer Died for Your Sins
(Norman, Oklahoma, 1988).

by
Sara M. Brandt and Michael Washington

Throughout history Native Americans have dealt with broken treaties, empty promises and the greed of the government. Over two decades ago, Vine Deloria, Jr. published *Custer Died For Your Sins*, and in 1988 republished it with a new preface. There have been many changes in the "Indian World" since the first publication, but not enough, which is the reason why there was a new publication. Deloria feels that "it makes good sense to keep Custer in print until enough people come to understand Indians' attitudes toward their treatment and begin to take action on behalf of the tribes" (pp. ix, x). Some of the points Deloria made two decades ago influenced federal policy, "in particular the subcontracting provisions of P.L. 635 which allowed tribal governments to assume responsibility for some of the functions of the Bureau of Indian Affairs" (p. viii). The government did, however, find ways to override the efforts to expand and improve programs for the people on the reservations.

Deloria expected that organizations such as the Indian Rights Association, which raised large amounts of money, would be replaced in the future by new groups who would actually use the money raised and the tribes would see results with different programs. There have been positive outcomes with successful groups, such as the Native American Rights Fund, emerging in the legal field. Several other organizations have developed in various fields and have survived the loss of some very wise and influential leaders such as Verne Gagne and Stan Steiner. On the other hand there has been little change in public attitude toward Indians all these years, especially when it involves historic and religious traditions and rights. For example, some pickup truck owners express resentment over Indian fishing and hunting rights with bumper stickers, found mostly in Wisconsin and Michigan, reading: "Save the deer, shoot an Indian" (p. ix).

There has been an escalation in the number of people showing interest in Indian culture, and many Indians have objected to the commercialization of Indian tradition. Deloria states, nevertheless, that if Indian culture "influences people to deal more kindly with the earth and the various life forms on it, then there should be few complaints about its impact on people's lives and practices" (p. xi). Today,

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Deloria writes, Indian tribes "stubbornly hold on to what is important to them and discard what they feel is irrelevant to their current needs. Traditions die hard and innovation comes hard. Indians have survived for thousands of years in all kinds of conditions. They do not fly from fad to fad seeking novelty. That is what makes them interesting" (p. 16). This example is a good illustration of how Deloria's writing affirms Indian self-respect and pride and a strong belief in Indian heritage.

There are a number of pages devoted to what Deloria calls "Indian humor." For instance, Custer was fond of wearing "an Arrow shirt" (p. 149), and when an Indian saw Columbus landing, he said: "Maybe if we leave them alone they will go away" (p. 148). Even the title of the book was originally meant as a pun on the National Council of Churches. "Custer Died For Your Sins" was originally designed as a bumper sticker referring to the Sioux Treaty of 1868. In this treaty, according to Deloria, the United States "pledged to give free and undisturbed use of the lands claimed by Red Cloud in return for peace. Under the covenants of the Old Testament, breaking a covenant called for a blood sacrifice for atonement. Custer was the blood sacrifice for the United States breaking the Sioux treaty" (p. 148).

The book provides an extensive discussion of the government policy of termination of tribes. Termination was designed to provide the "answer" (p. 55) to all Indian problems. When it proved not to be a solution, Congress continued the policy nevertheless as a means of acquiring tribal lands and saving federal funds. Essentially, tribes who were terminated had all federal assistance stopped. One of the serious effects of this was that a number of people died as a result of unavailable health services. In July, 1970, President Richard Nixon's message to Congress declared "the official disavowal of termination as a formal goal of the federal government" (p. viii). With the increase of interest in Indian culture, hopefully there will be greater appreciation for the Indian. Until then, this book should be read by all, for knowledge is the key for change since the medicine man cannot cure everything.

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