

JOURNAL OF THE ALPHA BETA PHI
CHAPTER OF PHI ALPHA THETA

**Perspectives
in
HISTORY**

EDITOR

Mary Beth Patterson

ASSISTANT EDITORS

Terry A. Leap II

Brian K. Puddy

Dawn R. Hollifield

ADVISOR

James A. Ramage

Perspectives in History is an annual scholarly publication of the Department of History and Geography. Opinions expressed by contributors do not necessarily reflect the views of the NKU Board of Regents, the faculty of the university, or the student editors of the journal. Manuscripts are welcome from students and faculty.

Send all articles, essays and book reviews to:

Northern Kentucky University
History/Geography Department
Highland Heights, KY 41099
copyright 2000

Acknowledgement of cover art:

Photography by Joseph Ruh of the World Peace Bell, Newport, Kentucky, dedicated January 1, 2000.

CONTENTS

Perspectives in History

Vol. XV, 1999-2000

LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

5 *Brian K. Puddy*

FOREWORD

9 *Mary Beth Patterson*

ARTICLES

- 11 Truman's Decisions: Invasion, Unconditional Surrender,
and Dropping the Atomic Bomb
Brian K. Puddy
- 22 Robert F. Kennedy: Transformation from Conservative to Liberal
Mary Beth Patterson
- 44 President Lyndon Johnson and Domestic Politics:
Conflicting Historical Viewpoints Since 1985
Rob Langenderfer
- 56 Noble Experiment: Baseball Integration, 1945-1947
Mark E. Garbett, Jr.
- 64 Revolutionary Inequality: An Exploration of the Persistence
of Class Divisions in Revolutionary France
Susan Conrady

BOOK REVIEWS

- 81 *A History of Blacks in Kentucky, Volume 1:
From Slavery to Segregation, 1760-1891,*
by Marion B. Lucas
review by Ronald E. Foltz
- 84 *Making Malcolm: The Myth and Meaning of Malcolm X,*
by Michael Eric Dyson
review by Joseph E. Brown II

FILM REVIEW

- 86 *Follow the River,*
review by Mark E. Garbett, Jr.

90 OFFICERS

91 MEMBERS

LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

As President of Alpha Beta Phi Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta, it is my distinct honor and privilege to welcome you to Volume XV of *Perspectives in History*. This journal is one of the activities in which our Chapter takes most pride. However, it would not be possible without the incredible commitment of time and energy devoted to it by some very talented people. First, thank you students and faculty for submitting articles and book and film reviews for publication. We also recognize the devotion of Dr. James Ramage to this volume and all previous volumes, which speaks volumes in itself to his importance to this journal, this Chapter, and indeed, the organization at large. We also owe a debt of gratitude to Mary Beth Patterson for the long hours she devoted to the journal as Editor. As we are certain you will see, the hard work and devotion of these people will be readily apparent as you find your way through what we believe to be a quality scholarly journal. We hope you will find it both beneficial and enjoyable.

The Chapter had a very successful year, participating in a wide variety of worthwhile projects and activities. In 1999 we again won the national Best Chapter Award, for the seventh time in the last eight years. For this, the Chapter received a cash stipend of \$250 that we donated to books for Special Collections in the W. Frank Steely Library. *Perspectives in History* won runner-up honors for the 1999 Gerald D. Nash Student Journal Award. For the Nash Award we received \$100 to defray expenses in publication of this year's journal. On May 4, 1999 in the annual Student Organization Celebration Awards for student organizations at NKU, the Chapter won—for the second straight year—the Merit Award, as one of the top ten student organizations on campus. As well, we won the Award of Distinction, the top award, given to the student organization with “the most outstanding program in all achievement areas,” that “has shown evidence of a commitment to excellence at NKU.” Awards such as this and the Best Chapter Award would not be possible were it not for Dr. James Ramage, who was honored with the Outstanding Faculty Advisor Award. Congratulations Dr. Ramage for a richly deserved honor.

The Chapter was again privileged to co-sponsor the Military History Lecture Series with Regents Professor Dr. Michael C. C. Adams, Director, and Adjunct Professor Bonnie W. May, Coordinator. This year, Bonnie invited veterans organizations and advanced placement high school students, heightening public awareness, and enabling us to set new attendance records. The first lecture was on September 21, 1999 in Landrum Fifth Floor Auditorium, and was given by Dr. Frank Stallings, Professor Emeritus of Literature at NKU. Dr. Stallings presented a wonderful account of army life entitled, “An Unmilitary History: the Cold War in Germany, 1952-1953.” The second lecture was by Dr. Robert Lilly, Regents Professor of Sociology, on “Rape in Wartime.” This was on October 21, 1999 in the fifth floor of Landrum Hall, drawing a large crowd and stimulating discussion. The final lecture of the fall semester was on November 10, 1999, and began at 7:00 PM

enabling more people from the community to attend. Charles F. Hinds gave the lecture "Patton Trooper: 'I Was There,'" on his book *Patton Trooper*. Mr. Hinds is the former State Librarian and served under General George S. Patton during World War II. The attendance was the largest ever for the series, with over 240 people, requiring the use of the larger auditorium in the BEP building. Mr. Hinds sold and signed seventeen books and donated a portion of his receipts to the Chapter.

The Spring Semester kicked off with a lecture from the History and Geography Department's own Dr. Francois LeRoy on February 10, 2000. His lecture, "France and the Mirage of Grandeur and Independence," was based on his University of Kentucky doctoral dissertation on the diplomatic history of the Mirage III/5 jet fighter. The lecture was given in the first floor auditorium of Landrum and was very well attended. The fifth lecture of the year was a very poignant discussion entitled "'Breaking the Cycle of Violence and War:' Political Forgiveness in International Relations." Dr. Jerry Richards, Chair of the Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Philosophy, presented this paper on March 23, 2000 in Landrum's first floor auditorium. Dr. Richards also serves on the Executive Committee of Concerned Philosophers for Peace, a national organization. The final lecture was held on April 20, 2000, in BEP auditorium. Dr. Michael D. Pearlman, Associate Professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, presented "The Atom Bomb: The Truth at Last." His probing discussion was a great climax to a very successful season for the Military History Lecture Series. At the sixteenth annual banquet of the Chapter on April 11, 2000, Dr. Adams and Professor May presented specially designed coffee mugs to Interim Provost Dr. Rogers Redding, Interim Dean Dr. Gail Wells and other supporters of the series.

The Chapter also sponsored three very interesting and well attended field trips. The first was a trip to the "Mysteries of Egypt" exhibit at the Cincinnati Museum Center on Sunday, October 10, 1999. It was the first field trip by the Chapter in which we invited another student organization to participate, at our expense. The Student Anthropology Association accepted our invitation and this made it the largest field trip, with twenty-seven people attending, including Dr. Sharlotte Neely, Professor of Anthropology. The exhibit was very extensive and included a reproduction of the Burial Chamber of King Tutankhamen. The next trip, to Camp Dennison east of Cincinnati, on November 6, 1999, attracted twenty-six people, including former NKU President, Dr. Frank Steely, History and Geography Department Chair Dr. Robert Vitz, and Dr. Michael Adams, former Chair, Regents Professor and Military History Lecture Series Director. A camp official in Union uniform gave us a guided walking tour of the camp, and the museum had many Civil War artifacts and photographs. The final field trip on Saturday, March 4, 2000 was to the Kentucky History Center in Frankfort. A special thanks to Dr. Ramage for driving to what turned out to be a very extensive exhibit. We were treated to a live performance by a re-enactor portraying an early Kentucky Native American fighter.

Our treasury in University Accounting was successfully replenished by our fund-raising activities. The annual Halloween and Valentine's Day Bake Sales were very successful and a special thanks goes out to all those who took time out to bake or work the sale. The annual Phi Alpha Theta Book Sale, March 1 and 2, was a rousing success. We worked hard but earned \$512.30 during the two-day event. Our sincere thanks goes out to the faculty and alumni who donated hundreds of fine books and to the students who sorted books on Sunday afternoon and those who worked the sale.

The Chapter took a leading role in philanthropic and volunteer activities during the year. Several members volunteered to work the Traveling Vietnam Memorial Wall at Crestview Hills Mall in Edgewood, Kentucky. It was a truly moving and fulfilling experience for all those that participated. On December 8, 1999, we sponsored a Christmas Reception and Canned Food Drive in the department office. We served sandwiches and other food and collected a large quantity of goods and \$5 in cash for the Parish Kitchen in Covington. That success inspired our new campus-wide initiative called "Project Spring Share," April 19, 2000. This was a soup drive in which all student organizations on campus were invited to participate. We collected over 2000 cans of soup and other non-perishables for free food stores in Covington and Cincinnati. Very special thanks go to Prof. Bonnie May for her efforts in developing and coordinating this event. Thank you goes to Terry Leap for 376 cans of soup and tuna through your students at Calvary Christian School and for your logistical assistance.

The Chapter participated in the Phi Alpha Theta Regional Conference on March 25, 2000 at Georgetown College. Eight members attended and three gave papers. Mary Beth Patterson presented "Robert F. Kennedy: Transformation from Conservative to Liberal;" Mark Garbett spoke on "The Noble Experiment: Baseball Integration 1945-1947;" and I presented "Truman's Decisions: Invasion, Unconditional Surrender, and the Dropping of the Atomic Bomb." Dr. Ramage drove the University van, and we enjoyed discussing a wide range of topics on the trip down and back.

The annual Phi Alpha Theta Faculty-Student Picnic was on Sunday, May 16, 1999 at the home of Bonnie and Jim May. We provided the food, and several faculty members and their families attended. On September 15, 1999, we hosted a Welcome Back Reception in the Department for the staff and faculty.

I would like to thank all those that have helped make this a successful year. A very special thanks goes to Dr. Robert Vitz and the faculty of the History and Geography Department for all of their help and support of all our activities. To Jan Rachford, Tonya Skelton and Tara Higgins of our department staff, we owe a debt of gratitude for assisting with mailings, help with the journal, and countless other things. I would like to thank all the officers for this year: Vice-President Ann Reckers, Secretary Wendy Bradley, Treasurer Jann Irwin, Historian Jennifer Gerding, Journal Editor Mary Beth Patterson, Assistant Journal Editor Terry Leap, Assistant Journal Editor Dawn Hollifield, and all the members of the Chapter for their help in the work and

planning for our activities. Another special thanks goes to Dr. Jonathan Reynolds for his invaluable help in updating our homepage. We are especially thankful because, with the help Dr. Reynolds, we are preparing to post this and future volumes of the journal on our Alpha Beta Phi web site: www.nku.edu/~phi. Thank you Daniel Pickett for your help with this project. I would certainly be remiss if I did not also pay a debt of gratitude to Prof. Bonnie May for all her help, advice, and encouragement. To have someone of her many talents across the hall was truly an asset, and I cannot begin to adequately recognize you, Bonnie, except to say, thank you.

Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Ramage for making this one of the most rewarding experiences I have ever had. It should be recognized that Dr. Ramage published *Gray Ghost: The Life of Col. John Singleton Mosby* at the beginning of the school year. The book has been a complete success and has entered its second printing, keeping Dr. Ramage busy on the Book Tour for a large part of the year. However, as busy as he was, he continued to place the Chapter ahead of his own personal success. To say I have learned how a true scholar conducts and carries himself would be an understatement - I have learned so much more. Thank you very much, Dr. Ramage, for all your help and guidance.

In closing I would like to say how honored I have been to serve as your President this academic year. The trust and faith that so many have put in me has helped make this a fulfilling and rewarding experience. I hope that the Chapter is as well off as it was when I inherited the post last year. And if it is better off, it is due to the quality of people that I have come into contact with throughout my term. It is my sincere wish that you may enjoy, learn and profit from the scholarly works inside these pages.

*The things will perhaps be known to me some day,
or have been once, according as fortune may have
brought me to the places where they were made clear.*

Michel de Montaigne - On Man

Brian Puddy
President

FOREWORD

As we ready for the publication of this year's journal, I have been spending a great deal of time reflecting on the past year and my experiences as editor for Alpha Beta Phi Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta and this edition of *Perspectives in History*. I have learned so much and I know that I will carry this with me for the rest of my life. What began as a duty swiftly became a privilege as I began to work with so many learned and talented professors and fellow students. I personally owe thanks to so many that it would be difficult to mention them all. I must however use this space and time to publicly thank at least a few.

To Dr. James Ramage, Regents Professor of History and Faculty Advisor of Phi Alpha Theta, I owe a debt of gratitude first and foremost for his role as my academic advisor (I could have asked for none better) and for his confidence in my abilities as a writer and editor. He is an inspiration to all that learn to know him and I consider it a privilege to have been able to work with him.

To Dr. Michael C.C. Adams, Regents Professor of History and Director of the Military History Lecture Series, thanks are owed on behalf of the entire history department and the University for the fascinating lectures he has organized for our edification. On a personal level, I owe him a great debt for convincing me to add a second major in history to my degree and for nominating me for both awards and scholarships. His encouragement has been of inestimable value to me.

To Dr. Robert Vitz, Chair of the History and Geography Department, the members of Alpha Beta Phi Chapter and NKU students of history as a whole I owe a debt for their unflinching moral, scholastic and financial support. To Dr. Gail Wells, Interim Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, we owe gratitude for support and encouragement. To Kathy Stewart and University Communications, to Kathy Dawn and Printing Services, and to University photographer Joe Ruh who provided the cover art, we offer our thanks for their professionalism and excellent work. This publication would be impossible without them.

The Editors are grateful to everyone who is assisting in publication of *Perspectives in History* on the Internet. President Brian Puddy and Dan Pickett are relying on the expertise of Dr. Jonathan Reynolds, Assistant Professor of History, in accomplishing the technical feat of up-dating the journal on the Chapter's home page and entering the journal on line. Thanks to Ron Ellis, Kathy Stewart, Sara Sidebottom, and Dr. Ramage for exploring the legal aspects.

To the administrative staff of our department, Jan Rachford and Tonya Skelton, and to our student assistant Tara Higgins—well, words simply cannot express how invaluable they are to us all. Not only do they work tirelessly to meet the official needs of the department, they are always willing to drop whatever they are doing to assist both professors *and* students—and they do it with grace and cheerful willingness. Such things simply should not be taken for granted in a world where they are so rare.

To the rest of the History and Geography Department, I must express both my thanks and admiration. As a University we have been blessed to attract some of the best, and without doubt, the brightest minds in the disciplines of history and geography. I would challenge anyone to sit under the tutelage of these fine men and women and compare them with any other department faculty in the world. I have been both inspired and edified in my own quest to be a teacher by the attitudes and scholarship of every one. I thank you all for the many hours of learning and enjoyment we have shared.

The writings contained in this journal are some of the finest I have read. Would that we could present every paper submitted in original form, but that simply isn't possible. I am sure Dr. Ramage would agree that editing can be a tortuous process when faced with such gifted composition. Nevertheless, the end result, which you will find in this edition of *Perspectives*, is a compilation that I am proud to be a part of, as a contributor, but especially as an editor. This experience is one that I will treasure and I am grateful to all that made my participation possible. Now, open wide the following pages and enjoy!

Mary Beth Patterson
Editor

Truman's Decisions: Invasion, Unconditional Surrender, and Dropping the Atomic Bomb

**by
Brian K. Puddy**

The dropping of the atomic bomb in 1945 may well have been one of the most important acts in world history, certainly at least in the history of the twentieth century. It was an event that has elicited a great deal of debate as to its necessity in ending World War II and on the morality of the act itself. In the past thirty years, scholars have closely scrutinized the decision-making process. Revisionist interpretations of the decision to drop the bomb have ranged from condemnations as an immoral diplomatic stunt to an overt racist act. My attempt here is to explain the process that led to the use of the atomic bomb and to evaluate the decision in the context of those momentous days in August 1945.

The Manhattan Project started as a response to fears expressed by scientists about a possible atomic bomb program under way in Nazi Germany.¹ From that point, the American program picked up considerable momentum. By 1944, tens of thousands of people were working on the project and enormous resources had been used. President Franklin Roosevelt had steered the program on one assumption: The United States would develop and use the atomic bomb before the Nazis did.

The assumption that the bomb would be used in combat prevailed over the entire program, and few voices offered alternative views. One question historians wrestle with is what kind of planning was devised for possible use of the bomb in the Pacific theater? In September 1944, Undersecretary of War Robert Patterson was one of the few people to propose an alternative to military use after Germany was defeated.² At about the same time, Roosevelt, after hearing of Neil Bohrs' recommendations of a similar strategy to deal with Germany, wondered aloud if the atom bomb should be used on Japan without a demonstration first.³ This statement might appear indicative of a search to find alternatives, but as historian Barton F. Bernstein has noted, it is striking that in the first few years of the Manhattan Project the chief policy makers, including the President, offered very few alternative views. Only twice in four years did the President express even the slightest reservation about the use of the new weapon.⁴

One might argue that uncertainty over whether the project would successfully build an atomic bomb tended to quell that aspect of the debate. However, by September 1944, hundreds of millions of dollars had already been spent on the project. There had to have been at least some confidence in the project to have

Brian K. Puddy, History and Social Studies major, and President of Alpha Beta Phi Chapter, delivered this paper on March 25, 2000 at the Phi Alpha Theta Regional meeting at Georgetown College.

warranted that kind of expenditure. Even if a few officials in the military and the administration had reservations about the success of the program, there certainly were more than a few scientists who did not. Secretary of War Henry Stimson felt the same optimism, and he was the principal civilian overseeing the project. He told Roosevelt that a “war trial” was the only way he could determine if all of the new technologies that had been developed would work or not.⁵ The President was open to use in either theater. It might, “after mature consideration, be used against the Japanese,” he told British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.⁶ The only question left to policy-makers, according to Stimson, was not whether to use the bomb, but how to control nuclear weapons afterward.⁷ These were the operating assumptions going into April 1945.

The stakes were great indeed, and a totally new player was about to enter the scene. Harry S. Truman, who had been a senator from Missouri and a compromise Vice Presidential nominee in 1944, was completely unprepared to fill the void left by the death of Franklin Roosevelt. He wrote: “I felt the moon, the stars and all the planets had fallen upon me.”⁸ Whether it was the need for secrecy or a lack of confidence on Roosevelt’s part, Truman was completely in the dark about even the basic goals of the Manhattan Project. Truman had only ten meetings with Roosevelt before his death and at no time did they discuss key policy matters, such as atomic weapons.⁹ However, the new President brought with him a valuable trait that even Roosevelt did not possess—experience in battle. Truman had seen the horrors of the foot soldier on the western front during World War I and had seen men die. That experience shaped Truman’s view of war in ways that would profoundly influence his thinking in the summer of 1945.¹⁰

History is full of defining moments. On April 13, 1945 the headline of the *New York Times* declared: “President Roosevelt is Dead; Truman to Continue Policies.” Perhaps few headlines have underscored the reality of the situation as much as this one. Truman was committed to all policies initiated by Roosevelt, and reticent to change them. He attempted to follow FDR’s policies as best he could interpret them. As he wrote later, “It would have been sheer nonsense to expect anything else.”¹¹

Truman was given a short briefing on S-1, the code name for the Manhattan Project, by Stimson shortly after becoming President. James Byrnes, Director of War Mobilization and presidential advisor, described to Truman the possible power of the new weapon, but warned that it might fail. On April 25, 1945, Stimson gave Truman a full briefing and predicted that the bomb might shorten the war. Stimson was a very adroit veteran politician, and he sensed that the President was slightly overwhelmed by this new responsibility. He recommended the formation of an Interim Committee to discuss post-war implications of the new weapon, and Truman agreed.¹²

As large as the program developed, secrecy dictated that only certain individuals in the political/military establishment have full knowledge of it. The Operation Division of the War Department (OPD), where much of the strategic planning originated, had no knowledge of the project. OPD had made evaluations of the

Pacific war and in April 1944 had concluded that a blockade and air-war, by themselves, would not compel surrender. An invasion of the Japanese mainland was the only viable alternative. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had a comprehensive knowledge of the S-1 program, accepted their evaluation, having already made certain that plans for blockade, bombardment and invasion were fully underway by January. The S-1 was never mentioned in their planning. To them, the project was an experiment, and therefore would have the obvious conclusion in a war trial. Almost everyone, from the Office of the Secretary of War to the pilots training for the mission expected a war trial. Nevertheless, the experimental nature of the program and the risk of failure dictated that the military not include the project in its strategic planning.¹³

Secretary of War Stimson's staff formulated a basic strategic plan in July 1945. It included an intensified air and sea blockade of Japan, large-scale strategic bombing of the Japanese military/industrial infrastructure, and a November invasion of Kyushu (southern-most island of the mainland), followed in the spring with a 5,000,000-man invasion of Honshu, the main island of Japan.¹⁴ Again, S-1 was not mentioned in the plan. By 1945, Japan's air force and navy had been decimated, but its army still had over 2,000,000 men in mainland China, from Hong Kong to Dairan. Another 2,000,000 troops were ready on the Japanese mainland. Any invasion of Japan would likely bring many casualties.¹⁵

By June 1945, plans for a November invasion were proceeding. The President sailed to the Potsdam Conference to meet with Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin. There, on June 18, Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff; Adm. Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations; and Gen. Henry H. Arnold, Commander of the U.S. Army Air Corps, met with Truman and advised him to stay the course on plans for the Japanese invasion. They gave him the OPD projections of 31,000 casualties for the first one hundred days of operations. Marshall stated that these numbers were too optimistic, that casualties might run as high as 250,000 to 500,000 men, given the size of the operation and the strength of Japanese resistance at that point.¹⁶ His warning was not unrealistic given the 42,000 casualties on Okinawa. However, Marshall said that the invasion was the "only course to pursue."¹⁷ He and the others made these recommendations despite the fact that they and Truman had received news of the successful test at Alamagordo two days earlier.¹⁸

Much has been written about the numbers. Some have scoffed that the estimate of "lives saved" was exaggerated. However, Marshall's estimate does not seem implausible. Pentagon planners were revising casualty figures throughout 1945 based on new intelligence reports and casualties on Okinawa. Their estimates, which had not been completed by the Potsdam meeting on June 18, rose to 132,000 for the Kyushu invasion and another 90,000 for the Honshu operation.¹⁹ Yet, even with the growing casualty projections, invasion planning continued and Stimson and the Joint Chiefs advised the President to proceed with these plans, even after the success of the atom bomb test.²⁰ This was to be the largest island invasion in history.

Meanwhile, strategic plans for the use of the atomic bomb continued. The Interim Committee recommended by Stimson was formed, and it consisted of Stimson, as Chairman; Ralph A. Bard, Undersecretary of the Navy; Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD); James F. Byrnes, Presidential Adviser; William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State; Dr. Karl T. Compton, President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Chief of Field Service, OSRD; Dr. James B. Conant, Assistant to Dr. Bush; and George L. Harrison, Special Assistant to Stimson. The committee met on May 31, 1945, and Stimson explained, in the starkest terms, the reality of the situation: "Today's prime fact is war. Our great task is to bring this war to a prompt and successful conclusion."²¹ Thereafter, the committee operated on the general assumption that the bomb would be used when available. No other options were discussed in the meeting. However, at lunch Compton brought up the idea of a demonstration and the idea was soundly rejected. In the first place, it was generally accepted that a non-military demonstration would not dissuade the firmly entrenched military leaders in the Japanese government to surrender. Second, committee members feared that the Japanese might endanger the lives of American POW's by bringing them to the demonstration site. And finally, they had nagging doubts as to the successful detonation of the device during an air drop. If the demonstration was a dud, some committee members feared that it would only galvanize Japanese resistance.²² The next day, the committee drafted a memo on a preliminary strategy that stated, "the bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible, that it be used on a war plant surrounded by workers' homes, and that it be used without prior warning."²³

One component of the Interim Committee was the Scientific Panel, headed by Dr. Robert Oppenheimer and including the primary atomic bomb scientists, Dr. Enrico Fermi, Dr. Arthur H. Compton, and Dr. E.O. Lawrence. They concurred with the committee that a demonstration would not force Japan to surrender and therefore a war trial was necessary. However, some scientists outside the panel opposed a war trial. Oppenheimer told the committee that there were few dissenters in Los Alamos, and that dissension was centered in the Metallurgy Laboratory in Chicago.²⁴ Two weeks later the dissenters presented the Franck Report to the Scientific Panel. Drafted by by Dr. James Franck, Dr. Leo Szilard, and other scientists at Metlab, the report raised concern over possible diplomatic problems from a war trial and over post-war control of atomic energy.²⁵ On June 16, the Scientific Panel presented the report to the Interim Committee, recommending that it be rejected and that the committee proceed with plans for a war trial.²⁶

The only other alternative discussed in the spring and summer of 1945 was that of issuing a warning to Japan. At a White House meeting on June 18, Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy brought up the subject, but it was rejected because if, after a warning the bomb was a dud, Japanese resistance might stiffen. Military leaders, believing that a warning was impractical and that it would reduce shock value, favored a no warning policy.²⁷ The only context in which a warning was

realistically discussed was in relation to the planned invasion in November, well after the expected use of the bomb. Stimson referred to the possibility in his diary as “giving her (Japan) a warning after she had been sufficiently pounded with S-1”²⁸

The U.S. considered other war aims in the last two years of the war. Throughout 1944 and into 1945, the nation had the stated war aim of bringing the Soviet Union into the Pacific war. As invasion plans were being made for Kyushu, military planners hoped that Soviet entry would tie up Japanese troops on the Asian mainland that could otherwise be diverted to defend the homeland. At Yalta, Roosevelt had pressed Stalin for Soviet entry into the war with Japan. Stalin responded that he would enter the Pacific war three or four months after Germany’s defeat. Roosevelt did not inform the Soviets of the project. However, Stimson had told Roosevelt as early as September 1943 that the Soviets knew about it and that Soviet operatives had obtained bomb secrets and he reiterated this in December 1944. Roosevelt knew that the bomb had implications other than for ending the war. It would also give the U.S. leverage over the Soviets following the war’s end. As the torch passed to the new executive in April 1945, Stimson wondered if the invasion of Japan and Russian entry into the Pacific war would be as important if the bomb worked. Nevertheless, the official U.S. position, up to the surrender of Japan, was to encourage Soviet entry into the war in the Pacific.²⁹

Some scholars have suggested that the primary reason for using the atomic bomb was to intimidate the Soviets. Some cite the cavalier reference to the bomb in Stimson’s diary as a “master card” for post-war diplomacy.³⁰ Gar Alperovitz suggests that Japan was completely beaten by the summer of 1945 and would have surrendered after the Soviets entered the war. He refers to the Combined Intelligence Committee report that predicted the inevitability of Japanese defeat after Soviet entry. The problem with that theory, as Barton F. Bernstein points out, is that the same committee came to a similar conclusion about Germany’s imminent surrender in late 1944, and yet the Germans hung on until May 1945. Alperovitz concedes this fact when he reflects on Marshall’s comments to Truman at Potsdam that Soviet entry might be enough to compel surrender “at the time, or shortly thereafter, we land in Japan.” One can clearly see, however, that neither Marshall nor anyone else believed that Soviet entry on one day would compel surrender on the next. Japanese surrender was viewed in time frames of months, not weeks, and certainly not days.³¹

The entire concept of atomic diplomacy rests on the idea that intimidating the Soviets was the sole purpose in using the bomb. The premise assumes that diplomatic and military considerations were mutually exclusive, which is incorrect; and that underlying Americans’ stated objective to bring the Soviets into the war, there was also a schizophrenic desire to keep them out of the conflict. Yet, after he had been guaranteed Soviet entry at Potsdam, Truman wrote: “we’ll end the war a year sooner now, and think of the kids who won’t be killed.” This hardly sounds like a man obsessed with keeping the Soviets out of the war. It certainly can not be denied that policy makers realized that possession of nuclear weapons by the U.S. might

gain diplomatic concessions from the Soviets after the war. Nevertheless, this does not prove that intimidating the Soviets was the only reason to use the bomb. If that were the case, a demonstration with Soviet military leaders there as witnesses would have been more effective.³²

Another criticism of the decision to drop the bomb was retention of unconditional surrender terms by the Truman administration. Unconditional surrender had always been the stated objective of the government. Roosevelt felt it necessary to wipe out Japanese militarism.³³ Truman's V-E day radio address reiterated FDR's policy while indirectly expressing to the Japanese people that unconditional surrender did not mean their extermination or enslavement, but an end to their agony and suffering.³⁴ Some thought that dropping the unconditional surrender term would bring a quicker end to the war. Joseph Grew, Acting Secretary of State after Edward Stettenius resigned, suggested that the Emperor should be allowed to remain in power after the Japanese surrendered. Others wanted him tried as a war criminal. Some in the military suggested that if U.S. objectives could be met while keeping the Imperial house, why not do so? Truman accepted the idea in principle but wanted to wait until after the Potsdam Conference to issue the terms. The Joint Chiefs wanted to hold the declaration until just before the invasion. The Potsdam Declaration did not mention the Emperor, but stated that the Allies would recognize, "in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, a peacefully inclined and responsible government." Truman later told Stimson that if unconditional surrender appeared to be the only thing preventing peace after the declaration was issued, he would amend it.³⁵ Two days after the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, the Japanese government declared it "unworthy of public notice."³⁶ Some Japanese leaders regarded the declaration as a demonstration of weakness. Prime Minister Suzuki interpreted it as a signal of failing American resolve and encouragement to fight on.³⁷

Not every one in the Japanese government agreed with Suzuki, but peace seekers were in the minority. The Emperor sent Prince Honoye to Moscow to explore a mediated peace. U.S. intelligence agencies, monitoring transmissions between Tokyo and Moscow, discovered that when Japanese Ambassador Naotake Sato mentioned terminating the war, he was completely rebuffed by Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo. It was impossible to find any consensus on peace terms in Tokyo, Togo declared. Some historians have interpreted this as a mere delaying tactic, but, as Truman biographer Alonzo Hamby asks, how could the U.S. negotiate with Japan when no one appeared to be in charge? The Japanese peace overture to the Soviets had no support from the military hard-liners. In fact, Japanese military leaders probably did not even know of the initiative. Officials in Washington were convinced that hard-liners still held the balance of power in Tokyo and that the Moscow peace mission was a sham. Even if legitimate, the terms would have been unacceptable to the U.S. and its Allies since the Japanese were negotiating with the Soviets to retain occupied lands.³⁸ Other negotiations were underway in Bern, Switzerland between American representative Allan Dulles and a Japanese repre-

sentative. They agreed that the U.S. could privately accept the protection of the Imperial house on condition that Japan quickly surrender, but suddenly Japan broke off the negotiations because of political pressure by hard-liners in Tokyo.³⁹

What was going on in Tokyo in August 1945? In February, the War Cabinet and the Emperor had approved the “Homeland Battle Strategy Plan” calling for “a decisive battle in the homeland, even at the cost of the entire Japanese race.” Such dogged resistance seems to confirm Marshall’s casualty projections. The defense plan, like all proposals to the cabinet, required unanimous consent for approval. Emperor Hirohito seldom interceded, and he did not when peace initiatives were discussed and defeated by the military hard-liners. On August 6, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, but the cabinet was still divided on surrender three days later. All fifteen members insisted on retention of the Imperial house. War Minister Korechika Anami and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy required additional terms. They demanded that Japan be allowed to disarm itself, that war criminals be tried in Japanese courts, and that limits be placed on time and place for the occupation of Japan. None of these additional terms were acceptable to the U.S. On August 10, the cabinet was still divided, even after receiving news of the bombing of Nagasaki the previous day. For three hours military leaders attempted to persuade the others to fight on. Finally, Suzuki asked Hirohito to intercede, and he directed the cabinet to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The military leaders attempted a coup that was narrowly defeated, and on August 14, Japan surrendered, at last ending the war.⁴⁰

The reasons behind the Japanese surrender have been misinterpreted. Kido, an advisor to the emperor, reported to the Japanese people at the time that “the presence of the atomic bomb made it easier for us politicians to negotiate peace. Even then the military would not listen to reason . . . [until] the Emperor ordered them to do so.” Hirohito told Togo that further fighting was futile, “now that a weapon of this devastating power was used against us.”⁴¹ Premier Fumimaro Konoye believed that the war would have lasted until the end of the year and perhaps longer without the bomb.⁴²

Truman always maintained that the decision to drop the bomb “was up to me.”⁴³ Yet, in my opinion, the momentum and bureaucracy that developed around the project indicate that he was only along for the ride. All of the top military leaders recommended using the bomb, as did Winston Churchill.⁴⁴ No serious objections were raised.⁴⁵ In fact, as Bernstein argues, all of the possible alternatives to using it assume that there was an inclination in the high command to find alternatives, which is exactly contrary to the working assumption of “use-when-ready.”⁴⁶ All options mentioned were considered too risky.⁴⁷ Most policy makers were not even certain that the atomic bombings would compel surrender, and they were surprised when surrender came.⁴⁸ After investing two billion dollars on the program, money that could have gone to other vital war programs, Stimson wrote: “No man could have failed to use it and looked his countrymen in the eye.”⁴⁹

It is perfectly legitimate to question the morality of the decision to use the atomic bomb in 1945. It is just as legitimate to question the morality of nuclear weapons in general. However, are the weapons one uses the question, or should one look a little deeper? If the U.S. had not used the atom bomb would World War II, with thirty-five million deaths, really have been the “good war?”⁵⁰ Was it more morally correct to firebomb Dresden and Tokyo than to atom bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki?⁵¹ The answer is that war by its very nature is immoral. Modern humans believe themselves to be more civilized than their ancestors. Ironically, critics of the decision imply that people of the new millennium are more civilized than humanity in 1945. Can this be, when today’s smart weapons do exactly as they were designed and strike their “combatant” targets? Yet, the genius of these smart weapons does not realize that the seventeen-year-old Iraqi conscript it has just killed is as much an unwilling victim as the elderly woman or child killed by the atomic bombs in Japan. Is one any more civilized when he chooses these new technologies to kill people than were those who resorted to hand axes and machetes in Rwanda?⁵² Perhaps modern humans choose to blame the weapons rather than take a long look at themselves. Mahatma Ghandi gave us another alternative. Does one follow his peaceful advice or attempt to fight a “good war?” As long as one fights, one must face the immorality of war. If modern man continues making war, who can honestly question the decision to drop the bomb? The cold, hard facts are that the atomic bombs saved some lives and cost others. The alternatives were just as morally repugnant.

Endnotes

1. Albert Einstein to Franklin D. Roosevelt, August 2, 1939, in *The Manhattan Project: A Documentary Introduction to the Atomic Age*, comps. and eds., Michael B. Stoff, Jonathon F. Fanton, and R. Hal Williams (Philadelphia, 1991), 18.
2. Barton F. Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1995), 74: 138.
3. Memorandum, Vannever Bush to James B. Conant, in Stoff, et al, *Project*, 74.
4. Bernstein, "Atomic Bombings," 138.
5. Walter Smith Schoenberger, *Decision of Destiny* (Athens, Ohio, 1969), 45.
6. Aide-memoire of conversation, Roosevelt and Churchill, September 18, 1944, in Stoff, et al, *Project*, 70.
7. Henry Stimson diary, March 15, 1945, in Stoff, et al, *Project*, 84; Schoenberger, *Decision*, 46.
8. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs: Volume One; Year of Decisions* (Garden City, New York, 1955), 19.
9. Schoenberger, *Decision*, 110.
10. Alonzo Hamby, "Truman and the Bomb," *History Today*, August 1995, 19.
11. Truman, *Memoirs*, 82.
12. Truman, *Memoirs*, 87; Barton Bernstein, "Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb: A Reinterpretation," *Political Science Quarterly* (1975), 90: 36.
13. Schoenberger, *Decision*, 42-43.
14. Henry Stimson, "The Decision to Drop the Bomb," in Kai Bird and Lawrence Lifschultz, comps. and eds. *Hiroshima's Shadow* (Stone Creek, Connecticut, 1998), 204. Originally appeared in *Harper's Magazine*, February 1947.
15. Truman, *Memoirs*, 229; Stimson, "Decision," 203.
16. Truman, *Memoirs*, 417; Hamby, "Bomb," 22.
17. Minutes of meeting, June 18, 1945, in Stoff, et al, *Project*, 151.
18. Truman, *Memoirs*, 415.
19. Hamby, "Bomb," 20.
20. Truman, *Memoirs*, 415.
21. Arneson, Notes of Interim Committee, May 31, 1945, in Stoff, et al, *Project*, 105.

22. Compton, Recollections of Interim Committee discussions and the project, *ibid.*, 122.
23. Arneson, Notes of Interim Committee, June 1, 1945, *ibid.*, 127-128; Truman, *Memoirs*, 419.
24. Bernstein, "Atomic Bombings," 145; Schoenberger, *Decision*, 130.
25. The Franck Report, in Stoff, et al, *Project*, 140-145.
26. Bernstein, "A Reinterpretation," 38; Stimson, "Decision," 202.
27. Bernstein, "A Reinterpretation," 37-40; Stimson, "Decision," 202; Hamby, "Bomb," 20.
28. Stimson diary, June 26-30, 1945, in Stoff, et al, *Project*, 163; Stimson, "Decision," 204-207.
29. Bernstein, "A Reinterpretation," 42-43; Bernstein, "Atomic Bombings," 136.
30. Stimson diary, May 15, 1945, in Stoff, et al, *Project*, 104.
31. Gar Alperovitz, Robert L. Messer and Barton J. Bernstein, "Correspondence: Marshall, Truman, and the Decision to Drop the Bomb," *International Security* (1991), 16: 216-218; Alperovitz, "Historians Reassess: Did We Need to Drop the Bomb?" in Bird, et al, *Hiroshima's Shadow*, 8; Bernstein, "A Reinterpretation," 43.
32. Alperovitz, "Historians Reassess," 9; Bruce Loebs, "Hiroshima and Nagasaki: One Necessary Evil, One Tragic Mistake," *Commonweal*, August 18, 1995; Bernstein, "A Reinterpretation," 42.
33. Schoenberger, *Decision*, 93.
34. Truman, *Memoirs*, 207.
35. Minutes, "Committee of Three," June 12, 1945, in Stoff, et al, *Project*, 133; Bernstein, "A Reinterpretation," 53-56.
36. Stimson, "Decision," 208.
37. Brian L. Villa and John Bonnet, "Understanding Indignation: Gar Alperovitz, Robert Maddox, and the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," *Reviews in American History* (1996), 24: 531; Hamby, "Bomb," 20-22.
38. Stimson, "Decision," 204; Bernstein, "A Reinterpretation," 58-59.
39. Villa and Bonnet, "Understanding," 531-532.
40. Loebs, "Hiroshima," 15-16.
41. *Ibid.*, 16; Villa and Bonnet, "Understanding," 532.
42. Paul P. Gentile, "A-bombs, Budgets, and Morality: Using the Strategic Bombing Survey," *Air Power History* (1977), 44: 25.

43. Truman, *Memoirs*, 419.
44. Bernstein, "Atomic Bombings," 151.
45. Stimson, "Decision," 198.
46. Bernstein, "A Reinterpretation," 50.
47. Alperovitz, et al, "Correspondence," 220.
48. *Ibid.*, 218; Bernstein, "A Reinterpretation," 52-53.
49. Bernstein, "Atomic Bombings," 139; Stimson, "Decision," 210.
50. Encarta 99 CD-ROM, Windows 95 Ver., Microsoft Corp.
51. I.B. Holley Jr., "Second Guessing History," *Technology Review* (August/September 1995), 52-53.
52. Brian Doyle, "An Eye on History," *Commonweal*, August 18, 1995.

Robert F. Kennedy: Transformation from Conservative to Liberal

by
Mary Beth Patterson

This study of Robert Francis Kennedy's personal and political growth was prompted in large part by a lack of knowledge. In reading about the era of the sixties in William H. Chafe's *The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II* (New York, 1991) I was intrigued by the seemingly contradictory behaviors that were cited concerning Robert Kennedy. I had heard bits and pieces about the "ruthless" Bobby, and his part in the notorious Mafia/Teamster investigations of the 1960s. I had a vague recollection of the perception of RFK as a forerunner in the civil rights movement and of the sadness and horror brought about by his assassination. What I never had heard much about was the man himself. What better way to find out about this enigmatic man than to explore his seemingly quixotic change from conservative to liberal?

What I have discovered in the process of writing this paper is that there was nothing precipitous or sudden about his perceived liberalism. It was simply a continuance of development, an evolution of wisdom and the fulfillment of who he truly was, even as a child. Less than opportunism, this change was a final parting from the Robert Kennedy who was an administrator and an investigator, and the coming into power of Robert Kennedy the active politician.

I am sure that the fact that I grew up in a Roman Catholic, Irish, Democratic family had an effect on my point of view in writing this paper. I grew up well aware of the Kennedy persona, both because of my heritage, and because much of my childhood was spent in the era of the sixties. I also have realized in researching this topic that the ideologies that RFK espoused in his last years are very similar to my own. Though I suppose that most would consider me a conservative in today's political arena, I feel that I am much more a combination of the two camps, much like Robert Kennedy. Whether there is gender bias involved in my research, I am less certain. I know that I tend to look to a person's emotional and psychological background for motivations, and this made RFK a very appropriate subject.

Of all of the politicians in the recent history of the United States, Robert Francis Kennedy may very well have been the most adored, as well as the most vilified of them all. He was, at the very least, one of the most controversial. In John Phillips' review of a biography on RFK, he stated when referring to RFK's candidacy in the 1968 presidential primary campaign that, "In three months Bobby had evoked

Mary Beth Patterson, a Senior History and Secondary Education/Social Studies major, is a member of Alpha Beta Phi Chapter and Editor of *Perspectives in History*, Volumes XV and XVI. She presented this paper at the Phi Alpha Theta Regional meeting at Georgetown College on March 25, 2000.

intense feelings of love and hate that it took Franklin D. Roosevelt eight years to achieve.”¹ Among his contemporaries, there were those who saw him as a hypocrite; others simply saw him as a man who had become open to new points of view. Some believed him to be a ruthless, cold, and unforgiving politician. He has been touted as the most feared politician of his times and as the consummate demagogue “to whom little mattered but victory.”² Others knew him to be emotional, compassionate, honest and moral. For some, his political career stood as a testimony to the ultimate in rhetorical manipulation and blatant opportunism. Still others perceived him as someone who could, when he allowed his inherent emotionalism to show forth, move angry crowds to tears and motivate the apathetic to feats of altruism. How is it that one man could unleash such varied reactions?

Perhaps the answer lies in Kennedy’s own changing perceptions over the last two decades of his life. Robert Kennedy began his political career as an ultra-conservative, interning under the notoriously fanatical anti-Communist, Senator Joseph P. McCarthy. By the end of his life he had become a politically progressive champion of the underprivileged whom historian, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., christened the “tribune of the underclass.”³ How did such a change come about? What truly motivated him, both as a man and as a politician? In order to find an answer to these questions it is necessary to understand how Robert F. Kennedy became the man that he was.

Robert Francis Kennedy was born in Brookline, Massachusetts in 1925. He was the seventh of nine children, a rather daunting place to begin life in any family, but even more so within the boisterous and over-achieving Kennedy clan. Moreover, the novelty and charm of having yet another child had worn off by the time Robert came along. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. quotes Robert’s mother, Mrs. Rose Kennedy, as remarking that by the time the seventh child comes along, “Even the most enthusiastic parent may feel less excitement about ‘another baby.’”⁴ This is not to say that Robert Kennedy was unloved, or that he was, by any means, deprived of the same care and benefit that his older siblings were given. It simply meant that he had to try harder to get attention than his older brothers and sisters. This was particularly true where his father, Joseph Kennedy Sr., was concerned. By the time Robert came along, his entrepreneurial father was often away in either New York on banking business, or in Hollywood producing films. Thus he was absent for a large part of RFK’s early childhood.

When Robert was born, Joe Jr. was eleven and John was eight years old. The two eldest children had already established a relationship of “friendly enmity,” with “John winning the arguments and Joe winning the fights.”⁵ With four sisters between him and these two rambunctious older brothers, carving out a niche would be a daunting task for any child, let alone for Robert Kennedy who, by all accounts, was the “smallest, shyest and least well coordinated of the four boys. From the beginning, he was the outsider, the one who had to try the hardest to keep up with the pressure of competition.”⁶ And try he did, constantly striving to prove himself. As an illustration of this, Schlesinger cites an incident that occurred when Robert

was only four years old. Having decided that he wanted to learn to swim like the rest of the family:

... he threw himself off a yawl into Nantucket Sound as if determined to learn all at once or to drown. His brother Joe pulled him out. "It showed," John Kennedy observed, "either a lot of guts or no sense at all, depending on how you looked at it." "I was," Robert said, "the seventh of nine children, and when you come from that far down you have to struggle to survive."⁷

This need to prove himself, the "obsessive compulsion for self-improvement, competition, and victory" that Joe Sr. had instilled in all of his children, stayed with Robert throughout his life. It impelled him to work the toughest district in his brother John's 1946 Congressional campaign. It pushed him to finish a football game while playing for Harvard in 1947 even though he had fractured his ankle. It prodded him, in 1962, to finish a fifty-mile hike in one day (even though his companions could not) and to climb the 14,000-foot Mount Kennedy in 1965.⁸ In his book on RFK, Victor Lasky ridicules Kennedy for only climbing to the top of the previously unscaled peak from the 8500-foot base camp, and for having assistance in doing so from two professional climbers. He makes the observation that Kennedy came to regret having taken on the challenge, but that having done so, could not back down.⁹ There is a great deal of truth in at least part of that statement. All of the Kennedy children had been raised to follow through to the end any endeavor that they undertook. One of their father's cardinal truisms had always been that "Failing to do your best was the mortal sin, not losing."¹⁰ Considering that he had never before climbed a mountain, not to mention that he was afraid of heights, the incident still speaks of remarkable tenacity and determination on RFK's part.

Another characteristic instilled in the Kennedy children was that of an almost fanatic loyalty to family first, to friends and all others second. To the senior Kennedy this sense of fidelity was the most important quality of all, and he passed this attribute down to his clan. Compounding and reinforcing this almost feudal sense of allegiance to the family was the strong Roman Catholic faith of the Kennedys, in particular of Rose Kennedy. A woman of resolute personality and convictions, Mrs. Kennedy tried to instill her faith into all of her children. Masses were attended regularly, on weekends and at odd times during the week, apparently in an attempt to show the children that God wasn't just for Sunday.¹¹ Of all the Kennedy children, Robert apparently was the one who was most greatly influenced by his mother's devotion to the church. According to Jack Newfield, it was this devotion to Catholicism that contributed most to Robert Kennedy's almost Puritanical sense of morality.¹²

Even during his high school days at secular Milton Academy, RFK retained his strong faith and moral convictions; he refused to participate in crude conversations and he made it abundantly clear that he would have no part in the "adolescent sport

of ganging up on one particular boy.”¹³ Of course, this last aversion was also due to his sense of being an outcast. His best friend at the time, David Hackett, remembers that Robert was “neither a natural athlete nor a natural student nor a natural success with girls and had no natural gift for popularity. Nothing came easily for him. What he had was a set of handicaps and a fantastic determination to overcome them. The handicaps made him redouble his effort.” They had also, in conjunction with the gentle nature he had displayed as a small child, given him a natural affinity for others who were in need.¹⁴ This identification with the underdog, though it may have disguised itself for a time, never left RFK.

Throughout his life Robert Kennedy evinced the greatest of respect for anyone whom he perceived as industrious or courageous, even if they were diametrically opposed to him in every other aspect. When running in the 1968 Democratic Primary, Kennedy expressed considerable admiration for the young people who worked for his opponent, Eugene McCarthy. Although they were working against him, he respected them because they worked so hard. As for his opponent, “one of the many reasons he did not like Eugene McCarthy was that he believed his presidential rival to be ‘indolent.’” Only an average student at best while in school, Robert Kennedy was nevertheless always industrious in his studies, with the exception of his junior year at Harvard when he was put on probation. Moreover, he had learned over the years to study diligently before facing either issues or people. McCarthy was apparently not as driven to this type of preparatory analysis, and Kennedy had no patience for those whom he perceived to be either lazy or, even more irksome, apathetic.¹⁵ This trait was another that had come directly from his father. During conversations at the dinner table, Joe Sr. would often deliberately play devil’s advocate and take a side in opposition to one of his children’s arguments. His point was that the content of the discussion wasn’t necessarily what mattered, but that whatever point was being argued, it should be done in an intelligent and knowledgeable manner.

By October 1942, while his two older brothers fought overseas, sixteen-year-old Robert Kennedy continually pleaded with his father to aid him in enlisting — a hope neither his father nor his brothers endorsed. Finally, in October 1943, just a month before his eighteenth birthday, Robert enlisted in the Naval Reserve. He was released from active duty until the following spring when he was sent to Harvard to begin training for the V-12 (ROTC) program, a move his father had to pull some strings to accomplish.¹⁶ Nonetheless, after Joe Jr.’s plane exploded over the English Channel in August 1944 and John nearly died when a Japanese destroyer rammed his PT boat, Robert’s father wasn’t taking any chances. From November 1944 to June 1945, Robert was at Bates College in Lewiston, Maine training and testing and then returned to Harvard to continue his ROTC instruction. Sending him to officer’s candidate school was a family decision; it was an arrangement that wasn’t very popular with young Robert. In a letter to a friend at the time he wrote “I wish to hell people would have let me alone to do as I wished, but I suppose I simply must be an officer.”¹⁷ Particularly after Joe’s “heroic death” he felt that “he was wasting his

time. . . . The lectures bored him and he was afraid he would end up sitting the war out on some college campus.”¹⁸

After his eldest son was killed in World War II, and second son John had emphatically gone his own way, Joseph Kennedy Sr. began to pay more attention to his third son. According to Schlesinger, it was in response to this that Robert Kennedy began:

“ . . . in effect, remaking his personality, or at least his *persona*, in his determination to overcome doubts of his own worth and to win the love of the most important person in his life. . . . to demonstrate that, like his father, he was not soft but tough. . . . He became in these years the scrappy adolescent, the relentless kidder, the ferocious competitor, the combative mick. Only those who knew him very well perceived the gentleness within.”¹⁹

And so, these were the pivotal attributes that were instilled into Robert Kennedy’s character as a youth: passionate loyalty to family and friends, unwavering religious devotion, a fiercely competitive spirit and a formidable determination to prove his own worth, to himself and to everyone else. It was not a part of the Kennedy nature to do anything half way. While these traits were in some cases an advantage, they could also be detrimental if they became excessive, and, in Robert’s case, they often did. When he was kind and compassionate, he was a veritable saint. But, when he was angry or disapproving, he could be just plain nasty. He never really did learn how to keep up a neutral facade; instead, his thoughts and feelings were always right on top for all to see. It is because of this that he evoked such strong reactions, positive and negative, from those with whom he came into contact.

While still in ROTC at Harvard, Robert and his father began an extensive exchange of letters. Robert requested this communication in a letter to his father which said, “I wish, Dad, . . . that you would write me a letter as you used to Joe & Jack about what you think about the different political events and the war as I’d like to understand what’s going on better than I now do.” This correspondence, point by point and thoroughgoing, revolved around not only the political events of the day, but, in large measure, the elder Kennedy’s strongly-held opinions about those events. Through these missives Robert began to fall firmly into line with the political leanings of his father. This was in great part due to his need for paternal approval, but also due to his own lack of social and political experience.²⁰

Fed up with waiting, in the fall of 1945 Robert went behind his family’s back and visited Secretary of the Navy, James V. Forrestal. He had himself released from Naval ROTC and was assigned to the newly commissioned destroyer, *Joseph P. Kennedy Jr.* (named for his dead brother), as an Apprentice Seaman, Class V-12 in February 1946. He served for the next six months “mostly chipping paint as his ship cruised peacefully in the placid waters.”²¹ In May 1946, after an uneventful stint at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, Robert Kennedy returned home “just in time for a new

family undertaking”²² and entered into a new era in his life. His brother John was running for the Congressional seat in Boston’s Eleventh District. This would prove to be a period of induction, for both John and Robert, into the complicated world of political machinations. And the teachers would be their father and the gaggle of old school politicians whom he gathered around them.

John wasn’t thrilled about his little brother’s involvement (“I can’t see that silent face breathing new vigor into the ranks”), but this apparently was one of Papa’s wishes, and so it was accepted that Robert would help out. He was assigned to East Cambridge, one of the toughest places to garner support for his brother. The area was predominantly Italian and was firmly held by the incumbent mayor, Mike Neville. Other than loosening things up by playing ball with the neighborhood kids, “shaking hands, eating spaghetti and telling voters what a wonderful brother Jack was. And a war hero, too,”²³ Robert’s contribution to his brother’s victory was minor. His big brother won the election, but this was largely due to behind-the-scenes workings of their father and his cronies. And, although the traditional cigar-smoking, back-slapping Boston politicians they encountered exasperated Robert and made John skeptical, the episode was an initiation into the world of politics for both young Kennedys.²⁴

After the election had been won, Robert took a trip to Latin America with LeMoyné Billings, a schoolmate of John Kennedy. Billings recalls ribbing Robert when people they encountered in their travels asked where and how they had served in the war. “Bobby didn’t have anything to say. I used to tease him about it. He didn’t think it was especially funny.” Moreover, Billings was disappointed with his friend’s little brother, whose behavior he considered “exceedingly seemly.” Robert apparently was determined to win the \$2000.00 prize his father had promised to any of the children who refrained from drinking and smoking until after their twenty-first birthday. Once again, Robert was determined to prove that he could be just as tough and resolute as the “old man.”²⁵

Back from his first trip abroad without his family, Robert returned to Harvard in the fall of 1946 to finish his rather uninspiring academic career as a Government major. Although most of his professors were well acquainted with the two older Kennedy brothers, they seemed to have little or no memory of Robert. Those that did were not impressed. Robert himself said, “I didn’t go to class very much. I used to talk and argue a lot, mostly about sports and politics.”²⁶ Not unintelligent, RFK simply directed his energies to other spheres. His passion was the game of football, possibly because it seemed “the most direct way to prove to his family, and to himself, that he was approaching paternal standards of toughness.”²⁷ Story after story, friends tell of his stubborn refusal to give up on the field, no matter how hard or how often he had been hit. Years later, while addressing a group of college coaches, RFK said: “Except for war, there is nothing in American life - nothing - which trains a boy better for life than football.”²⁸

RFK also seemed to live for the almost daily off-the-cuff debates with other members of the Varsity Club. He would debate political ideologies with his fellows,

spouting off the same isolationist, conservative verbiage that he had heard his father use so often. Most of his fellow members were World War II veterans whose sole means of entry to an Ivy League university was the GI Bill and nearly all were opposed to his father's isolationist views.²⁹ It was here that Robert Kennedy began to see that there was another side to the political coin.

In 1948, RFK finally graduated with a BA from Harvard. Following this, he took on an assignment as "special correspondent" to the *Boston Globe*, a now defunct newspaper. What this meant, in effect, was that his father had arranged for him to take a trip and gain some insight while ostensibly working for the paper. His first assignment was to journey to the Middle East and Europe. While in the Middle East, many of RFK's subsequent leanings toward the Jewish people and the nation of Israel were formed, as well as his dislike of the British. He was extremely impressed by the industriousness and courage that he felt the Jews displayed. Much like him, they fought on and on, no matter how hard and how many times they were hit. To a man of Robert Kennedy's character, these were strong recommendations indeed. At the same time, there is in his correspondence from that time a melancholy in the realization that "hate sums up the situation in Palestine better than anything I can think of. There will be a bloody war because there must be a bloody war. There is no other alternative."³⁰

After leaving the Middle East and traveling on to Europe, Kennedy got his first real exposure to the ravages of World War II. The sight of cities never cleared of rubble, lands destroyed, and still-visible fire marks on buildings which had been bombed, gave the young man pause and began to make him think of the European nations in slightly less presumptuous terms. As he was touring Italy, a new tragedy befell the Kennedy family. The eldest sister Kathleen, on a weekend trip to France from her home in England, was involved in a fatal plane crash. For the second time in his life, Robert Kennedy had lost a sibling. After this, the rest of his tour took on an increasing solemnity. His correspondence becomes more and more involved in political events, showing a growing awareness and maturity in his nature. "His diary notes for the six months abroad showed sharp generally dispassionate observation, relentless curiosity, laconic courage, wry humor and a certain sobriety of judgment."³¹

This tour also began to create a disjunction in RFK with his father's view on isolationism. Having learned much from his tour and coming face to face with the possibility that Europe might once again go to war (this time with Russia), Robert Kennedy began to show some of the ideological inclinations toward the idea of U.S. intervention that would manifest themselves more forcefully as he got older. As to immediate concerns for his future, he explained, "I just didn't know anything when I got out of college. I wanted to do graduate work, but I didn't know whether to go to law school or business school. I had no attraction to business, so I entered law school."³² And so the next step in Robert Kennedy's life was his admission to the University of Virginia Law School in Charlottesville in September 1948.

As they had been at Harvard, RFK's grades in law school were unspectacular—he graduated with an overall G.P.A. of only 2.54. The "impression among the

faculty was that he had not worked hard academically because native ability enabled him to do sufficiently well with a minimum of effort.”³³ Lasky quotes his professor of labor law, Charles Gregory:

Bob had lots on the ball, but he would never set the Thames on fire scholastically . . . but then he had lots of other activities, so it was hard to judge what he could have been like if he had given more time to work. . . . He wasn't one of the students who talked much in discussion times. You have to work harder than he did to stick your neck out. He listened. You can't talk unless you've worked.³⁴

Nonetheless, Robert achieved some measure of scholastic success when an essay that he wrote on the Yalta Agreements made it into the University's Law Library Treasure Trove. The paper was a virulent criticism of Roosevelt's policy of appeasement toward Russia, a popular right-wing stance of the day.³⁵

Kennedy found his true niche at Charlottesville when he became the president of the Student Legal Forum, “an institution set up to bring outside speakers to the Law School.”³⁶ Drawing on his father's long list of contemporaries, he recruited speakers of every political ilk, including his father. This exposure no doubt had some effect on RFK's evolving political outlooks. However, his greatest achievement by far as president of this club was when he succeeded in bringing Ralph Bunche to the Forum as a lecturer.³⁷ Although he was the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1950 (for helping to negotiate the armistice agreements which led to the end of the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli War), as well as a respected member of the Roosevelt New Deal administration,³⁸ Bunche was also an African-American. In Charlottesville, Virginia in the early 1950s this was bound to cause a stir, particularly when Bunche stipulated that in order to accept the engagement he must be able to speak to a fully integrated audience. There was a great deal of opposition to this request, particularly since, by law, blacks and whites were forbidden to mingle in a meeting hall. So, Kennedy met with a group of classmates and proposed the adoption of a resolution, to which all agreed. However, when asked to sign their names to the resolution, most of the southerners backed out. This sent Kennedy into a rage; he simply could not fathom how anyone could agree with something and yet refuse to stand behind it one hundred percent. Having never been exposed to the problem of racism, Robert Kennedy did not understand the dilemma faced by these southern boys who must go home to families in which an action of this sort would be reprehensible. Here again was the “black and white view of things” he was so famous for.³⁹

Though the resolution failed, Kennedy persevered. An emphatically-written statement, under Kennedy's signature, was adopted by the Student Legal Forum and submitted to the University president:

We would like to register the strong conviction reenforced [sic] by our belief in the issues presented by the last war in which most of us fought,

and by our belief in the principles to which this country is committed in the Bill of Rights and the United Nations Charter, that action which would result in the cancellation of Dr. Bunche's lecture appears to us morally indefensible.⁴⁰

Kennedy finally convinced his professors and the University Dean Colgate Darden, of his determination to have Bunche appear. Using a Supreme Court ruling in a recent Texas case that stated that educational meetings must be desegregated, the University approved the appearance of Dr. Bunche. Kennedy had "struck a blow for decency and . . . had learned the efficacy of law." Furthermore, he had learned that there was value to working within the system. Robert Kennedy graduated from law school in June 1951 "the first Kennedy of his generation to have a profession."⁴¹

During this time he had married Ethel Skakel, a former roommate of his sister Jean. Their backgrounds were similar, at least superficially. Although born a Dutch Protestant, George Skakel, Ethel's father, had married a devout Irish Catholic woman. Both Mr. Skakel and Mr. Kennedy were self-made millionaires; both had fathered large broods of "athletic, boisterous" children.⁴² Ethel was raised to be as devoted to Catholicism as Robert, if not more so. She had the same competitive drive and determination to win. Both were among the youngest of many siblings. There the similarities ended. The Kennedys had "a certain reserve, discipline and frugality as well as a large measure of civic and intellectual aspiration." The Skakels, on the other hand, "did not conceal their wealth or restrain their children" and "in so far as they cared about public affairs, were conservative Republicans."⁴³ Where Robert was somber and contemplative, Ethel was exuberant, humorous and somewhat flighty. She was, it turned out, exactly what he needed. She loved him unconditionally and supported his every endeavor. Finally, he could stop trying to gain approval; with Ethel he never had to prove himself. Schlesinger notes that this gain of a wife and the beginning of his own family may well have been one of the major turning points in Robert Kennedy becoming his own man.⁴⁴

After graduating from law school, Kennedy got a job (with the help of family friend Senator Joe McCarthy) as an attorney with the Justice Department in the Internal Security Division investigating tax frauds, corruption, and bribery. Shortly thereafter, he was transferred to the Criminal Division and assigned to a case against two former Truman officials who had been charged with corruption. It was his first truly important assignment, and he was absolutely enthralled with the work. It seems strange therefore that he stayed there a mere three months, and left to join his brother John's campaign for a seat in the Massachusetts Senate.

According to Victor Lasky, it was not qualification that was the driving force behind Robert's appointment as his brother's campaign manager, but loyalty. Lasky quotes Eunice Kennedy as saying that politics is "a business full of knives. Jack needed someone he could trust, someone who had loyalty to him. Jack knew he had a person like that with Bobby around."⁴⁵ However, while Arthur Schlesinger agrees that family loyalty was one of the driving forces behind RFK's joining the

campaign, he cites Kenneth O'Donnell, another member of JFK's campaign committee, as saying that he "pleaded with Robert Kennedy in New York to come up and take over." O'Donnell remembers Robert as being "very angry. . . . He loved what he was doing in the Department of Justice. He did not look forward to a summer arguing with his father." Stating that he knew nothing about Massachusetts politics, Robert originally refused to go.⁴⁶ This was one of the few times that Robert actually expressed a desire to go his own way, rather than follow behind the family banner. Nonetheless, after some consideration, the Kennedy sense of loyalty kicked in and Robert went to Massachusetts to help his brother. Apparently, the generational differences between John Kennedy and his father had widened to nearly insurmountable heights and it was felt that only Robert could truly "handle the father."⁴⁷

As it turned out, this prediction was true. Robert's endeavors at being "tough" had eliminated any fear he may have felt at facing his father's disapproval. Not only that, there had been enough of a transformation in Robert Kennedy since the 1946 campaign that he now proved himself to be a natural at organization, and he became indispensable to his brother's political career. The brothers began to grow close to one another, something they had not heretofore been. The age difference, as well as the difference in temperaments, had always been a barrier between them. Now they began to form a dependence on each other that, though strictly political at the outset, grew into a great love for one another. Nevertheless, not everything that came out of this campaign was positive. Schlesinger believes that it is at this juncture in his life that Robert Kennedy first began to gain the reputation for "ruthlessness" which would haunt him throughout his life.⁴⁸

He would brashly throw people out of the campaign headquarters unless they were actually working. This especially offended the Boston politicians who came just to hang around and watch. His brother John said, "Every politician was mad at Bobby after 1952, but we had the best organization in history. And what friend who was really worthwhile has he lost? I can't recall."⁴⁹ As well as being unable to tolerate any indolence, Robert hated the idea of the Massachusetts style campaign that his father was so good at and that was the accepted standard for local politicians at the time. Shaking hands, making small talk, putting up a false face for the public—these ideas were insupportable to him. He simply didn't see the need for it, at least on his part. He was there to see that his brother's campaign ran smoothly and that he got elected. Nothing and no one was going to stand in the way of that goal. Schlesinger posits that there may also be some truth to the theory that RFK "felt that a tough exterior was the only means by which a novice could hope to keep the campaign under control. Perhaps, too, he was proving things to his father, and to himself."⁵⁰ This persona of impatience and insolence stuck with him from that point on, becoming even more firmly fixed during the next phase of his career.

After his brother succeeded in winning the race for Democratic Senator of Massachusetts, Robert Kennedy began his own career in public service, serving as counsel on a variety of Senate subcommittees. The first of these was with Senator Joe McCarthy, at the behest of Joseph Kennedy Sr. It was a posting that, at first

glance, suited Robert's predominately conservative and anti-Communist views. In later explaining his connection with McCarthy, RFK said, "I felt the investigation of Communism was an important domestic issue."⁵¹ Though Robert had wanted to claim the post of Chief Counsel for the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, McCarthy had already promised this post to a young man named Roy Cohn, whose investigative manner and rabid anti-Communist streak were commensurate with McCarthy's own style. In hindsight, McCarthy would have been better served by appointing RFK to this post. Kennedy would have had a tempering effect on the virulent paranoia of the McCarthy investigations. Robert Kennedy researched his facts thoroughly and completely and "did not question the loyalty of those under investigation. Roy Cohn's investigatory style was directly opposite: nearly everyone questioned his facts, and he questioned nearly everyone's loyalty."⁵²

Kennedy soon became disillusioned with the McCarthy commission, and after six months he resigned. Before he left, Kennedy recalled, "I told him I thought he was out of his mind and was going to destroy himself."⁵³ Unfortunately, this relationship with Senator McCarthy haunted him into his last years and became one of the predominant arguments for those who mistrusted his eventual move to a more liberal stance. This was in part due to the fact that he refused to revile his old friend. When asked, ten years later, by writer Peter Maas how he could have ever had anything to do with McCarthy, RFK replied, "Well, at that time, I thought there was a serious internal security threat to the United States; I felt that Joe McCarthy seemed to be the only one who was doing anything about it . . . I was wrong."⁵⁴ Though he may have disagreed with McCarthy on many points, there was still the characteristic Kennedy sense of loyalty that would not allow him to turn his back on McCarthy as a person. Years later, in trying to explain his fondness for McCarthy, RFK stated, "He wanted so desperately to be liked. . . . He was sensitive and yet insensitive. He didn't anticipate the results of what he was doing. He was very thoughtful of his friends, and yet he could be so cruel to others."⁵⁵

From 1947 to 1949 Joe Kennedy Sr. had served as a member of the Commission on Reorganization of the Executive Branch (the Hoover Commission, organized to propose ways and means of curbing waste and confusion in government) and was now serving on the second such commission, which had been appointed by Dwight D. Eisenhower. Having left the McCarthy ranks, Robert joined the staff as his father's assistant in August 1953.⁵⁶ Assigned to analyze the Weather Bureau, RFK very soon grew bored and frustrated. Surrounded by men of his father's age and outlook, he grew exasperated by the "squabbling among the septuagenarians" and "considered his own work to be inconsequential." Although the position only lasted a few months, it was considered a low point in his life. By now he had "decided to dedicate himself to the government . . . and felt he was accomplishing nothing and getting nowhere. He just didn't see any future."⁵⁷ Moreover, it couldn't have been easy working day to day with his father.

In January 1954 he was once again appointed minority counsel of the Investigations Committee, this time under Senators John McClellan, Stuart Symington and

Henry Jackson.⁵⁸ By this time, McCarthy and Cohn had gotten themselves in way over their heads in a fracas against the United States Army and were being investigated. Soon after these investigations began, McCarthy was officially censured and his career ruined.

It was at this time that Robert first encountered J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. During the investigation, he was sent to follow up on some information in the FBI's files. Hoover was a friend of McCarthy's and Cohn's, and, having already expressed a dislike for Kennedy whom he saw as an "arrogant whippersnapper, who pushed around his family's money and power," he refused to cooperate with Kennedy, falsely informing him that they didn't have the information that he needed.⁵⁹ This was the beginning of a relationship that became even more sour when RFK became Attorney General.

In 1955, after the downfall of Joe McCarthy, Senator McClellan took over as chairman of the Investigations Subcommittee, appointing Robert Kennedy as chief counsel. During that summer he traveled to the Soviet Union with Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, once again at the behest of his well-connected father. The trip had originally been suggested while Robert was still in law school, but because of Soviet red tape was postponed five times. By the time visas had been granted, neither Robert nor Justice Douglas were thrilled about spending so much time with each other. However, Robert felt it was easier to go than to argue with his father, and Justice Douglas felt an obligation to the elder Kennedy for helping him secure his seat in the Supreme Court.⁶⁰ Though the trip seemed in some ways to intensify RFK's conservative anti-communism, eventually his curiosity overwhelmed his hostility toward all things Russian and it opened his eyes to the plight of the Soviet people for whom he felt some sympathy.

Back in the U.S. again and working under Senator McClellan, Kennedy intensified his investigations into communist activity, mostly in response to the prevailing perception that Democrats were softer on communism than were Republicans. Both McClellan and Kennedy were determined to disprove this. And, although the investigations were never run in the fanatic manner that they had been under Joe McCarthy, because of his relentlessness in prosecution, they enhanced Kennedy's reputation for ruthlessness.⁶¹

Kennedy continued working for the investigative commission, taking a break in 1956 to help with his brother John's bid for the vice-presidency. Though all worked as diligently and as hard as they had in the campaign for the Senatorial race in 1952, John Kennedy lost the bid for the vice-presidency to Estes Kefauver. This was by no means a wasted experience, though. Especially for Robert Kennedy, it was an education in the differences between a statewide and a national campaign, and a lesson in what works and what doesn't. He was learning, "the importance of communications at a convention; the importance of an accurate delegate count; the importance of the rules . . . ; the importance of friendship . . . all points filed away in a retentive mind."⁶² RFK commented:

It really struck me then . . . that it wasn't the issues which mattered so much, it was the friendships. So many people had come up to me and said they would like to vote for Jack but they were going to vote for Estes Kefauver because he had sent them a card or visited their home. I said right there that as well as paying attention to the issues we should send Christmas cards next time.⁶³

After the vice-presidency was lost, Bobby went on a campaign tour with Adlai Stevenson. The intent was to learn all that he could about how to run a presidential campaign. Even then it was apparent that John Kennedy would be making a bid for the presidency in the not-too-distant future, and his brother Bobby intended to learn as much as possible before that time came. As to the effectiveness of his time with Stevenson and his unsuccessful campaign, Bobby said, "I was learning what not to do."⁶⁴

The next few years of Robert's life were once again devoted to the Senate Investigations Committee, work that suited him and gave him a great sense of accomplishment. In the beginning, a large portion of his energies were centered on the investigation and prosecution of Teamster Boss Jimmy Hoffa and Mafia figures such as Sam Giancana. Joe Kennedy Sr. was highly opposed to Robert's involvement in these investigations, fearing that they would have to forfeit union support when John made his presidential bid.⁶⁵ It was this concentration in the fields of administration and investigation that was, in part, the reason that so many of his detractors saw him as ruthless, opportunistic and ultra-conservative.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, you don't hire a dogcatcher to round up a pride of lions.

In 1960, John made his bid for the Presidency of the United States. Pulling together all that he had learned about politics in the past few years, brother Bobby ran the campaign in a highly organized and extremely successful manner. In fact, without Robert's tenacity and determination to do whatever it took to win, it is doubtful that John F. Kennedy would have been elected. Having won the election, John appointed Robert to his cabinet in the post of Attorney General, against heavy opposition from outside. But the pressure from his father to do so was even greater. Joe Sr. knew the workings of politics, and he had first hand knowledge of some of the means of persuasion that were used to get his son into office. In particular was a deal that he himself had made with Sam Giancana, one of the leading bosses in the Chicago organized crime arena. John was going to need the loyalty of his brother in the position of Attorney General.⁶⁷

As Attorney General, Robert inevitably became involved with the FBI and J. Edgar Hoover, both in his continuing investigations of labor unions and large corporations like U.S. Steel and in the civil rights movement. RFK's refusal to rein in the unconstitutional actions of Hoover's FBI and to censure them for inaction during his brother's presidency gave his critics plenty of ammunition. And in many cases rightly so, particularly when the FBI refused to protect the Freedom Riders and others who worked in the civil rights movement.⁶⁸

Because John Kennedy feared losing the southern vote in 1964 if his administration took on too liberal a stance, the administration, for purely political reasons, tried to avoid embroiling itself inordinately in the Movement. Robert Kennedy and his brother apparently believed that “by not mobilizing the FBI on the protection front . . . they would be more likely to avoid confrontations. By mobilizing the FBI on the surveillance front . . . they would have a better chance to manage the civil rights movement.”⁶⁹

Then too, Kenneth O’Reilly states that, “Ignorance about the realities of life for black Americans in the South and a sensitivity to hard political facts explain, in part, the Kennedy’s caution with regard to civil rights in general, on the protection issue in particular.”⁷⁰ However, as O’Reilly goes on to say, by failing to challenge the attitudes and methods of Hoover and the FBI as regards their policies of spying on leaders of the movement, ignoring the rights to protection of the Freedom Riders in the South, etc., the Kennedys were in effect sanctioning this unethical behavior. O’Reilly posits that “The men who debated the constitutionality of federal protection never even considered the constitutionality of federal surveillance.”⁷¹

On the other side of the coin, Todd Gitlin quotes Victor Navasky as stating that Robert and his team should be commended for “converting the freedom rides into an ICC order desegregating interstate bus travel; with calling out the troops to back up court orders integrating Ole Miss . . . and the University of Alabama . . .; with not calling out the troops and nevertheless preventing a racially explosive Birmingham from exploding into a bloody race war.”⁷² In analyzing Robert Kennedy’s decisions as Attorney General, it has to be remembered that he was first and foremost there to support his brother and his administration. In hindsight it is easy to see how misguided some of their decisions were, and in later years, RFK himself admitted to mistakes in judgment. At the time, it seemed that no matter what tack he took, in either the civil rights movement or in his dealings with unions and big business, Robert Kennedy was going to be the bad guy. If he did nothing, he was a coward, a racist, and a rich kid in the pocket of big business; if he stood his ground he was the “villain who persecuted steel barons and enforced racial integration.”⁷³

It is also necessary to remember that there were many other issues on the front burners in those days. Castro had taken power in Cuba, tensions were deepening with Asia and other nations over the issue of communism, and the President was, first and foremost, involved in foreign rather than domestic policies. While this doesn’t excuse the administration’s lack of action in the arena of civil rights, it begins to explain why less aggressive actions were taken in regard to the movement.

As to foreign policy, Schlesinger states that after they toured Asia in 1951, the two Kennedy brothers saw “nationalism as the most vital political emotion of the developing world. They instinctively sympathized with new nations struggling for survival; and . . . they saw the Third World as the crucial battleground between communism and democracy.”⁷⁴ In 1961 President Kennedy sent his brother on a tour around the world on “Third World missions” to reinforce this view point and to gather information of where America stood with the developing nations of the

world.⁷⁵ It was during this tour that what was to become one of his strongest convictions was born:

Far too often, for narrow, tactical reasons . . . this country has associated itself with tyrannical and unpopular regimes that had no following and no future. Over the past twenty years we have paid dearly because of support given to colonial rulers, cruel dictators or ruling cliques void of social purpose.⁷⁶

It was also during this time that Robert Kennedy proved himself to be much more diplomatic than previously thought, although he was still known for his blunt speech. It became clear that he had “peculiar skills as a propounder of home truths to world leaders.”⁷⁷

While his brother was President, Robert Kennedy remained in a secondary position, and he had grown accustomed to it. He was still the little brother, still the helper, the supporter, the prop that held things up; he was “his brother’s keeper.”⁷⁸ As well, he often acted as “a lightning rod, as a scout on far frontiers, as a more militant and somewhat discountable alter ego . . . the man on whom the President relied for penetrating questions, for follow-up, for the protection of the presidential interest and objectives.”⁷⁹ And he was good at it. It may not have made him a reputation for being warm and cuddly, but it played into his gift of efficient organization, made him feel a necessary part of the family “business,” and it gave him purpose. He was still a cog in the Kennedy machine, but it was a machine he had helped create. His brother’s positions and policies as President suborned his own stances on the issues of the day. But, it was precisely this position that allowed him to encounter circumstances and perceptions other than those that he had heretofore held. “He acquired his perceptions of the complexity of things partly because his beloved older brother led him to broader views of society and life and partly because he himself possessed to an exceptional degree an experiencing nature.”⁸⁰ It was these changing perceptions that allowed Robert to make the change from the hard line conservatism he had learned from his father and practiced under his brother’s administration.

After his brother’s assassination in November 1963, Robert’s life changed drastically. There is no doubt that his grief was monumental. By all accounts, it took months for the younger brother to recover, months that he often spent in solitary contemplation. Even then, he never seemed to lose the melancholy that had settled over him. Harris Wofford notes that he became more reflective and less hostile toward those with whom he had previously been in conflict. Wofford quotes Anthony Lewis as saying, “Most people acquire certainties as they grow older; he *lost* his. He changed — he grew — more than anyone I have ever known.”⁸¹ Jack Newfield, in his book *Robert Kennedy: A Memoir*, called John F. Kennedy’s assassination:

. . . the catalyst that accelerated other changes. Softer personal qualities, long latent and repressed, came to the surface. He began to identify himself with a romanticized notion of what his brother stood for — peace, Negroes, the next generation. His deep moralistic rage against evil did not change; it merely discovered new outlets. Violence and suffering replaced the old devils of Communism and corruption.⁸²

Newfield suggests that the assassination “removed the hero-brother for whom he had submerged all of his own great competitive instincts. . . . It thrust a man trained for the shadows, into the sunlight. It made Robert Kennedy, a man unprepared for introspection, think for the first time in his life, what *he* wanted to do, and what *he* stood for.”⁸³ And what he discovered was that he wanted to serve his country. He wanted to carry on the *good* works that his brother’s administration had begun, but had never seen through to their fruition. In order to do this he would have to garner a position of power in the Johnson administration, or more to the point, in opposition to the Johnson administration. It seems clear that it was at this point, if not before, that RFK determined to run for the Senate. Kennedy felt that he “would be in a stronger position to criticize Johnson’s foreign policy” from the floor of the Senate.⁸⁴

Having run for and won a seat in the New York Senate in 1964, Robert Kennedy began to establish a political power base in opposition to Johnson’s. By 1965, Kennedy could claim the most radical wing for himself, more so even than entrenched liberals such as Eugene McCarthy could and Hubert Humphrey could. Kennedy’s “leftward shift accelerated” in 1966 when he formally broke with the Johnson administration on the issue of Vietnam,⁸⁵ but the movement to a more liberal stance had begun much sooner. As early as 1964, he was deeply involved in “Community Action Programs” aimed at helping the poor through integration and the long term infusion of funds, both public and private, into rejuvenating urban communities. The difference between Kennedy’s urban plans and those of Johnson’s War on Poverty was mainly in the arena of funding. Whereas Johnson’s plan called for federally subsidized funding to create employment opportunities in the ghettos, Kennedy’s plan called for the involvement of private corporations who, in exchange for tax breaks, would base employment facilities in urban areas where the poor had access.⁸⁶ When planned out and properly implemented, Kennedy’s plan was a great success, as in the “prototype for community rehabilitation,” Bedford Stuyvesant. An “especially poor ghetto in New York,” the area is still prospering today, due to the infusion of capital on the part of the IBM corporation.⁸⁷

According to Dooley, Kennedy was also very much in tune with the needs of the African-American population (although not necessarily with their leaders, who distrusted him because of his lack of understanding during his stint as Attorney General). In great part this was accomplished by means of a huge staff, including “Earl Graves, the only black aide on any Senate staff at the time,” who were able to keep Kennedy in touch with his constituency.⁸⁸ Dooley suggests that Kennedy’s

popularity among blacks may also have been due to Weber's theory of charismatic transferal. In other words, the love that so many blacks had for John Kennedy was passed on to his little brother, an inherited charisma.⁸⁹ Whatever the reason, by the time that the 1968 primary came around, in two of the most important primaries (California and Indiana) Robert had the firm support of blacks.

Another manifestation of Kennedy's "new" liberal politics was in the mutual disrespect between himself and big business. Kennedy felt that the business community was uninterested in working for anyone but themselves, a prejudice that he had inherited from his father. As to the businessmen's side, Kennedy's treatment of the steel barons in an aggressive 1962 investigation, as well as his association with Cesar Chavez and the California migrant farm workers, did nothing to inspire their trust in him.⁹⁰ In tune with this was the attitude of the union bosses toward Robert Kennedy. Having gained a reputation for excess in his investigations of Jimmy Hoffa and other union bosses when he was Attorney General, Kennedy never regained their trust.⁹¹

But, according to Michael Sandel, Kennedy was not a true liberal. He had, instead, established for himself a unique brand of liberalism:

His political outlook was in some ways more conservative and in other ways more radical than the mainstream of his party. He worried about the remoteness of big government, favored decentralized power, criticized welfare as "our greatest domestic failure", challenged the faith in economic growth as a panacea for social ills and took a hard line on crime.⁹²

To some, this unique blend of conservative and liberal was a deliberate ploy to "woo the white working-class ethnic voters while retaining the support of minorities and the poor." But, according to Sandel, this is not so. He contends that Kennedy's appeal was that he argued neither in terms of the individual nor of nationalism, but that he called for a return to communal self-government, an operation somewhere between the individual and the national. Sandel states that instead of polarizing issues such as joblessness and crime (as other politicians were wont to do) Kennedy linked them together, calling on the entire community to bear the weight of change together as individuals.⁹³

The truth of Robert's political stance seems to lie somewhere in between. He once said, "I don't believe in labels . . . they're somewhat phony" and his brother John, soon after his election to the Presidency, remarked, "Bobby is caught in a cross current of labels we pin on people. We tend to check off an arbitrary list, add up the results and come up with a liberal or a conservative. Bobby doesn't fit this. I could say that he is essentially conservative, but not on a matter like the minimum wage or a number of other issues."⁹⁴ Proof, it seems, that those who harangued RFK for his "sudden" jump from conservative to liberal hadn't really been paying attention.

As I have researched the man and his politics, it seems clear to me that Robert Kennedy was, like anyone, a product of his experiences as well as his inborn

personality. It seems clear to me that Kennedy's intrinsically shy and gentle nature, the part of him that could relate to the underdogs of the world, was forced into submission by the over-achieving and compulsively competitive environment of his childhood. By force of need, Robert Kennedy adopted a persona of ruthless, relentless determination, seen by some as a rampant conservatism. He must at all costs prove his worth. As he matured, I believe that he began to realize his worth as the organizational force behind his brother's successful political career. Eventually he became a successful politician in his own right, able to finally put forth his own, true views on the issues of the day. A man not given to introspection, Robert Kennedy wasn't good at the kind of obsessive self-analysis in which so many American seem to indulge. It was therefore, not always easy for him to explain his thoughts and feelings on what motivated him to do the things that he did. Once while some critics of her brother were doubting his bona fides, Eunice Shriver cut short the questioning of Robert Kennedy's motives. "What difference does it make, why waste time arguing about that? What counts is that all that energy, all that power, all that ability is being used for peace and for civil rights and for the poor."⁹⁵ I believe that she was correct. No matter what his motivations, what matters most is the legacy that he left behind in "the generation of politicians that he inspired to public service."⁹⁶ Kennedy was assassinated in 1968, while running for the Presidency. Ruthless though he may have been when he felt it was warranted, he nonetheless inspired both love and admiration even in those who were virulently opposed to him. Agreeable or not, Robert Kennedy showed a deep and abiding love for his nation and called upon her people to display the same. He was a man who stood by his convictions with unwavering determination. Tom Hayden, a man who had publicly vilified RFK for certain of his policies, nonetheless stood next to Kennedy's casket, weeping bitterly.⁹⁷ It is a good indication of the measure of a man when even his declared enemies weep at his death. It speaks of the loss of something extraordinary.

Endnotes

1. John Phillips, review of Jules Witcover, *85 Days: The Last Campaign of Robert Kennedy* (New York, 1969), in *The New York Review of Books*, 13, (August 21, 1969), 4.
2. Victor Lasky, *Robert F. Kennedy: The Myth and the Man* (New York, 1968), 7.
3. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (Boston, 1988), 872.
4. Mrs. Rose Kennedy, quoted in Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 21.
5. *Ibid.*, 13.
6. Jack Newfield, *Robert Kennedy: A Memoir* (New York, 1969), 44-45.
7. Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 23.
8. Newfield, *Kennedy*, 47.
9. Lasky, *Kennedy*, 32.
10. Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 14.
11. *Ibid.*, 46.
12. Newfield, *Kennedy*, 49.
13. Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 44.
14. *Ibid.*, 45.
15. Newfield, *Kennedy*, 47.
16. Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 52.
17. *Ibid.*, 58.
18. Lasky, *Kennedy*, 60.
19. Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 61.
20. *Ibid.*, 59.
21. Lasky, *Kennedy*, 60.
22. Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 63.
23. Lasky, *Kennedy*, 61.
24. Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 64.
25. *Ibid.*, 65.
26. Lasky, *Kennedy*, 62.

27. Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 67.
28. Lasky, *Kennedy*, 64.
29. Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 68.
30. *Ibid.*, 77.
31. *Ibid.*, 80.
32. Lasky, *Kennedy*, 64.
33. Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 87.
34. Lasky, *Kennedy*, 65.
35. Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 82.
36. *Ibid.*, 84.
37. *Ibid.*, 85.
38. UPI/The Bettman Archive, "Ralph Johnson Bunche," *Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia 99*, 1993-1998, Microsoft Corporation.
39. Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 86.
40. *Ibid.*, 86.
41. *Ibid.*, 87.
42. *Ibid.*
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*, 89.
45. Lasky, *Kennedy*, 71.
46. Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 94.
47. *Ibid.*, 95.
48. *Ibid.*
49. Lasky, *Kennedy*, 72.
50. Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 95.
51. Lasky, *Kennedy*, 78.
52. Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 105.
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Ibid.*, 106.
55. *Ibid.*
56. *Ibid.*, 107.

57. Ibid., 109.
58. Lasky, *Kennedy*, 85.
59. Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 112.
60. Ibid., 124.
61. Ibid., 118.
62. Ibid., 133.
63. Lasky, *Kennedy*, 99.
64. Ibid., 100.
65. Seymour M. Hersch, *The Dark Side of Camelot* (Boston, 1997), 135.
66. Douglas Ross, *Robert F. Kennedy: Apostle of Change* (New York, 1968), xxi.
67. Hersch, *Dark Side*, 134.
68. Kenneth O'Reilly, "The FBI and the Civil Rights Movement During the Kennedy Years: From Freedom Rides to Albany," *The Journal of Southern History*, LIV (May 1988), 205.
69. Ibid., 212.
70. Ibid., 203.
71. Ibid., 203-204.
72. Victor Navasky, quoted in Todd Gitlin, *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage* (New York, 1987), 136.
73. Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 603.
74. Ibid., 559.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid., 575.
77. Ibid., 583.
78. Harris Wofford, *Of Kennedys and Kings: Making Sense of the Sixties* (New York, 1980), 416.
79. Schlesinger, *Kennedy*, 599.
80. Ibid., 602.
81. Anthony Lewis, quoted in Wofford, *Of Kennedys and Kings*, 420.
82. Newfield, *Kennedy*, 33-34.
83. Ibid., 31.

84. Brian Dooley, *Robert Kennedy: The Final Years* (New York, 1996), 85.
85. *Ibid.*, 14.
86. *Ibid.*, 28-29.
87. *Ibid.*, 33.
88. *Ibid.*, 36.
89. *Ibid.*, 40.
90. *Ibid.*, 51.
91. *Ibid.*, 46.
92. Michael J. Sandel, "My RFK" *The New Republic* (July 1998), 1.
93. *Ibid.*, 1.
94. Ross, *Kennedy*, 16.
95. Wofford, *Of Kennedys and Kings*, 421.
96. Dooley, *Kennedy*, 150.
97. Gitlin, *The Sixties*, 310.

President Lyndon Johnson and Domestic Politics: Conflicting Historical Viewpoints Since 1985

**by
Rob Langenderfer**

Lyndon Johnson ranked as a very controversial figure in American History. He tried to aid the poor and end racial segregation and his goals have won him much praise. However, historians hold many different perspectives on why he supported civil rights so strongly as president after he ignored it previously while in Congress. Many feel that Johnson used questionable tactics to enact his civil rights and social welfare legislation. Throughout his career, Johnson had a reputation as an unscrupulous back-room dealer willing to ignore ethical standards to achieve his goals. Historians have had to judge Johnson by both the results of his actions and by the means through which he achieved his accomplishments.

Lyndon Johnson was born in the Texas hill country on August 27, 1908. There were no paved streets, no electric outlets, and few cars where he lived. His father served as a member of the state legislature. As the Johnson family had a lower middle class income, Lyndon went to the inexpensive Southwest Texas State Teachers College. Through his activities with various groups on campus, he developed many of the back room skills that made him successful in politics. Johnson taught at a school for poor Mexican-Americans during his college years, and after graduating, briefly taught speech at Sam Houston High School.¹

By this time Johnson had vowed to one day become President of the United States. He had always been fascinated by politics, having often heard his father speak about current issues. Soon Lyndon began his slow climb toward the presidency, starting as secretary to a Texas Congressman. He then became a Capitol page, running errands for many different House members. Already a master at using contacts, in 1935 Johnson was named head of the Texas branch of the National Youth Administration (NYA), thanks to the influence of several Texas Democratic Congressmen. He did very well as director of the Texas NYA, and soon decided to run for the House of Representatives.²

Winning the election on April 11, 1937, Johnson quickly became a very active member of the House, gaining the passage of many laws to help his district. He ran for the Senate in 1941, but lost the election in a very close race that his opponent may have stolen. Deeply disappointed by the loss, Johnson nevertheless kept his seat in the House all through the 1940s. In 1948 Johnson ran for the Senate again, and won

Rob Langenderfer, a member of Lambda Sigma Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta, wrote the original draft of this paper as an undergraduate History major at Thomas More College. He graduated from Thomas More in 1996 with a B.A. in History and English. He went on to earn his Master of Arts in History in 1998 from the University of Cincinnati.

the election by an eighty-seven-vote margin that many historians believe Johnson stole. In 1951 he entered the national spotlight as minority whip. He now had to give more consideration to the mood of the country as a whole.³

After the Democrats lost their majority in the 1952 elections, Johnson became Senate minority leader. In 1955 when Democrats regained their Senate lead, he became majority leader. Many historians claim that he was the most powerful majority leader in Senate history, with the ability to bring opposing sides together and create compromises to enact legislation, such as the 1957 Civil Rights Act.⁴

In 1960 John F. Kennedy chose Lyndon as his running mate in the presidential election. LBJ decided to accept the position when Kennedy promised that he would be the administration's main figure in guiding Kennedy's proposals through Congress. As Vice President, LBJ organized the Plan for Progress, a group of volunteer corporations that agreed to follow government guidelines in hiring minorities. He also convinced the president to require government contractors to sign a statement confirming that they did not practice racial discrimination. When Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, most of his civil rights proposals had not been passed by Congress. Johnson pushed them and a set of anti-poverty programs to passage. Since then historians have argued over Johnson's motivations and methods in achieving the passage of the many laws his administration secured. Historians have also pondered the effect of Johnson's abrasive personality on his proposals.⁵

The earliest major works to be written on Johnson's domestic policies were, for the most part, either extremely positive or extremely negative. For example, William S. White's *The Professional: Lyndon B. Johnson* was a very flattering work by a long-time friend of Johnson written shortly after Kennedy's death. At one point in the book, he claimed that LBJ never even came close to being a demagogue. In contrast, Alfred Steinberg's book *Sam Johnson's Boy* was extremely negative. According to one critic, Steinberg's book suffers from "an adamant refusal to see Johnson as anything but a seeker after personal wealth and political power." The authors of these books relied mainly on interviews, which reflect the subjective opinions of the persons interviewed. This type of research marked nearly all of the early books on Johnson.⁶

In the early 1980s many authors wrote books about Johnson that were more thoroughly researched. Besides using interviews, these authors used newspapers and materials from the Johnson Presidential Library. The books still passed strong judgements, mostly negative. Perhaps the most disappointing of all was Robert Caro's 1982 work *The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power*. Caro wrote that Johnson had "a hunger for power in its most naked form, for power not to improve the lives of others, but to manipulate and dominate them, to bend them to his will." While reviewing Caro's book, Robert Divine noted: "From his first great plunge into political maneuvering in college through his first great setback in the 1941 Senate race, Johnson is portrayed as a ruthless, deceitful, and utterly immoral man, intent only on his own advancement."⁷

Writers that have published since 1985 have departed from the extreme conclu-

sions of their predecessors and instead have adopted a more measured and moderate approach. All recent authors acknowledge the greatness of some of Johnson's domestic policies and the lack of scrupulousness of some of his politics, although some writers emphasize one of the two. Every recent writer on Johnson respects the validity of opposing views. The years that have passed since Johnson left office have allowed historians to take a more dispassionate, objective view of him, rather than being swayed by their emotions. The later negative books could also have been caused by the sometimes shocking revelations that appeared after his death. Often those types of discoveries will lead to a temporary loss of sympathy for a historical figure out of a feeling that the heroic figure has let people down. The passage of time has helped to temper those feelings as well. The views of more recent writers fall into several categories: those who emphasized Johnson's self-serving politics while down-playing his great domestic contributions, those who emphasized his successful domestic policies while down-playing his unscrupulousness, and those who felt that Johnson's questionable behavior was a necessary evil so that his great domestic achievements could be enacted.

At the head of the group of largely negative books was Robert Caro's *The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent*. It is the second book in a multi-volume series on Johnson's life that started with *The Path to Power*. However, the book's negativity is not as strident as it was in *The Path to Power*. In *Means of Ascent*, Caro is more ready to acknowledge Johnson's positive contributions to America. This qualified negativity can be seen in the introduction to the book, which is the only part that really touches on his presidency or his life as a whole, as the rest of the book deals with Johnson's life from his 1941 Senate defeat through his 1948 Senate victory. Regarding Johnson's quest for power, Caro notes:

[Johnson displayed] an utter ruthlessness in destroying obstacles in the path [to power], and a seemingly bottomless capacity for deceit, deception, and betrayal....but along with them there was displayed a rare gift for mobilizing the government to raise up the downtrodden....Johnson had displayed that capacity for compassion, and for the accomplishment that made compassion meaningful.

Caro found something to praise in Johnson's attitude while teaching Mexican-American students:

No teacher in that school had ever really cared if the Mexican children learned or not. He [Johnson] cared....He persuaded a reluctant school board to buy bats and balls and volleyball nets so that, although these children had no lunch, they could at least play games at lunch hour.... To encourage his students to learn English, he formed a debating team.

Caro presents Johnson's Congressional record on civil rights with much skepticism,

and contrasts it with Johnson's later position. Yet the author does not condemn Johnson outright, as one might have expected from his earlier work. Other writers, as will be seen later, judged the Congressional civil rights record of Johnson much more harshly than Caro did.

In fact, when relating how Johnson finally took a stand in favor of civil rights, Caro presents it with all its vigor. Immediately after Johnson gave his emphatic speech on March 15, 1965 presenting a bill that would make it easier for African Americans to vote, Caro reveals how Johnson pushed Emanuel Celler, Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, to start hearings on the bill at once. When Celler resisted:

Johnson's eyes narrowed, and his face turned harder. His right hand was still shaking Celler's [hand], but the left hand was up and a finger was out pointing, jabbing. "Start them *this* week, Manny," [he said to Celler], "and hold night sessions, too." Celler did.

When the Southerners began a filibuster to prevent passage of the bill, Johnson pushed Senators to work together to stop the filibuster in order to pass the bill. Caro posits that even when Johnson was fighting for a just cause, he could be extremely manipulative and forceful.⁸

Mark Stern's book *Calculating Visions: Kennedy, Johnson, and Civil Rights* is in the same camp. Stern feels that Johnson did not arrive at the White House as an avid civil rights supporter. Stern believes that judging from his previous Congressional record, Johnson had been a moderate on civil rights and most issues, while serving as a master at bringing people together in compromise. Stern contends that Johnson was a politician who schemed and compromised as the political situation dictated. His sole interest lay in appealing to voters. By acting on the suggestions of Martin Luther King Jr. and other idealists who inspired and excited much of the public, Johnson made himself highly appealing to voters. In other words, Stern believes that although the civil rights legislation resulting from Johnson's actions was certainly very good, ideals did not motivate Johnson at all. Johnson only did what he did because of the political situation of the time. Therefore, Johnson deserves no great credit for his civil rights achievements.

Stern's views on Johnson are not totally negative. He states that Johnson always sympathized with the poor, for Johnson was nearly one of them himself early in life. However, he ends that same paragraph by pointing out that Johnson soon realized it was necessary for a politician to sacrifice principles to win votes. This shows that although the author has a strand of respect for Johnson, it is just that – a strand.⁹

Reviewer Carl Brauer persuasively criticized Stern's picture of Johnson's motivations as too negative and simplistic. Brauer found that Stern attached too much importance to the desire for votes in motivating Johnson's civil rights policies. Brauer thinks that Johnson was also influenced by how he wished himself to be seen by history.¹⁰

An author whose position on Johnson is not quite as negative as Stern's but still similar to it in many respects is Paul Henggeler whose *In His Steps: Lyndon Johnson and the Kennedy Mystique* contains much detail about Johnson's relationships with the Kennedys and the pressure he felt to fulfill the Kennedy legacy.¹¹ Henggeler believes that Johnson held principles, but sacrificed his principles when necessary to advance himself politically. Long before connecting with the Kennedys, Johnson voted against an anti-lynching bill in 1940 because of his segregationist Texas constituency. Henggeler notes, however, that occasionally Johnson took a courageous stand, such as when he was one of only three Southern senators who would not sign the Southern Manifesto of 1956 which supported segregation. Unlike other writers, Henggeler does not suggest that Johnson's position on the 1956 document was due to being minority leader at the time and having to think in a more national mode.¹²

As president, Johnson got the Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed by spending many hours on the phone with numerous senators and their wives. He bargained, appealed to their sense of morality, and didn't hesitate to flatter. Johnson got Senate Minority Leader, Republican Everett Dirksen, behind him by promising a corps of engineers project for his state of Illinois.¹³ Henggeler does not mention the combination of flattery and appeal to principle that Vice President Hubert Humphrey used with Dirksen on national television over the same issue. Other writers mention that occurrence, including Richard Loevy in his article in the anthology *Lyndon Baines Johnson and the Uses of Power*. However, Loevy does not mention Johnson offering the corps of engineers project. Loevy attempts to document a very specific record of the lobbying through statements from Johnson and others but admits the impossibility of determining how much lobbying Johnson actually did over the phone. Henggeler just assumes that Johnson did a lot of phone lobbying.¹⁴

Author Dennis Eskow expresses the opinion in his book *Lyndon Baines Johnson* that Johnson's Congressional experience and style hurt him when he became president, citing his lack of knowledge about how to implement government programs. Eskow writes:

He [LBJ] was the ultimate deal-maker. He was the man who went behind the scenes and brought powerful parties together. He had never been an executive long enough to develop the decision-making process needed to run any organization – especially a country. An executive executes. A deal-maker makes deals.¹⁵

Eskow's book provides very little else in the way of interpretation of Johnson, and doesn't offer any evidence to support his interesting assertion.

Alongside the largely negative books on Johnson, several substantially positive ones have appeared since 1985. The best-known study in this group is Robert Dallek's *Lone Star Rising*. This book mainly examines Johnson's life up through his election to the vice presidency in 1960. However, there are some interesting

comments about Johnson's presidency in the introduction. Dallek feels that one of Johnson's greatest achievements lay in integrating the southern and western economies into the U.S. economy as a whole. Dallek holds that historians have largely ignored this development in American history. Moreover, Dallek feels that Johnson *always* cared about the disadvantaged; not just when it was politically advantageous. Dallek notes that in the 1930s Johnson worked very hard helping black, Hispanic, and poor white Texans. He also reveals that Johnson secretly helped Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany in their attempts to come to the United States. Although Dallek admits that Johnson had flaws as a man, he believes that more attention should be paid to Johnson's accomplishments.¹⁶

Another example of a mostly positive work among the recent Johnson books is *White House Operations: The Johnson Years* by Emmette S. Redford and Richard T. McCarthy. Redford and McCarthy mainly explore Johnson's relationship with his staff in their dull and technical work. However, the authors make some valuable comments related to the areas in question, and they see Johnson in a positive light, although not quite as positive as Dallek. In contrast with Eskow, they believe that Johnson's Congressional experience helped him greatly in the presidency. They feel that Johnson's time in Congress helped him to learn many things and to do certain things well that helped him both then and later when he was president. The benefits the authors believe came out of Johnson's time in Congress are as follows: he discovered that the great issues were national public issues; he learned that issues were resolved by give-and-take between those who held opposing views; he became an expert at forging compromises; he learned who the centers of personal power were in Congress; and he learned how important it was for members of Congress to enact programs that pleased their constituents.

McCarthy and Redford feel that these skills helped Johnson greatly when he was attempting to pass legislation as president. The authors believe that Johnson had "a strong mixture of personal vanity in the drive for accomplishment, but it also reflected a deeper sense of mission for government and for the presidency." In contrast to authors such as Stern who feel that Johnson's presidency was not dominated by any particular philosophy, Redford and McCarthy conclude that Johnson's presidency was dominated by a two-pronged philosophy: having the government help those who needed some sort of special aid, and giving the poor a chance to help themselves with government assistance.¹⁷ They take a very positive view of Johnson and believe that his ideals and accomplishments outweighed the negative effects of his bloated ego.

Several books contain relatively balanced portrayals of Johnson, recognizing both his good and bad aspects. The first of these is *Lyndon Johnson, The Tragic Self: A Psychohistorical Portrait*. The two authors, Hyman L. Muslin and Thomas H. Jobe, are psychiatrists who also have strong backgrounds in the field of psychohistory. Much of their work deals with Johnson's performance in relation to Vietnam. They hardly mention his domestic programs and the civil rights issues of his presidency. However, they do offer some key insights into Johnson's personality.

Muslin and Jabe believe that Johnson could not admit to making a mistake and that he refused to accept personal responsibility for anything. Instead of admitting that he might have been wrong, he would give a tongue-lashing to anyone who criticized him. He lied and often acted very secretly so that no one could challenge his power by learning of his weaknesses. Overly domineering when he took charge of something, he would personally go over the work of his aides several times. He would even spy on their work during the night. The authors feel that Johnson's main problem in leading the country was that he could only feel the pain of others up to a certain point. They blame this on Johnson's self-centeredness and secrecy.

Johnson wanted the admiration of the public very much, but to win that overall admiration, he pushed and bullied individuals. Although on occasion he could be very friendly and kind to his aides, generally he showed little appreciation for subordinates, and therefore some rejoiced at his downfall. The authors are critical of Johnson on these points, yet the tone of their book is not condemnative toward Johnson. In fact, throughout the book, they portray him as a man who desperately wanted people to love him but was unable to win the people's affection. The passionate, almost melodramatic wording that the authors use makes the reader feel a tremendous amount of sympathy for Johnson. The authors believe that it was Johnson's insecurities that kept the public from loving him. In making these points, the authors use Paul Conkin's book *Big Daddy from the Pedernales* to support their arguments and their research complements Conkin's book. Jobe and Muslin agree with Conkin's argument that Johnson failed in his attempts to abolish poverty because of his constant secrecy, a secrecy that he used, ironically, to try to avoid responsibility for failures. When his secrets and falsehoods were made public, he suffered many attacks.¹⁸ Overall, *The Tragic Self* is a book whose title reflects its thesis perfectly. The authors create a picture of Johnson that is unflattering in many ways, and yet the reader feels a tremendous sense of pity for Johnson. They forcefully attempt to demonstrate that he wanted to be loved by people very much, but was unable to achieve his goal.

Unfortunately, as a work of history, their book falls a bit flat. They present very little evidence to support their theory that Johnson wanted to be loved, and their theory is seemingly convincing more from the authors' rhetoric than from any historical events that the authors describe. What little historical evidence is presented in the book tends to support a more negative view of Johnson. The authors' sympathy toward Johnson ensures that their historical evidence, which points toward an unflattering portrayal of Johnson, has only a limited effect. I think the book is balanced in its presentation. I would be hesitant in dismissing the psychoanalytical theory advocated in the book about Johnson because much of it is supported by most of Johnson's acquaintances and other historians, to varying degrees. However, without considering the work of other historians and the opinions of Johnson's associates, there is not enough historical evidence in *Lyndon Johnson, The Tragic Self: A Psychohistorical Portrait* to justify the authors' theory in a convincing fashion.

Paul Conkin's *Big Daddy from the Pedernales* is one of the most objectively balanced, and complete of all the works on Johnson covered here. It deals with his whole life and presents all of his conflicting drives and personality traits without giving too much emphasis to any one of them. Conkin admits in the preface that he was never fully able to understand Johnson's personality and notes that he found that he couldn't love or hate Johnson.

Conkin seems to hold the position that Johnson's great accomplishments in domestic policy were a function of his tremendous ego. He mentions that Johnson believed that government could not solve the private, personal problems of people's lives, like making sure they had happy marriages. However, he did believe that the government had the capacity to create a state of national economic stability and a general environment that promoted stable families. Johnson believed that the government could educate its citizens so that they could all reach their full potential. Moreover, he contends that Johnson's idealism would not have been possible without his great ego: "His powerful ego, his impossible expectations, defined the breadth and extent of what he wanted to achieve. Without his ego and overweening ambition, the Great Society would be inconceivable." Conkin agreed that Johnson needed to be in command of every situation: "Johnson never acted as a remote chief of staff. He had to have his say on every issue, and as much as time permitted, he tried to become informed on every bill, every agency, every foreign policy problem. He wanted not only to make the critical final decision but to shape the process."

Although there is ample evidence to show Johnson's immense pride during his presidency, Johnson felt humbled by the office and was always in a state of wonder at the power of the position. His religious attitudes demonstrate this. During his life up until his time as president he had never had a very active church life. When he became president that situation changed. Conkin writes:

Johnson sought in churches a type of support or consolation. Age and responsibility helped push him back toward the religious certainties of childhood, and in some respects he wanted to be able to defer to a higher power, to be able to claim a sense of cosmic righteousness for his causes and to use prayer to find help in making critical decisions.

Conkin considers absolutely false the claims of some writers that Johnson exploited religion for its political benefit by his public practices, such as attending churches of several different denominations. Conkin reveals that because of Johnson's wish for dramatic, surprising triumphs, he often misled reporters in regard to his policies. He was so angry when his plans or decisions were leaked to the press that he would sometimes change the policy to spite reporters, and this certainly points out a lack of stability and good judgement. On the other hand, the goals of the Great Society and Johnson's religious attitudes show a sense of morality and a desire to do the right thing.

Similarly, Conkin gives a very even-handed presentation of Johnson's attitudes on civil rights. Conkin mentions that prior to the 1957 Civil Rights Act, Johnson had

voted against every civil rights bill to come before Congress and had always defended the filibuster. Conkin notes, however, that when Johnson was voting on civil rights as a Texas Congressman and Senator, he was voting in a way that would protect states' rights and local autonomy. He had said that he always favored equal opportunity for blacks. Conkin believes that Johnson backed up his statement by his policies as the Texas director of the National Youth Administration in the 1930s. Johnson told racial jokes and engaged in stereotyping, but Conkin believes that such actions were unconscious echoes of the views of the society in which he grew up.¹⁹ Obviously, Conkin tried very hard to present a balanced picture of Johnson on every issue, pointing out both positives and negatives.

In 1998 the second volume of Robert Dallek's two-volume biography of Lyndon Johnson's life, *Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973*, was published. It is incredibly comprehensive and in its 628 pages of text and 90 pages of footnotes goes into more detail than any other work reviewed here on Johnson and his presidency. Like Conkin's work, *Flawed Giant* takes a very balanced view of Johnson. Although the admiration and sympathy that Dallek obviously felt toward Johnson in his first book were still present, the second volume adheres to a more objective tone. Dallek writes in the preface;

Johnson was an actor, a role player who in turn could be courtly and crude, gentle and overbearing, magnanimous and vindictive.... There is no question but that LBJ wished to be the greatest presidential reformer in the country's history.... This is a biography about a brilliant, highly effective, but deeply troubled man. At times, Johnson came frighteningly close to clinical paranoia.... For all my research effort, this book is hardly the last word on so important a twentieth-century President.

Dallek consistently presents Johnson as truly wanting to help people who were suffering from hardships but he also always kept in mind the political consequences of any action that he took. He shows that Johnson was not above using high-handed methods to ensure that events fell his way. Johnson's actions during the debate over the 1964 Civil Rights Act serve as examples of both of these character traits.

Dallek reveals how Johnson told Senator John Stennis of Mississippi how Zephyr Wright, his cook when he was Vice President, was not allowed to use the white restroom facilities at a gas station while driving from Washington to Texas and had to relieve herself on the road. Johnson exclaimed to Stennis, "That's wrong. And there ought to be something to change that." Johnson's ability to empathize with suffering people was something that Dallek sees as present throughout his life. Dallek writes, "Johnson – the prominent politician, the great Majority Leader, the Vice-President, the all-powerful President – was at the same time Johnson the underdog, the poor boy from Texas struggling to escape from the shadows and win universal approval." When Johnson was faced with the spectre of a Southern filibuster over the bill in the Senate, he snapped, "They can filibuster until hell

freezes over...I'm not going to put anything on that floor until this is done." Dallek notes that Johnson was unwilling to back down on the bill, quoting Johnson as saying he was "committed" to it with "no wheels and no deals." To pass the bill, however, Johnson was ever-ready to use his considerable arm-twisting ability. He weakened Southern opposition with his charm and garnered support for the bill with personal flattery and political payoffs. Johnson was quoted by a White House aide commenting to Southern senators:

You've got a southern president [sic] and if you want to blow him out of the water, go right ahead and do it, but you boys will never see another one again. We're friends on the q.t. Would you rather have me administering the civil rights bill, or do you want to have Nixon or [Republican Bill] Scranton?

Johnson utilized the advice of his bitter personal antagonist Attorney General Robert Kennedy in attempting to pass the bill. That way Kennedy could take some of the heat if the bill failed to get through and Johnson could still receive much praise if it passed. Johnson also promised to support a Central Arizona water project if Arizona Senator Carl Hayden would support the bill and persuade other Western senators to go along with him.

Overall, Dallek is still positive about many of Johnson's accomplishments, especially his integration of the Southern economy into the rest of the country's. However, Dallek is much more willing to analyze Johnson's flaws than in his first book and to show how those flaws hurt the country in some respects.²⁰ *Flawed Giant* stands at the high point of Johnson scholarship. Due to Conkin's willingness to propose a motivating force for Johnson's actions that ties the many strands of his actions and personality, his work is close in line behind Dallek's. Dallek's work suggests a similar motivation if you read between the lines, but he never states it explicitly and boldly as Conkin does. However, for its sheer comprehensiveness and its total readability and engrossing story-line, Dallek's book edges past its rival.

The books that have been written about Lyndon Johnson's domestic politics in recent years have all come to the consensus that he was a man who loved holding power, making decisions and having control over others. They all agree that he often used unscrupulous means to achieve worthy goals. Most authors agree that he was motivated by a mixture of self-interest and a strong desire to help people who had no one else to speak up for them. Although they differ on the amount of emphasis on the two motivations, the writers of today do not hold the strongly opposing views of the writers that wrote fifteen to thirty years ago. Recent works on Johnson are more objective. Although finding the truth about Lyndon Johnson may be unattainable, the historians of today are definitely progressing toward that goal.

Endnotes

1. Dennis Eskow, *Lyndon Baines Johnson* (New York, 1993), 13-14, 16, 18, 20, 25, 27, 29-31, 47-48; Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York, 1976), 65.
2. Eskow, *Lyndon*, 49, 53-54, Kearns, *Lyndon*, 68, 70.
3. Eskow, *Lyndon*, 56-57, 59, 61, 64-65, 67.
4. *Ibid.*, 69, 70-72; Emmette S. Redford and Richard T. McCarthy, *White House Operations: The Johnson Presidency* (Austin, 1986), 50.
5. Eskow, *Lyndon*, 81, 91-92.
6. Robert A. Divine, "Assessing Lyndon Johnson," *The Wilson Quarterly*, (Summer 1982), VI: 142-150.
7. Divine, "The Johnson Revival: A Bibliographic Appraisal," in Robert A. Divine, ed., *The Johnson Years: Vietnam, the Environment, and Science* (Lawrence, Kansas, 1987), 3-18.
8. Robert A. Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent* (New York, 1990), xvii-xviii, xxi, xxvii.
9. Mark Stern, *Calculating Visions: Kennedy, Johnson, and Civil Rights* (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1992), 116-117, 232-233.
10. Carl M. Brauer, review of *Calculating Visions: Kennedy, Johnson and Civil Rights*, by Mark Stern, in *The Journal of American History* (March 1993), 79, 1684.
11. Gilbert Taylor, review of *In His Steps: Lyndon Johnson and the Kennedy Mystique*, Paul R. Henggeler, in *Booklist* (January 15, 1991), 1001.
12. Paul R. Henggeler, *In His Steps: Lyndon Johnson and the Kennedy Mystique* (Chicago, 1991), 111; Robert A. Divine, *Since 1945 Politics and Diplomacy in Recent American History* (New York, 1985), 81.
13. Henggeler, *In His*, 113-114.
14. Richard D. Loevy, "'To Write It in the Books of Law': President Lyndon B. Johnson and the Civil Rights Act of 1964," in Bernard J. Firestone and Robert C. Vogt, eds. *Lyndon Baines Johnson and the Uses of Power* (New York, 1988), 119.
15. Eskow, *Lyndon*, 108-109.
16. Robert Dallek, *Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1908-1960* (New York, 1991), 7-8, 10.
17. Redford and McCarthy, *White House*, 50-51.

18. Hyman L. Muslin, and Thomas H. Jobe, *Lyndon Johnson, The Tragic Self: A Psychohistorical Portrait* (New York, 1991), dust jacket, 53-54, 80-82.

19. Paul Conkin, *Big Daddy from the Pedernales: Lyndon Baines Johnson* (Boston, 1986), ix-xii, 74, 139, 180, 186, 193-195.

20. Dallek, *Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973* (New York, 1998), ix-xii, 112-113, 115, 117-119, 625, 627.

Noble Experiment: Baseball Integration, 1945-1947

by
Mark E. Garbett, Jr.

The year 1945 saw the end of World War II, and Americans were ready to leave war behind. But within the next two years, battle broke out in the struggle for civil rights for African Americans. On August 28, 1945, Jackie Robinson signed an agreement with the Brooklyn Dodgers and became the first African American in the twentieth century to play major league baseball. It was a landmark event, and questions come to mind: Why did this happen when it did, soon after World War II? Why was it the Dodgers? Why Jackie Robinson? The purpose of this paper is to address these and other questions in the noble experiment to end Jim Crow baseball. The war in Europe was fought to end the tyranny of maniacal dictator Adolf Hitler, and the holocaust against the Jewish people opened the eyes of the world to the evils of racial hatred, segregation and discrimination. Yet segregation remained deeply engrained in American society, and the integration of baseball came very early in the civil rights movement. In 1945 President Harry Truman commissioned a study of discrimination in American society against African Americans. It was entitled "To Secure These Rights," and on July 26, 1948 he issued an executive order integrating the armed forces. By then, without government intervention, the color barrier was already broken in baseball.¹

Blacks had played in the major leagues in the nineteenth century, but as segregation took hold, they were excluded. They formed black teams and barnstormed and after 1920 formed Negro Leagues. The teams played each other, and in the 1930s played traveling white major league all-star teams during the off-season. Many of the white all-stars were amazed at the ability of black players, as were many fans, but the owners of the white leagues nevertheless kept repeating the Jim Crow excuse that blacks were not as talented as white players.² Then during World War II, when many white stars were drafted, fans turned out in greater numbers to watch the Negro Leagues. This increased the outcry to bring them into the major leagues. Fans marveled at the pitching of LeRoy "Satchel" Paige, and were amazed at the prodigious home runs of Josh Gibson, the "Black Babe Ruth." Spectators enjoyed their showy and aggressive style, and in a time when white major league players did not run fast or steal bases, fans loved it when black players raced around the bases, harassed pitchers, and seemed to almost routinely steal home.³

Why were the Dodgers the first team to integrate? One reason was the makeup

Mark E. Garbett, Jr., Senior History major and Pastor of New Hope United Methodist Church in New Hope, Ohio, is a member of Alpha Beta Phi Chapter. He delivered this paper at the Phi Alpha Theta Regional meeting, Georgetown College, March 25, 2000. He plans to enter the teaching profession upon graduation. He reports that he is a die-hard fan of sports nostalgia.

of the community of Brooklyn; it was becoming a melting pot. Anglo-Americans were moving to the outskirts, leaving an amalgamation of Italians, Jews, and an increasing number of blacks. The African Americans came during World War II, when labor was needed for war industry. These diverse cultures tolerated each other and developed intense pride in their neighborhood and their baseball team. The Dodgers played at Ebbets Field in the heart of Brooklyn, and given their losing tradition, were lovingly called “Dem Bums.” But the residents accepted them as their own and perhaps nowhere else were the players and fans so close in admiration and friendship. The community was a perfect laboratory for the great experiment. And, the Dodgers had Branch Rickey as general manager and owner, and he was a man with a vision. He was born and reared in Ohio, and had strict Methodist parents. He was educated, but wanted to play catcher and use equipment called the “tools of ignorance.” He had a deep conscience, but was referred to as a spendthrift shyster and the robber baron of baseball. He was named “The Mahatma” for his high-minded ideas, but because of his thrift was also known as “El Cheapo.”⁴

The Mathatma played baseball, but left the game in 1904 to coach at Ohio Wesleyan University. It was here that he met racism head-on for the first time. His team was playing a game in South Bend, Indiana, and he was checking them into the local hotel when a problem arose. Charlie Thomas, the only black player on the team was denied admission. Rickey forcefully persuaded the clerk into allowing Thomas to stay with him in his room. After Rickey saw the other team members into their rooms, he went to his room and found Thomas sobbing and tearing at the flesh on his hands. If only he could rip off the black flesh and be white, he said, he would be treated like everyone else. Rickey remembered the incident for the rest of his life.⁵

In Brooklyn, Rickey was not new to innovation. While general manager of the St. Louis Cardinals he instituted the farm system of developing talent in the minors for major league teams. He was an impressive judge of talent, able to scout players well ahead of other teams. He recognized in the Negro Leagues a gold mine of talent. He also saw that there was vast exploitation and corruption in the black leagues. There were no contracts so players could be bought and sold by corrupt owners as many as three times in one week. Many games were unofficial and score keeping was haphazard. Rickey wanted to help black players play in a reputable league.⁶

He called a meeting with his most trusted scouts, including Clyde Sukeforth, and told them to scout Negro League players so that he could build his own team of black players. They were to tell no one. They were to examine the players thoroughly, including their personal life styles and criminal records. With scouting underway, Rickey sent up a series of smokescreens to hide his real intentions. When black sportswriter Joe Bostic brought black players unannounced for tryouts, he flew into a rage, pretending for an audience of reporters that he opposed the integration of baseball. Then he created an elaborate subterfuge to mask his intentions. He announced the creation of a new league for black players, the “United States League,” and he organized the black team, the Brown Dodgers, to play at Ebbets Field. The Brown Dodgers would play only one season, but they provided a screen

for Rickey's recruitment of black players. As a member of Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia's Committee on Unity, Rickey refrained from endorsing inclusion of the Negro Leagues in organized baseball—he wanted to avoid the impression that he was integrating baseball under government pressure.⁷

Fortunately for Rickey's purpose, Baseball Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis died in 1944. Landis was totally opposed to integration, but in April, 1945, his successor, A.B. "Happy" Chandler, was selected. Chandler was a U.S. Senator and former governor of the segregated state of Kentucky, and sports writers assumed that his appointment would end hopes for blacks in the major leagues. Chandler was publicly neutral, but privately he informed Rickey that he would solidly stand behind him.⁸

Rickey searched for a special player and a certain kind of man. He had to be talented, but he also had to be willing to bear the weight of all African Americans on his back. He had to be able to impress crowds not only with his ability, but also with his attitude. The first black player could not be a carouser, and it would be better if he were married. After exhaustive reports from his scouts, Rickey selected Jackie Robinson, an educated, twenty-six-year-old player who had a positive attitude in spite of his turbulent life. Robinson was born in 1919 in Cairo, Georgia and when he was an infant his father left him and his four siblings and his mother, Mallie Robinson. Mallie moved the family to Pasadena, California in 1920. There, growing up in a white neighborhood, he endured racist remarks and discrimination as the neighbors constantly attempted to force the family to move. He played with gangs, but a clergyman turned his attention to sports and sports became his cornerstone in life.⁹

He attended Pasadena Junior College and set the men's collegiate broad jump record. Then he enrolled in the University of California in Los Angeles and became the first athlete in UCLA history to letter in four sports: baseball, track, football, and basketball. He was not jaded by success, but lived a life of self-denial and social responsibility. Yet, he did not finish his degree program. His family needed money, and he could no longer endure the treatment of white students who respected him as an athlete but refused to associate with him because he was black. Many considered him an arrogant troublemaker because he was assertive and refused to accept being segregated and discriminated against. If he had been white, he would have been considered a competitor, but since he was black they called him "an uppity nigger." His future wife Rachel Isum watched him on the playing field and thought him arrogant, but once she talked with him and got to know him, she realized that he was a passionate man with a deep sense of justice.¹⁰

Robinson dropped out of UCLA in his senior year and worked as a coach for the National Youth Administration and played for the Los Angeles Bulldogs, a semi-pro football team. The next year, in 1942, he was drafted. At Fort Riley, Kansas, he applied for Officer Candidates' School (OCS) but was rejected even though he had attended college and had high scores on the exam. He appealed to a fellow athlete on the base, heavyweight champion Joe Louis, and Louis used his influence to get

him admitted. He graduated from OCS and was appointed morale officer of the black battalion at Fort Riley. He tried to join the white baseball team and was rebuffed, and he pressed for more seats for black soldiers in the PX. Labeled a troublemaker, he was transferred to Fort Hood, Texas.¹¹

At Fort Hood he was placed in charge of a tank battalion. He won the admiration of his men by admitting that he knew nothing about tanks and he would need their help. He even won the respect of the white officers. But on July 6, 1944, he was sitting at the front of a bus talking with the wife of an officer friend, when the driver stopped the bus and ordered him to “get to the back of the bus where the colored people belong.” Robinson knew that the army had recently ended segregation on military buses, and refused to move. When the bus arrived at the base, the driver had him arrested and charged with insubordination.¹² His court-martial began August 2, 1944, and influential African Americans helped in his defense. The NAACP, Joe Louis, and many black newspapers condemned the injustice. Robinson was acquitted, but he was sick of the army and asked for a discharge. In November, 1944 he was honorably discharged, and in 1945 he played for the Kansas City Monarchs of the Negro Leagues.¹³

Branch Rickey knew of the tumultuous events in Robinson’s life, and considered Robinson’s fighting spirit and experience with segregation strengths. Rickey sent Clyde Sukeforth to find Robinson, who had been selected as starting shortstop for the Negro League All-Star game, and bring him to his office for an interview. Rickey knew that Robinson possessed all of the five skills—running, hitting, fielding, throwing (though his arm was suspect), and power. But Rickey wanted to meet Robinson and know the full measure of the man.¹⁴ Sukeforth brought Robinson into Rickey’s office for the historic meeting on August 28, 1945, after a flight from Chicago, where Robinson had just played a double-header with the Monarchs. Sukeforth and Robinson assumed that Rickey wanted Robinson for the Brown Dodgers. “Do you know why you are here?” Rickey asked. “To play for the Brown Dodgers,” answered Robinson. “I’ve brought you here to play white baseball . . . if you will. I’ve sent for you because I’m interested in you as a candidate for the Brooklyn National League Club.”¹⁵

Robinson could not believe it. He was speechless, and then Rickey asked him if he had the guts. Robinson started to answer, but Rickey cut him off and began role-playing hateful situations he would face on the field. Rickey pretended to be a racist player, a racist teammate, a fan making fun of Jackie, a player trying to hurt him, and others. “Mr. Rickey, are you looking for a Negro who is afraid to fight back?” Jackie asked, and Rickey replied: “Robinson, I’m looking for a ballplayer with guts enough not to fight back.” He said that Robinson had to fight racism with hitting and running, not with fists or words. “Mr. Rickey, I’ve got two cheeks. If you want me to take this gamble, I’ll promise you there will be no incidents.” At some point in the three hour meeting Rickey asked if Robinson had a girlfriend, and he answered that he and Rachel Isum were planning to be married. The session closed with Jackie secretly signing with Brooklyn’s top farm club, the Montreal Royals.¹⁶

On October 23, 1945 the public signing occurred in Montreal, and reaction was immediate. Some major league players threatened boycotts; and managers and owners called Rickey a grandstander and race baiter. The *New York Daily News* predicted that Jackie would fail: "Robinson is a 1000-1 shot to make the grade." The *Sporting News* declared him six years too old, and of such mediocre talent that once white veterans returned from the war, he would be replaced. Jackie and Rachel married in February 1946, and when they traveled from Los Angeles to spring training in Daytona Beach, Florida, they experienced the humiliation of all blacks who traveled in the segregated south. In New Orleans they were bumped from their connecting flight, and in Pensacola they were removed from the airplane so that white passengers could have their seats. From there, they took a bus and when they sat in the reclining seats in front, the driver moved them to the black section in the back where it was crowded and the seats did not recline. In Daytona Beach they were denied housing in the team hotel and stayed in the home of a local black politician.¹⁷

On April 18, 1946, the Montreal Royals played their first game of the season and Jackie broke the color barrier. It was before a record crowd in Roosevelt Stadium in Jersey City against the Giants. Black fans were present in unusual numbers. At first, crowd reaction was restrained, and in his first at-bat Jackie grounded out to the short-stop. But the next time he up, he hit a three-run homerun. By the end of the game he had made three more hits, had stolen two bases and had twice provoked the pitcher to balk and scored. Beginning with the homerun, the spectators went wild with enthusiasm. At home in Montreal, the Royals team and their fans treated Jackie and Rachel with respect and kindness, but in Syracuse, Baltimore and other cities, Jackie was taunted severely. Nevertheless, he led the league that year, with a .349 batting average, and his team won the International League pennant. The Junior World Series was against the Louisville Colonels of the American Association. The first three games were in segregated Louisville, and every time Jackie came on the field the fans greeted him with boos, foul language, and racial epithets. He entered the series in a slump and went one for eleven in the first three games. Luckily, the Royals won a game in Louisville and looked forward to playing in Montreal. There, the home fans did something for their star second baseman that he could never forget. Every time a Colonel player stepped from the dugout, the Canadian fans booed boisterously. Robinson's slump ended and he made seven hits in the last three games and the Royals won the series. After the final game the fans chanted, "We want Robinson!" and ran onto the field lifting him on their shoulders. One writer said it was probably the first time on the continent that a black man was chased by a white mob with something on their mind other than lynching.¹⁸

Meanwhile, in 1946 Rickey had signed four other black players into the Dodger organization. Preparing to bring Robinson up to the Dodgers in the Spring of 1947, he met with African American leaders in Brooklyn and requested them not to make Jackie's appearance a "national comedy." He scheduled spring training in Panama to avoid segregated Florida, and he and Manager Leo Durocher squelched a plan by some of the Dodger players to sign a petition against Robinson. When Robinson

played his first game in a Dodger's uniform, an exhibition game at Ebbets Field against the Yankees, over 14,000 black fans attended. He did not get a hit, but autograph hunters mobbed him after the game regardless.¹⁹

The Great Experiment encountered racial hatred on the playing field. During the 1947 season the Philadelphia Phillies managed by Ben Chapman yelled off-color, hateful remarks from the dugout and held their bats like machine guns, pretending to shoot Jackie. The bench jockeying was so severe that it actually worked in Jackie's favor by motivating his teammates to rally behind him. Dixie Walker from Alabama, who had been the ring leader opposing Jackie's acceptance on the team, began yelling back in Jackie's defense. He and fellow-Alabaman Eddie Stanky called the Phillies cowards and challenged them to pick on some one who could fight back. The attacks had the effect of solidifying support for Jackie among his teammates. In a game in Cincinnati, where Robinson was severely taunted and received death threats, Kentucky short stop Pee Wee Reese walked over to Robinson at first base and put his arm around him and joked with him. They became friends, and Reese became one of his strongest defenders.²⁰

Robinson had an amazing rookie season, hitting .297, winning Rookie of the Year and helping the Dodgers win the National League pennant. In a *Time* magazine poll he was voted the second most popular man in America, behind Bing Crosby. This was amazing in the time when segregation was still alive. Five years after his rookie season most hotels admitted Robinson and other black players. Almost a decade before *Brown v. Board of Education*, Jackie Robinson, Jr. was attending a white school and his father was riding on buses with white teammates. In 1948, Satchel Paige realized his dream by signing with the Cleveland Browns. The golden talent in the Negro Leagues was being mined.²¹

Would baseball have been integrated without Jackie Robinson? What impact did the integration of baseball have on the civil rights movement? Rickey and Robinson were innovative, but integration was on the way. New York and other communities were pressing for reform, and major league owners and managers knew there was great talent in the black leagues. However, Rickey and Robinson accomplished the feat. Other owners were delaying and other players might have wilted under the pressure or reacted in other ways other than with performance on the field. Robinson, with his upbringing, education and beliefs, realized that nonviolence and leading by example would win hearts. He was the most popular player in baseball and is still recognized by young people today, over twenty-five years after his death. Jackie retired from baseball in 1957 and died from a heart attack at the age of fifty-three in 1972, at his home in Connecticut. Rickey was an innovator and a revolutionary and Robinson was the right player, and Brooklyn was the right place. Rickey's debt to Charlie Thomas was paid.²²

Endnotes

1. Joram Warmund, "In the Eye of the Storm: 1947 in World Perspective," in *Jackie Robinson: Race, Sports, and the American Dream*, Joseph Dorinson and Joram Warmund, eds. (New York, 1998), 6.

2. Jules Tygiel, *Baseball's Great Experiment: Jackie Robinson and His Legacy* (New York, 1983, 13-15; Sidney Gendin, "Moses Fleetwood Walker: Jackie Robinson's Accidental Predecessor," in Dorinson and Warmund, *Robinson*, 24-25; and Anonymous, "The Flaw in the Diamonds," *Economist*, January 18, 1997, 81-82. Elaine M. Richardson reviewed Tygiel's book in Vol. 1, No. 1 of *Perspectives in History*.

3. Warmund, "Storm," 5-8; Anonymous, "Diamonds," 81-82; *Soul of the Game*, HBO television program, two hours, 1997; LeRoy "Satchel" Paige and David Lipman, *Maybe I'll Pitch Forever* (New York, 1962), 110-115.

4. Dorinson and Warmund, *Robinson*, 41; Robert Gruber, "It Happened in Brooklyn: Reminiscences of a Fan," in Dorinson and Warmund, *Robinson*, 43-48; Peter Golenbock, "Men of Conscience," in Dorinson and Warmund, *Robinson*, 13-17.

5. Golenbock, "Conscience," 13-17; Anonymous, "Higher Calling," <http://www.chron.com/content/chronicle/sports/special/barriers/rickey.html>, March 24, 1999.

6. Tygiel, *Robinson*, 45-47.

7. Jackie Robinson with Alfred Duckett, *I Never Had It Made: The Autobiography of Jackie Robinson* (New Jersey, 1995), 27-29; Tygiel, *Robinson*, 47; William Marshall, *Baseball's Pivotal Era, 1945-1951* (Lexington, 1999), 125, 128-129.

8. Golenbock, "Conscience," 14-17.

9. Marshall, *Pivotal Era*, 126; Tygiel, *Robinson*, 50-55, 58, 63-64; Robinson, *Autobiography*, 3-9, 26-35; Patrick Henry, "Jackie Robinson: Athlete and American Par Excellence," *Virginia Quarterly Review* (Spring 1997): 191-192; Arnold Rampershad, *Jackie Robinson: A Biography* (New York, 1997), 3-39.

10. Robinson, *Autobiography*, 10-12; Rampershad, *Robinson*, 77-83.

11. Tygiel, *Robinson*, 61; Robinson, *Autobiography*, 12-13, 16-18; Rampershad, *Robinson*, 91-93, 98-99.

12. Tygiel, *Robinson*, 59; Robinson, *Autobiography*, 18-22; Rampershad, *Robinson*, 103-104.

13. Robinson, *Autobiography*, 19-22; Rampershad, *Robinson*, 105-110.

14. Rampershad, *Robinson*, 123-125; Robinson, *Autobiography*, 30-31.

15. Marshall, *Pivotal Era*, 127.
16. Ibid.; Robinson, *Autobiography*, 30-35; Rampershad, *Robinson*, 126-127.
17. Tygiel, *Robinson*, 76, 100; *Soul of the Game*; and Marshall, *Pivotal Era*, 129, 131-132.
18. Robinson, *Autobiography*, 51-53; Rampershad, *Robinson*, 156-7; Marshall, *Pivotal Era*, 133-134.
19. Marshall, *Pivotal Era*, 134-138.
20. Robinson, *Autobiography*, 59-63, 64-65; Rampershad, *Robinson*, 172-173, 182-183; Henry, "Robinson," 192; Tygiel, *Robinson*, 183.
21. Marshall, *Pivotal Era*, 142; Rampershad, *Robinson*, 188; Michael Malec, "Robinson and Worrell: Athletes as Agents of Societal Change," *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* (November 1997): 412.
22. Gerald Early, "American Integration, Black Heroism, and the Meaning of Jackie Robinson," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, May 23, 1997; B4-B5; Tygiel, *Robinson*, 206-207, 328, 341.

Revolutionary Inequality: An Exploration of the Persistence of Class Divisions in Revolutionary France

by
Susan Conrady

Was the French Revolution, ultimately, a success or failure? Traditional views often include visions of an oppressed, starving, impoverished lower class that revolts and wins equality. Historians generally agree that this view is not accurate, but their agreement tends to end there. Even today, the French Revolution is surrounded by debate and disagreement.

The inequality of the social structure of pre-Revolutionary France contributed a great deal to dissent among its people. The entire social structure, called the Ancient Regime, was based in inequality. It held most of the lower classes in a very oppressive state of poverty, with almost no hope of rising to anything better. The distribution of prosperity weighed strongly in favor of a very small ruling class. Such class distinctions were seen as unnatural and unjust privileges, established by a divided and inept ruling class.¹ The Revolution was fueled, in large part, by angry middle and lower class citizens demanding equality. This realization of equality was valued highly by the revolutionaries.² Was equality achieved by the Revolution?

This thesis argues that sufficient evidence suggests that the French Revolution was a failure, in terms of the social equality it set out to achieve. By examining the structure of the society of France, both before and after the Revolution, one can find comparable systems of inequality. By social inequality, we mean to say that certain social, political, and economic relations divided wealth, power, and prosperity very unevenly³ among the people of France. Definite groups within French society enjoyed many unearned advantages and conferred dominance while others had no hope of achieving such advantages. This inequality was a driving force behind masses in the Revolution, yet very few actually gained equal access to the wealth and power of France.

This study does not intend to argue that nobody in French society benefited as a result of the Revolution. Certainly, there were groups, particularly the bourgeoisie that gained a great deal. However, the *structure* of inequality appears to have changed little; the power and wealth of France remained in the hands of a very small group of elite. These benefits shifted from one group to another, but the majority of the population never enjoyed such privileges.

Throughout the Revolution, a succession of governing bodies, each with different ideas and goals, took control of France. The conflicting goals of the

Susan Conrady graduated from Northern Kentucky University in 1999 as an Honors Graduate and Computer Science Major. She presented this paper as her honors thesis in the spring of 1999.

revolutionaries were made apparent in the huge differences between these governments. However, the rapid rise and fall of these ruling bodies offered limited opportunity for a particular social structure to develop according to particular government policies. The first rule to offer real stability and longevity was that of Napoleon Bonaparte. We will use the society that evolved directly from the policies of his government as our point of comparison.

The first section of this paper will examine, in detail, the structure of society of pre-Revolutionary France, and the policies that led to the established structure. The Ancient Regime, established in the Middle Ages, was a form of society grounded in the inequality of rights, or the idea of privilege. Prosperity and wealth were not evenly distributed; it was available only to those who held large estates, exercised feudal rights, or who received farm rent.⁴ The Ancient Regime was divided into three distinct estates: the First, Second, and Third Estates. The people in each of the Estates held very different positions in society.

The First Estate was made up of the clergy of the Church and numbered less than 150,000, or .5 percent, of the entire population of France.⁵ The official religion of France was Roman Catholicism, and the clergy from the nobility held a very high place in society. These were the elite of the Regime, being second only to the monarch, and even that was questionable. Bishops held positions of inherent authority and hierarchical supremacy. They were free to enjoy revenues and exalted status without external interference.⁶ These were the aristocratic clergy not parish priests. The parish clergy were among the class of commoners and did not share the privileges of the First Estate. They were almost entirely excluded from any decision making process. In order to be appointed a bishop, a man required three very important advantages: aristocratic birth, land, and connections at Versailles.

Even then, it was difficult to achieve a position as a bishop. During his fourteen year reign, Louis XVI named only fifty-five (of one-hundred and thirty) bishops, and only two were not of the nobility. Many of the bishops in the First Estate were the nominees of his great-great-grandfather, Louis XIV.⁷ The competition and scandal that took place to secure a position in this estate when one became available was fierce, but it dulled in comparison to the scandal of those who were already members of the First Estate.

The bishops of the First Estate were notorious for being of very poor character. Many bishops were involved in questionable forms of “entertainment” that gave the Catholic Church in France a very bad name. They seriously neglected the people they were supposed to help. The commoners received little, if any, support from these Church officials, many of whom cared more for their personal indulgence than the well being of those under their keeping. The cries of the parish priests and their people fell on deaf ears. The members of the First Estate lived a life of luxury and indulgence, while many of those beneath them starved.

It is not difficult to wonder why the Church became one of the sworn enemies of the Revolution. Public welfare and charity were left in the hands of the Church, and the aristocratic bishops would have nothing to do with it. Many had become too

caught up in politics to concern themselves with their religious duties. There was no longer much of a distinction between the work of the aristocratic clergy in the Church and State. Very few of the cures actually put themselves at the disposal of their diocese. Even the parish clergy began to question the Church in its oppressive materialistic state. "Relations between upper and lower clergy were an exchange of arrogance on the one part and open or suppressed hostility on the other."⁸

The Second Estate consisted of the nobility, who were divided into two very distinct classes, the nobility of the sword and the nobility of the robe, who together represented only 1.5 percent of the total population of France.⁹ The nobility of the sword were those who could trace their nobility many centuries back, as members of the aristocracy. Most of these nobles lived or were permitted attendance at Louis XVI's court in Versailles. This was the greatest honor a noble could hope to achieve. Court society was a "charming and wicked moment, a world which had brought the art of sensuous enjoyment to it perfection."¹⁰ They lived in luxury at the expense of the taxpayers, who resented it very much. The nobility of the sword held all of the other nobles and, even more so, commoners with great contempt. In return, they were resented and often times hated by the commoners and the lower nobility.

Most of the remaining nobility fell under the title of the nobility of the robe. This included all those who acquired their rank through military service, purchase of patents of nobility, or by appointment to certain public offices.¹¹ France was dominated by an endless competition for power, prestige, and security.¹² There was a constant drive to acquire and exercise power. As France fell further and further into debt, the monarchy created and sold numerous public offices, leading to a drastic increase in this class during Louis XVI's reign. Although many of these men envied the nobility at court, they held much of the influence of the state in their hands.

The real power of the nobility of the robe lay in those who were granted the position of magistrates of the parliaments. "The crown and parliament together constituted the policy of the Ancient regime under which France was governed."¹³ The fight to acquire an office with the king was fierce. During Louis XVI's reign, parliament was the major legislative body whose power was checked only by the king himself. Of the ministers and intendants of Louis XVI's reign, only one was not a noble. Thus the nobility seemed to monopolize the power of the government, stirring discontent among the commoners. "The people disliked them because of their excessive powers, because they were the official representatives of the monarchy that the public opinion condemned."¹⁴

The majority of the nobility of the robe, however, was made up of 'sparrow hawks' who were "too poor to flee from their poverty to Versailles and forbidden by their noble status to pursue legitimate activities that might rescue them from their plight."¹⁵ They envied and despised the power of the nobility above them because they were denied the same luxuries. They too, however, fell under the condemnation of the commoners. They were exempt from direct taxation, held seigniorial rights, rights of administering manorial justice, and held important public offices in the courts, the administration, and in the army.¹⁶ This poorer nobility also quarreled

with their tenant peasants over insignificant manorial dues and they insisted upon the recognition of their trivial social rights.¹⁷ On the whole, almost the entire nobility was despised by the commoners for one reason or another. The constant competition and bickering among the nobility made it impossible for them to unite.

The largest estate, the Third Estate, was made up of commoners. Ninety-eight percent of the population fell into this class, and most enjoyed none of the privileges of those above them. The nobility and the clergy held all the power and privileges that France had to offer, and made up only two percent of the population. The Third Estate was the only one to pay direct taxes, even though many lived in terrible poverty. They resented the intolerable distribution of prosperity. As time passed, and conditions grew worse, the people began to rise and rebel.

The Third Estate consisted of many different groups of people, each of whom were ready to rebel for their own reasons. The largest group among the commoners was the peasants, who made up three-fourths of the population.¹⁸ They worked as tenant farmers cultivating small plots of land, frequently in soil and climatic conditions which were far from suitable.¹⁹ Free peasant ownership was eliminated almost entirely during the 18th century. The landed nobility and the Church owned the land and frequently exercised great political and military authority over the peasantry. This relic of feudalism, that the monarchy supported, kept most of these peasants living in poverty.

Not many peasants could support their families from the small piece of land they were granted to cultivate. The owner, or feudal lord, received many dues and services from the peasants, making their financial burden even greater.²⁰ They became infuriated by all the manorial dues that were considered to be intolerable and innumerable. Resentment welled toward feudal lords and also toward the Church, who owned and leased their land to tenant farmers. They became concerned for their land and resentful of the classes above them that seemed to make it impossible for them to advance.²¹

This class was held in a very oppressive state of poverty. One fourth of the peasantry did not own or rent any land at all. They were forced to work as farmhands and harvesters during the busy season or as household servants or industrial workers. Many ended up starving, or became poachers, smugglers, vagrants, highwaymen, or beggars in the town.²² Economic problems of the state resulted in rising costs without a rise in wage for these peasants. This sent them further into poverty. There was a steady decline in the fortune of the peasantry during Louis XVI's reign due to three major causes: a sharp and continuous growth in population, a marked upward movement of prices without corresponding increase in real wages, and agrarian reforms that caused many peasants to lose their jobs.²³ All of these things added to the discontent of the peasantry. As conditions grew worse, the cry for reform grew louder.

The women of the Third Estate played a large role throughout the Revolution. They were immediately responsible for keeping their families fed so were the most angry at the conditions of famine that were tied so closely to their poverty and

position in society.²⁴ As conditions in France grew worse due to economic, political, and social problems, the women of the Third Estate grew more and more impatient for reform. In 1789, they led a march on Hotel de Ville and on Versailles.²⁵ They set the tone for the Revolution and led the campaign for patriotic contributions throughout the Revolution.²⁶ Another group among the commoners that played a major role in the Revolution was the bourgeoisie. This class became very difficult to define because it consisted of a blend of so many different people with varying wealth and prestige. It contained a vast assortment of businessmen and workers ranging from craftsmen, masters of the guild, merchants and printers to members of the legal profession to physicians and surgeons to professors of the universities. They came from all different social and economic backgrounds.²⁷ Like the nobility, they were unable to unite under common goals.

With the selling of places in the nobility, there was constant competition and bickering among the bourgeoisie. As noted previously, this class contained a huge variety of people. This proved to be a problem as the Revolution unfolded. In opposition to both the nobility and others among their own class, they failed to unite and set any common goals.

The bourgeoisie were a very powerful group of people. They possessed almost all of the industrial, commercial, and agricultural capital of France.²⁸ The bourgeoisie grew in number and strength, but were still denied state posts because they lacked aristocratic birth. As time passed, they became very aware of their economic importance and aimed at social and political advancement.²⁹

The bourgeoisie were hungry to get their share of power. "Attesting to the lure of elite status were the bourgeois purchases of seigneuries, the marrying off of bourgeois daughters to the sons of penurious but pedigreed rural squires, and the unabashed bourgeois aping of noble fashion and fanfare."³⁰ As the financial situation grew worse and the sale of places in the nobility, or seigneurie, increased, the line between the upper bourgeoisie and the lower nobility grew thinner and thinner. These two groups often met to discuss enlightened ideals and politics and grew in their distaste for the current condition of the state and the policies of inequality that did not allow them to advance.³¹ The goals of the two groups varied greatly, yet one factor running through every level of the regime was distaste for the distribution of prosperity and prestige.

At the top of the Ancient Regime sat the absolute monarch. When Louis XIV first established himself as absolute monarch in 1661, it was as the sole source of authority, subject to no limit or condition.³² In his constitutional canon, he declared that he exercised a function that was wholly divine. As the "father of his people... He owed them love, and protection, and the duty to devote himself to their welfare." They, in return, owed "tribute to his majesty."³³ His self-confidence and sense of purpose persuaded his people to accept his authority and follow him. It was made very clear that the absolute monarch was above all others, and no position or authority equaled his own.

In the years immediately preceding the Revolution, Louis XIV's great-great grandson, Louis XVI, reigned over France. Unlike his great-great grandfather, Louis XVI was very concerned with the opinions of those around him. He was reluctant to use his authority in most instances. Upon making a decision, he explained to his council: "It may be politically unwise, but it seems to me this is the general will, and I wish to be loved."³⁴ Under Louis XIV's absolutism, "the king was the only public person, there was nothing public external to himself, least of all an opinion."³⁵ Louis XVI, on the other hand, was readily influenced by opinions of those around him.³⁶

Aside from the dislike of the idea of an absolute monarch, the commoners despised Louis XVI for his lack of control. He alone might have checked the power of the First Estate, but refused to maintain authority over them. Overlapping and poorly defined jurisdictions were common in politics under Louis XVI.³⁷ He never appointed or dismissed a minister—he merely asked them to sit with him and stopped asking when he no longer wanted them.³⁸ Louis knew little about the kingdom which he was ruling and he did not understand what was going on within its borders.³⁹ He lacked the confidence to enforce his measures, so by the 1780s he was unable to impose his authority over parliament. Necker, Calonne, and Brienne, three of his financial ministers, all tried to impose taxes on the upper estates but could not pass reforms through parliament.⁴⁰

The king dismissed minister after minister due to pressure from parliament. Again, when attempting to levy taxes on Church property, the clergy refused to give inventories unless the King himself directed them to do so⁴¹ and Louis would not enforce it. It was difficult to say that even the king himself could have a document passed through parliament⁴² and he exercised limited, if any, authority over them. "No longer could he make even a pretense of governing and taking responsibility for his acts."⁴³

Contributing greatly to the hostility toward the monarch was Louis XVI's extravagance. He maintained a fantastic court at Versailles. An invitation to Louis' court was a distinction many nobility and Church officials hoped for. Aside from the expenses of maintaining the court at Versailles, Louis XVI had many other contributing factors that made his court seem very frivolous. For example, when a minister was appointed in Louis' court, they were never dismissed. The King ceased summoning them to his court but they remained ministers for life, and were paid 6000 lyre a year until their death.⁴⁴ There were various other situations similar to this in Louis' court. The extravagance that the nobles at court enjoyed was envied by many in France. Louis' Queen, Marie-Antoinette, also contributed to the debt by demanding that she and her close companions receive huge sums of money to maintain their desired court style.⁴⁵ This, in itself, was enough to enrage the people of France.

The government began to levy additional taxes including the salt tax, the excise tax, the land tax, the stamp tax, the customs duties, and the tobacco tax. Tariffs and transit fees were introduced as well as various other forms of taxation.⁴⁶ The money

was needed to pay for the many expenses accrued by Louis XVI. Unfortunately, the class that ended up paying for it was the Third Estate, many of whom were already impoverished. This fueled the already rising discontent among the Third Estate.

The Estates General was the representative assembly of pre-Revolutionary France. Even though the king had absolute authority, it was established as a means to give the people of France the opportunity to have their voices heard. Representation was very unequal in the Estates General. The First Estate, representing .5 percent of the total population of France, held one third of the seats in the General Assembly, reflecting their power and influence in the French government. The Third Estate, that numbered close to six million voters, had to reduce their number to 600 for the Estates General.⁴⁷ However, even with limited power or representation, the Estates General was the only form of political representation for the Third Estate. The Bourbon dynasty had worked to centralize the power of the kingdom and to avoid consulting its citizens through any type of representative assembly.⁴⁸ As a result, between the years 1615 and 1789 the Estates General in France was not convened. The royal claim to monopolize power led to rule without the support or help of the people of France.⁴⁹ This enraged the commoners and caused more hatred for the already ridiculed absolute monarch.

In 1787, the King ordered a new taxation that would be levied on the First and Second Estates. Parliament claimed this was illegal and summoned an Estates General. The King refused, but there was tremendous support for the calling of the Estates General. After a great deal of opposition, the king capitulated.⁵⁰ Parliament thought they had won, but the battle had just begun. The King imposed a doubling of the representation of the Third Estate in 1788. Of the 147 members of parliament, only 33 voted for the doubling of the Third Estate. However, on this rare occasion, Louis overruled Parliament and allowed the doubling of the Third Estate.⁵¹

Another issue still remained among the representatives of the Third Estate. They also wanted “voting by head.” They wanted the entire Estates General to vote together in one room. They believed that they had enough support in the upper estates to win if they could vote together. However, the First Estate rejected the proposal by a 133 to 114 vote.⁵² Infuriated by these results, the commoners decided that time for action had come; “the breach between the government and the governed had become too great.”⁵³

The frivolous life-style of the king and his failure to exercise authority over an increasingly corrupt upper class led the citizens of France to despise the absolute monarch. The entire social system supported inequality among them. As time went by the power of the First Estate grew, the expenses of the king mounted, and the oppression of the lower classes increased. The failure to gain appropriate representation and privilege in the Estates General was the final blow. A public outcry that came from many areas in society arose in France. The vast majority of the people of France demanded equality.

While a detailed description of the course of the Revolution is not necessary, a brief look at the sequence of events will assist in understanding how Napoleon’s

reign was chosen as our point of comparison. As the following section will demonstrate, the Revolution went through numerous phases and forms of government. None of these governments were in power long enough to establish a particular social order as a result of political policy.

Two of the early “new governments” that were established were the Constituent Assembly, 1789 to 1791, and then later the Legislative Assembly from 1791 until the rise of Robespierre and the radicals.⁵⁴ The Constituent Assembly was made up primarily of bourgeoisie. They wrote a constitution that destroyed the legal distinction between orders, abolished any legal status based on privilege, eliminated titles, making all people “citizens of France” and abolishing feudal order.⁵⁵ The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, written by the National Assembly as the part of the new constitution, was a statement of individualism. It asserted that there were fundamental human rights: freedom from unjust arrest and imprisonment, freedom of opinion, freedom of speech, freedom from taxation without consent, and it protected the right of property. Equality of rights was its emphasis, including both equality before the law and equality of opportunity.⁵⁶ But it was at the same time much like an authoritarian government.

The supremacy of the law was clearly stated in the Declaration. All that meant was that instead of having a society ruled over by a monarch responsible to God alone, there was a representative body, made up of the wealthy and powerful, that had unrestricted and complete power.⁵⁷ In order to keep themselves in power, the bourgeoisie established an electoral system that denied the people a great deal of suffrage. The qualifications for voting and holding public office were based on wealth and ownership of property. A new privileged class was established, once again, excluding most of the people of France. This led to the development of many political groups. As time passed, these groups gained number and strength.⁵⁸

Blaming the nobles and bourgeoisie, the peasants began to burn the chateaux of country landlords and violent riots broke out across the countryside.⁵⁹ The divided dominant class began to realize that they were facing a popular revolutionary movement. The peasants were not easily suppressed and continued to riot throughout the early years of the Revolutions. The National Assembly had established a civic militia, consisting of nobles, financiers, merchants, and priests, but it was difficult to control the widespread discontent.⁶⁰

The ruling class pursued their own interests, and much of the clergy and nobility, as well as Louis XVI were considered threats to many of the commoners. Little had really changed in terms of inequality among the people of France. The power merely shifted from one oppressive group to another, with little relief for the commoners. “The majority did not yet believe that the Revolution was safe and feared that it might be reversed in the interests of the old privileged orders.”⁶¹

From the National Assembly (the Constituent), to the Legislative Assembly there was one major issue that was overlooked: the ruling bodies still did not share political power with the lower class. The leaders claimed to speak in the name of the whole community, but did not represent that community⁶² or its needs. Thus, a new

inequality was created. With the varying goals of the revolutionaries, “the heroes of one day became the villains of the next.”⁶³ So it was in 1792 during the French Revolution. France entered into a war with Austria, and fighting was not going well for the French. The people began to look for scapegoats, blaming the government, the king and all associated with it.

With the support of the Parisian crowd, from 1793 to 1794 the Revolution fell into the hands of a radical political party, the Montagnards.⁶⁴ It was during this phase of the Revolution that the rebels lost a great deal of support from the population of France. Beginning with Marat’s mass murder of the clergy in September 1792, the commoners of France began to lose faith in the Revolution. The time from 1793 to 1794, under Marat and then Robespierre, was characterized by “a reign of Terror and denunciation carried out in the name of egalitarian virtue by means of mock trials and the institutionalization of envy.”⁶⁵

In 1793, the Montagnards used the fear of foreign invasion to rally the people against one another. They viewed many of the poor as irritants that refused to participate in social functions⁶⁶ and regarded them with much hostility. They used their power to seek revenge on their opposing class, the Girondins. Their political goals were difficult to define, for they argued first on one side then the other on a large number of issues and problems confronting the people of France.⁶⁷ This reveals that things really had changed little; the government was still a confused battle for power that left the common people little power and little to hope for. According to many peasants, “the revolution was no longer free.”⁶⁸

Beginning with the assassination of the clergy of the First Estate, moving on to the murder of “nobility,” and finally to the purging of French society of those who were deemed against the “patriot” movement, masses of innocent Frenchmen were massacred. It was a time when the “pure purged the impure.”⁶⁹ Now the commoners of France feared their own people more than the threat of foreign invasion. The unending battles for control of the government “represented the entire political history of the French Revolution.”⁷⁰ No event during the Reign of Terror was separate from that struggle. By the end of the Terror the people had lost faith in the government.

The governing body that took over after the fall of Robespierre and the end of the terror was a conservative one that left France with very poor leadership. For the four years that the Directory was in power, the nation was characterized by military defeats and internal insurrections. Executive authority was feeble and corrupt. Election results were frequently manipulated, discrediting the republican politics that the Constitution had established. High inflation and famine once again swept the nation. The assessments for taxes were as arbitrary as before the Revolution and collected with greater difficulty. Throughout France, murder gangs took revenge on the ex-Jacobins and other nationalists.⁷¹ The France of 1795 was far removed in spirit from the France of 1789, when enthusiasm and public morality ran high and convictions were deep.⁷² Once again, France was left in shambles due to the poor leadership of their government and the abuse of its powers.

Throughout the Revolution, a “rapid succession of mutually hostile factions governed France.”⁷³ The people of France lost their passion for the Revolution, and sought any form of stable government. It had become apparent that the law, in the courtroom as well as on the street, could not offer protection from the angry mobs and political groups. Without a king or any real leader, France was torn by dissension that left it thoroughly disorganized.

Many of the events of the Revolution are the direct result of the ambiguity of the ideology of the revolutionaries.⁷⁴ Since the revolutionaries had very little in common with each other, once a group came into power, they abused their privilege and persecuted those below them, much as the Ancient Regime had done. The very things that the people revolted against were re-established in various forms during every phase of the Revolution. “The Revolution devoured its children.”⁷⁵

When the Coup of Brumaire overthrew the Executive Directory in 1799, Napoleon Bonaparte came to power. He rose through the military ranks during the Revolution, while France was in chaos. He took control of the French government, and declared the end of the Revolution, claiming that the revolutionaries had achieved their goals. When the dust settled, it is clear that he was far from the truth; the government that emerged under Napoleon created a form of inequality very similar to the Ancient Regime. New faces came to power, but for the lower classes of France, the new social order held a startling resemblance to the old order.

In the description of those things that made Napoleon a successful “revolutionary,” self-confidence, aggressiveness, purposefulness, and a willingness to bear responsibility,⁷⁶ we find the very qualities that made Louis XIV successful as an absolute monarch. Napoleon was a very arrogant man who, like Louis XIV, considered his word law, and would accept no opposition to that law. One of the greatest examples of that, and the failure of the Revolution, lies in Napoleon’s Constitution of the year VIII.

Externally, the Constitution contained the liberal reforms of the revolutionaries. It established universal suffrage; every man over the age of twenty-one was able to vote. It instituted a bicameral legislature whose members were indirectly elected by the people. The establishment of three consuls gave the impression of limiting the power of any one man in the government. However, a “no more bungling and bizarre instrument for conducting the affairs of a nation was ever devised.”⁷⁷

In reality, the new Constitution organized a strong, autocratic central government.⁷⁸ The new Constitution was founded on principles that were the very opposite of those for which the Revolution had been made. The method of election took the suffrage from the people. Voters, a total of about six million men, met in the principle town of their district and selected one tenth of their number to become members of the Communal List. From this group, one tenth was chosen to move on to the Departmental List. The departments then met, and chose one tenth of their number to be eligible for the national public function. After review and revision by one of the first consul’s administration, the list was then passed to the Senate, who chose the members of the administration and legislature. Essentially, Napoleon

gave the people the illusion of power, while truly the selection lay in his minister that revised the list, and the Senate, whose members he had appointed. The “electoral pyramid” was used to neutralize popular democratic forces, and to make sure that elections would produce a conservative result. Once established, no changes were made unless a seat became available.⁷⁹

The legislature was composed of several bodies, each of which was practically powerless due to an elaborate system of checks and balances. The power to initiate laws rested in the Council of State, whose members Napoleon nominated. It then moved on to the Tribunate, who could debate and discuss the proposals, but could not vote on them. The Legislative body then voted on accepting or rejecting laws, without discussing them, and had no power to amend the bills. The Senate then had the power to annul any measure passed by the other branches of the legislature.⁸⁰ In essence, the power of the legislature was an illusion.

The Senate bore a very close resemblance to the First and Second Estates in the Ancient Regime. The Consul, Napoleon, chose an elite of eighty men to sit in the Senate.⁸¹ These men held their office for life and had very generous salaries, and they were frequently rewarded with estates from Napoleon throughout France for their loyalty to the first Consul. Like the preceding regime, that of the Year XIII sought to reward its supporters. The idea of privilege now emerged in a new form, though not significantly different than that of the Ancient Regime, which, ten years earlier, had been a cause for revolution.

With the establishment of the Legion of Honor and the elite Senate, a new court appeared, this time in Tuileries. “Royal usages and etiquette slowly replaced the informality of republican customs....Paris reasserted its pristine supremacy in politeness, in elegance of dress, and in the culinary arts.”⁸² Great balls and feasts were once again held and Paris was once more run by a form of aristocracy that was just as cold as the last. Those who were not part of this elite class, that Napoleon had created, were rejected by the court and prestigious salons.⁸³ Once again, the commoners of France were cut out of a social elite way of life that was established under the new Consul. There was little hope of receiving these privileges unless appointed by Napoleon or one of his ministers. Those within this elite class frowned upon any new admittance and excluded them from many court and social activities.

The Constitution also set up Napoleon as the First Consul, on whom was “virtually bestowed dictatorial power.”⁸⁴ The Constitution set up three consuls, but the power of the first far outweighed the other two. The Second and Third Consuls were not to have votes, but offer consultation to the First Consul.⁸⁵ Napoleon alone could appoint and dismiss ministers, who had no responsibility and were not united.⁸⁶ In this, he established himself as a ruler that came very close to that of an absolute monarch, an institution whose destruction had been a major goal of the revolutionaries.

Napoleon held a policy of restriction to opposition in the new French State. He organized a special police force, which was to monitor the nation. A special force was designated to monitor the members of the government, through spying, opening

and reviewing mail, and various other tactics. Salons were monitored and any government criticism was reported. The press, theater, and public pamphlets were censored and restricted.⁸⁷ The number of political papers and pamphlets in Paris alone fell from seventy-three to thirteen. Factory workers, laborers, tradesmen, farmers, businessmen, and, in particular, trade guilds were subject to rigorous surveillance by the police. Any liberal critic was silenced. The punishment for opposing or criticizing the government ranged from proscription, to imprisonment, and even as far as execution.⁸⁸

In 1801, Napoleon ordered the deportation of at least one hundred outspoken Jacobin supporters and arrested more than seven hundred sympathizers.⁸⁹ Napoleon shackled all opposing opinions. The Revolution had not gained the people freedom. All of this oppression is evidence that it established a government and ruler that was more oppressive than the last in many aspects.

In 1802, when Napoleon wished to become Consul for life, it was refused by the legislature, so he took it to the people. Just as the Bourbon dynasty had ruled without the Estates General, so Napoleon had chosen to rule without his assembly. In the vote, men were required to report to their district and sign their name under “yes” or “no” to name Napoleon Consul for life.⁹⁰ In forcing them to sign their name, any man who signed “no” could be held in opposition to the government, so Napoleon easily won his title. This brought him one step closer to the absolute monarchy that the Revolution had attempted to abolish.

The years that followed showed a significant growth in Napoleon’s power. In 1804, he had himself crowned Emperor, and made the final departure from revolutionary goals.⁹¹ Many changes came with the “empire” of France, each one showing the failure of the Revolution. His executive power could now bypass parliamentary institutions regularly without explanation. The legislative system became entirely irrelevant. The police force was refined and strengthened to further limit opposition and increase control. Napoleon also took this opportunity to introduce the Constitution of the Year X.

The new Constitution extended the power of the First Consul and further restricted the power of the people. He now had the power to appoint all members of the Senate, and dispose them at any time, to appoint the other two consuls, as well as his successor, to conclude peace treaties, and to excuse any convicted criminal of the state. He now had the power to dissolve the legislative bodies and overrule them, or he could bypass the legislature completely. He could interpret the Constitution in any way and could even suspend it.⁹²

The similarities in government before and after the Revolution are astounding. Napoleon’s government, in reality, was a stronger, more efficient, and more oppressive government than the one that had been deposed in 1789. When we look back at the goals for democracy, the Revolution changed little, particularly in social structure.

Napoleon established a new form of elite to replace the First and Second Estates of the Ancient Regime. They were the Senate and the Legion of Honor. They lived

lives very similar to that of the upper estates under Louis XVI. While they enjoyed a court life of privilege and property, those beneath them worked for the promotion of the State, but were excluded from the rights of the other classes.

One common goal that could be traced through all levels of society was the discontent with the absolute monarch, which limited political freedom and liberty. It was said that under Louis XIV and the establishment of absolute monarchy there were a huge number of inspectors, controllers, receivers, registrars, and checkers to ensure the proper functioning of the State.⁹³ Napoleon, too, established an elaborate system of policing to ensure the welfare of his state. The government limited and restricted many of the rights that were fought for in the Revolution. The legislature had even less power than it had under Louis XVI. By 1804, Napoleon had all the power of the government in his hands. He carefully monitored and restricted all form of industry and commerce, and no business could function unless under the permission of the government. Were not these all things that the people had fought to free themselves from?

Many historians have argued the continuity of French history. "Revolution" is defined as "forcible, pervasive, and often violent change of a social or political order..." that "causes profound, far-reaching change."⁹⁴ There was no such occurrence in France in 1789. The new government under Napoleon did not create far-reaching social change; it only affirmed the ideals of the Ancient Regime and absolute monarchy. The Revolution exchanged the tyranny of one social order for the tyranny of another. Inequality was disguised under different names and institutions, but it still existed. France moved from an absolute monarch to a very powerful emperor, but the very state of inequality under which many lived did not change.

Endnotes

1. Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York, 1952), 53. I express appreciation to Dr. W. Michael Ryan for his assistance as my Honors Thesis Mentor.
2. George Lefebvre, *The French Revolution From Its Origins to 1793* (New York, 1962), 146.
3. Definition of structural inequality interpreted from Michael Dyson, "The Plight of Black Men" in *Race, Class and Gender* (Albany, 1998), 139.
4. Douglas Johnson, *The French Revolution* (New York, 1970), 8.
5. Johnson, *French Revolution*, 14.
6. Nigel Aston, *The End of an Elite: The French bishops and the Coming of the French Revolution, 1786-1790* (Oxford, 1992), 5.
7. Aston, *End of an Elite*, 12.
8. Leo Gershoy, *The French Revolution and Napoleon* (New York, 1964), 33.
9. Johnson, *French Revolution*, 15.
10. Gershoy, *French Revolution*, 37.
11. Gershoy, *French Revolution*, 35.
12. John Hardman, *French Politics, 1774-1789: From the Accession of Louis XVI to the fall of The Bastille* (New York, 1995), 20.
13. Hardman, *French Politics*, 9.
14. Gershoy, *French Revolution*, 39.
15. *Ibid.*, 36.
16. *Ibid.*, 37.
17. *Ibid.*
18. Johnson, *French Revolution*, 24.
19. *Ibid.*
20. The facts of the preceding lines come from: Gershoy, *French Revolution*, 40-41.
21. Johnson, *French Revolution*, 6.
22. Gershoy, *French Revolution*, 41-42.
23. *Ibid.*, 48.
24. Simon Schama, *Citizens* (New York, 1989), 457.

25. Ibid., 460-461.
26. Ibid., 440-441.
27. Gershoy, *French Revolution*, 53.
28. J. M. Roberts, *The French Revolution* (Oxford, 1978), 33.
29. Johnson, *French Revolution*, 6.
30. Bailey Stone, *The Genesis of the French Revolution* (Cambridge, 1994), 185.
31. Roberts, *French Revolution*, 33.
32. Nancy Barker, "Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette: Revolutionary Personalities?" *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History* 1 (1992), 119.
33. Stone, *French Revolution*, 65.
34. Ibid., 232.
35. Ibid., 233.
36. Gershoy, *French Revolution*, 108.
37. Hardman, *French Politics*, 9.
38. Hardman, *French Politics*, 19.
39. Johnson, *French Revolution*, 34.
40. Stone, *French Revolution*, 186.
41. Aston, *End of an Elite*, 83.
42. Hardman, *French Politics*, 11.
43. Barker, "Louis XVI," 123.
44. Hardman, *French Politics*, 19.
45. Peter Burley, "A Bankrupt Regime," *History Today* 34 (1984), 40.
46. Gershoy, *French Revolution*, 25-27.
47. M.J. Sydenham, *The French Revolution* (Westport, 1985), 23.
48. Stone, *French Revolution*, 65.
49. Ibid., 66.
50. Johnson, *French Revolution*, 30-31.
51. Aston, *End of an Elite*, 123.
52. Ibid., 159.
53. Stone, *French Revolution*, 162.

54. Johnson, *French Revolution*, 44.
55. Johnson, *French Revolution*, 24-25.
56. "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen," n.d., <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/law/hrcr/docs/frenchdec.html> (January 9, 1998).
57. Johnson, *French Revolution*, 45-47.
58. Facts in the preceding paragraph taken from Lefebvre, *French Revolution*, 151-153.
59. Johnson, *French Revolution*, 30.
60. Gershoy, *French Revolution*, 116.
61. Johnson, *French Revolution*, 32.
62. Alan Forest, *Society and Politics in Revolutionary Bordeaux* (London, 1975), 181.
63. Stanley Loomis, *Paris in the Terror: June 1793-July 1794* (Philadelphia, 1964), 11.
64. Martin Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution* (New York, 1995), 10.
65. Patrice Higonnet, "Social and Cultural Antecedents of Revolutionary Discontinuity: Montagnards and Girondins," *English Historical Review* 100 (1985), 531.
66. Forrest, *Society and Politics*, 187.
67. Patrice Higonnet, "Social and Cultural Antecedents," 517.
68. Lyons, *Napoleon*, 10.
69. Higonnet, "Social and Cultural Antecedents," 531.
70. Loomis, *Paris*, 42.
71. All information in the preceding paragraph taken from: Lyons, *Napoleon*, 29-33.
72. Gershoy, *French Revolution*, 317.
73. Loomis, *Paris*, 43.
74. Higonnet, "Social and Cultural Antecedents," 514.
75. *Ibid.*, 538.
76. Nancy Barker, "Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette: Revolutionary Personalities?" *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History* 1 (1992), 119.
77. Ida Tarbell, *A Life of Napoleon Bonaparte* (New York, 1914), 106.

78. Gershoy, *French Revolution*, 350.
79. Lyons, *Napoleon*, 61.
80. Gershoy, *French Revolution*, 351.
81. Lyons, *Napoleon*, 63.
82. *Ibid.*, 374.
83. *Ibid.*, 375.
84. Gershoy, *French Revolution*, 351.
85. Lyons, *Napoleon*, 65.
86. *Ibid.*
87. Tarbell, *Napoleon*, 134-138.
88. Gershoy, *French Revolution*, 357.
89. Gershoy, *French Revolution*, 371.
90. Lyons, *Napoleon*, 112.
91. *Ibid.*, 111.
92. *Ibid.*, 113.
93. Stone, *French Revolution*, 73.
94. Unknown, "Revolution," in Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia 99 CD-ROM (Microsoft Corporation, 1998).

Marion B. Lucas,
A History of Blacks in Kentucky, Volume 1:
From Slavery to Segregation, 1760-1891
(Frankfort, 1992).

review by
Ronald E. Foltz

The struggle that African Americans endured throughout the early years of Kentucky is portrayed in Marion B. Lucas's book *A History of Blacks in Kentucky*. The book is an account of how enslaved and free blacks sought to share in the world they helped create, and of their successes and failures. It is a story of struggle against almost overwhelming odds and triumph of the human spirit. By documenting many personal accounts Lucas brings the African American experience to life and provides an excellent picture of the living conditions that enslaved blacks were forced to endure. Former slave George W. Buckner stated that his childhood home was a crude cabin with holes for windows. Betty Guwn recalled that the one room cabin where she and her husband raised fifteen children had large cracks in the logs that allowed her husband to shoot barking dogs without even opening the door. However, not all slaves lived in primitive and crude cabins; some resided in the houses of their masters, allowing them the opportunity to have a closer relationship with their masters and a better chance for emancipation. For some slaves, being in the house instead of the field was an easier way of life. One of the traditional themes in the history of slavery in Kentucky is that since there were less slaves and few large plantations, slavery was milder than in the Deep South. Lucas concludes that the institution probably was less harsh in Kentucky, but "the examples of abuse in the Commonwealth doom the system to condemnation, demonstrating what an awful thing slavery was" (p. 50).

Perhaps the most unpleasant memory for many enslaved blacks in Kentucky was having their families separated by the slave trade. Lucas describes the sad fate of a former slave by the name of Isaac Johnson: "At about age eleven, Isaac stood on an auction block. When the bidding ended, a man took Isaac's hand and said: 'Come along with me, boy, you belong to me.' Isaac asked to see his mother, but the man refused and 'hitched' the lad to a 'post.' Isaac watched as Ambrose, his four-year-old brother went on the block next, followed by his mother, with her youngest son, Eddie, still in her arms. When the bidding lagged, Isaac heard someone shout: 'Put them up separately.' One buyer purchased his mother and another Eddie. 'Thus,' Isaac wrote in his memoirs, 'in a very short time, our happy family was scattered, without even the privilege of saying 'Good by.' Isaac never saw any member of his family again" (p. 25).

Ronald E. Foltz graduated from Northern Kentucky University on May 15, 1999 with a major in History and concentration in Geography.

Another unfair practice that slaves encountered was their treatment in the courtroom. Lucas relates how many slaves were convicted of capital crimes “on hearsay evidence, mere suspicion, or upon the flimsy testimony of whites” (p. 49). Kentucky’s slave code was more liberal than in the Deep South, but no grand jury was necessary for an indictment. Slave testimony was restricted to confession, one’s own defense, or giving evidence in cases of blacks, mulattos, or Indians. “Unfortunately, corroborating testimony by fellow slaves seldom had any influence in court decisions,” Lucas concludes (p. 49). When a slave was executed, his or her master was paid the slave’s value from the public treasury, and this encouraged some masters to accept guilty verdicts without complaining. Free blacks had the right of trial by jury; they could challenge jury selection in certain cases; and they could give evidence in their own behalf. Free blacks could, on occasion, exercise their right of appeal. However, the same list of crimes prescribing the death penalty applied equally to slaves and freedmen: man-slaughter, murder, rape of a white woman, arson, and rebellion. Lucas makes it clear that despite some advantages, many of Kentucky’s free blacks lived under difficult, if not impossible conditions placed upon them by white society. Just as their counterparts in the Deep South felt that free blacks were lazy and worthless, so did many white Kentuckians.

Resistance to slavery was not uncommon, and the most prevalent form was running away. Being surrounded by the free states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, many slaves were tempted to swim across the Ohio River to free soil. Lucas points out that some enslaved blacks thought of elaborate ways to pull off their escape, including disguising themselves or smearing blood from self-inflicted wounds on their clothes to make believe they had been killed. The author also mentions the fact that some slaves turned to violence, burning down their master’s barns or houses. Some even killed their masters and their families. However, this was not a very common method of resistance.

The Union victory during the Civil War resulted in the freedom that blacks had sought. However, with freedom came a fair share of pain. Lucas notes that many black soldiers were severely discriminated against during the war, and after the war black veterans and their families became special targets of violence. Local courts in some areas authorized any white man to disarm blacks. In rural areas, gangs of white “rowdies” terrorized blacks, often shooting or lynching them without reason. Lucas adds chilling accounts of violence and hatred toward the newly freed blacks in northern Kentucky. He tells of an angry mob of 500 regulators that stalked Gallatin County, forcing blacks to flee north across the Ohio River. One Freedmen’s Bureau official stated that 200 blacks, fearing “the lash and other abuses” (p. 195), crossed into Indiana from Warsaw in a single day. Immediately after the Civil War, many local officials refused to use state funds for the sick and destitute for freed blacks. “The Yankees freed them, now let them take care of them,” they said (p. 198). For a few years in Covington, destitute, sick freedmen were denied medical care, but when they died the city provided free coffins.

Lucas notes that many blacks sought sanctuary from their suffering in religion and education. In an all black church, they could openly speak their minds without fear of harsh punishment. Education helped young blacks get away from the fields and into the cities where they had a better chance of making a living. Eventually, after working against racist white politicians, blacks finally gained the right to vote, sit on juries, and even testify against whites in court. Lucas adds that by the end of the 19th century blacks began appearing more frequently in significant roles, including careers in medicine, law, journalism, and the clergy. These victories were hard fought and won.

What made this book so interesting to read was the many stories from secondary sources as well as newspapers, magazines, and primary records. The author's creative use of these sources gives the book a more personal feel. Reading the individual and historical accounts in the book made me see how far African Americans have progressed in the last two centuries. Unfortunately, racism still exists throughout the state of Kentucky and across the nation. Nonetheless, African Americans of our generation can look back to their ancestors of a century ago and say, "We've come a long way."

Michael Eric Dyson,
Making Malcolm:
The Myth and Meaning of Malcolm X
(New York, 1995).

review by
Joseph E. Brown II

By providing the reader with an analysis of the influence that Malcolm X has had on contemporary literature and society, Michael Dyson illuminates how Malcolm has been used as an icon, both positively and negatively. Providing the reader with a discussion on some of the literature that has been written about Malcolm, the author criticizes most of the works by either claiming that they have redefined moments in history or have blindly offered praise. Moreover, the author states that this is unfortunate because Malcolm was too controversial a leader not to be fairly and accurately analyzed. Dyson identifies four different images of Malcolm X that have emerged from the literature he has chosen to analyze: Malcolm as a hero, Malcolm as a victim, Malcolm as a public moralist, and Malcolm as a revolutionary claimed by both Nationalists and Socialists. Although he does not provide an exhaustive review of the literature, he gives an impressive road map that highlights the use of Malcolm's legend by different authors as they have attempted to define Malcolm in their own terms.

Dyson attempts to show how Malcolm's identity has been used as a tool for those who wish to strengthen the idea of black nationalism. The author sees Malcolm's appeal as strongest among black youths, age fifteen to twenty-four, who find him a leader of great achievement. His influence has been most effectively used by those who are tired of living in an America that contains forces that try to keep African Americans down through practices of economic, social, and political oppression. The author gives the example of the Black Panthers as one of the groups that was heavily influenced by Malcolm after his death. The Black Panthers were a prominent arms-bearing, nationalistic group that, along with other organizations like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, challenged the authority of police and National Guard units during the period after Malcolm's death in 1965.

Making Malcolm illustrates the influence of Malcolm X in current popular culture to fuel the feelings of masculinity in black males from the ghetto. The author points out that rap music and movies created for African Americans are increasingly showing the importance of the black male while simultaneously downplaying the role of the black women, a tendency for which Malcolm X was heavily criticized. For example, *Boyz n the Hood*, a popular movie by John Singleton released in 1991,

Joseph E. Brown II graduated from Northern Kentucky University on December 18, 1999 with a major in Mathematics and a minor in History.

centers around the need for young black males to be raised by black fathers, implying that black mothers are not as effective. The film portrays a child raised by a father alone as successful, while the child's friends raised only by their mothers are affected negatively, their entire lives. Dyson concludes that oppression of black women, inspired by Malcolm, continues to influence today's African American culture.

The author, an ordained Baptist minister and eminent Professor of Religion at Chicago Theological Seminary, describes attitudes toward Malcolm that he encountered among young black male students in his classes, and this reveals how Malcolm's influence still makes a significant impact, especially among youthful, angry, black males. He points out that Malcolm's legacy can be used to correct tendencies toward destructive self-hatred caused by structural constraints in today's society. Overall, Dyson clearly fulfills his intended purpose through the use and analysis of a broad collection of traditional and non-traditional sources.

Follow the River,
(A Hallmark Presentation, 1995, 93 minutes)
review by
Mark E. Garbett, Jr.

The film *Follow the River* is based on the historical novel of the same name by James Alexander Thom. The book tells the true-life story of Mary Draper Ingles, who was kidnapped by the Shawnee Indians from her home in Virginia and made a daring escape over 800 miles of untamed frontier in 1755. The novel, in turn, is based on the account of Mary Ingles's youngest son, John, in his short book entitled *Escape from Indian Captivity: The Story of Mary Draper Ingles and son Thomas Ingles*. The film used Thom's book as a blueprint, but it strayed and erred in grievous ways and was not overly accurate or authentic in some of its presentations. The film was shown as a made-for-television Hallmark movie starring Eric Schweig and Ellen Burstyn.¹

The producers of the film watered down the tremendous ordeal of Mary Ingles. In Thom's book, and in the book by John Ingles, the gruesome details of the Indian raid at Draper's Meadows and the abduction are revealed, portraying the Indian attack as both deliberate and daring. In the film, the raid is a haphazard event, with the Indians just walking into the settlement and attacking. Moreover, the viewer is given no indication of the atrocious acts committed by the Indians, such as the ruthless braining of Bettie Draper's infant child. Neither does the film follow the Thom book with regard to the death of Eleanor Draper, Mary's mother. In the film, she survives the attack but dies of heartache due to her longing to be reunited with her daughter and grandchildren. This never happened. In reality, Eleanor Draper was killed and scalped by the Indians.² The film skirts around the viciousness of this assault and subsequent attacks as Mary and her relatives are led into captivity. In doing this, the film does a serious injustice to the novel and to history. Without revealing the brutality, the viewer cannot get an appreciation of Mary's outrage and drive for escape.

Inaccuracy occurs in the casting and portrayal of characters, as well. In the book and in history, Mary Ingles was 23 years old when her abduction occurred. Ellen Burstyn, who appears to be in her middle to late thirties, portrays Mary Ingles in the film. The portrayal of William Ingles is realistic psychologically, but not physically. In the book, William Ingles is hairy, ruddy, rugged and a strong man with deep feelings. The movie only gets right the part about deep feelings. A more serious error occurs in portraying the family of Mary Ingles. The film depicts as her having one child, Thomas, and being pregnant with another. In reality, Mary Ingles had two sons, Thomas and Georgie. Thomas survived the massacre and lived to adulthood. Georgie, separated from his mother, died sometime after that.³ Perhaps the movie producers did not want to end the story showing only one of two children returning, believing that this might put a damper on the film. True to Thom's book, Mary is

pregnant when she is captured, and during captivity she gives birth to an infant daughter who she has to give up to the Indians.

The portrayal of Native Americans in the film is overly romanticized toward the modern liberal opinion. The Indians are seen merely as dissimilar people who have taken the family captive. The pendulum of treatment has been overweighted to present a more flowery version of the real events. Both Thom and Ingles do a more balanced job. Thom is able to counterbalance the ferocity and viciousness of the Shawnee in their attacks with the compassion and culture of the tribe as a whole. In reality, the Shawnee who kidnapped Mary expose a mixed view of the Indians. While they certainly could be vicious toward the settlers on the frontier, they were also known to care for the wounded and adopted some of their captives. This was the true representation of the Indians.

Other things in the film were simply wrong. With regard to running the gauntlet, the film's depiction was much diluted compared to Thom's book. In the film, the Shawnee were waving switches and small sticks at the runners. In the book, these same Indians swung clubs and other harmful devices at the prisoners as they ran. As well, the trip to the Shawnee village on the Scioto River is remarkably routine compared to the one described in the Thom book. This was untamed wilderness, not a walk in a state park. Also in error is Mary's relationship with Wildcat, the warrior chief. Wildcat, surprisingly, is fairly well played by Eric Schweig. In the book, Mary has much more of an internal conflict with regard to her relationship with him. She notes how handsome he is and fantasizes about being his woman. In the film, all the viewer sees is a brief flirtation when Mary is measuring Wildcat for his shirt. The longing for companionship is only seen in Wildcat's eyes. He is the spurned lover, exacting revenge by taking Mary's son. In the book, Wildcat is more complex, combining brutality with kindness, and sarcasm with respect.

The film was also inaccurate in its portrayal of the Dutch woman, Ghetel. In the film, she is seen as a kindly looking woman, who only has thoughts of cannibalizing Mary. In the book and in Ingles's narrative, she is seen as a large, rugged woman, dull but conniving, who not only considers cannibalism but acts on her thoughts, chasing Mary around the New River area. This portrait deminishes Mary's internal struggle to forgive Ghetel at the end of the story, and also the intensity of Mary's journey. With no knowledge of Ghetel's attempts to kill Mary and consume her flesh, the viewer does not fully grasp the trials and tribulations and the determination of Mary Draper Ingles.⁴

The escape from Big Bone Lick and the journey home to Virginia is much less challenging in the film than it was in reality. The terrain seems not very difficult and the women appear rested and healthy all the way. The conclusion of the film is so romanticized that it is a travesty. Mary is found by some hunters (presumably the Harmons, as in the Thom book) and taken to the fort. There she is reunited with William in a romantic embrace and tears streaming down both of the characters' faces. Then the viewer is shown a joyful reunion scene, in which none other than Wildcat shows up, bringing Mary her captive children, Thomas and the infant

daughter who she never expected to see again. This is pure fiction. If Mary had such an infant in real life—John Ingles' book does not mention the pregnancy or the infant—Mary never saw the baby again. She did regain her son Thomas, who was a teenager and not the young child shown in the film. In real life, in 1767, Thomas was ransomed and brought home by Mr. Baker. Fully indoctrinated into the Indian way of life, he ran away and returned to the tribe. In 1768, his father William went for him and ransomed him again, and this time he stayed. There is no mention of the return of Bettie Draper, Mary's sister-in-law, who was taken captive with Mary. Bettie was eventually ransomed and returned to her husband, Mary's brother Johnny Draper. However, she was never the same person again and died young.⁵

This film depicts Mary as a superwoman who would not be denied. Granted, Mary was an amazing woman, but she was not the all-powerful force shown in the film. Women are portrayed, through Mary, in an extremely positive light. Mary represented the true frontierswoman, able to survive on her own and knowledgeable about life in the wilderness. Bettie is more of the recent immigrant woman who does not understand the frontier or its unforgiving ways. Ghétel is viewed as a pathetic figure who succumbs to the savage nature of the frontier, but does not revert to civilization, as described in Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier essay. Mary is similar to Turner's idea of the frontiersman, willing to adapt and conquering the wilderness, fighting through it back to civilization.⁶

While inaccurate and over-romanticized, this film still has value, both in entertainment and in historical study. The viewer is awed by the struggle of Mary and her willingness to adapt to Indian ways and to fit in with the Shawnee. The viewer feels the sexual tension between Wildcat and Mrs. Ingles that is hinted at in the film. The story in the film is an entertaining tale of willpower over environment, and of the camaraderie of women. The film stimulated me to research Mary and her family, and I learned that her son Thomas never quite became comfortable in the white world and was always moving westward to the borders of the frontier. He married Eleanor Grills and they had three children. Ironically, in 1782, Indians captured Eleanor and the children from their home in Burke's Garden, Virginia. Thomas organized a rescue mission, but two of his children died from being tomahawked, and Eleanor was seriously injured. William Ingles later became a colonel and played roles in negotiating the peace with Indians that led to the Proclamation of 1763, and the Fincastle Resolutions. William and Mary moved east to Ingles Ferry, Virginia, where William owned a ferry and built a tavern and inn. Mary Ingles had another four children and lived to the age of eighty-three.⁷ I am grateful for this film, inaccuracies, romanticism and all, for getting me interested in the story of Mary Draper Ingles and the history of the American frontier.

Endnotes

1. James Alexander Thom, *Follow the River* (New York, 1981); Roberta Ingles Steele and Andrew Lewis Ingles, eds., *Escape from Indian Captivity: The Story of Mary Draper Ingles and son Thomas Ingles*, by John Ingles, Sr. (Radford, Virginia, 1982), 1-3.

2. Thom, *Follow the River*, 13-14; Ingles, *Escape*, 8; Alonzo Charlie Thomas, "Inspiring Spirits," <http://members.aol.com/lctdugan/wmingles.htm>.

3. Thom, *Follow the River*, 1-3, 17-18, 63; Thomas, "Inspiring Spirits."

4. Thom, *Follow the River*, 87, 93-102, 114-116, 119-128, 310-313; Ingles, *Escape*, 9-11, 12-15.

5. Ingles, *Escape*, 1-37; Joan Schroeder, "An Extraordinary Woman, and Equal to Any Emergency," <http://www.blueridgecountry.com/brc/ingles/ingles.html>; Thom, *Follow the River*, 375-376, 382, 393-394; Thomas, "Inspiring Spirits."

6. Schroeder, "Extraordinary Woman;" Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Significance of the Frontier in American History* (New Hampshire, no date), 207, 210, 226-227.

7. Thomas, "Inspiring Spirits;" Ingles, *Escape*, 28-33; Schroeder, "Extraordinary Woman."

*Officers
of
Alpha Beta Phi
Chapter
1998-1999*

Brian K. Puddy	President
Ann L. Reckers	Vice-President
Wendy J. Bradley	Secretary
Jann K. Irwin	Treasurer
Jennifer L. Gerding	Historian
James A. Ramage	Faculty Advisor

Charter Student Members

Joy M. Baker
Ann C. Cahill
John P. DeMarcus Jr.
Scott K. Fowler
Bennie W. Good
Matthew W. Hornsby
Kenneth E. Hughes
Shonda S. Kinman
Douglas K. Meyer, Jr.
Grace M. Murimi
Dick Wolfe

Christopher P. Burns
David R. Caudill, Jr.
Daniel M. Driscoll
Mark K. Gilvin
Joseph S. Guilyard
Todd P. Huff
Jeffrey Junto
Andrew O. Lutes
S. Wayne Moreland
Elaine M. Richardson
Rudiger F. Wolfe

Members Initiated April 15, 1986

David P. Anstead
Richard T. Dedman
James R. Eilers
Michael P. Holliday
Betty R. Letscher
Darlene S. Miller
Linda M. Ruh

Joseph T. Shields
Harold A. Stephenson
Shelley L. Stephenson
Deborah S. Trego
Edwin L. Vardiman
Shawn T. Young

Members Initiated April 14, 1987

Kristen H. Breen
Laura A. Butcher
Lynn David
Cheryl L. Grinninger
Linda Kay Hon
Judith F. Hutchison

John Prescott Kappas
Martha Pelfrey
Julie Ann Prewitt
Edna L. Stracener
Verna L. Vardiman

Members Initiated April 12, 1988

Susan M. Burgess
Lori Ann Dinser
Stacey L. Graus
Timothy Craig Grayson
Jeffrey Hampton
Derick Rogers Harper
Christopher Gary Holmes
Virginia Johnson

Sarah Suzanne Kiser
Joyce Borne Kramer
William H. Lowe
Michael K. G. Moore
Jennifer A. Raiche
Debra Beckett Weigold
Nancy Lynn Willoughby

Members Initiated
April 11, 1989

Roger Craig Adams
James Lee Breth
Edward R. Fahlbush
Linda Holbrook
Christopher Iannelli

Tracy Ice
Elizabeth W. Johnson
Wylie D. Jones
Mary Elaine Ray
Rebecca Rose Schroer
Jeffery A. Smith

Members Initiated
April 10, 1990

Fred Quintin Beagle
Kyle Wayne Bennett
Susan Claypool
Daniel Paul Decker
Gregory S. Duncan
Mark A. Good
Richard Timothy Herrmann
Rebecca Leslie Knight
Mary Alice Mairose

Bryan P. McGovern
Ernestine Moore
Christina Lee Poston
Preston A. Reed, Jr.
Christine Rose Schroth
Scott Andrew Schuh
Michael Scott Smith
Eric Lee Sowers
Dorinda Sue Tackett

Members Initiated
April 9, 1991

Patrick Thomas Berry
Nicholas Brake
Shelly Renee Helmer
Toni Hickey
Tina Holliday
Charles F. Hollis, III
Rick Jones
Michael Shawn Kemper

Todd Michael Novak
Greg Perkins
Larry Prine
Janine Marie Ramsey
Brian Scott Rogers
Sandra Seidman
Stacy E. Wallace
Steven David Wilson

Members Initiated
April 7, 1992

Tonya M. Ahlfield
Lisa Lyn Blank
Douglas E. Bunch
Ty Busch
Brian Forrest Clayton
Thomas M. Connelly
Marvin J. Cox
Kristi M. Eubanks
Lori J. Fair
Aric W. Fiscus
Christopher Bentley Haley

Laurie Anne Haley
Sean P. Hennessy
Brett Matthew Kappas
David R. Lamb
Mary Emily Melching
Kenneth Edward Prost
Ty Robbins
Gregory J. Scheper
Julie Shore
David Stahl

Members Initiated
April 16, 1993

Mark E. Brown
Randy P. Caperton
James L. Gronefeld
Marian B. Henderson

James L. Kimble
Daniel T. Murphy
Heather E. Wallace
Kathryn M. H. Wilson

Members Initiated
April 12, 1994

Fred Lee Alread
Julie B. Berry
Craig Thomas Bohman
Michael A. Flannery
Aimee Marie Fuller
Kelly Lynn Auton-Fowee
Joyce A. Hartig
Hilari M. Gentry
Louis W. Brian Houillion
J. Chad Howard
Jill K. Kemme

Brian A. Lee
Alden T. Meyers
Leslie C. Nomeland
Thomas Arthur Roose, Jr.
David Austin Rosselott
Shannon J. Roll
Paula Somori-Arnold
Kimberly Michaela Vance
Brady Russell Webster
Michael D. Welsh
Robert W. Wilcox

Members Initiated
April 11, 1995

Donald C. Adkisson
Monica L. Faust
Sean A. Fields
Randal S. Fuson
Jason E. Hall
Michael Hersey
Sherry W. Kingston

Christina M. MacFarlane
Andrew J. Michalack
Rachel A. Routt
Steven M. Watkins
Brian Winstel
Bradley E. Winterod
Roberta A. Zeter

Members Initiated
April 9, 1996

Sarah E. Adams
Brandon E. Biddle
Dale N. Duncan, Jr.
Gary W. Graff
Robert L. Haubner II
William M. Hipple
Deborah L. Jones
Francois Le Roy
Bonnie W. May

Scott A. Merriman
Laureen K. Norris
Cliff J. Ravenscraft
Allison Schmidt
Diane Talbert
Jason S. Taylor
Elisaveta Todorova
Lisa A. Young

Members Initiated
April 8, 1997

Megan R. Adams
Dawn R. Brennan
Patrick A. Carpenter
Brad A. Dansberry
Terry L. Fernbach
Mary A. Glass
Roy S. Gross
Walter C. Heringer
Kraig S. Hoover
William J. Landon

Carrie D. Mayer
John D. Nichols
Andrea M. Reckers
Christopher M. Scherff
Jennifer L. Schmidt
Walter L. Schneider
Joshua L. Searcy
Gabrielle H. Snyder
Andrew G. Wilson

Members Initiated
April 9, 1998

Erik J. Arwood
Clara M. Gerner
Stephanie Hagerty
Andre L. Maitre
Thomas J. May
Patricia A. Morwood

Jodi L. Otto
Rick L. Trump
Andrew K. Von Bargaen
Karen L. Watkins
Aaron M. Weaver

Members Initiated
April 13, 1999

Lisa V. Barrett
Wendy J. Bradley
Emily C. Bromwell
Dean H. Celenza
Mark E. Garbett, Jr.
Jennifer L. Gerding
Jann K. Irwin
Anthony R. Koester
Daniel H. La Botz

Terry A. Leap II
Mary Beth Patterson
Joshua P. Perkins
Daniel E. Pickett
Brian K. Puddy
Ann L. Reckers
Sara P. Scheyer
Dawn R. Ward

Members Initiated
April 11, 2000

William B. Addison
Rick Brueggemann
Jeremiah J. Cummings
Suzanne K. De Luca
William R. Eckerle
Theresa D. Geisen
John A. Hodge
Michael D. Howton
Sara Meuser
Rachel E. Noll
Nicole R. Puckett

Karen S. Ramsey
Thomas L. Ramstetter
Jonathan T. Reynolds
Gregory J. Schweitzer
Misty A. Spinner
Ryan N. Springer
John R. Stoll
Catherine D. Trunnell
Rhonda K. Vrabel
Anna M. Webb

Faculty

Michael C. C. Adams
Lawrence R. Borne
John P. DeMarcus
J. Merle Nickell
W. Michael Ryan
Louis R. Thomas
H. Lew Wallace
Michael H. Washington
Robert W. Wilcox

Leon E. Boothe
James C. Claypool
Tripta Desai
James A. Ramage
Jonathan T. Reynolds
W. Frank Steely
Robert C. Vitz
Richard E. Ward
Jeffrey C. Williams

Perspectives in HISTORY



ALPHA BETA PHI
CHAPTER
PHI ALPHA THETA
