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PERSPECTIVES IN HISTORY -

PHI ALPHA THETA

PHI ALPHA THETA
ALPHA BETA PHI CHAPTER

Perspectives in History

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Letter from the President

This journal, the 29th volume of *Perspectives in History* is the result of 29 years of hard work done by the Alpha Beta Phi chapter of Phi Alpha Theta. This journal is a collection of the some of the finest historical research done by students at Northern Kentucky University this past year, but some of the work comes from around the United States as our journal editor, Andrew Boehringer, kept an eye open for great papers at the 2014 Phi Alpha Theta National Conference.

The authors of the articles and book reviews within this volume have put a great deal of time and effort into these papers. They are not just the result of class work; these papers were also forged in the fires of conferences. Many of the authors went to multiple conferences this term to present their work, and from responses to their work they strengthened their final product. This year the position of journal editor was held by Andrew Boehringer who has thrown himself into the task of creating the best journal our chapter could possibly produce, his long hours of work are greatly appreciated. He was aided in this task by our journal adviser, Dr. Christopher Teters, whose Phi Alpha Theta Career has come full circle as he was president of our Chapter many years ago. We greatly appreciate his hard work and the guidance he has given our chapter with this journal.

I would also like to thank our chapter advisor, Dr. Jonathan Reynolds, who not only helped guide us in producing a great journal this year, but also served as a guiding light in all matters for our chapter. I would also thank Sheyrn Labate and Lincoln Meltebrink and for their help in the editing of this work. Jan Rachford and Lou Stuntz also deserve our thanks, as we are forever in their debt for the many services they have provided our chapter. Dr. Landon as Chair of the History and Geography Department deserves a special thanks as a great supporter of our chapter. I would also like to thank Professor Bonnie May our assistant adviser for the chapter. Without her help we would not have our continued success.

This year, like all the years previously, was a full one for our chapter. We helped the Drop-in center, a homeless shelter in Cincinnati Ohio, by raising donations of money and domestic goods for them. Alpha Beta Phi made a strong showing at conference this year showing up to three conferences in one term. These conferences included the 2014 National Phi Alpha Theta national conference in Albuquerque New Mexico, Eastern Kentucky University's regional conference, and the University of Southern Indiana's regional conference. We also had a movie night, and two field trips this year: to the Ohio Renaissance Festival and to the underground brewery tunnels of Cincinnati.

I would also like to thank the officers of the 2013-2014 academic year.

These include: Katie McDonald, who served as both Vice-President and Secretary, Danny Hagedorn, Vice-President, James McManus our Treasurer, Eric Kelso our Historian, and Brandi Cummingham our Wellness Officer. I would also like to thank each and every member who helped at our events this year.

This journal, *Perspectives in History*, and the NKU Alpha Beta Phi, chapter of Phi Alpha Theta serve as a source of comfort, community and inspiration for the students of the History and Geography department. Please enjoy the articles and book reviews of this volume as much as we enjoyed writing them.

Anthony Baker

President of Alpha Beta Phi chapter of Phi Alpha Theta, 2013-2014

Foreword

Two years ago, I submitted a review to *Perspectives* that I wrote in Doc R's Ancient Africa survey. I never thought I would end up being the editor of the same journal. I would like to thank all those who spent countless hours writing papers to submit to this journal for I stand on your shoulders. Dr. Kris Teters and Dr. Jonathan Reynolds were a tremendous help in the pre-production process. I don't believe in making appointments, or sending email. Despite this, they never turned me away from their doors when I had a query. My assistant editors Sheryn and Lincoln were also instrumental in editing papers in the second round of drafts and reading over 20 papers during our most arduous blind peer review ever.

A special thanks to JoAnn Fincken in University Printing for answering all of my production questions and assisting me with the whole process. She was also instrumental in getting all back issues of *Perspectives in History* scanned so they could be uploaded to the web for the first time.

This year we have over a dozen articles and reviews from Northern Kentucky University and across the country on topics ranging from local political history to international political, economic, and legal history. Due to the diverse range of papers, we were able to create two journals; one with US history and one with World history. In reality, the world history journal is the "rest of the world", not to quote Niall Ferguson. In many aspects local interests and US nationalism are positive, however we often lose sight that there is life beyond our borders.

But "complicated" doesn't make the news. That's why we have historians. We sift through it all searching for truth, or the best we can muster.¹ More often than not, what people study is a reflection of what they want to change in the world today.

As a species on earth, we view this galaxy with wonder while simultaneously being a part of it. This is an allegory for the temporal problem, part of what being a historian is about as our perspective is influencing our writing. While we cannot touch the histories we attempt to interpret, we observe and feel the effects. Though events and actions of those in the past do not change, our perceptions do with our individual biases, cultural schemas, and knowledge of the past.

Our perspective of this past impacts us every day.

Andrew J. Boehringer

Editor of Perspectives in History, 2013-2014

¹ John 14:6



PERSPECTIVES

Nobody Expects the Maoist Inquisition! How Mao Tested Khrushchev and Caused the Sino-Soviet Split, 1958-1959

Cameron Nielsen

Introduction

In 1949, shortly after founding the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong traveled to Moscow to beg for an alliance with his stronger neighbor, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Mao had proclaimed that "China has stood up," and then proved it by uniting China under one government for the first time since the abdication of the Emperor in 1912. However, his country was still desperately poor with no geopolitical standing. China needed a staunch ally, and the USSR, which had mentored the Communists' revolution, was the natural choice. When the alliance was announced in 1950, it bore the fingerprints of Stalin's unfair treatment of his allies, but it was still what China needed—a legitimizing emblem, backed up with Soviet aid to develop the economy. Yet 1961, just eleven years later, saw the Chinese denouncing the Russians as traitors to Communism, and 1969 saw the two countries fighting a brief border war. What happened?

While there were many factors leading to the Sino-Soviet Split, one of the most important proximate causes was a pattern of almost bizarrely bad diplomacy, mostly on the Chinese side. If it were not for jarring provocations such as the infamous "swimming pool meeting" in 1958, the split may have not occurred until much later, and certainly would not have been as precipitous. When the behavior of Mao and other Chinese leaders is analyzed, it becomes clear that this was their intent. The evidence is strong that the 1958 Khrushchev-Mao meetings were crucial moments when this decision was made, and their

bitter 1959 meeting just made this obvious.¹ Why would Mao choose to torpedo the Soviet relationship, which had so many benefits for China? Many scholars point to ideological differences between the two sides, but these only became important later when Marxist theory was deployed to legitimize the Split. The 1958 meetings, in particular were surprisingly non-ideological. Since Mao was the primary instigator of the Sino-Soviet Split (one author said it should be more accurately called the “Mao-Soviet Split”)², this paper will focus on the factors that led to his making that decision. In order to jettison the alliance, Mao had to decide the Russians were his enemies, and it was not over Marxist ideals, but due to an unfortunate interplay of worldview and methods that Mao and Khrushchev became enemies. After taming the elusive term ‘ideology,’ this paper will analyze how Mao’s leadership style and his prejudices about peace led to Khrushchev becoming an enemy in Mao’s eyes so quickly—simply by being Nikita Khrushchev.

Cutting the Ideological Knot

Since the fall of the USSR, it has become acceptable, even fashionable, in academic discourse to approach the Cold War as a primarily “ideological” conflict.³ While it was certainly not unheard-of during the period to present the rivalry between Capitalism and Communism as the driving engine of the Cold War’s strains, it tended to be sidelined by the assumption most (Western) analysts had that Communist ideology was basically insincere.⁴ The opening of the archives has since revealed that the leadership of both the Soviet Union and Communist China took ideas very seriously and they thought and communicated among themselves using much the same terms they put out for public consumption.⁵ While *realpolitik* certainly had its place, for top comrades goals like building socialism and hewing to the principles of Marxism-Leninism were important in determining their policies, much as American leaders ideally tried to promote concepts like democracy and free trade whenever

1 Allen S. Whiting, “The Sino-Soviet Split,” in *The People’s Republic, Part I: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1949-1965*, Vol. 14 of *The Cambridge History of China*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 478; Chen Jian, *Mao’s China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 75.

2 Steven I. Levine, in Priscilla Roberts, ed., “Forum: Mao, Khrushchev, and the China’s Split with the USSR,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 12, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 132.

3 For examples, see Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Cold War: What Do ‘We Now Know?’” *The American Historical Review* 104, no. 2 (April 1999): 503, 505-506. Gaddis and the other “post-revisionists” emphasize this the most, sometimes to the exclusion of security calculations and the cultural/stylistic factors that this paper focuses on.

4 Douglas A. Stiffler, in Roberts, ed., “Forum,” 152.

5 Chen, *Mao’s China*, 6.

possible. How this dynamic played out in practice to influence events, however, is still a bone of contention, especially as far as the Sino-Soviet Split is concerned.⁶

The problems between the two Communist “brothers-in-arms” that led to their alliance’s rocky and early end played out amid an obfuscating cloud of rhetoric, much of it incomprehensible to outsiders. At the time, it was possible for an informed and insightful analyst to think that China and the USSR’s shared ideology would lead to healing the rift.⁷ But with the benefit of hindsight, it is now possible for the author of the most important recent book on the subject, Lorenz Luthi, to claim the opposite extreme—that the rift was primarily caused by ideology, with all other factors taking back seat.⁸ Not that this thesis of Luthi’s has gone uncontested. The *Journal of Cold War Studies* devoted a full forty-six pages to discussion of his landmark book by several experts, much of it critical.⁹ All historians of the Split must admit that there were multiple factors at work, but debate is fierce over which were primary and decisive versus those that were secondary and incidental—the search is for a “master narrative.”¹⁰ Luthi is not the only one to grant ideology a leading role; Chen Jian has staked out a similar position, though with the proviso that Mao’s ideological arguments were motivated more by his domestic political needs than by concern over Marxism’s doctrinal purity.¹¹ Most contemporary observers ascribed the falling-out to balance-of-power politics, without ideology as a major concern, but these theories now look rather dated.¹²

Since so many of these attempted overarching explanations “founder on complexity,”¹³ many historians have avoided giving one altogether, opting for an avowedly “multifactorial” approach.¹⁴ Some of those who still seek the

6 Peter Vamos, in Roberts, ed., “Forum,” 143.

7 Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962).

8 Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

9 Roberts, ed., “Forum.”

10 Douglas A. Stiffler, in Roberts, ed., “Forum,” 153.

11 Chen Jian, “Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s ‘Continuous Revolution,’ and the Path toward the Sino-Soviet Split: A Rejoinder,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 10 (March 1998): 162-164.

12 A somewhat updated version of this theory ascribes the Split to Mao’s desire for untrammelled power, a quest in which the Soviets were rivals as well as the Americans. One example: Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009). Jung Chang and Jon Halliday also promote this idea in their polemical *Mao: The Unknown Story* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005).

13 Leffler, “We Now Know,” 511.

14 Douglas A. Stiffler, in Roberts, ed., “Forum,” 153.

straw that broke the camel's back among all the possibilities sometimes prefer to push other issues into the background, to better focus on the personalities of those in power.¹⁵ Mao and Khrushchev did not like each other, which was hugely important in states so completely centralized, and where so much diplomacy happened in face-to-face summits. However, so many of these interpretations rely on just that—interpretation. In particular, one gets the impression that if these writers could agree on what exactly 'ideology' means, many of their disagreements (and theories) might evaporate. Without devaluing any of these explanations or offering a "master narrative" of its own, this paper will refocus on the personal context around the leaders, Mao in particular. This new focus will offer some insight into why he made the choices he did when faced with all the factors that came to a head in 1958-1959. In doing so, we will consider elements of ideology and personality, as well as culture and personal history.

Laced throughout the debate is the problematic term 'ideology.' Historians use the word as if it were self-evident, yet no useful, universally agreed-upon definition of the concept really exists.¹⁶ In practice, most tends to assume 'ideology' means 'Marxist theory' and the mindset it presumably inculcates in Party members. This use is confusing and distorting, but the tendency to leave the term amorphous makes real analysis difficult by distracting from other aspects of decision-making. Luthi does provide a working definition of ideology "as a set of beliefs and dogmas that both construct general outlines ... of a future political order, and define specific methods ... to achieve it."¹⁷ While this formulation is certainly in line with the way most writers think of and use the term, rather than help Luthi (or us) to delve deeper into the interaction of ideas and action, Luthi's definition merely serves to demonstrate the vague and analytically useless nature of the term. Who can know what politicians really believe? In the end, while Luthi is quick to affirm that people like Khrushchev were "true believers" in Marxism-Leninism, he does not explain what that actually means. Partially, this blind spot is due to Western assumptions about what "conversion" to the Church of Marxism-Leninism consisted of.

What does being a "true believer" in Communism entail? The phrase seems to imply a religious element, as if the genuine disciple of Marx would in some way be blessed while the cynically utilitarian manipulators of ideology would be thrust down to hell. This emphasis on inward orientation over outward

15 Unsurprisingly, the biographers tend to focus on this—Pantsov, Taubman, and Short being notable examples.

16 Frank Bealy, *The Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science: A User's Guide to its Terms* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1999), s.v. "Ideology."

17 Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008) 8.

action (orthodoxy vs. orthopraxy) is a quintessentially Christian formulation, and yet many authors (like Luthi) try to subjectively sort Communist uses of political ideas into categories based on their apparent “sincerity.”¹⁸ This distinction would have been meaningless to the Communists themselves—they were concerned only with “objective” truth, and everyone who disagreed with whatever that truth was at the moment was a class enemy, sincere or not.¹⁹ Not only are these assumptions about belief anachronistic, but the confusion over the genuineness aspect of ‘ideology’ also distracts us as historians from the main question: what ideas were influencing decision-making in reality, and how can they help us understand why things happened the way they did? A more useful, accurate formulation, and one which will lead to more fruitful analysis, is that both Mao and Khrushchev thought of themselves as totally committed to the goal of creating a real communist society and as personally understanding best how it was to be achieved. Like all self-definitions, this type of “orthodoxy” was quite flexible, depending on both circumstances and evolution in the leaders’ opinions as they rethought their earlier theories—though they would have had to rationalize any changes to fit their image of personal consistency at least (as we all do).

In order to draw some solid conclusions on the relationship ideology played in the Split, it will be helpful here to divide ‘ideology’ into its constituent parts to create more specific and easily-defined terms. The top level, and the one which most readily comes to mind when we speak of ‘ideology,’ consists of values, goals, and what Luthi calls “claims in principle,”²⁰ which we will call ‘ideals.’ In Mao and Khrushchev’s cases, this is where their conversion to Marxism was most complete. In the middle of the ideological range lies the fuzzy realm of assumptions and models of how the world works. These tend to be cultural, hereditary, and not always examined by the holder—we will refer to this category as ‘worldview.’ For Mao, ‘worldview’ was first and foremost “Chinese,” and Khrushchev likewise “Russian.” Finally, mental

18 Steven I. Levine, in Roberts, ed., “Forum,” 129. Thank goodness for Peter Vamos’ sensible comment on this mess: “The genuine belief in Marxism-Leninism does not preclude its use as a means to achieve domestic and international aims that are based on Chinese national interests and, in the case of Sino-Soviet relations, that are against the interests of the USSR.” In Roberts, ed., “Forum,” 135.

19 Fr, in Roberts, ed., “Forum,” 149. (And I might add, what hope have we, as historians, to settle the question when the Communists themselves could not?) This distinction would have been especially incomprehensible to the Chinese Communists, who were accustomed to a syncretic and non-exclusive approach even in the local religions that Communism was intended to supplant. Both Russian and Chinese communists inhabited cultures whose religious traditions, which indeed might have influenced Communist norms of belief, tended toward orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy (ie, choosing outward actions rather than inward conversion), further underlining the Western Christian-ness of most analysts’ belief concepts.

20 Luthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*, 8.

constructs like ideals and worldview have to be put into practice. People generally discover strategies that work for them as they are beginning their careers, and these become habitual skills that are returned to repeatedly later in life. . This category, ‘methods,’ includes questions of how to apply ‘ideals’ like Marxist theories that typically come up in discussions of ideology. It also includes more implicit, assumed styles of management and interpersonal relations, and it is in this category that Mao and Khrushchev differed most.

The two top Communists grew to maturity in radically different systems, and this resulted in antithetical leadership styles. Mao was a local peasant organizer first, then an ingenious guerrilla commander and strategist in a civil war. Often a loose cannon, he drove his superiors to distraction—a problem he solved by using his military successes to become the supreme leader himself. Khrushchev grew up under Communism, served as a military commissar in a country savaged by Hitler; then as a bureaucrat under a brutal dictator, a position he survived primarily by seeming harmless. The one thing they had in common was skill at political infighting, since they both had to push many others out of the way to get to the top.

Beneath his conversion to Communism, Mao’s worldview and methodology was still foreign to the Russian style of Marxism-Leninism. For example, he referred far more to traditional Chinese folk sayings and literature in his speeches and conversations than to anything by Marx or Lenin. Using the vague conventional definition of “ideology” can make it seem like Mao was using Marxism-Leninist language cynically, or did not understand it. In reality, he believed in the ideals of Communist thought, but during the period of the Sino-Soviet Split he came to realize that the Russians did not possess the only path to socialism and that building Communism did not necessarily mean Europeanization. He had always viewed the teachings of Marxism-Leninism through a lens of his Chinese culture, but, as one of the leading scholars of Mao Zedong thought has noted, “By 1965, [Marxism] no longer constituted a universal and immutable ‘fundamental theory,’ but merely one more contribution from the West which must be digested critically and made to serve China.”²¹ How this shift affects Mao’s status as a so-called “true believer” is perhaps a topic for further analysis—as mentioned earlier, what is important is that both Mao and Khrushchev saw themselves as such. Suffice it to say, both of these “popes” had ample ground to “excommunicate” each other. However, this is not why the Sino-Soviet Split happened. Mao made enemies over much more down-to-earth matters.

21 Stuart R. Schram, “Introduction,” in Stuart R. Schram, ed., *Chairman Mao Talks to the People: Talks and Letters, 1956-1971* (New York: Pantheon, 1975), 36.

“Who Are Our Enemies? Who Are Our Friends?”²²

Perusing an index of Mao's works, one is struck by the size of the entry for “enemies.” Mao saw many of them all around: fascists, imperialists, reactionaries, “running dogs,” capitalists, Nationalists, various “cliques” and “gangs,” and, eventually “Khrushchevs.”²³ How did Khrushchev become part of this unlucky group? This is a situation where it will be helpful to break down ideology into smaller categories. In the matter of his larger ideals, Mao had at times been open to allowing “contradictions” to exist within socialist societies, both internationally and intranationally. He had philosophized on the subject and stated that there could be “nonantagonistic” disagreements that did not lead to becoming enemies.²⁴ However, on the levels of worldview and methods, Mao's comfort zone for disagreement had been getting smaller and smaller due to unpleasant experiences in the application of this liberalizing idea. Mao took a “left turn” before the Sino-Soviet relationship started foundering, and that this clashed with Khrushchev's increasing tolerance.²⁵ However, Khrushchev's road to becoming Mao's enemy was not paved with Marxist dogma—though that did come into play later, after Mao already hated him. In fact, the two leaders clashed for reasons of worldview and culture. Mao had an army commander's approach to evaluating people, one informed by Chinese social expectations of which Khrushchev was ignorant. Unknown to Khrushchev, Mao had become extremely sensitive to potential “enemies” in the late 1950s, and he became classified as one of them largely due to their differences in background reacting with the special circumstances of this flammable period.

Khrushchev's timing was unfortunate, because his “De-Stalinization” reforms and disastrous visits with Mao in 1958 and 1959 came shortly after Mao's own experiment with “letting go” in a liberalizing way—the Hundred Flowers Campaign.²⁶ The unexpectedly negative reaction Mao received to this call for free speech and criticism made him more rigidly orthodox in his policies, which led to the Maoist fervor of the Anti-Rightist Campaign and the Great

22 Mao Zedong, *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1972), 12.

23 John Bryan Starr and Nancy Anne Dyer, *Post-Liberation Works of Mao Zedong: A Bibliography and Index* (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, 1976), 120-22.

24 Mao Zedong, “On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People,” in *The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976*, Vol. 2, ed. John K. Leung and Michael Y. M. Kau (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), 312.

25 Luthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*, 112.

26 Mao was quite fond of using the phrase “letting go” to describe the policy of “letting a hundred flowers bloom and letting a hundred schools contend,” for example in Leung, *Writings*, 478.

Leap Forward.²⁷ Views on how genuine this experiment was vary, but Khrushchev himself later thought it was a “provocation” to trap moderates.²⁸ This probably was not his actual opinion at the time, but a bitter retrospective jab at a policy that to a certain degree trapped him too. If he had seen it as a “provocation” at the time, perhaps he would have been more careful during his meetings with Mao in 1958 and 1959. During these two years, when the Great Leap Forward seemed to be doing everything the Chinese leadership had dreamed of, Khrushchev came across as a faithless naysayer to the wonderful things that could be fueled by orthodox Maoism.

Maoist orthodoxy was a mix of Stalinism and Mao’s revolutionary, militaristic strategy, both things Khrushchev hated, and he allowed this to show in his interactions with Mao. The fallout from Mao’s liberalization policy, the “Hundred Flowers,” should have warned the Russians. When the Hundred Flowers started backfiring, Mao had quickly realized the danger of going down the “communism with a human face” road. He had revised his original talk calling for liberalization to include criteria for distinguishing between “fragrant flowers and poisonous weeds.” This new formulation stated that an opinion was only acceptable if it was “beneficial, not harmful, to socialist transformation and socialist construction.”²⁹ Opinions harmful to socialism on the other hand marked one as a subversive element. So when Khrushchev said things about Mao’s methods such as “they are old-fashioned, they are reactionary,”³⁰ he began to sound like a “poisonous weed.” Nor was this the only time Khrushchev unwittingly sounded like an “enemy” in Mao’s ears; we will discuss one major instance in depth in the section on Mao’s fear of peace. Coming at a time when Mao was obsessed with identifying enemies and at the crest of his power and confidence, these missteps were dangerous for the alliance. They could have been avoided, of course, but as Brezhnev noted later, “Our side had been poorly prepared for the negotiations.”³¹

This insensitivity of the Russians’ was simply poor diplomacy, but where Mao was concerned it was not easily forgiven or forgotten. Mao took a uniquely Chinese approach to authority that the Russians did not understand. While he was a Marxist revolutionary, Mao was still very much Chinese culturally,

27 Cameron Nielsen, *Contradictions Among the People: Mao Zedong and Aims of the Hundred Flowers Policy*, forthcoming in the *Thetean*.

28 Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1970), 466-67.

29 Mao, “Contradictions,” in Leung, *Writings*, 308-340.

30 Hubert Humphrey, “My Marathon Talk with Russia’s Boss,” *Life*, 12 Jan 1959, 86.

31 Luthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*, 94. See also William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era* (New York: Norton, 2003), 394, who states that Khrushchev’s aides were “guilty of not alerting him to Mao’s sensitivities,” but mostly blames Khrushchev for being outclassed by Mao and not controlling his mouth.

and this included a Confucian-influenced attitude towards seniority and social relations. In fact, an incident in Mao's rocky childhood relationship with his own father bears striking parallels to the way he treated his subordinates at times:

My father invited many guests to his home, and while they were present a dispute arose between the two of us. My father denounced me before the whole group, calling me lazy and useless. This infuriated me. I cursed him and left the house. My mother ran after me and tried to persuade me to return. My father also pursued me, cursing at the same time that he commanded me to come back. I reached the edge of a pond and threatened to jump in if he came any nearer ... My father insisted that I apologise and kow-tow as a sign of submission. I agreed to give a one-knee kow-tow if he would promise not to beat me.³²

Mao was not seen as a very good son at the time; the traditional teaching was that even if his father beat him until he bled, the son was “not to be angry and resentful, but be (still) more reverential and more filial.”³³ However, Mao did expect to receive proper respect from other Communists in his role as “father” of the party.³⁴ As the older and more experienced Communist of the two, Mao assumed Khrushchev would defer to him. Khrushchev had inadvertently confirmed this idea of Mao's when, as a new General Secretary, he had made the first visit to Beijing, bearing generous gifts. While the Chinese appreciated the loans, specialist assistance (including with nuclear weapons), and diplomatic concessions Khrushchev gave them, according to Chinese mores Khrushchev was signaling his lower rank—he was coming to pay tribute to and get the approval of his senior, Mao. While the Chinese probably knew that the Russians did not think of it this way, Khrushchev only deepened the impression by behaving immaturely in a way that lost face in Chinese eyes.³⁵ When Khrushchev later behaved the way he assumed the Soviet Union should, like an “elder brother,” it struck the Chinese, especially Mao, as provocative and suspicious.

Following this patriarchal pattern, when Mao suspected someone of being

32 Philip Short, *Mao: A Life* (New York: Henry Holt, 1999), 28.

33 Chu Tung-Tsu, *Law and Society in Traditional China*, 2nd Ed. (Paris: Mouton & Co., 1965), 21.

34 And some in the Party, such as the often sycophantic Lin Biao, actually called him “father.”

35 Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine, *Mao: The Real Story* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012), 409-411.

an enemy, he put them through testing ordeals to find proof of loyalty.³⁶ To understand how this worked, it is important to realize far greater importance of “face” in Chinese society relative to Western culture.³⁷ The Chinese will go to great lengths to keep from losing face, but ritual humiliation before superiors is also customary, and was often used as a disciplinary method. Mao operated within this cultural assumption in controlling his subordinates, and the “criticism and self-criticism” method promoted by the Party for “rectifying” mistakes clearly relied on public penitence and humiliation for its effectiveness. On a personal basis, when he began his process of testing others in the party, Mao would often surprise them with a face-destroying personal criticism.³⁸ In doing this, Mao played both “good cop” and “bad cop” roles himself—and he was an excellent actor.³⁹ He would bully, threaten, and harangue the suspects, harshly criticize their opinions and personalities, put on shows of exaggerated rage, and try to provoke outbursts. But he would also give advice, express his confidence in the suspect’s good intentions, play the role of the disappointed and surprised father-figure, and offer forgiveness. Often the forgiveness was fake, but a suitable display of humiliation, contrition, and harsh “self-criticism” in Party meetings would usually be enough to prove the suspect’s loyalty to the cause.⁴⁰ Earlier in 1958, Mao had carried out this routine on no less than Zhou Enlai, his second-in-command.⁴¹ Mao had had nascent suspicions and grievances about the Russians for several years before 1958,⁴² but now the time seemed good to him for a test of the Soviet leader.

Mao would never have attempted a submission ritual of this sort on Stalin, who was senior in world Communism and willing to show it with his own rituals and tough bargaining. In fact, striking parallels present themselves

36 Tang Tsou, *The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective*, 85. We can probably assume that the purpose of these ordeals were clear to those around Mao. His doctor realized this about the “Black Flag Incident:” Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao’s Personal Physician*, trans. Tai Hung-chao (New York: Random House, 1994), 244.

37 Hu Wenzhong, Cornelius N. Grove, and Zhuang Enping, *Encountering the Chinese: A Modern Country, an Ancient Culture*, 3rd Ed. (Boston: Intercultural Press, 2010), 99-111.

38 Surprise was one of Mao’s favored tactics in politics as well as in war: see Harrison E. Salisbury, *The New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao and Deng* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1992), 143-44. Some examples of these attacks: chewing out a young Lin Biao, Short, *Mao*, 323; denouncing Liang Shu-ming in a large meeting over saying the peasants were deprived, Edward E. Rice, *Mao’s Way* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 137; outing Minister of Defense and Great Leap critic Peng Dehai, Pantsov, 464-465; among many other occurrences.

39 Pantsov, *Mao: The Real Story*, 367.

40 Frederick C. Teiwes, *Politics at Mao’s Court: Gao Gang and Party Factionalism in the Early 1950s* (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), 19-20.

41 Pantsov, *Mao: The Real Story*, 448.

42 Schram, “Introduction,” in Schram, ed., *Chairman Mao Talks*, 37.

between Mao's treatment of the Soviet delegations in 1958 and 1959 and the way Mao was received by Stalin on his first visit to Moscow in 1949-50. Stalin treated him in a way that made it clear Mao was not important. Mao was lodged in an out-of-the-way dacha and left to cool his heels for several days before Stalin's birthday party celebrations, then for a full month before Stalin called him in to negotiate their treaty.⁴³ Mao became increasingly angry over his forced inactivity, and in the end Stalin himself had to admit "probably, we went to far."⁴⁴ Mao, as a Chinese, was more sensitive to the loss of face Stalin was inflicting than most of Stalin's subjects were. The Chinese were more subtle. In fact, even when Mao put Khrushchev in the pool, then banished the Soviet delegation to a remote vacation home of his own, it is possible that they did not realize it was a "deliberate insult."⁴⁵

This is the context in which we must view the symbolic humiliations of Khrushchev's 1958 meeting with Mao. First, Mao took the Russians by surprise and put them on the defensive. When Ambassador Yudin floated an idea about joint naval construction, Mao chose to interpret this as neo-imperialism, and made a scene over it.⁴⁶ His rage created an "emergency" that brought Khrushchev to visit *him*—on his timetable and in a panic over presumably having done something wrong. The sanitized official transcripts, of which two are available in English for both the first and last of their four meetings, document what seems to be a tense conversation, leaving out the theatrical aspects.⁴⁷ However, an avalanche of eyewitness memoirs confirm that Mao's behavior was intentionally inflammatory and aggressive. One biographer summed up:

Mao, a chain smoker, smoked one cigarette after another during their conversations, and blew the smoke right into Khrushchev's face. Khrushchev could not stand tobacco smoke. Mao tried to stay calm, but periodically he lost self-control, poked his finger at his interlocutor's nose, started yelling, and during the breaks between sessions berated his interpreter for not conveying the whole gamut of the emotions that were gripping him.⁴⁸

43 Pantsov, *Mao: The Real Story*, 369.

44 Pantsov, *Mao: The Real Story*, 371.

45 Luthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*, 94.

46 Luthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*, 92-93.

47 Vladislav M. Zubok, "The Mao-Khrushchev Conversations, 31 July-3 August 1958 and 2 October 1959," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001): 244-287; David Wolff, "'One Finger's Worth of Historical Events:' New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948-1959." *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Working Paper No. 30* (August 2000).

48 Pantsov, *Mao: The Real Story*, 459. See also Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 390-391.

Next, Mao aimed to symbolically humiliate Khrushchev, which he did by holding the next talk (of which we do not have transcripts) at his personal swimming pool. For Mao, swimming (an unusual activity for a Chinese, but one which became popular by his promotion) was emblematic of his personal strength and primacy. He had earlier undertaken long swims at important moments in his career to show he was still on top.⁴⁹ This incident is infamous, because, in contrast to Mao's prowess, Khrushchev could hardly swim, and looked like an idiot trying—yet he submitted to the indignity without protest. While Khrushchev later tried to downplay it in his memoirs, he in fact felt embarrassed and off-balance, though perhaps not as much as he was meant to.⁵⁰

All throughout their talks, Mao was waging a verbal guerrilla offensive to feel out Khrushchev's motives. In war, Mao's basic dictum had been, "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue," a mantra which acquired "a kind of mystical significance" for his admiring troops.⁵¹ He did the same thing in conversation, and this is noticeable even in the official transcripts of the Mao-Khrushchev meetings. At one point, after Mao re-opened a subject Khrushchev thought had been settled and started attacking, Khrushchev got frustrated and burst out, "You defended Stalin. And you criticized me for criticizing Stalin. And now—vice versa." Mao archly replied, "You criticized [him] for different matters."⁵² Khrushchev retreated more than he attacked, but Mao was not satisfied and kept up the pressure. In the end, while Khrushchev's visit was supposed to last a week, the Soviet delegation left after three days of indignities like these. Mao's doctor recalled, "The Chairman was deliberately playing the role of emperor, treating Khrushchev like the barbarian come to pay tribute. It was a way, Mao told me on the way back to be Beidaihe, of 'sticking a needle up his ass.'"⁵³ As far as determining Khrushchev's "loyalty," the results of the 1958 meeting were ambiguous, but Mao did not have to wait long to get the evidence he was looking for. Several months later, Khrushchev blasted his commune policies while on a trip in Poland, and by the time of their 1959

49 Rice, *Mao's Way*, 164-5, 247-8.

50 Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1974), 259; Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 391-92.

51 Pantsov, *Mao: The Real Story*, 324. See also Mao Zedong, "Basic Tactics," (http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-6/mswv6_28.htm).

52 First Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, Hall of Huaizhentan [Beijing], 31 July 1958, Document No. 1 appended to Vladislav M. Zubok, "The Mao-Khrushchev Conversations, 31 July-3 August 1958 and 2 October 1959," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001): 255.

53 Li, *Private Life of Chairman Mao*, 261.

meeting both sides quickly lost all restraint and became blatantly antagonistic.⁵⁴ For his part, Khrushchev began to catch on by this point to what Mao was trying to do, bursting out during one of these verbal brawls, “you want to subordinate us!”⁵⁵ The Russians were well on their way to becoming full-fledged “enemies of the people,” and Mao was the self-appointed Inquisitor-in-Chief.

Peace and Rumors of Peace

One of the most striking examples of Khrushchev making himself seem like the enemy was his push for “peaceful co-existence” with capitalism. To see why this was it will again be helpful to consider our three subcategories of ideology, since while most historians describe this disagreement as an “ideological” one, it was not that simple.⁵⁶ On the level of ideals, it is likely Mao had no argument with Khrushchev’s pursuit of peace. Mao called for “world peace” as often as any Communist leader, and genuinely hoped that it would continue, because he knew that war would destroy his socialist experiment.⁵⁷ He had a dim view of the threat of atomic weapons, to be sure, which made him less afraid of war than most (a stance which scared his comrades in the international Communist bloc).⁵⁸ However, on the level of worldview and means, Mao’s concept of attaining “perpetual peace” was starkly different; war would only become unnecessary once capitalism had been “eliminated.”⁵⁹ Temporary peace was possible at intervals along the road, but in Mao’s eyes it was dangerous to lose sight of who the enemy really was. To Mao, Khrushchev’s delight at the Soviets’ friendly talks with Eisenhower in 1959 just showed that the Soviet leadership was “very naive” and “easily fooled

54 Luthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*, 148-50; Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 393-394.

55 Record of Conversation of Comrade Khrushchev N.S. with CC CCP Chairman Mao Zedong, Deputy Chairman CC CCP Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Lin Biao, Politburo members Peng Zhen and Chen Yi, and Secretariat member Wang Jiaxiang, 2 October 1959, Document 23 appended to David Wolff, “‘One Finger’s Worth of Historical Events:’ New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948-1959,” *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Working Paper No. 30* (August 2000): 67. Exclamation mark mine.

56 Douglas A. Stiffler, in Roberts, ed., “Forum,” 157. Though I doubt that either Mao or Khrushchev saw it as an ideological issue either.

57 Leung, *Writings*, 762. Specifically, Mao said he needed twelve years of peace to industrialize China: *ibid.*, 12.

58 Pantsov, *Mao: The Real Story*, 445-6.

59 Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War,” in Mao Zedong, *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 223.

by imperialism.”⁶⁰ While Mao was open to establishing relations with the United States eventually,⁶¹ unlike Khrushchev he could not ignore their current “maniacal aggression.”⁶² Mao was particularly aware of the United States’ role as the leading imperialist country, because he was essentially still at war with them through their proxy, Taiwan. Perhaps it was to remind Khrushchev of this that he bombarded one of the outlying islands in the Taiwan Strait between their 1958 and 1959 meetings, creating a diplomatic crisis—to which the Russians reacted by trying not to offend either side.⁶³

Like many of the points where Mao clashed with Khrushchev, Mao’s views on war came from his own personal experience. During the civil war, the Communists had frequently received offers of peace from the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-Shek. Mao had rejected these and fulminated against them with all the rhetoric he could muster, because he knew that Chiang simply wanted to demoralize Mao’s troops and gain some breathing space for his own forces before resuming the fight. Chiang had had “United Front” relations with the Communists twice, and had turned against them both times, which simply proved to Mao the hostile true nature of all bourgeois capitalists. So for Mao, the Communist ideal of peace was tempered: “As for the imperialist countries, we should unite with their peoples and strive to coexist peacefully with those countries, do business with them and prevent any possible war, but under no circumstances should we harbour any unrealistic notions about them.”⁶⁴ He was particularly leery of capitalist offers of peace:

What is the enemy’s tactics? (1) [Waving] the flag of peace, building lots of missiles, establishing lots of [military] bases, preparing to use war to eliminate socialism. This is the first. (2) [Waving] the flag of peace, [through] cultural intercourse and personnel exchange, prepare to use to corrosion to eliminate socialism. This is the second. Self-preservation and elimination of enemies is the fundamental concept [we should follow].⁶⁵

60 Mao Zedong, An outline for a speech on the international situation, December 1959, Document 25 appended to David Wolff, “‘One Finger’s Worth of Historical Events:’ New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948-1959,” *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Working Paper No. 30* (August 2000): 73.

61 Leung, *Writings*, 250-251.

62 Leung, *Writings*, 763.

63 Taubman, *Khrushchev*, 392.

64 Mao, *Quotations*, 66. See also Chen Jian, “Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s ‘Continuous Revolution,’ and the Path toward the Sino-Soviet Split: A Rejoinder,” *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 10 (March 1998): 163.

65 Document 25 in Wolff, “One Finger’s Worth,” 72.

While he could dismiss Khrushchev's desire to make peace with the imperialists as naive, for Mao a far more dangerous sign was that it seemed to be working:

I hold that it is bad as far as we are concerned if a person, a political party, an army or a school is not attacked by the enemy, for in that case it would definitely mean that we have sunk to the level of the enemy. It is good if we are attacked by the enemy, since it proves that we have drawn a clear line of demarcation between the enemy and ourselves."⁶⁶

Such communists, who had become "safe" enough to live side-by-side with capitalists, had been given a label by Lenin himself: "revisionists." Unbeknownst to him, Khrushchev was doing exactly what he needed to do to attain this benighted status in Mao's mind. And he had a point, since many of Khrushchev's new initiatives "revised" Stalinist thinking—but if so, why was Mao the only one in the Communist bloc to rebel?

As already discussed, Mao was rapidly becoming more independent of the Soviet Party for guidance in building socialism. When Soviet advice and plans clashed with his own (Chinese) instincts, he generally preferred the latter unless politics prompted otherwise, and he advised Party members to do the same.⁶⁷ He was also becoming more confident in adding his own philosophizing to Marxist theory. One such addition, a fairly new one codified in mid-1950s and which he was very proud of, was the concept of the primacy of "contradiction" in bringing about change—a sort of Communist yin-yang cycle.⁶⁸ Restless for progress, in Mao's mind the quest to work out these "contradictions" in society fed into a sort of violence-worship becoming an important part of Maoism.⁶⁹ In essence, beneath his official peace-loving stance, Mao the former revolutionary distrusted and even feared peace. He needed enemies to fuel his goal of "continuous revolution."⁷⁰ Some scholars have seen the Sino-Soviet conflict through this lens and dismissed it as "domestic political needs" feeding in to Mao's foreign policy, inducing him to create another enemy to fulminate

⁶⁶ Mao, *Quotations*, 15.

⁶⁷ Schram, "Introduction," in Schram, ed., *Chairman Mao Talks*, 33-34.

⁶⁸ For a contextualization these ideas of Mao's with traditional Marxist and Hegelian dialectics, see Schram, *Thought*, 136-138. Interestingly, Mao was into this idea (and reading Hegel devotedly, as he did even late in life) even before he became a Marxist. Rice, 79-80; Chenshan Tian, *Chinese Dialectics: From Yijing To Marxism* (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2005), 146.

⁶⁹ Rice, *Mao's Way*, 101-2; Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 74, 102.

⁷⁰ Chen, *Mao's China*, 72-73; see also Document 25 in Wolff, "One Finger's Worth," 74.

against.⁷¹ However, this view overlooks the fact that Mao already had plenty of foreign foes—practically the entire world, as the Taiwan Straits Crisis underlined. Moreover, domestic politics and foreign policy ultimately came from the same place—Mao’s mind. He wanted strife, because he was convinced that that was the way to produce the dramatic change in Chinese society necessary to make it a great power. If he followed the pragmatic approach offered by Khrushchev, with its low growth rates (and, incidentally, much lower mortality) that could hardly keep up with the United States, how could China become a world power in eight years?⁷²

Conclusion

Khrushchev grated on Mao’s predispositions in many other ways that are beyond the scope of this paper. His proposals for cooperative military ventures reminded Mao of imperialism and “big-power chauvinism;” he immediately thought “their real purpose is to control us.”⁷³ He also feared the Soviet policy of “De-Stalinization,” which seemed a threat to Mao’s power after the Hungarian Rebellion—and which presaged the backlash against his own legacy by his successors.⁷⁴ However, what we have covered should be sufficient to show how the causes of the falling-out between the two largest Communist states was more comprehensible and preventable than it tends to appear when painted with the broad brush of “ideology.” In essence, Chinese foreign policy relied heavily on the impressions and impulses of one man—Mao Zedong. He was a man who could not get along with anyone not subordinated to him for long, not even the leader of the Soviet Union. For his part, Nikita Khrushchev proved unable to understand what Mao was doing, and unable to play his game, angrily threw in the towel.⁷⁵ Their contrasting attitudes toward relations with non-Communist countries made this worse, and led to Khrushchev failing Mao’s tests and becoming an “enemy of the people” in Mao’s estimation. Closer examination of what “ideology” meant for these people—in this paper

71 Chen Jian, for example.

72 Mao used many different estimates of how long this would take but in 1959, he said eight years: Document 25 in Wolff, “One Finger’s Worth,” 73.

73 Mao Zedong, “On Sino-American and Sino-Soviet Relations,” 27 January 1957, in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 152; William Taubman, “Khrushchev vs. Mao: A Preliminary Sketch of the Role of Personality in the Sino-Soviet Split,” *CWTHP Bulletin* 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997): 245; Li, 261.

74 Rice, *Mao’s Way*, 139-142.

75 Khrushchev made numerous remarks in his memoirs about how incomprehensible Mao seemed to the Russians: Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1974), 160-1; Nikita Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes* trans. Jerrold L. Schecter (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), 147-150.

attempted by subdividing the term into clearer categories—hopefully will lead to a clearer understanding of why countries with seemingly similar goals and worldview could turn on each other so quickly. The events studied here suggest that it had more to do with the past experiences and backgrounds of the leaders involved, and less to do with a possible inherent quality of Marxism.⁷⁶ Nor was it what is typically called “realpolitik,” suggesting possible applications in modern diplomacy and political science.



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76 Steven I. Levine, in Roberts, ed., “Forum,” 130.



An Agora of Improvements: A Study of Emperor Hadrian's Reforms in Greece

Brandi Cunningham

When studying Roman emperors, historians typically have focused on such ones as Augustus, Nero, and Constantine. The Roman Empire began in 27 BC with Augustus, the first Roman emperor, who expanded the empire into areas such as Africa and Asia Minor. Nero is known for his many battles as well as his extravagance in Rome. Constantine spread the influence of Christianity into areas as far as Turkey. Though all of these emperors made impacts across the Roman Empire, Hadrian is often forgotten. Emperor of the Roman Empire from 117-138 AD, Hadrian worked to build up the country of Greece. Other emperors in the past made reforms in Greece; however, through Hadrian's improvements to the Greek landscape, religion, and politics, a merged Greek and Roman culture was created.

Before the reign of Hadrian, there had been two separate cultures: one Roman and one Greek. These two empires were once known as the two greatest in the world. Despite them both lying on the Mediterranean Sea, they seemed worlds apart. To the Romans, Greeks seemed weak and feminine in contrast to their Roman masculinity and strength. Romans saw Greeks as feminine because of their involvement with the arts and philosophy. Romans, on the other hand, preferred to spend their time working on their military tactics. By focusing on the arts and not on advancing their empire, the Greeks were seen as a defeated country. The disconnect between these two empires was a rift that would be difficult to close even once Greece was annexed by the Roman Empire.

Hadrian chose Athens to become the imperial capital and to serve as the springboard for his reforms because of the potential he saw to build it up from its desolate state. At the time, Athens was underdeveloped, especially because of its distance from the less provincial capitals of Antioch, Ephesus, and

Corinth.¹ Also, attacks on Athens left it in destruction. One notable attack on Athens was by the Roman emperor Sulla in the 1st century BC.² Along with these attacks, Greece became involved in various war battles. The Macedonian War, for instance, left many battle scars, and out of all the cities in Greece, second-century writer Pausanias tells that “the Athenians were more exhausted than anyone else in Greece.”³ After bloodshed such as this, Hadrian worked from the ground up to create a whole new image for the city. He not only wanted Athens to be the center of the Roman Empire but also to be the center of a new league of Greek city-states.⁴ Hadrian’s adoration for the city and its important sites, including the Acropolis and the Olympieion, enticed him to return to Athens time and time again.⁵ Though the Athenian scenery of the time was alluring to Hadrian, he nonetheless still wished to improve it through various building projects.

The city changed aesthetically through Hadrian’s extravagant donations given on a level that even Rome did not receive.⁶ Hadrian, through his building projects and gifts, helped many cities by boosting their pride and their economies.⁷ Hadrian left an architectural legacy throughout Greece with his most notable projects in Athens: the library, the agora, and the Olympieion.

Hadrian’s Library (Stoa) was much more than a library, in the modern sense. This structure did have a library in the square, yet it also housed lecture halls, gardens, and artwork.⁸ Hadrian’s architects made the library with a spa-like area and additional social spots. This was also a public forum where citizens could come and openly discuss politics and different philosophies. Large white columns led visitors into the library where they could experience the various activities. The library’s exterior was made similar to that of the nearby Roman agora. Also, Hadrian placed a Roman-looking building in the middle of his beloved city, thus merging Greek and Roman cultures’ very different aspects into a shared style.⁹

1 T. Leslie Shear Jr, “Athens: From City-State to Provincial Town,” *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 50 (1981): 372.

2 Shear, “Athens: From City-State,” 356.

3 Pausanias, *Guide to Greece I: Central Greece*, trans. Peter Levi (London: Penguin Group, 1971), 19.

4 Thorsten Opper, *Hadrian: Empire and Conflict* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 128.

5 Anthony Birley, *Hadrian: The Restless Emperor* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 63-64.

6 Opper, *Hadrian: Empire and Conflict*, 128.

7 Catherine Barrett, “Hadrian and the Frontiers of Form,” *Journal of Architectural Education* 56 (2003), 40.

8 Shear, “Athens: From City-State,” 375.

9 Mary T. Boatwright, “Further Thoughts on Hadrianic Athens,” *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 52 (1983) 176.

The Athenian agora was the central marketplace of a second-century city. Much like the library, only on a larger scale, the agora was a public forum where philosophy and religion were frequent topics of discussion. Famous philosophers, including Socrates, spent much time speaking publicly there. The agora was also a place of trade in the city. Since the agora is now in so many fragments, its historical significance is often overlooked.¹⁰ By reforming the agora, a key site in the lives of the Athenian people, Hadrian was showing the citizens that a place so significant to them was also important to him as emperor. Though a popular spot in Athenian life before the second century, the agora's importance grew through Hadrian's efforts, including the addition of the Temple of Ares.¹¹ Pieces such as the Roman basilica connected new Roman constructions with the ancient traditions of Athenian life in the agora.¹² The Athenian agora, the Roman agora, and Hadrian's Library all incorporated the Roman look into their architecture in a way that had to have been purposefully planned.¹³ Also, each of these buildings are near one another in the center of Athens. With their close placement and similar designs, these three sites draw in visitors who can experience Greek and Roman culture without ever leaving Greece.

Construction on the Olympieion, also known as the Temple of Olympian Zeus, first began in the 6th century BC under the reign of Peisistratos, an Athenian tyrant. However, it was soon abandoned until the 2nd century BC when King Antiochus of Syria began working on it again. Emperor and General Sulla, who attacked Athens, destroyed much of Greece's art in the process. During that attack, Sulla removed some of the temple's inner columns. Though the Olympieion was disregarded much during its early years, Hadrian revived it.¹⁴

Some question Hadrian's involvement with the Olympieion's construction. These doubts typically stem from the differences in Hadrian's architectural constructs in comparison to the Olympieion. For example, there are distinctions between the Olympieion's columns and the Arch of Hadrian.¹⁵ To this, some scholars suggest that the capitol in Augustan Rome is a better match to the temple's columns.¹⁶ On the contrary, most find more compelling similarities between the arch and the Olympieion than the distinctions found. These two

10 Shear, "Athens: From City-State," 376.

11 Susan E. Alcock, *Graecia Capta: The Landscapes of Roman Greece* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 192.

12 Boatwright, "Further Thoughts on Hadrianic Athens," 176.

13 Boatwright, "Further Thoughts on Hadrianic Athens," 174.

14 Oppen, *Hadrian: Empire and Conflict*, 128.

15 Herbert Abramson, "The Olympieion in Athens and Its Connections with Rome," *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 7 (1974), 24.

16 Abramson, "The Olympieion in Athens," 24

structures share a close proximity and a similar style. The Arch of Hadrian is placed directly in front of the temple, leading visitors to the beloved Olympieion.

There is patchy information about Hadrian's involvement with the Olympieion's construction. However, from a compilation of second century sources, Athenian locals and many historians find Hadrian to be the true restorer of the temple. Pausanias speaks about the dedication of the temple as well as a cult statue found there. Philostratos, though, only mentions the temple's dedication. Lucian gives credit to Hadrian for the furnishings of the temple, which leads to the perception that the emperor was very involved with the temple's building. To bring this full circle, Cassius Dio discusses Hadrian's dedication of the Olympieion and asserts that he finished the temple.¹⁷

Not only is the Olympieion a local and national monument, but it also served as a site of Hadrian's deification. Like many other places throughout the provinces, the Olympieion held statues brought from all over Greece to honor the emperor.¹⁸ Much of what is known in regards to this god-like view of Hadrian comes from the Athenian-made connection between him and their Greek gods. During the era of Hadrian's rule, the worship of Greek gods such as Zeus and Athena was common. Hadrian was elevated to the level of these various gods, much like the tradition of venerating Roman emperors to great heights among gods such as Jupiter. The emperor was even initiated into high places of honor reserved only for gods such as Dionysus.¹⁹ Since Athenian contemporaries had an embedded love for the original gods of Greece, it would prove difficult for Greeks to include someone new in their sphere of worship. Amongst all this, they still deified Emperor Hadrian.

Pausanias, an elite Roman citizen, visited Greece in the second century and authored the book *Guide to Greece*. He gleaned information from what he had read as well as from what the locals told him about various sites and events at those sites. Much of what historians use to learn about Hadrian in Athens comes from what Pausanias wrote during his visits to Greece. Frequently discussed in Pausanias' book is the subject of Hadrian's deification. From experience as well as from what the locals told him, Pausanias writes that "every city dedicated a portrait of the emperor Hadrian, but Athens outdid them."²⁰ Though Athens gave special recognition to Hadrian, Pausanias tells that it was equal to the amount of generosity shown to Athens over other

17 Abramson, "The Olympieion in Athens," 25.

18 Anna S. Benjamin, "The Alters of Hadrian in Athens and Hadrian's Panhellenic Program," *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies* 32 (1963), 58.

19 Daniel J. Geagan, "Hadrian and the Athenian Dionysiac Technitai," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association* 103 (1972), 149.

20 Pausanias, *Guide to Greece*, 52.

provinces.²¹

All of these shrines and places of honor dedicated to Hadrian were, in fact, not forced upon an unwilling beneficiary. He allowed, and even welcomed, honorific constructions such as the Panhellenion.²² Second-century author, Cassius Dio, writes, “Hadrian completed the Olympieion at Athens, in which his own statue also stands.”²³ Hadrian rebuilt the Olympieion for many reasons, but sources of the day link this particular construction partially to Hadrian’s belief in himself as worthy of such a sanctuary. If the Temple of Olympian Zeus had not been reconstructed, there would have been one less place for a shrine of Hadrian to stand. From these accounts and others, one can see that like many other Roman emperors, Hadrian was not particularly humble.

Though accounts tell that Hadrian had a bit of an ego, second century sources also tell that he was not as fierce as historians of today may believe. For instance, Philostratus points to a disagreement between the philosopher Favorinus and Hadrian. Philostratus tells of Hadrian’s great character in that “though he was Emperor, he disagreed on terms of equality with one whom it was in his power to put to death.”²⁴ Cassius Dio, another source of the time, confirms Hadrian’s good character: “Hadrian was a pleasant man to meet and he possessed a certain charm.”²⁵ It’s no wonder why the people so admired and worshipped this emperor since these Greek contemporaries felt he was one of such good character.

The quantity of sites dedicated to Hadrian himself does not exceed that of other Roman emperors, since the deism of Roman officials was common in Greece. In fact, there is nothing extra special about Hadrian being lifted to the status of a god. Throughout the Roman Empire, it was part of everyday life for emperors to be exalted to a god-like status. However, what does set Hadrian apart from other emperors is the number of cult sites dedicated to honor Hadrian’s boyfriend, Antinous.

Antinous was an important factor in Hadrian’s deep philhellenism.²⁶ Though Hadrian had a wife, Sabina, his love truly went to Antinous. Since Antinous was from Greece, the emperor invested much of his time here. Not only did Antinous divert Hadrian’s attention to the east, but he also got the attention of Greek citizens throughout the provinces. Throughout the Greek cities and

21 Pausanias, *Guide to Greece*, 17.

22 Ilaria Romeo, “The Panhellenion and Ethnic Identity,” *Classical Philology* 97 (2002), 22.

23 Cassius Dio Cocceianus, Earnest Cary, and Herbert Baldwin Foster, *Dio Cassius Roman History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914), 429.

24 Philostratus and Eunapius, *The Lives of the Sophists*, trans. Wilmer Cave Wrights (London: William Heinemann, 1922), 23.

25 Cassius Dio, *Dio Cassius Roman History*, 429.

26 Opper, *Hadrian: Empire and Conflict*, 186.

countrysides, shrines commemorate Hadrian's beloved. In the fall of 130 AD, Antinous tragically drowned in the Nile River. After his death, Hadrian declared that Antinous should be promoted to god-like status. As such, Cassius Dio writes that Hadrian "set up statues, or rather sacred images, of him, [Antinous] practically all over the world."²⁷ In Greece there were countless statues built in honor of Hadrian's fallen angel.

Though partly out of adoration for their fellow Greek, towns across the province also built places of honor for Antinous in hopes that Emperor Hadrian would then bestow gifts upon their city. Just as with the shrines to commemorate Hadrian, Antinous was honored on a level equal to that of the Greek gods. At Eleusis, a municipality outside of Athens, Antinous was put at a place of respect near the level of Dionysus. There is a statue of Antinous in Eleusis containing a religious stone called an omphalos. This type of attribute typically was only associated with the Eleusinian Dionysus.²⁸ These religious sites dedicated to Antinous and Hadrian are known as imperial cults. Though Antinous was never a ruler, the effect he had on Hadrian gave him authority to be worshipped, even after his death. When a city would present its new monument for Antinous to Hadrian, they could expect many blessings coming back their way. These blessings came in forms of new building projects or money towards their province.

The Athenians formally requested for Hadrian to reform their laws, and the emperor did just that.²⁹ Hadrian's political reforms are typically overshadowed by architectural and religious improvements, but he did make changes to the way Greece was run. With control given to him by the citizens of Athens, Hadrian would be able to change the laws to meet his needs. However, as Hadrian's contemporaries would attest to, he instead worked towards the needs of his subjects. Hadrian gave control to the people of Greece and provided them with protection which they had not experienced under the previous reign.³⁰ The military, though, was the area with the largest political influence during Hadrian's reign.

Since Hadrian was so often in Greece, his military was present there as well. These trips gave the Roman military a refined discipline and a new strength that might not have been gained otherwise.³¹ At this time, the main military style of the Romans in regards to Greece was similar to a laissez-faire approach.

27 Cassius Dio, *Dio Cassius Roman History*, 447.

28 Geagan, "Hadrian and the Athenian Dionysiac Technitai," 148.

29 Birley, *Hadrian: The Restless Emperor*, 177.

30 James H. Oliver, "Hadrian's Reform of the Appeal Procedure in Greece," *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 39 (1970), 336.

31 Mary Boatwright, *Hadrian and the City of Rome* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 135.

Practically speaking, the Romans disliked the inconvenience of running a centralized government.³² Instead, the Roman military preferred to hand off their duties to local governing bodies³³ within the countries they imperialized. Romans would choose a leader to rule over the people of the province. This individual would be Greek, yet he would be the hand-picked choice of the Roman government. This left little room for upheavals and revolts. The Greek people were not normally legal Roman citizens with rights like members of the commonwealth but rather they played the part of “passive beneficiaries of Roman rule.”³⁴ The Roman-chosen leaders would be liaisons between the two differing cultures. A relationship like this was very helpful to an emperor trying to make changes in the land, especially because of the conflicting views of the Romans and Greeks. With this military structure, Greeks didn’t feel imperially controlled by the Romans. Instead there was a sense of unity among the Greek and Roman leaders. With the distant presence of the Roman military, the Greek citizens could identify with the Roman Empire while also keeping their nationalism for Greece intact.

Rome was not left in need when Hadrian went off to work on Greece’s reforms. Rome benefitted from Hadrian’s interactions with Greece as well. For one, there were many improvements made in Rome that took from Greek architecture and culture. Much of the Grecian ideals brought to Rome were exhibited through Hadrian’s villa that seemed to be “an empire in miniature.”³⁵ These brought the bests of Hadrian’s empire into a setting of “perfect harmony.”³⁶ At the emperor’s villa, there were many examples of Athenian architecture including replicas of the Erechtheion Caryatids which reside on top of the Acropolis.³⁷ These aspects would invade Hadrian’s Roman home, as one might expect, because he was so closely connected to Athens. He spent much time in Athens, the capital of the Roman Empire, visiting it on several occasions and presented many favors to its people,³⁸ because the town continually allured him. Through the implementation of Greek architecture in Rome, these two worlds could be united on both peninsulas, not just along the landscapes of Greece.

It would prove to be a difficult task for Hadrian to try to connect two such different places as Rome and Greece, but Hadrian, being a strong ruler, bridged

32 A.H.M. Jones, “The Greeks under the Roman Empire,” *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 17 (1963), 5.

33 Jones, “Greeks under the Roman Empire,” 5

34 Jones, “Greeks under the Roman Empire,” 11.

35 Opper, *Hadrian: Empire and Conflict*, 148.

36 Ibid., 148.

37 Opper, *Hadrian: Empire and Conflict*, 165.

38 Birley, *Hadrian: The Restless Emperor*, 177.

the gap between the two. Architectural, religious, and political reforms were the methods Hadrian used to bring these two cultures together. Yet the underlying question remains: why would Hadrian choose these two differing cultures? He could easily build up Athens to make himself look good, and his boyfriend was Greek. Even more than these reasons lies something within Hadrian himself. Though a Roman emperor by title, Hadrian was very much a Greek emperor at heart. Hadrian had personal investments in the country of Greece, and though it was an advantageous move to reform it, he ultimately chose to build it up for his connections to the country.

Hadrian is known as the bearded Roman emperor, which upon looking at him immediately presented a “distinctive outward sign of the graeculous Hadrian.”³⁹ Currently, beards are seen as more masculine than a clean shaven face; however, in the second century, it was the opposite for Greeks and Romans. Along with the emperor’s Greek facial hair, he also was a homosexual which was also known to be a feminine and therefore Grecian trait. Hadrian was a Roman emperor, and though he demonstrated traits perceived as feminine, the fact that a Roman was embracing these Grecian traits pushed together the two countries he loved, bringing them into a harmonious relationship. Displays of this harmony are present in the architecture and artwork that demonstrates both Roman and Grecian concepts. Overall, both Rome and Greece gained much from one another. Rome gleaned from Greek art, philosophy, language, and education,⁴⁰ and Greece gathered a new identity found in the Roman culture and political ways. With this, Greece would have to join a process of change so that it might adapt to its new position within this imperial system.⁴¹

Whether the changes made by Hadrian were improvements or hindrances to Athens, they were deep changing factors in Athens’ identity. The Arch of Hadrian speaks of the New Athens best. On one side of the arch are the words, “This is Athens, the ancient city of Theseus.” However, on the other side of the arch is: “This is the city of Hadrian and not of Theseus.” This inscription speaks volumes about how Hadrian felt about Athens. Pausanias writes about Athens being hurt by war; however, he tells that Athens “flowered again in the reign of Hadrian.”⁴² He provided patronage to the city, and moreover, he saw it as his own. Much like the statues to deify Hadrian, the arch’s inscription shows how proud the emperor was of himself and in his accomplishments throughout Athens.

All in all, it is clear to see that Emperor Hadrian was heavily invested in Greece as a whole, though he had a special place in his heart for Athens. As

39 Oppen, *Hadrian: Empire and Conflict*, 69.

40 Jones, “Greeks Under the Roman Empire,” 3.

41 Alcock, *Graecia Capta*, 230.

42 Pausanias, *Guide to Greece*, 58.

such, he provided Athens with incredible buildings and a revised political system which brought her out of obscurity and into the limelight where she would flourish. To thank Hadrian for all of his efforts throughout the land, he was deified, as many Roman emperors were. However, his lover was also deified, bringing Greece back to himself for personal reasons. During the reign of Hadrian, two disparate empires merged through one emperor who was formally Roman and personally Greek.



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PERSPECTIVES

La Justicia

Katie E. McDonald

Christopher Columbus's landing in the Americas in 1492 was a transformative event in history, as it caused world relations to expand. One result was that the indigenous people of the Americas came into contact with Europeans. This began a period of mercantilism and colonialism for most of the world, colonizers and colonized. However, these people who were subjugated by colonialism were not just victims. The indigenous people were intelligent and adaptive. They came to understand and utilize the very system that was subjugating them. They may have been conquered, but they were by no means defeated, and continued to resist their occupiers over the centuries.

This paper explores legal resistance employed by indigenous peoples against their Spanish colonizers in a variety of geographical locations and cultures in Latin America from the early 16th century into the 18th century. Before exploring legal resistance a brief look at the conditions of the cultures' legal institutions at the time of contact is necessary. Latin America's legal systems today are not only a manifestation of Spanish colonialism that spanned four centuries, but also a combination of colonial and pre-colonial legal systems employed by both the natives and Spaniards.¹ By the time of contact both societies had undergone evolutionary processes that led to the specific conditions of their legal systems.²

In Latin America the evolution of indigenous law originated with kinship relations and small chiefdoms like many early settlements. These then grew and transformed to agricultural sedentary communities, with complex political and social organizations.³ For example, the Aztecs had a "legalistic system"⁴ which was complex and had criminal and civil laws (which had begun to be codified before conquest), a variety of court systems, trials, and trained judges.⁵ The Incan empire was more like Egypt under the rule of pharaohs, as it was

1 John O. Haley, "Foundations of Governance and Law: An Essay on Law's Evolution in Colonial Spanish America," *Dikaion* 23 (2009): 178-189, 200.

2 Haley, "Foundations of Governance and Law," 178-9.

3 Haley, "Foundations of Governance and Law," 179.

4 Haley, "Foundations of Governance and Law," 180-182.

5 The University of Texas School of Law Tarlton Law Library Jamail Center for Legal Research. "Aztec and Maya Law: An Online Exhibit and Bibliography" 2012.

a “centralized, administrative empire”.⁶ In these circumstances, the legal responses indigenous people employed against their colonizers were not just a reaction to what they had learned from Spanish legal institutions, but native legal comprehension and actions had their own foundations that dated from before colonialism.⁷ Additionally after Spain made contact with Latin America, its emissaries acknowledged that the indigenous cultures had legal institutions.⁸ In fact, the indigenous peoples and Europeans had a commonality in law, and despite their separate languages and cultures, legal terms were mutually understandable.⁹

Spanish legal institutions had a long history. By the end of the fifteenth century they were a blend of Gothic and Roman ideologies. A number of thinkers and their works influenced the evolution of Spanish law and its reflective ideologies. Alfonso the Wise and his three works *Siete Partidas*, *Fuero Real*, and *Especulo*, were influential after the 14th century. These works were used as an essential aspect of Spanish law. They provided Spain and its expanding territorial possessions a “uniform set of legal principles, proscriptions, and procedures.”¹⁰ Also important to this system was that the King was the highest authority applying justice and enforcing law, legally entrenched through the legislation *Fuero Juzgo*.¹¹

Another important aspect for Spain was the Church, which acted as a “principal organizational and cultural remnant”.¹² The Church’s influence in law can be illustrated by the fact that Latin was chosen as the basic language of the law.¹³ Yet the Church’s biggest impact on the legal system was the innovation “of natural rights within a universally valid and mandatory hierarchy of legal principles and rules.”¹⁴ Supplemental and influential works of people like Gratian Thomas Aquinas, provided a “shared common vision of law within a hierarchical system of principles and rules with God’s law as supreme.”¹⁵ Rights by law included contracts, compensation for wrongs, right to property, and many other elements. These rights were “universally applicable and mandatory”.¹⁶ In addition to its legal institutions and ideologies, Spain carried

6 Haley, “Foundations of Governance and Law,” 183-4.

7 Saliha Belmessous, *Native Claims; Indigenous Law Against Empire 1500-1920* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 15.

8 Belmessous, *Native Claims*, 4.

9 Belmessous, *Native Claims*, 5.

10 Haley, “Foundations of Governance and Law,” 184, 186.

11 Haley, “Foundations of Governance and Law,” 184.

12 Haley, “Foundations of Governance and Law,” 189-90.

13 Haley, “Foundations of Governance and Law,” 189-90.

14 Haley, 189-90

15 Haley, 189-90

16 Haley, 189-90

beliefs that stemmed from the *Reconquista*, a long period in which they had fought with Muslim forces over centuries, until they finally reclaimed their lands, expelling the invading forces. This “cultural mentality” was transmitted to Latin America.¹⁷ There were two important aspects of the mentality, one was the practice of rewards for services to the crown, particularly militaristic service. The second was the Christian mission mentality that God supported the Spanish cause and Christian conversion was imperative.¹⁸

At the time of contact, Spain was “characterized as the most legally advanced European state.”¹⁹ Since the indigenous people of Latin America faced such a legalistic society, the best way to resist its colonial structures and demands, was to employ legal resistance. The word resistance inevitably invokes images of physical resistance. Legal and physical resistances were not always mutually exclusive.²⁰ The intertwined nature of the two was not uncommon,²¹ but force did not provide the type of success desired. Legal resistance was safer and gave natives a better opportunity to be successful.²² Thus, natives quickly comprehended and used strategies within the “colonial legal system, [which] included courts designated for their cases.”²³ Natives brought claims orally and in writing.²⁴ Colonization frequently was resisted by ideas which were native, Spanish, and “cross-culturally” created, but translatable by all.²⁵

This paper will provide facts, supported by real legal case examples and outcomes that indigenous employed against their Spanish colonizers. This paper will argue that legal resistance was the most successful form of resistance, even when it failed or when success seemed short term. The examples illustrate that natives did have legal rights which were recognized by Spain, even though they were inferior in comparison to Spaniards or creoles’ rights. While throughout the colonial period overall indigenous rights were reduced, contradictorily legal rights were at times expanded. Additionally, natives used these rights and the Spanish legal system to their benefit, often cleverly adapting their

17 Mark A. Burkholder and Lyman L. Johnson. *Colonial Latin America*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 23.

18 Burkholder and Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 24.

19 Haley, “Foundations of Governance and Law,” 190.

20 Belmessous, *Native Claims*, 13.

21 Burkholder and Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 139.

22 Ward Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions: Nature, Law, and Culture in Indigenous-Spanish Land Relations in Colonial Peru,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 80 (2000): 88.

23 Burkholder and Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 139.

24 Kathleen Deagan, “Native American Resistance to Spanish Presence in Hispaniola and La Florida, ca. 1492-1650,” in *Enduring Conquests; rethinking the Archaeology of Resistance to Spanish colonialism in the Americas*. ed Matthew Liebmann and Melissa Scott Murphy (Houston, Texas: The Brown Foundation Inc., 2010), 48.

25 Belmessous, *Native Claims*, 15.

rhetoric in legal petitions to match Spain's changing society and politics. Such rhetoric often illustrates clever manipulative appeals rather than a reality of conditions.²⁶

Legal resistance also aided in an ability to keep native culture intact. Over the years of utilization of the legal system, native peoples helped to shape and influence Spanish policies and laws. These all resulted in a new Latin American legal system. Legal resistances occasionally failed. However, examples show that it often allowed for retention of possessions, rights, and culture.

In order to engage or while engaging in legal battles, the indigenous peoples came into contact with numerous obstacles. Prejudices and the hierarchal colonial social structure was always a hindrance to indigenous daily life. Courts were not reserved in emphasizing what they believed to be the inferior status of the natives.²⁷ In addition, Spaniards who believed in these hierarchical structures often set out to assert dominance and control.²⁸ Natives were ultimately separated into a society legally designated as the “república de indios” which defined them as people without reason, as perpetual children, which thus placed a legal stigma on them.²⁹ They also encountered high court costs and individuals with influence, who swayed decisions in certain ways because of the stake they had in claims.³⁰ Those individuals were not always Spaniards, but at times other natives.³¹ Like justice systems today, there were obstacles of complexity and contradictions in court cases; it was hard to differentiate truth from lies, and employ justice.³² However, generally for the sake of legitimacy “within the context of an exploitative colonial system—the colonial justice system functioned as impartially as possible.”³³

Indigenous people came up against these and other obstacles, but they proved resourceful and utilized tactics and leverages to overcome them. In some instances, to overcome obstacles such as corruption and destructive tactics, the natives used Spanish tactics, such as moving land boundaries or

26 Baber, “Law, Land, and Legal Rhetoric in Colonial Spain,” 56-7.

27 Erin E. O'Connor and Leo J. Garofalo. *Documenting Latin America; Gender, Race, Empire Volume* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall), 205.

28 O'Connor Garofalo. *Documenting Latin America*, 205.

29 Cheryl E. Martin, and Mark Wasserman, *Latin America and Its People 2nd edition Volume 1 to 1830*, (New York: Pearson Education Inc., 2008.)

30 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 111.

31 Laura Matthew, ““A Case of Contested Identity: Domingo Perez, Indigenous Immigrant in Ciudad Real, Chiapas,” in *Documenting Latin America; Gender, Race, Empire Volume 1* ed. Erin E. O'Connor and Leo J. Garofalo (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall 2011), 35-44.

32 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 105.

33 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 111.

passing rented land down to family members.³⁴ Also in their petitions natives utilized the colonial system and its restrictive class distinctions to their benefit. For example, the colonial law calling for the imposition of separation was utilized by natives in times of crisis to remove Afro-mestizos from their lands.³⁵ They also used “imposed categories” as “useful tools of defense.”³⁶ For example, they employed the designation of “república de indios” to successfully resist relocation.³⁷

Natives also utilized Christianity in legal petitions, which often rendered favorable decisions.³⁸ An example involved a petition from the Masca people in the Ulua Valley of Honduras against a petty officer. The natives utilized religious arguments, winning a favorable outcome.³⁹ In addition, natives used Spanish designated protectors, who waged fierce legal battles for them.⁴⁰ An example of this involved the indigenous people of Quiquijana (in modern Peru), who were aided by a protector in order to retain their land from the encroachments of a miner. The outcome of the case is unknown, though evidence indicates that the protector provided a good defense for the indigenous.⁴¹ Natives utilized other natives and Spaniards to testify on their behalf.⁴² This is exemplified in Quispichanchis where a land dispute took place between Doña Ursula Belaquez, whose hacienda was in Cana y Canchis, and was instigated by Felipe and Juan Choque who was “speaking in the name of ayllu Chachaca of Acopia.” Both a neighbor and a Spaniard testified on behalf of the *ayllu* (which is “(t)he basic social unit above the family...a kin group that had a common ancestry and a hereditary chieftain or *kuraka* advised by village elders.”)⁴³ and their rights to the land. The case was successful as the Crown heard the case and the land was returned to the possession of the ayllu.⁴⁴

Furthermore, because of the great dying, which involved the loss of

34 Rachel Corr, and Karen Viera Powers, “Ethnogenesis, Ethnicity, and “Cultural Refusal”: The Case of the Salasacas in Highland Ecuador,” *Latin American Research Review* 47 (2012): 4-27.

35 Rachel Sarah O’Toole and Leo J. Garofalo, “Introduction: Constructing Difference in Colonial Latin America,” *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 7 (2006).

36 O’Toole and Garofalo, “Introduction”.

37 Martin and Wasserman, *Latin America and Its People 2nd edition Volume 1 to 1830*, 147.

38 Sheptak, Joyce, and Blaisdell-Sloan, “Pragmatic Choices, Colonial Live,” in *Enduring Conquests; Rethinking the Archaeology of Resistance to Spanish Colonialism in the Americas*. ed. Matthew Liebmann and Melissa Scott Murphy. (Houston, TX: The Brown Foundation Inc., 2010), 165-167.

39 Sheptak, “Pragmatic Choices, Colonial Lives,” 167.

40 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 100-101, 111.

41 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 100-101, 111.

42 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 101-102.

43 Burkholder and Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 19.

44 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 101-102.

indigenous life of up to 90-95 percent over the first century of conquest, natives could leverage the fact that Spaniards needed their labor and tributes. The great dying also provoked moral appeals and cries for reforms. Natives operated and “made sense of their changing world” which provided them the ability to survive and retain “their families and their communities.”⁴⁵

An example that illustrates successful legal resistance involves the Tlaxcalans from the Valley of Mexico. The Tlaxcalans allied themselves with Cortes against the Aztecs, who were a common enemy of the Tlaxcalans and the Spaniards. This alliance of military service was one important aspect of Tlaxcalans legal arguments. They continued to be successful politically and legally because of “their ability to recognize shifts in the political culture, and to fashion their legal rhetoric and strategies accordingly.”⁴⁶ They did this with three different strategies, following three changes in Spanish ideologies.

The Tlaxcalans’ first period of success cleverly utilized Spanish political philosophy, dating to medieval times, of contractual mutual duties between King and those who “submitted to his authority”.⁴⁷ They requested exemption of labor and tribute demands, and to retain authority over labor, land, and subjects.⁴⁸ In their petition to the King they appealed, as the conquistadors did, on the basis of loyalties and services provided. They also insisted that since they freely became Christians they were not only rational and capable, and deserved these and other rights, including “self-government, and lawfully possessed property rights and jurisdiction.”⁴⁹ To further strengthen their claims they cited the fact that they fought under the same God and aided in expanding the Christian kingdom following Spanish mission. This also exempted themselves from Just Wars.⁵⁰

A second change in Spanish ideologies was a shift from militaristic to bureaucratic authority of royal supremacy. In response the Tlaxcalans changed the rhetoric in their petitions to match Spain’s new “ideological foundation” of “good government” which included the use of the *Siete Partidas*, which the Tlaxcalans used to assert mutual contractual obligations between the King and his subjects. This time they capitalized on the idea that the Crown demanded loyalty and faith from its subjects and in return they were given “peace and

45 Martin and Wasserman, *Latin America and Its People 2nd edition Volume 1 to 1830*, 176.

46 Baber, “Law, Land, and Legal Rhetoric in Colonial Spain: A Look at the Changing Rhetoric of Indigenous Americans in the Sixteenth Century,” in *Native Claims; Indigenous Law Against Empire 1500-1920*. ed. by Belmessous, Saliha. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012.) 41.

47 Baber, “Law, Land, and Legal Rhetoric,” 44.

48 Ibid.

49 Baber, “Law, Land, and Legal Rhetoric,” 45.

50 Ibid.

harmony”.⁵¹ This proved successful and allowed for protection of land and reparations for damages caused by Spanish settlers.⁵²

The third change in Spanish ideologies came with new sympathies for the treatment of the indigenous. Spain believed that vulnerable members of society deserved protection. They categorized these vulnerable members as “indios miserable”.⁵³ Tlaxcalans applied this terminology into their petitions, and were subsequently granted protections.

Tlaxcalans legal successes illustrates that the Spanish colonial justice system recognized natives’ legal rights. Spain influenced aspects of their lives, but Tlaxcalans actions influenced Spain and provoked a “legal dialogue that contributed to the shifts in the legal culture of the empire and informed their claims and counterclaims to land.” It also invoked self-reflection on the part of Spanish Crown, and throughout the colonial period many actions and laws resulted. Including the Laws of Burgos⁵⁴ which were created to improve working conditions for natives⁵⁵ and regulate overall interactions.⁵⁶ The Tlaxcalans overcame obstacles and utilized leverage, and their continued success expanded their status, autonomy, possessions, and rights. Tlaxcalan’s resourcefulness and legal resistance was “extraordinary but not unique or exceptional.”⁵⁷ They are representative of legal resistance by other natives throughout colonial Latin America.

Perhaps the largest aspect of legal resistance involved land. Indigenous survival depended on their rights to land⁵⁸ and this “defense of community lands against European encroachment was one of the hallmarks of indigenous resistance to colonial domination.”⁵⁹ To enable defense of lands, natives also used the colonial legal system.⁶⁰ Rhetoric was changed in legal petitions to enable success. For example, in the early years of colonialism natives utilized ancestral landholdings claims. For example, a petition from Juan Zumba in 1565 claimed rights to land because it had been in his family’s possession in “times of Incas” and in 1649 brothers Fransico and Vetrúa Elbay’s claimed possession of land citing their ancestors.

Repeated litigation with this wordage suggested Spaniards allowed natives

51 Baber, “Law, Land, and Legal Rhetoric,” 43.

52 Baber, “Law, Land, and Legal Rhetoric,” 53

53 Baber, “Law, Land, and Legal Rhetoric,” 42, 51

54 Baber, “Law, Land, and Legal Rhetoric,” 45, 53-54.

55 Burkholder and Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 43.

56 Belmessous, *Native Claims*.

57 Baber, “Law, Land, and Legal Rhetoric,” 41.

58 Burkholder and Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 210.

59 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 77.

60 Burkholder and Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 210.

to retain lands based on pre-colonial possession.⁶¹ However, beliefs changed and Spaniards no longer recognized ancestral landholdings because they were seen as pre-Christian and not a rightful claim. As a result, the indigenous strategy also changed to using documentation received from the Spaniards such as past Spanish judicial rulings, which protected retention of their lands.⁶² Since this type acknowledgement was important to retention of lands, natives asked for titles, even before there was a threat to their land possession and rights. In response, Spanish authorities acknowledged indigenous rights to possess land.⁶³ The “Nahuatl-speaking Indians” exemplified this type of rhetoric and strategic change in order to win land disputes.⁶⁴ These changes in indigenous rhetoric and actions with regard to the colonial legal system showed the adaptive nature of indigenous people in response to property issues.⁶⁵

Natives extensively used the legal system as a weapon of defense and resistance as well. An example of a legal battle ensued between indigenous of the ayllu Charachapi and a priest San Pedro de Cacha. Both claimed rights to land that they had received. The whole dispute was full of legal arguments and evidence.⁶⁶ It ended with a ruling in favor of the indigenous litigants. The indigenous people continually proved to be successful and accomplished “legal strategists”⁶⁷ and in some areas they won more legal battles for land retention than they lost.

Indigenous people waged legal battles in various forms to protect their land, including using litigation to remove settlers.⁶⁸ Often settlers invaded and controlled land, “muscling” the land away from natives. In 1606, a two year battle ensued in which the natives in Quiquijana, led by curacas Francisco Huaman Sauni and Pedro Ninaronto of the ayllu Saiba. The lands along the Vilcanota river were highly contested. The complaint was against Dona Casilda de Anaya Maldonado and Lorenzo Bezerra who had “invaded” their lands (named Cochapata and Guaguaconga) “by force and against” the natives’ will. Other ayllus testified on the behalf of Saiba about how the land had been in their possession for many decades. Since the Spaniards had never provided proof of land claims, and in 1608 the natives won.⁶⁹

61 Tamar Herzog, “Colonial Law and “Native Customs”: Indigenous Land Rights in Colonial Spanish America,” *The Americas* 69 (2013): 305.

62 Tamar Herzog, “Colonial Law and “Native Customs,” 305, 308-309

63 Herzog, “Colonial Law and “Native Customs,” 308 -309.

64 Burkholder and Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 210.

65 Burkholder and Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 210.

66 Rachel Corr, and Karen Viera Powers. “Ethnogenesis, Ethnicity, and “Cultural Refusal”: The Case of the Salasacas in Highland Ecuador,” *Latin American Research Review* 47 (2012): 107.

67 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 87.

68 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 101.

69 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 99, 100.

They also used legal resistance to prevent land encroachment. Natives of Quiquijana sought legal action against a miner who asserted that he needed their land for his mining economic ventures. The miner gained the land through force “at least initially.”⁷⁰ However, with help the natives put up a legal battle to prevent the acquisition of their lands and destruction of their economic livelihoods.⁷¹ In many cases like this one, efficacy of legal battles depended on the amount of time settlers had been on the land, since they gained land through de facto possession.

Legal measures were also utilized to resolve land disputes.⁷² When Spaniards deemed native lands unnecessary for natives to retain, settlers “illegally occupied” in this case “communal lands belonging to Oropesa.”⁷³ The natives took legal action and authorities ruled in their favor. The people of Oropesa lands were restored to them.⁷⁴

Legal resistance can also take on land and economic characteristics. An example is an incident brought against Andres del Campo by Agustin Gualpa with other Urcos curacss in the Quiquijana over *puna* grasslands. Campo was charged with moving boundary markers. Because this had interfered with their economic ventures and other “notable offenses” Campo was ordered by the viceroy “off the lands and the Indians were put back in possession.”⁷⁵

Indigenous peoples also used legal resistance for economic benefits. For example, they successfully secured the ability to produce silk independent of Spaniards.⁷⁶ This took place in Oaxaca, Mexico in 1543. The Tejupan Indians and Marlin brothers entered a contractual venture together. When the contract was fulfilled, the Indians petitioned to remove the Marlin brothers from their land and retain the ability to raise silk on their own. They won the petition, as, the “viceroys so orders and grants the town license to raise silk.”⁷⁷ Another example is when natives sold their land. In Coyoacan countryside in Mexico, Nahuas sold land to Spaniards. In the 17th century there are documents of land sold by Nahuas to Dr. Diego de Leon Plaza a Spanish clergyman. Land

70 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 101.

71 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 100-101, 111.

72 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 101-102.

73 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 98.

74 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 98.

75 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions: Nature, Law, and Culture in Indigenous-Spanish Land Relations in Colonial Peru,” 101.

76 Woodrow Borah, “The Indians of Tejupan Want to Raise Silk on Their Own.” In *Colonial Lives; Documents on Latin American History, 1550-1850*, ed. Richard Boyer Geoffrey Spurling (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press 2000), 7.

77 Borah, “The Indians of Tejupan Want to Raise Silk on Their Own,” 7.

was sold not only by indigenous elite but commoners as well.⁷⁸

The people also employed legal resistance to preserve/protect their resources, such as water accessibility and retention.⁷⁹ An example of this type of legal resistance included the people of Oaxtepec village in Mexico who were part of the “república de indios.”⁸⁰ They engaged in litigation in order to preserve their land and water accessibility. The villagers were taken to court over a dispute with a neighbor who owned a sugar mill. The dispute involved the usage of water. After two decades the villagers won the court decision, but conflict continued, and part of their victory was based on fear of an uprising. Another case involving Oaxtepec was a combination of success and failure. During a time of famine, the Oaxtepec won a court decision that allowed them to receive more water to irrigate their maize crops. However, it was short lived and the hacienda won a reversal.⁸¹ There was a mix of success and failure in legal resistances. Another example involves the struggle for water rights of the Vulcanite River. Since the Crown usually favored villages, the courts ruled in favor of “caciques of Arcos representing ayllu Mollebamba” on the same issue of interference of crop irrigation. Different Spaniards continued to interfere, and the court ruled more than once for the disruption to stop.⁸²

Legal resistance by indigenous people was also employed against tribute demands. An example of a legal battle to exempt tribute involves a case in which Domingo Perez and his son Pedro Gomez claimed exemption, based on military loyalties. Perez stated that he was a Tlaxcalteca “conquistador who fought alongside the Spanish.”⁸³ This claim was disputed by “indigenous councilmen of Tlaxcalteca and Mexicano barrios of Ciudad Real,” who proclaimed that he was a slave. Nonetheless, the ruling by Spanish authorities went in favor of Pedro Gomez and Domingo Perez. Their victory was appealed, but there is no record of the outcome.⁸⁴

Natives also used legal means to negotiate tribute payments.⁸⁵ One example took place with the curaca of Mohina, Don Bernabe Gualpa, during a time of

78 Rebecca Horn, “Spaniards in the Nahua Countryside: Dr. Diego de Leon Plaza and Nahuatl Land Sale Documents” in *Colonial Lives; Documents on Latin American History, 1550-1850* ed. Boyer, Richard, and Geoffrey Spurling. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 2000), 101.

79 Martin and Wasserman, *Latin America and Its People*, 151.

80 Martin and Wasserman, *Latin America and Its People*, 151.

81 Martin and Wasserman, *Latin America and Its People*, 151.

82 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 103.

83 Laura Matthew, ““A Case of Contested Identity: Domingo Perez, Indigenous Immigrant in Ciudad Real, Chiapas,” In *Documenting Latin America; Gender, Race, Empire Volume 1* Ed. Erin E. O'Connor and Leo J. Garofalo (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall 2011 Pearson Education Inc.), 35-44.

84 Matthew, “A Case of Contested Identity,” 35-44.

85 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 101-102.

bad harvest, who used litigation to alter the tribute payment from corn and wheat to silver. An argument ensued in which a representative disagreed, saying the harvest year was good. With the backing of “the Corregidor of Quispichanchis” and a local priest, Gualpa prevailed. In addition, the Crown not only “waived payment” but warned against extortive actions by tax collectors and caciques.⁸⁶

Legal resistance was utilized against relocation for labor.⁸⁷ Although they were not always successful, sometimes they were awarded reversals from colonial courts on the demand for relocation. An example involved the village of Anenecuilco. Their legal resistance freed them from relocation to Cuautla. Furthermore, three hundred years later the village was still there with its inhabitants.⁸⁸

Relocation of labor was prompted by labor demands. Indigenous workers employed legal resistance to combat this as well. An example in Masca a “pueblo de indios in the Ulua Valley” shows how the indigenous peoples cleverly capitalized on relationships and militaristic loyalties. They had provided a military service, their strongest argument, by being part of the coastal watch. This was used to argue in a petition for exemptions from “labor demands from the residents of nearby city.”⁸⁹ The petition was presented by Blas Cecil, who also “cited his previous appearance before the court of Guatemala as the reason he was charged with advancing this request.”⁹⁰ In this case they succeeded because they played a distant powerful Spanish colonial city against a local, less powerful, city.⁹¹

Examples show that natives not only understood, but at times wrote about what a individual’s rights should be by Spanish divine and secular standards.⁹² For example, Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, was an Andean who spoke both Quechua and Spanish. His story is an example of how indigenous peoples were ‘assimilated’ by the colonial Spanish society and utilized what they learned, “to defend their claims to lands and other possessions in the Spanish colonial justice system.”⁹³ Guaman Poma was an elite whose actions and attitudes can serve as example of to others in the larger society. Guaman Poma and those like him strived to be part of the Spanish colonial system and be rewarded by

86 Stavig, “Ambiguous Visions,” 101-102.

87 Martin and Wasserman, *Latin America and Its People*, 147.

88 Martin and Wasserman, *Latin America and Its People*, 147.

89 Sheptak, “Pragmatic Choices, Colonial Lives,” 166.

90 Sheptak, “Pragmatic Choices, Colonial Lives,” 166.

91 Ibid.

92 Rolena Adorno, “Court and Chronicle: A Native Andean’s Engagement with Spanish Colonial Law”, in *Native Claims; Indigenous Law Against Empire, 1500-1920*, ed. Saliha Belmessous (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 67-80, 75-76.

93 Adorno, “Court and Chronicle,” 63

the colonial legal system. His story is not one of success. Through his legal battle, he won some legal decisions such as land rights and documents certified and upheld his claims, but he ultimately lost. This caused him to reject the Spanish legal system as unjust and provoked him to write *Nueva coronica y buen gobierno*.⁹⁴ Though he failed in courts, his case is an example of a native who used the Spanish legal system, practically and theoretically. Later in his writings, he applied the works of Spanish thinkers, specifically Bartolomé de las Casas. Guaman Poma read *Doce dudas*, and then employed a number of Las Casas points, including rights given to people over their own land, not only by Spanish law, but by divine and natural law. To him these included, “the right of all peoples to jurisdiction over their own lands.”⁹⁵

Not all legal resistances were successful, but through them natives were granted numerous rights, including the ability to engage in economic ventures, free trade, contractual obligations, negotiations, court litigations, and many other activities. And while the colonial structures were powerful and influential, indigenous peoples “exercised some autonomy in their interpretations and usages”⁹⁶ of such structures. And they “were able to seize on the colonial categories of difference to make a living, defend their land, or argue for freedom.”⁹⁷

Legal resistances worked not only to retain and expand rights, possessions, and resources but they also allowed for indigenous persons to enact a “cultural refusal”, which permitted them to retain their “indigenous identity.”⁹⁸ However there is a contention that by utilizing the Spanish system in gaining recognition for their rights, the cost was “becoming more Spanish.”⁹⁹ Both were likely, the reaction of indigenous peoples varied, and so did the results; some who did not wish to employ cultural refusal opted for assimilation.

Whatever they chose, legal resistance from the indigenous people gained the attention of Spain. The Crown spent a lot of money on its justice system in dealing with grievances, and considerable effort and time was spent to balance compensation and compulsion.¹⁰⁰ Often it was those very people “who lacked formal authority” through the use of “nonviolent resist(ance)” against the Spanish colonial society who altered “the Spanish American Empire and

94 Adorno, “Court and Chronicle,” 67-80.

95 Adorno, “Court and Chronicle: A Native Andean’s Engagement with Spanish Colonial Law,” 75-76.

96 O’Toole and Garofalo, “Introduction,”

97 O’Toole and Garofalo, “Introduction,”

98 Corr and Powers, “Ethnogenesis, Ethnicity, and “Cultural Refusal,”” 27.

99 “Colonial Law and “Native Customs”: Indigenous Land Rights in Colonial Spanish America, 309-311.

100 Martin, and Wasserman, *Latin America and Its People*, 175-176.

its policies.”¹⁰¹ A resulting factor was that this led to mutual exchanges and an expanded awareness and desire for rights by natives. During the colonial period a combination of accommodation and resistance between natives and Spaniards, “resulted in the transformation of indigenous American society, [though] so too did it transform Spanish society in America.”¹⁰² And in effect all reactions aided in the creation of the new legal system that evolved over centuries in Latin America; a legal system that was not distinctly indigenous, or Spanish.¹⁰³ Indigenous peoples undoubtedly suffered, “but they also played a crucial role in shaping the history of Latin America.”¹⁰⁴

In conclusion, legal resistance was the most successful resistance employed by natives against Spain during colonialism from the early 16th into the late 18th century. It influenced the Spanish Crown’s policies and laws. It allowed for retention of possessions, rights, and culture. Legal resistance and its effects had provoked a determination among the indigenous peoples to keep and expand rights, and combined with the changes and effects that occurred in the mid-to-late 18th century including Bourbon reforms,¹⁰⁵ a growing powerful creole population, increased social tensions, Enlightenment ideas,¹⁰⁶ and the French, American and Haitian Revolutions¹⁰⁷ contributed to revolutions and independences of the early 19th centuries. Legal resistance was an essential element of survival for the native people, and along with other “overt and covert forms of resistance” most Latin Americans today can claim their societies owe a great debt to colonial indigenous legal struggles.¹⁰⁸



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101 Deagan, “Native American Resistance to Spanish Presence in Hispaniola and La Florida, 41- 43.

102 Deagan, “Native American Resistance to Spanish Presence in Hispaniola and La Florida.”

103 Martin and Wasserman, *Latin America and Its People*, 176.

104 Martin and Wasserman, *Latin America and Its People*, 176.

105 Ward Staving, “A Modern Interpretation,” *In People and Issues in Latin American History: The Colonial Experience*, ed. Lewis Hanke and Jane M. Rausch, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2006), 351-2.

106 Burkholder and Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 316-17

107 Burkholder and Johnson, *Colonial Latin America*, 316, 327, 346.

108 Deagan, “Native American Resistance to Spanish Presence in Hispaniola and La Florida, 41.

Phi Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta, and will be president next year as a senior. After her undergraduate degree, she plans to go to law school. It is her passion to practice public interest, human rights, and/or humanitarian law. She is continually trying to expand her knowledge, and the research and writing of this paper fit perfectly with her undergraduate and post graduate interests. Her paper illustrates the human agency of natives during Spanish conquest and colonialism; furthermore, that natives were smart, adaptive and utilized legal resistance to achieve results.



Civil War Not Just Christianity: Taiping Rebellion as an Ethnic Revolt

Stephen Potter

In 1850, Hong Xiuquan, leader of the Taiping Rebellion, declared war on the Qing dynasty. In his view, the Qing were foreigners and demons without legitimacy, destined to die at the hands of God and his ordained sword: “China is a spiritual continent, and the barbarians are devils. ...Father had ordained the Heavenly Kingdom to be in China...yet the barbarian devils stole into Father’s Heavenly Kingdom. This is the reason Father decreed that I should come destroy them.”¹ Hong’s hatred of the Qing had long roots in ethnic tensions between the Han (group of northern Chinese descent) and Manchu (Qing dynasty Manchurian conquerors of the Han). Both groups claimed right to the imperial throne. Since the establishment of the Qing dynasty, and the loss of Peking to the Manchu in 1644, Han loyalists from southern regions had unsuccessfully attempted to reestablish Ming authority in 1644, 1645, and 1646.² These uprisings originated primarily from the Kwangsai and Kwangtung regions, where anti-Manchu sentiment fostered an almost three-thousand-year-old ethnic divide that endured through the Zhou 周朝 (1046-256 BCE), Han 汉朝 (226 BCE – 220 CE), Tang 唐朝 (618-906CE), Song 宋朝 (960-1279 CE), and Ming 明代 (1368-1644 CE) dynasties. Hong used the ethnic

1 “Pan-hsing chao-shu”, *T’ai-p’ing shih-lao*, First Series, I, 4b. In Vincent Yu-Chung Shih, *The Taiping Ideology: It’s Sources, Interpretations, and Influences* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1967), 6.

2 Jen Yu-wen, *The Taiping Revolutionary Movement* (London: The Murray Printing Company, 1973), 2. On ethnicities, the Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces were home to ethnic rivals, the *Punti* (translated “local”) and the *Hakka* (“guest family”). From 1855-1867, internal clan feuds in the two provinces became violent due to discrimination against the Hakka men after forced relocation by the Qing Empire in order to repopulate the south with peoples from the north. The result was internal strife between the two clans over land rights exacerbating already anti-Manchu sentiments and Hakka Ming loyalty. The Taiping Rebellion from 1851-1864, Hakka clansmen joined the Taiping in order to further fight against the Qing nationally and the Punti locally. For full history, see Yu-wen, early history chapters.

rift as a principle argument for war, stating that:

[We] have for countless ages held a strict division between the barbarians and the Chinese. ...I live, it happens, at the end of an age. ...These Manchus...seized the imperial throne. ...Their terror and despotism was identical with that of Yu and Li, and for six or seven reigns it was the same of old. Now the Han and T'ang culture has been gone for two hundred years. We should apply the usual penalty for barbarians who invade China.³

The core of Manchu resistance formed in the southern regions among a cross-class coalition of Han farmers and elite.⁴ Frustration due to famine, natural disasters, and a corrupt Qing system resulted in rebel groups and secret societies forming in order to overthrow the Qing and to force cultural, ideological, and economic reform.⁵

Under the banner of “righting corruption,” secret societies and bands of rebels joined to usurp Qing authority. In 1851, under the guidance of a failed Confucian scholar and Christian convert named Hong Xiuquan, the largest of these groups called the God Worshipping Society (and later the Taiping), established themselves as “holy warriors” with a military, ideological, and economic mission to destroy the Qing and rid China of Manchu imposters. In his “Proclamation for the Cause for the Campaign,” Hong declared, “I obey Heaven and raise the banner of benevolence and righteousness; it is not to substitute tyranny for tyranny. ...The demon officials will necessarily be destroyed.”⁶ The Taiping claimed to be sent by God to destroy the Qing “demons” and the British imperialist “foreign devils” in order to bring about the prophesied heavenly kingdom 太平天国 (Tàipíng Tiānguó) on earth.⁷

Although revolt and revolution were not unique in China, in 1852, the Taiping, a band of two million Han rebels’ revolted, resulting in the death of over twenty million across seventeen provinces, the largest rebellion in Chinese history.⁸ The Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) occurred after the First Opium War (1839-1842) and during the second (1856-1860) and split the Qing military efforts between internal uprisings and English attack. Over the course of the

3 Hong Xiuquan, #31, 1853. Franz Michael and Chung Li Chang, *Taiping Rebellion, The History and Documents, Volume 2* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1971), 169.

4 Yu-wen, *The Taiping Revolutionary Movement*, 2.

5 Yu-wen, *The Taiping Revolutionary Movement*, 6.

6 Hong Xiuquan, “Proclamation on the Cause for the Campaign,” 1852. Franz Michael, *The Taiping Rebellion*, Volume 2, 168.

7 Jonathan D. Spence, *The Taiping Vision of a Christian China 1836-1864* (Waco, TX: Baylor University, 1996), 3.

8 Spence, *Taiping Vision*, 6.

First and Second Opium Wars the British established themselves as fierce opponents and would-be conquerors of the Qing (Manchu) government. Prior to the Opium Wars, China maintained policies of isolationism and imbalanced trade with the British. The Chinese refused British goods and maintained strict policies against foreign imports.⁹ However, after “forc[ing] upon the Chinese Empire acceptance of opium...and recognition of Britain as an equal power,”¹⁰ the British dictated trade agreements with the Chinese. Militarily divided, the Qing dynasty crumbled fighting not only the British, but also the Taiping, who attacked the “Manchu-devils” ideologically, militarily, and economically.

The Taiping seized the old Ming capital of Nanking and settled there as a statement of deliberate opposition to the authority and legitimacy of the Qing imperial house.¹¹ In 1928, John B. Littell declared the Taiping Rebellion to be “the most destructive civil war of modern times...a gigantic protest against the weaknesses and conservatism of China’s Manchu rulers...[and a] fanatical religious outburst, proclaiming Old Testament Christianity as its creed.”¹² What originated as a regional uprising evolved into the establishment of the Taiping New Kingdom, a rebellion determined to overthrow imperialism in China and bring about religious, social, economic, and fiscal reform.¹³ Taiping ideology, steeped in Judeo-Christian concepts blended with Chinese Confucianism, centered around winning (and ending) not just a civil war, but a millennial battle between Christ’s followers and “serpent-devils” for the lands and souls of China.

Although the Taiping Rebellion focused on the spiritual battle between the “barbarian devils” and the Heavenly Kingdom, the rebellion itself was not an anti-western or strictly religious revolt. Hong Xiuquan and his “Heavenly Warriors” acted in the name of God, but the Taiping Rebellion emerged an ethnically and culturally driven war, not an inherently “Christian” one. For Hong and his followers, the Manchus and British were both foreigners and evil. Contrary to much historiography on Hong, Hong considered the Manchu

9 Glenn Melancon, “Honor in Opium? The British Declaration of War on China, 1839-1840, *The International History Review*, xxi, 4 (December 1999), 855.

10 Rudolf G. Wagner, *Reenacting the Heavenly Vision: the Role of Religion in the Taiping Rebellion* (University of California Inst. of East, 1984), 1.

11 Yu-wen, *Taiping Revolutionary Movement*, 116.

12 John B. Littell, “Missionaries and Politics in China—The Taiping Rebellion,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Dec., 1928), 568.

13 Yu-wen, *Taiping Revolutionary Movement*, 136.

the greater of the two evils.¹⁴ In 1853, “A Memorial Requesting That Troops Be Sent to Exterminate the Demons” outlined the military effort against the Manchu. The writings published in 1852-1853 speak exclusively about the demon Qing and did not denote intention to engage in warfare with the British, and the British were not mentioned in the memorandum requesting support. During the 1950s, Eugene P. Boardman studied the Taiping Rebellion in terms of ideology, moral views, and economics. The majority of Boardman’s works addressed Hong’s hatred of the Manchu and posed the English as secondary “devils.”

In 1951, Boardman published his article “Christian Influence Upon the Ideology of the Taiping Rebellion” and spoke at the American Historical Association about Hong Xiuquan and contemporary views of the Taiping Rebellion. Boardman claimed “the rebellion has been interpreted variously as a peasant uprising against official corruption, a protest against intolerable economic distress, or simply a nationalistic revolt against the Manchu dynasty.”¹⁵ Boardman argued that the Taiping Rebellion “centered around the institution of radical change in the [Manchu] political system [which] brought about economic, social, cultural, and religious reforms.”¹⁶ Although England, France, and the United States viewed the Taiping as potentially useful in destroying the Qing dynasty, the Taiping refused to work with any western powers, as foreign involvement went against their ideology. However, the main focus of the Taiping was never on the West, but on the destruction of the Qing imposters who had no right to rule China. In 1850, Hong declared in his “Manifesto on the Right to the Throne”:

The Manchoos {sic} who, for two centuries, have been in hereditary possession of the throne of China, are descended from an insignificant nation of foreigners. By means of an army of veteran soldiers well

14 See also: “Ch’en Hsun-tzuon JeI, “T’ai-p’ing t’ien-kuo chih tsung-chiao-cheng-chih,” (The religion and government of the T’ai-ping t’ien-kuo), Shih-hsueh tsa-chih (Magazine of History), 1:6 (1929), 4. Also see Boardman, “Christian influence upon the ideology of the Taiping Rebellion,” *Far Eastern Quarterly*, 10:2 (1951), 115-124. Eugene Powers Boardman, “Christian Influence Upon the Ideology of the Taiping Rebellion 1851-1864” (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1952). John B. Littell, “Missionaries and politics in China – the T’ai-p’ing rebellion,” *Political Science Quarterly*, 43 (Dec. 1928), 566-599. According to Boardman and Yap, the Taiping Rebellion failed due to Hong Xiuquan’s mental folly and ineptitude, no longer due to “social, economic, political, and culture terms,” which is disputed by modern historians such as So Kwan-Wai from Claflin College published a study of Hong Xiuquan in the *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, primarily based on Theodore Hamberg’s research.

15 Eugene P. Boardman, “Christian Influence Upon the Ideology of the Taiping Rebellion.” *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (Feb., 1951), 120.

16 Boardman, “Christian Influence,” 120.

trained to warfare, they seized on our treasures, our lands, and the government of our country, thereby proving that the only thing requisite for usurping empire is the fact of being the strongest.¹⁷

Then in 1852, in the “Proclamation On the Cause for the Campaign,” Hong outlined grievances against the Manchu occupation:

These Manchus...seized the imperial throne...and they spread their poison over China. In the provinces, they draw out the local bullies and make them their henchmen, turning over rain and reversing clouds. Within the capital, they establish connections among the powerful and influential and make them their claws and teeth, chasing after rumors and catching at shadows. ...Oppressing the people to the extreme, then, is cause for rebellion, and thus we know that the end of the barbarians reign has already come.¹⁸

Prior to the Opium War, the Manchu met any signs (or even rumors) of revolution with swift force and brutality. However, in the Kwangsi and Kwangtung provinces, four factors created the opening for the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion: a distracted Manchu military, disasters (including disease and famine), weak and passive governance, and a growing western religious and military presence. According to C. A. Curwen:

The most immediate influence of the West was felt in the two provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. No other region in China had quite the same coincidence of favorable circumstances with combustible material: distance from the capital (often resulting in administrative vacuums), increasing land concentration (thereby increasing tenancy), economic and social troubles connected with the disruption of trade after the Opium War and, in addition, famine, flood, and plague, from which Kwangsi in particular was rarely free.¹⁹

According to Jen Yu-wen, “The Taiping Revolutionary Movement in China, spanning the period from 1851 to 1866, is one of the cataclysmic events of history. ... The Taipings were indeed revolutionary, for they attacked not only

17 Hong, “Manifesto On the Right to the Throne”, #20, 1850, in Michael, *The Taiping Rebellion*, 2, 78.

18 Hong, “Right to the Throne,” 169.

19 C. A. Curwen, *Taiping Rebel: the Deposition of Li Hsin-Ch'eng (Cambridge Studies in Chinese History, Literature and Institutions)* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 9.

the ruling dynasty...but the prevailing order.”²⁰ The Taiping Rebellion directly addressed social and cultural conflicts between north and south China. However, the regional ethnic rivalries and growing economic instability provided the “perfect storm” for the Taipings to challenge imperial power in the region.²¹

Although the Taipings battled the “prevailing order,” the British compromised the Qing military and economic might when the British gained control of trade in the southern regions. Canton, the principal city of the Kwangtung province, was especially impacted by the outcome of the First Opium War: “During the Opium War, Canton had seen most of the fighting, and the changes brought about by the Treaty of Nanking had destroyed the trade monopoly formerly held by the merchants of the city.”²² As Canton was a central trade port, foreign control meant control of much of its wealth. The Opium War thus drastically altered the economic landscape of the regions.

The regional tensions in Kwangtung and Kwangsi deepened the ethnic and ideological conflicts between the Han and the Qing. The Taiping Rebellion started in these two regions and Hong cited the landscape as the battlefield of his mission, thereby making the Kwangsi and Kwangtung regions the birthplace of the ideological and military might of the Taiping. As Hong stated: “I have raised an army in Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and we have marched through Hunan. Wherever our battalions approach, their strength is overpowering; our legions are awe-inspiring, and victory is assured.”²³ Hong knew well the regions he raised his army in, the battle was in his home, and he saw his mission against the barbarians’ dynasty as just.

In 1850, in addition to the Taiping, several secret societies and local rebel bands emerged to fight against the Qing.²⁴ However, during the middle nineteenth century, the Taiping were the only large-scale, successful military force against the Qing. Prior to the Taiping, any attempt at reestablishing the Ming loyalists to power or forcing the Qing out of the southern regions was disastrous. Across the Kwangsi and Kwangtung regions, the peasant classes began to form their own militias to fight against the Manchu. In response, the Manchu massacred over 700,000 Cantonese.²⁵ The peasants who survived fled to the ranks of the Taiping. Many peasants moved into the trade cities looking for work, particularly Canton. However, the Manchu military occupied Canton

20 Yu-wen, *Taiping Revolutionary Movement*, xiii.

21 Yu-wen, *Taiping Revolutionary Movement*, 2.

22 Yu-wen, *Taiping Revolutionary Movement*, 2.

23 Hong, #31, in Michael, *The Taiping Rebellion*, 2, 171.

24 For a history of other rebellions in conjunction with the Taiping, see: Thomas Taylor Meadows, *The Chinese and Their Rebellions with an Essay On Civilisation and Its Present State in the East and West* (Shannon, Ireland; New York: Irish University Press, Barnes & Noble Books (a division of Harper & Row Publishers, Inc)., 1856).

25 Yu-wen, *Taiping Revolutionary Movement*, 3.

after the “forcible depopulation” of the southern coastal regions, which furthered the ethnic conflicts in the Kwangsi and Kwangtung provinces.²⁶ In conjunction with corruption and violence, increased inflation crippled currencies.²⁷ Farmers were unable to pay land or rice taxes after the Chinese currencies declined in value. Not only did the western trade impact the local economy, but the Qing government held the monopoly on salt: the principle raw material in Kwangsi. Without the ability to raise capital and pay taxes legally, underground organizations resorted to “smuggling, banditry, piracy, and rebellious activities of secret societies,” undermining government authority.²⁸

Before the Opium Wars, agriculture supported the Kwangsi and Kwangtung regions’ economic and subsistence needs. However, as the state required increased taxes to pay reparations to England, the two regions failed to produce enough to support either the national demands or the local needs. Further, by 1833, the population had nearly doubled in sixty-seven years, rising from 208,095,796 to 398,942,360.²⁹ The amount of agriculturally viable land did not expand as the population did. By the middle 1840s, the region could not support the needs of the people as well as the government-controlled trade rates. Furthermore, the agreements between China and England after the First Opium War tipped the scales in England’s favor.

Taxation laws passed to pay for the Opium War “forced many small farmers into debt and eventually caused them to lose their land, while some of the officials and gentry were able to buy up property.”³⁰ In answer to the Manchu exploitation of the Han people, Hong wrote the “Proclamation Denouncing Corrupt Officials,” announcing that:

The corrupt petty officials in the yamens are no better than tigers and wolves. To refer to the case of the land tax and grain tribute in particular, it appears that of late the exactions have been increased several times. ...The resources of the people are exhausted. The people’s hardship is extreme.³¹

26 Yu-wen, *Taiiping Revolutionary Movement*, 2. The depictions of the events can be found in multiple volumes, although see: *Mai Ying-jung, Kuang-chou Wu-hsien Ch’ien-bai shih-lueh* for separate history.

27 Chinese currency devalued from 1:2 to 1:3 pounds sterling. For further discussion, see Franz Michael, and Chung-Li Chang, *Taiiping Rebellion: History and Documents*, Far East and Russian Institute Publications On Asia, (Seattle, WA: University of Washington, 1971).

28 Ibid, 18-19.

29 Official Census of Population and Cultivated Land, 1661-1833 in *Ch’ing-shih-lu*. See Michael, Volume 1, Table 1, 15.

30 Michael, *Taiiping Rebellion*, 1: 10.

31 Hong Xiuquan, “Proclamation Denouncing Corrupt Officials,” #32, 185, in Michael, 2: 172.

As the distribution of wealth changed, corruption worsened, and some officials deliberately forced higher rent to seize land for themselves: “heavy taxes and high rent and lack of protection from a corrupt officialdom caused many farmers to leave their land and join roving groups of dispossessed people who became bandits.”³² Rising taxes and inflation resulted in mass resentment of the imperial elite by the peasant classes.

Lawlessness and corruption was rampant in all levels of government, particularly local administrators and governors. The growing discontent of all classes fractured China into multiple factions and also resulted in the growth of local militia.³³ Multiple uprisings formed, but none had the organization, vision, and execution that the Taiping established or, above all, the ability to publish ideology.

Up until their defeat in 1864, the Taiping never wavered in their fundamental beliefs of God as the lord benefactor, equality of all believers, and the charge from God to destroy all foreign devils in the heavenly kingdom. The Taiping ideology focused on establishing heaven on earth, and bringing to fruition a tangible Taiping dynasty. The Taiping taught all new recruits that “We should share our happiness and misery to restore the brilliance of heaven and earth and the ten thousand things, and to exterminate the barbarians to get ready for the coming of the truly mandated.”³⁴ The Taiping believed God ordained them to rule China and establish the Ming lineage on the throne once more: “Once the time comes when the princes and dukes of the present dynasty are not princes or dukes, and when the mind of the people is disturbed, we shall take these circumstances to be the heavenly signs of the restoration of the Ming and the collapse of the barbarians.”³⁵ As the war evolved, so did the ideology, but the goals of destroying the foreign devils and instating the heavenly dynasty were never altered regardless of the cost. Until 1860, those who followed the Taiping believed the Heavenly Dynasty would establish, implement, and maintain the implicit and explicit promises created in their ideologies.

The Taiping began publishing propaganda and constructing new ideas regarding social and religious hierarchy over a decade prior to the rebellion. The Taiping used printed ideology to advance national military strategy. As early as 1836 and 1837, Hong wrote pamphlets, proclamations, and sermons against the Manchu practices of usury, exploitation, overall corruption, and

32 Yu-wen, *Taiping Revolutionary Movement*, 3.

33 Curwen, *Taiping Rebel*, 5.

34 Shih, *Taiping Ideology*, 299.

35 Shih, *Taiping Ideology*, 300.

the need of the people to rebel.³⁶ The locals within the Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces who joined the God Worshippers knew Hong's sermons and writings well. Through his teachings, the original group of his followers grew from a half dozen to over ten thousand by 1846 and over twenty thousand by 1850.³⁷

By 1850, as organization grew, the Taiping evolved into a military unit bent on destroying the Manchu demon threat and establishing the Heavenly Kingdom. Hong's sermons became published rules and regulations for how the Taiping leaders expected the heavenly people to act publicly and privately.³⁸ Hong and the other Taiping leaders crafted declarations and proclamations calling for the removal of the Manchu from power and demanded that the people of the Kwangsi and Kwangtung provinces join their military:

As the demon is your enemy, you ought to lose no time in burning and destroying him...having fallen into your enemies' treacherous schemes, you will eventually sink into hell and destruction, to be victims of the demon's debauchery. ...We chiefs of staff are also truly desirous of saving you.³⁹

The Taiping rebels, comprised mostly of Han and Cantonese farmers, viewed the Qing imperial system as the primary repressive force, as well as the source of the Han's social, cultural, monetary, and regional oppression.

Although the Taiping destroyed Confucian temples and "idols" since 1847, organized military action did not begin significantly until 1850. By the beginning of 1850, ideology and military practices became closely linked, and as the numbers of rebels grew, so did the number of published proclamations. The demands for the destruction of the Qing dynasty focused on local and national corruption as well as the plans for the establishment of a heavenly order. In the "Proclamation on the Cause for the Campaign," Hong Xiuquan denounced

36 "Poem by Hung Hsiu-ch'uan on the Wall of Shui-k'ou Temple in Hua-Hsien" (1837), "Ode on Hearing the Birds Sing" (1837), "Ode to Repentance" (1836), "Ode on the Sword" (1837). Also see "Gospel Jointly Witnessed and Heard by the Imperial Eldest and Second Eldest brothers," which was a multiple poem volume written to demonstrate what Hong claimed to have seen in his visions in 1837. This is an incomplete listing. For further readings, see Michael, *The Taiping Rebellion*, Vol. 2 & 3.

37 Spence, *God's Chinese Son*, 129. Further: Yu-Wen, *Taiping Revolutionary Movement*, 35.

38 Michael, *Taiping Rebellion*, Vol 2, 131. See also *Tse-ch'ing, chuan*, 4. By 1850, the Taiping published writings regarding the expectation of officers and men of higher rank. However, pamphlets such as "The Taiping Military Organization" is claimed to have been printed potentially in 1850 or 1851. Regardless, "The Taiping Military Organization" and "The Taiping Rules and Regulations" (1851 or 1852) draft in detail the expectations of the leaders regarding military strategy, hierarchy, attitude, actions, behaviors, and allegiance.

39 Vincent Shih, *Ideology*, 46-47.

regional and national officials: “The Manchu rulers and their followers compete among themselves for profit. . . . In the matter of getting riches, why calculate harm done to the people? The grain fields are taxed, the customs and markets are taxed, and the forests on the mountains are also taxed.”⁴⁰

In the end, the Taiping lost nine million of the twenty million casualties. The heavenly kingdom was never fully established, and the Taiping failed in their mission to cause cultural, ideological, and religious reform. However, even in failure, the Taiping gained the attention of the eastern and western world. According to Meadows, an Englishman in China in 1854, failure of the Qing Empire to rule justly resulted in “first contempt and apathy, then positive disaffection, then disorders, riots, gang robberies, insurrections against local authorities, and ultimately avowed rebellion aiming at a change of dynasty.”⁴¹ For Meadows, the Taiping were “proof that the Divine Commission had been withdrawn from the old family; and that the rebellion was not simply excusable, nor laudable only, but, as an execution of the will of Heaven, inevitable.”⁴² The Taiping did not cause mass change. However, they forced the Qing to alter how they dealt with the western world, trade, and economics. The Taiping Rebellion virtually bankrupted the Qing who further relied on western support and military strength in order to rid themselves of the southern Han menace. As a result, the Taiping directly contributed to the financial, martial, and foreign occupation practices of the Qing, and ultimately the collapse of the dynasty.



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40 Hong Xiuquan, “Proclamation for the Cause for the Campaign,” 1852, in Michael, *The Taiping Rebellion*, 2: 170.

41 Meadows, *Chinese and Their Rebellion*, 23.

42 Meadows, *Chinese and Their Rebellion*, 23.



PERSPECTIVES

Statesmen, Planes, and Alcohol: Economic Policies and Their Manifestations in Post-independence Ghana

James McManus

Introduction

Ghana emerged in March 1957 as the first independent sub-Saharan African country. As a country newly freed of colonial governance this was a pivotal moment for Ghana in terms of deciding what types of policies the country would pursue and how best to make Ghana successful and thriving. This paper will examine the first leader and president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, particularly in the types of economic policies he espoused as a founder and key statesmen of this new African country that found itself with new independence in the midst of the Cold War. In addition these policies that would come to define Nkrumah's legacy and influence within Ghana will be examined as to how they affected two industries in Ghana, the commercial airlines and alcohol industry, and to what degree the policies that Nkrumah advocated benefitted or detracted from these industries. This analysis of both the commercial airline industry and the alcohol industry will be examined via how the industries advertised themselves to the general public. By studying Ghana's post independence economy this paper will try to conclude exactly how Kwame Nkrumah's political agenda was implemented by seeing how these industries attempted to model themselves through advertising, how they fit within Nkrumah's ideals, and how ultimately effective they were financially.

Kawume Nkruma: Ghana and Cold War Economic Crossroads

Upon its independence, Ghana found itself in an unusual situation as a newly formed nation state. This situation can be described by three factors. The first, that Independent Ghana emerged as a country in the midst of the Cold War on March 6th, 1957. The second factor is that Ghana was fortunate enough to

be in possession of fairly substantial reserves of hard currency of approximately \$700,000,000 left over from the previous British government. Third and most important Ghana was as the first sub-Saharan country to gain its independence.¹ These three factors largely influenced the political and economic policy of Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah

As the head of the newly formed country of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah was free to choose the political and economic trajectory of the country and inevitably found himself caught between choosing between the two economic juggernauts of the 1950s and the economic models they represented: the United States, a capitalist model, and the communist style economy as espoused by the Soviet Union. Instead of becoming an American or Soviet satellite country, Nkrumah played a shrewd game by pitting the cold war powers against each other to achieve his goals. His chief goal was to create a supranational African state by uniting the countries coming out of colonial rule both economically and politically. This goal can be seen quite clearly in a small excerpt from Nkrumah's speech given at the Organization of African Unity, "*The People of Africa are Crying for Unity*".

But let me suggest that this fatal relic of colonialism will drive us to war against one another as our unplanned and uncoordinated industrial development expands, just as happened in Europe. Unless we succeed in arresting the danger through mutual understanding on fundamental issues and through African unity, which will render existing boundaries obsolete and superfluous, we shall have fought in vain for independence.²

However, Nkrumah's goal of a united Africa predicated that Ghana not join either side of the cold war. Instead he would become a pioneer of "African socialism" an economic ideology that would be adopted by other African leaders like Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. This ideology ranged from "traditional capitalism with limited sectoral planning to collective forms of national autarky"³ For Nkrumah socialism conformed at an ideological level with his concept of an African identity, specifically within the frame of reconstructing a communal village mentality. Though it is key to note that Nkrumah was not advocating for a return to a "traditional" pre-colonial lifestyle. Instead he wrote that

1 Smith Hempston, "Ghana: Neutral on the Left," *Saturday Evening Post*, September 15, 1962, 22.

2 Kwame Nkrumah, "The People of Africa are Crying for Unity." *New African Magazine*, July 2012, 28.

3 Steven Metz, "In Lieu of Orthodoxy: The Socialist Theories of Nkrumah and Nyerere," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 20, no. 3 (1982), 377.

“socialist thought in Africa is not the Structure of ‘traditional African society’ but its spirit”⁴ and also that “a return to pre-colonial African society is evidently not worthy of the ingenuity and efforts of our people.”⁵ From these words it is clear that Nkrumah’s Ghana would have a progressive march to modernity and in turn industrialization.

From here it is possible to see how Nkrumah utilized all of his political assets to spur on development within Ghana. These assets were his policy of aligning with neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, and the large reserves of hard currency he inherited from the British colonial administration. The former would allow him to play the global hegemons off each other to further his goal. An example of this happened shortly after Nkrumah had taken an extensive tour of Russia and China in 1961 the United States made a move to counter what it saw as Ghana giving sway to the Communist powers by offering Nkrumah a \$133,000,000 dollar loan to help finance the damming of the Volta River for hydro-electric power.⁶ In addition foreign currency reserves would allow him to invest heavily in expensive infrastructure within Ghana and can be seen clearly within Nkruma’s early economic plans. With his Second Development plan he allocated 80 percent of the national budget to “non-productive” services emphasizing both infrastructure and social services.⁷ However, later in his career this emphasis on infrastructure changed from “non-productive” activities to productive ones in the form of import substitution industrialization (ISI) with the proposal of his Seven-Year plan in 1962.⁸

This article will now look at precisely how these policies played out within the industries that Nkruma was trying to kindle through infrastructure and by currying favor with the cold war powers. Two specific industries will be examined to examine the effectiveness of Nkruma’s efforts. The policies first implemented under his Second Development plan with its focus on infrastructure will be represented by the example of his use of the state controlled Ghana Airways as the only commercial airline. Star Beer and gin manufacturing will show an example of import substitution industrialization policies using the alcohol industry.

4 Kwame Nkrumah “Revolutionary Path” (New York 1972 edn.): 44 quoted in Steven Metz, “In Lieu of Orthodoxy: The Socialist Theories of Nkrumah and Nyerere” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, no. 3 (1982): 382.

5 Kwame Nkrumah “Revolutionary Path,” 3-9.

6 Smith Hempston, “Ghana: Neutral on the Left,” *Saturday Evening Post*, September 15, 1962, 25.

7 Jeff Grischow, “Kwame Nkrumah, Disability, and Rehabilitation in Ghana, 1957-66,” *The Journal of African History*, 52, no. 02 (2011), 182.

8 Grischow, “Nkrumah, Disability and Rehab,” 184.

Nkrumah, Infrastructure, and Getting An Airline Off The Ground

To understand how both the commercial airline and alcohol industry fit within the parameters of Nkrumah's economic policies that were promoting the industrialization and modernization within Ghana, it is helpful to see just how these industries were advertised to the Ghanaian public. Newspaper ads taken out for Ghana Airways are especially helpful in placing it within the wider context of Nkrumah's economic policy. The airlines as a hefty economic investment were justified by styling Ghana's leap into the modern age in not only travel but in business. One ad in particular exemplifies this, it shows two Ghanaian men shaking hands, one in a western style three piece suit while the other in traditional clothing in front of a sleek plane, stating:

The smart businessman travels the smart way- by air. Ghana Airways give you a quick, easy, comfortable journey. You arrive fresh, unwearied and alert, and because you use *modern* means of travel you command the respect of your business associates.⁹

This advertisement provides a clear link between the airlines and Nkrumah's vision of modernity and how infrastructure would radically change the nature of the Ghanaian economy. To further this point, articles also appear at this time in Ghana's newspapers with headlines like "Champagne at 15,000 feet," detailing how 54 people including the Speaker of Ghana's parliament took part in test flights of turbo-jets purchased from Britain for Ghana Airways.¹⁰ These newspaper excerpts can be seen as representative of not only the modernization of Ghana's workforce under slogans like "the smart businessman travels the smart way- by air" but also as an example of how the most important members of the new state of Ghana were just as modern as their American and Soviet counterparts flying by turbo-jets and sipping "champagne at 15,000 feet". As a result these advertisements fit Nkrumah's initial infrastructure centered economic plans.

While the afore mentioned advertisement and article become good examples to see how Ghana Airlines fit so well into Nkrumah's vision, they do not portray the economic and political realities of the airlines existence. By looking at how the airline was created it becomes possible to see just how the airline's actual economic trajectory was not as glossy and polished as its advertisements and newspaper articles made it appear. Ghana Airline was initially founded by the joint effort of the Ghanaian government and the British Overseas Airways

9 *Daily Graphic*, September 28, 1961, 14.

10 *Daily Graphic*, April 6, 1959, 7.

Corporation. The Airline was formed with an initial capital of £400,000. The Ghanaian government retained majority control, and invested 60 percent of the capital, £240,000, while the B.O.A.C. supplied the remaining sum.¹¹ It seems clear that Nkrumah was using the foreign currency reserves he inherited to provide this bit of infrastructure for his country, and he spared no expense. In addition just three years later in 1961 Nkrumah's government purchased the remaining 40 percent of the shares held by B.O.A.C., and became an entirely state run enterprise.¹² However, this would not prove to be a profitable venture and would eventually become a black mark on Nkrumah's economic policies and point of criticism against him. The airline became increasingly unprofitable, swallowing more and more government funds. This came about, in part, as the airline was used as a pawn, more or less, in Ghana's cold war political dealings. Nkrumah's government purchased British Bristol Britannia turbo-jets as well as Ilyushin-18's from the Soviet Union so as not to show favoritism and to maintain Nkrumah's "non-aligned" status.¹³¹⁴ This use of the airlines as a political tool cost both Ghana Airlines as well as Nkrumah dearly. Around this time, the airline was a lightning rod for criticism of Nkrumah's policies of spending Ghana's reserves on these infrastructure projects. Critics said he had:

Brought Ghana to the brink of financial ruin by involving the country in an orgy of wild prestige spending. Millions of dollars have been squandered on unneeded Russian Ilyushin and British Jets for the money-losing, government owned Ghana Airways.¹⁵

A criticism which appeared to be not just a stab at Nkrumah's infrastructure based style of economic development but fairly accurate, as well, when taken into account that, in 1963, the Ghanaian government had to persuade the Soviet Union to take back 4 of the 8 jets it had purchased from them on credit for \$1,876,000 per plane three years prior.¹⁶ The return of these planes more or less signaled that Nkrumah's style of economic development was no longer politically feasible or financially wise for Ghana. This end point for the airline brings us to Nkrumah's Seven year plan and the use of import substitution industrialization and the brewing and distilling industries as a way to stimulate Ghana's economy.

11 *Daily Graphic*, July 15, 1958, 5.

12 *New York Times*, February 16, 1961, 61.

13 *New York Times*, February 18, 1960, 65.

14 *New York Times*, September 13, 1962, 53.

15 Smith, "Neutral on the Left," 22.

16 *New York Times*, August 25, 1963, 36.

Nkruma, Alcohol, and Import Substitution

With the unimpressive results of the initial Second Development plan and its heavy investment in infrastructure Nkrumah needed to go back to the economic drawing board. This time he created a Seven Year Plan focusing heavily on the productive capacity of Ghana. The state now directed capital inflows into government controlled import substitution industrialization.¹⁷ This control and government influence created marketing strategies that very much paralleled and emulated those used to promote the Ghana Airways. For example Star Beer was advertised in Ghana wearing a doctoral cap and claiming that “The best people drink Star--- the best beer!” Showing at the bottom of that ad three presumably Ghanaian men in three piece suits.¹⁸ Advertisements like this can be seen as keeping in step with Nkruma’s emphasis on modernization, industrialization, and success, though this time through the lens of a commodity. Even further linkage between Nkruma’s earlier economic plans can be seen especially with the use of Star Beer in an advertisement claiming boldly the beer was “now bottled specially for Ghana Airways” which linked it directly to the modernity that was trying to be pushed in earlier economic plans.¹⁹ In addition Gin was marketed very much the same way. The distilleries much like the breweries, tried to link themselves to popular consumption and modernity. Okukuseku Gin advertised itself as “The Real Gin” with two Ghanaian women in western style clothing enjoying a glass together above the slogan “Everybody is swinging to Okukuseku”.²⁰ These advertisements can be viewed as a type of continuity in the focus of Ghanaian development in maintaining a persistent effort to achieve a western style modernity that was consistent with the policies outcomes for which Kwame Nkrumah had hoped.

However analyzing the success of these industries as models becomes difficult in terms of how effective import substitution industrialization is as a tool for a developing state. The Kumasi Brewery Limited often boasted of their economic importance in contributing to the development of the Ghanaian economy. A claim which can be seen in a large advertisement run in the *Daily Graphic*, that they were bringing “training, skill, and prosperity” to Ghana and as a modern brewery they helped to create skilled workers whether they be

17 Jeff Grischow, “Kwame Nkrumah, Disability, and Rehabilitation in Ghana, 1957-66,” *The Journal of African History*, 52, no. 02 (2011): 184.

18 *Daily Graphic*, December 5, 1960, 9.

19 *Daily Graphic*, February 15, 1962, 6.

20 *Daily Graphic*, November 2, 1962, 2.

“administrative officers”, “mechanical engineers”, or “accountants”.²¹ This would seem to support the idea of import substitution industrialization as being a net gain for Ghana as an economic policy in that it would appear to supply capital and expertise, and reduce the dependence on imports. However this approach can’t be left at this, like any industry it was susceptible to various market forces, and Ghanaian breweries faced shortages of raw materials in the mid-1960s.²² Though ultimately it should be a testament to this particular form of industrialization that brands like Star Beer still exist today, therefore, to a degree import substitution can be seen in the manufacturing industry as more economically viable than priming an economy through costly infrastructure such as Ghana Airways.

Conclusion

In summary, Kwame Nkrumah has been examined in the context of the circumstances in which he became the first president of Ghana. Those circumstances were that he was the head of the first independent sub-Saharan African state during the cold war, and he was sourced with a large government reserve with which to pursue development strategies. The first of Nkruma’s strategies was the use of constructing infrastructure to spur development like the creation of Ghana Airways; the later strategy was that of Import Substitution Industrialization and the focus creating manufacturing of products like gin and beer to replace imports of the same variety. By looking at these strategies and why they were used it becomes clear that capital intense infrastructure building method where inefficient and coupled with it being used in the case of Ghana Airways as a means to convey Cold War neutrality or “non-alignment” was politically risky. Leaving import substitution in the case of alcohol production as less risky in terms of capital investment which did not carry the same political risk as the purchases of large Soviet Union jets both domestically and abroad.



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21 *Daily Graphic*, September 19, 1961, 11.

22 Dmitri Bersselaar, “Who Belongs to the “Star People”? Negotiating Beer and Gin Advertisements in West Africa, 1949-75,” *The Journal of African History*, 52, no. 03 (2011): 392.



China in Africa:

Economic Imperialism in Post-Mao China and Its Relation to Political Legitimacy

Anthony Baker

With the death of Mao Zedong, China's Communist structure would undergo a transformation into a world power with a complex Party-State that oversees a command capitalist economy. Beginning in the early 2000s, the Chinese began to look out and develop and expand markets. By examining the pre-1978 economy, the reforms of post-1978 economy, the natural resources and energy demands in China, and the methods used to expand markets in Africa, this paper will show how economic imperialism and economic performance is vital to the political legitimacy of the ruling Communist regime.

In 1949, after nearly thirty years of civil war and fourteen years of Japanese occupation, the Chinese economy was devastated. In 1937, one hundred Chinese dollars could buy two oxen; by 1949, 100 Chinese dollars could only buy a single sheet of paper.¹ But China would finally have a stable government under the newly established People's Republic of China. With nearly ninety percent of its population living in the countryside most of the economy was based on agricultural production.² During the first three years the Communist party focused on the recovery of the Chinese economy. Then, under the first five-year plan (1953-1957), the Communist party focused on the development of a national economy.³

Under the first five-year plan we see the foundations of a traditional soviet style economy that would provide a centralized structure which could implement

1 Patricia Ebrey, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of China* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 290.

2 Jonathan Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990), 689.

3 Lueng Edward Pak-wah, *Essentials of Modern Chinese History: 1800 to the Present* (Pascataway, NJ: Research and Education Association, 2006), 107.

rapid industrialization.⁴ During the first decade of the People's Republic of China we see the gradual closing of the Chinese economy. From 1949 to 1957, although the size of state owned and collectivity owned enterprises increased during this period, private and foreign enterprises were present and legal, but they would soon be eliminated in 1958 at the start of the Great Leap Forward.⁵

Despite the growing economy during the first five-year plan Mao's political ambitions would derail the economy for a few years in the second five-year plan (1958-1962).⁶ Where the first five-year plan fulfilled most of its targeted goals⁷, the second five-year plan would kill 35 million people.⁸ In an attempt to boost agricultural production of the peasants, 120 million households were formed into 26,000 communes that would work the land collectively.⁹ The belief that this collectivization would lead to ample production caused some outrageous target goals, in 1958 the target was 375 million tons of grain; they only produced 215 million tons.¹⁰ Mao, believing in the wild targets, ordered the peasants grain "surplus" to be taken from the peasants and sold to the USSR for heavy machinery. The grain available to the peasants in 1957 was 205 kg a year, in 1961 it was 154 kg.¹¹ During the Great Leap Forward the food available to the peasants dropped by 25 percent. Despite the apparent failure of the communes they would continue for another twenty years until the reforms of the 1980s.

In 1978, at the third plenum of the 11th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Deng Xiaoping introduced the measures which planned to reform and transform China's economy and boost production.¹² In 1980, the fifth plenum would also see the raise of Deng Xiaoping to a leadership role within the Communist party.¹³ The reforms that Deng Xiaoping initiated would transform China.

Deng Xiaoping's major reforms would be the "Four Modernizations," which were proposed at the third plenum of the 11th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in 1978. This program called for over 100,000

4 Rongxing Guo, *An Introduction to the Chinese Economy: The Driving Forces Behind Modern Day China* (Singapore: J. Wiley & Sons Asia), 94.

5 Guo, *Introduction to the Chinese Economy*, 111, 95.

6 Guo, *Introduction to the Chinese Economy*, 111.

7 Spence, *Search for Modern China*, 543.

8 Richard McGregor, *The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers* (New York: Harper, 2010), 259.

9 Spence, *Search for Modern China*, 578-579.

10 Spence, *Search for Modern China*, 580.

11 Spence, *Search for Modern China*, 583.

12 June Dreyer, *China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2012), 158-159.

13 Lueng Edward Pak-wah, *Essentials of Modern Chinese History: 1800 to the Present* (Pascataway, NJ: Research and Education Association, 2006), 132.

construction projects and sought to modernize industry, agriculture, and scientific learning in China and in the military.¹⁴

In 1979, China created four Special Economic Zones, or SEZs, which allowed foreign investment into China proper. This policy proved so successful that a further fourteen cities were opened up to foreign investment.¹⁵ Ever since these zones opened, foreign investment in China has increased exponentially, going from nearly zero in 1980 to 600 billion dollars in 2008.¹⁶ These massive investments from foreign and domestic sources led to building China's production and exportation capacity. This exportation oriented economy led to massive deficits for its leading trading partners such as Japan, the European Union and the USA.¹⁷

China continued to grow its manufacturing structure which led China to become a massive trading power. China is now the largest exporter and is the third largest importer, outranked by the USA and the European Union, with a total trade of 3.641 trillion dollars,¹⁸ compared to 3.825 trillion dollars for the USA.¹⁹ For the last decade China has been exporting more than it has been importing creating a massive annual trade surplus of 297 billion dollars in 2008 and creating a foreign exchange reserve of 3.2 trillion dollars.^{20 21}

Starting early in the 2000s the Chinese economy and government began to build economic ties with various nations, developed and under-developed, in the hope of expanding Chinese markets. This makes sense for two reasons, the Chinese base their economy on their massive exports and as the Chinese nation industrializes they need large sources of energy. They are making large investment into under-developed nations for the purpose of access to oil and sources of coal.

In an effort to industrialize, the Chinese nation's consumption of natural resources is often off the charts extremely excessive in comparison in comparison to other nations. China is the leading consumer of aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, tin, zinc, iron ore, and the leading producer of steel. China consumes 31.5 percent of the world's total produced steel.²² Despite this need for raw

14 Pak-wah, *Modern Chinese History*, 134-136.

15 Pak-wah, *Modern Chinese History*, 134.

16 Terry Adamson, *Atlas of China* (Washington, DC: National Geographic, 2008), 60-61.

17 Adamson, *Atlas of China*, 60-61.

18 "The World Factbook: China," CIA. Accessed April 12, 2013, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>.

19 "The World Factbook: USA," Accessed April 12, 2013, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html>.

20 Dreyer, *China's Political System*, 171.

21 "Gold and Foreign Exchange Reserves," The People's Bank of China. <http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/html/2011s09.htm>.

22 Guo, *Introduction to the Chinese Economy*, 36.

resources, China is naturally resource poor. Of the above mentioned resources tin is the only one that is native to China which has more per capita than the world average.²³

Although China's need for the natural resources already mentioned is great, its need for oil has to be placed on a different level. From the period of 1980 to 2006 China's oil demand expanded over three times. In 1980, China had an oil surplus consuming 3.81 quadrillion BTUs and producing 4.55 quadrillion BTUs. By the year 2006, China was consuming 13.11 quadrillion BTUs, while only producing 7.5 quadrillion BTUs. Half of China's oil had to be imported. This trend is by no means expected to stop; by 2030 China's oil demand will be so great that they will need to import 80 percent of their oil.²⁴

Chinese trade with Africa started during the Ming Dynasty with the seven voyages of Zheng He, when the Yongle emperor ordered a massive fleet into the India Ocean for the purpose of political submission to the Ming court.²⁵ China is looking for more than political submission from African nations now they want new economic markets and natural resources.

In 1950, Chinese trade with Africa was only 12.1 million dollars and for the first five decades of the Peoples Republic's existence their trade relationship with the African continent was small. However, during the period from 2000 to 2005 both imports and exports reached 20 billion dollars and has been growing since,²⁶ reaching 160 billion in total in 2011.²⁷ This economic relationship is more than just straight forward trade. The Chinese government and Chinese companies are making large investments in a few key African nations.

In 2010, China's total accumulative investment was 10 billion dollars and this value is expected to rise, perhaps as high as 50 billion. So what is the Chinese government's interest in the Africa continent? By looking where the Chinese government is investing their money we can see that they are trying to compensate for their own lack of natural resources by investing into African mining operations.²⁸

Despite PetroChina's growth and the fact that it recently surpassed ExxonMobil in barrels pumped per day, China and Chinese companies are in dire need for oil and they are willing to pay for it. PetroChina has purchased

23 Guo, *Introduction to the Chinese Economy*, 37.

24 Guo, *Introduction to the Chinese Economy*, 41.

25 Edward Dreyer, *Zheng He: China and the Oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty, 1405-1433*. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), 27-95.

26 Ding Qingfen, "From Beijing to Benin, Guinea to Guangzhou," *China Daily*, June 15, 2011, http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-06/15/content_12701517.htm.

27 Wang Xiaotian, "Sino-African Cooperation to Grow," *China Daily*, March 16, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-03/16/content_14845655.htm.

28 Ding Qingfen, "From Beijing to Benin, Guinea to Guangzhou," *China Daily*, June 15, 2011, http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-06/15/content_12701517.htm.

7 billion dollars' worth of reserves since 2010. These reserves are located in Australia, Qatar, Canada, and of course Africa. Not only has PetroChina been making energy acquisitions, but other Chinese energy firms are also spending money to get more energy. In 2002 and 2003 Chinese companies spent only 2 billion dollars on acquisitions in 2009 and 2010 they spent 48 billion dollars. Often time, Chinese companies will spend above market price for oil fields making oil deals between companies very competitive.²⁹

The role of the Chinese government is often questioned in these deals. The Chinese government has an 86 percent controlling interest in PetroChina; they also have a controlling interest in COONC, a Chinese company, which attempted to buy an American Oil-producer Unocal in 2005.³⁰ With the expansion of Chinese energy firms it may seem surprising that China is interested in African sources of oil. Despite the size of its continent, Africa only has 10 percent of the world's oil, but Africa has become a key exporter of oil bound for the Chinese nation. China now receives 30 percent of its imported oil from Africa.³¹

To understand the interaction between Africa and China we must examine China's relationship with two key nations in the Sino-African trade network, Angola and Zambia. With Angola we can see the nature of the Chinese trade deals. Angola is China's top African supplier of oil, it exports 25 percent of its oil exports to China, and in return China makes available to Angola lines of credit for infrastructure projects.³²

These lines of credit are provided by the Export-Import Bank of China. In 2004 the Export-import Bank of China issued a line of credit of 2 billion dollars to Angola for construction projects on infrastructure.³³ This loan seems quite generous with a 17 year time frame and at 1.5 percent it seems Angola might have gotten a good deal.³⁴ However, within this deal there is a condition that only 30 percent of the 2 billion dollars, or 600 million dollars, goes to native Angola businesses. This leaves 70 percent, or 1.4 billion dollars, that will not go to Angola businesses but will end up in hands of Chinese contractors and they get this without competition from local Angolan construction

29 Chris Kahn, "PetroChina Passes ExxonMobil in 2011 Crude Production," *USA Today*, March 29, 2012, <http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/story/2012-03-29/oil-production-petrochina-exxonmobil/53851876/1>.

30 Kahn, "Petro China."

31 Christopher Alessi, "Expanding China-Africa Oil Ties," Council on Foreign Relations, February 2, 2012, <http://www.cfr.org/china/expanding-china-africa-oil-ties/p9557>.

32 Alessi, "Expanding China-Africa Oil Ties."

33 Jean Christopher-Servent. "China's Trade Safari in Africa," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, May 11, 2005, <http://mondediplo.com/2005/05/11chinafrica>.

34 Christopher-Servent, "China's Trade Safari."

companies.³⁵

In exchange for Angolan oil, China offers lines of credit for infrastructure projects, with the condition that a large portion of these projects must go to Chinese businesses. This is a win-win situation for the Chinese government and the Chinese companies. China gets the oil; Angola gets a *loan*, which they have to pay back, and China gets the money they loan to Angola contracted into their construction companies without competition.

This loan has caused many Angolan businesses to worry as they only get 30 percent of the contract, and the Angolan construction industry is one of the only sectors in which Angolans can even hope to get work.³⁶ One international aid worker said:

“I’m concerned about the Angolan component of these projects... Will this 30 percent benefit Angolan workers, or just some Angolan businesspeople with political influence? I would hope this 30 percent would go to capacity building of Angolan tradespeople.”³⁷

Sadly, as 2005 was a pre-election year some of the money was put towards funding the state’s propaganda in anticipation of the 2006 election.^{38 39} Despite this corruption China’s Export-Import bank issued another 2 billion dollar loan in September of 2007.⁴⁰

Though, as we discussed earlier, oil is not the only natural resource that China needs; China also needs copper and they have found a good source of this resource in Zambia. During the 1970s, a decade after Zambia’s independence from Great Britain, Zambia copper production was at 700,000 tons a year, but by 2000 production had dropped to only 200,000 tons a year.⁴¹ This drastic drop in production was caused by, according to Situmbeko Musokotwane, Minister of finance and national planning of Zambia, a lack of “reinvestment” causing production to drop.⁴²

Now, however, China’s economy is growing rapidly, and as discussed previously, China is in need of large sources of energy. Since 2000, Chinese involvement in the Zambian economy has increased. In 2000, trade between

35 “Angola: Cautious Optimism for 2005,” *IRIN*, June 14, 2005, www.irinnews.org/Report/52687/ANGOLA-Cautious-optimism-for-2005.

36 “Angola: Cautious Optimism.”

37 “Angola: Cautious Optimism.”

38 “Angola: Cautious Optimism.”

39 Christopher-Servent, “China’s Trade Safari.”

40 Alessi, “Expanding China-Africa Oil Ties.”

41 “A Magnet for Chinese Investors,” *China Daily*, May 23, 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-05/23/content_12557079.htm.

42 “A Magnet for Chinese Investors.”

China and Zambia was only 100 million dollars; in 2011 it reached 2.8 billion dollars.⁴³ This can be linked to a raise in Zambia Copper production which as of 2011 has reached nearly 700,000 tons.⁴⁴ Copper is the central basis of the Zambian economy. Copper composes 70 percent of Zambia's export earnings.⁴⁵

Recall from earlier discussion that China created a series of Special Economic Zones, SEZ, to make foreign investment easily during the late 70's and 80's; now China is creating Special economic Zones overseas. In February, 2007 China created its first overseas SEZ in Zambia. This SEZ, called the Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, has allowed Chinese investment in Zambia to be much smoother and has attracted seventeen companies and nearly one billion dollars in investments.⁴⁶ With the success of the Zambia-China Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone China opened up further SEZ's in Africa with two in Zambia and four more throughout Africa.⁴⁷

Besides the creation of SEZ's to make Chinese investments easier, Lusaka, the capital of Zambia, has also become the first African city to allow banking transactions in the Chinese Renminbi, or Yuan, this is done through a branch of the Bank of China.⁴⁸

With the SEZ's and the Renminbi being used to facilitate Chinese investment into Zambia's economy we cannot ignore direct Chinese ownership of Zambian companies. In 2009, China invested 400 million dollars into Zambia's mining industry. Three mining operations within Zambia are owned by Chinese businesses. Chinese businesses also own a large copper smelter with the capacity to smelt 150,000 tons of copper yearly.⁴⁹

China's presence in Africa is not without its controversy. Looking at Zambia we see how China's involvement in their economy has many seeing Chinese investment as a positive on their nation.

"Today, China is a capital-rich country so the amount of investment is increasing... We need them to keep investing so that our economy grows and we can generate more revenues."⁵⁰

43 Louise Redvers, "China's Stake in Zambia's Election," *BBC News*, September 18, 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14952240>.

44 Kennedy Gondwe, "China Eyes Zambian Mining Rewards," *BBC News*, February 19, 2010, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/business/8523967.stm>.

45 Gondwe, "China Eyes Zambian."

46 "Zambia-China Trade Zone Generates \$500m in Tax Revenue," *China Daily*, February 4, 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2012-02/04/content_14537589.

47 Redvers, "China's Stake."

48 Redvers, "China's Stake."

49 Gondwe, "China Eyes Zambian."

50 "A Magnet for Chinese Investors."

In that quote by Situmbeko Musokotwane, Minister of Finance and National Planning of Zambia, we can see where that he links Zambia's economic growth to Chinese investment. This opinion is not shared by all Zambians, Bob Sichinga; a former local legislator in Zambia had this to say.

"No one should tell us they have come to help Zambia when they have come to help themselves...If anyone is going to make resources available, they ought to get a reward for it and I don't have a problem with that...What I have a problem is where that investment doesn't leave any lasting benefit to the country."⁵¹

This brings up any interesting question with all this financial infrastructure in enabling Chinese investment in the Zambia economy, whose economy is dominated by copper, where will all the Chinese investments go when Zambia no longer has any sources of copper to fuel the Chinese economy? This question can also be applied to Angola and all African nations with a natural resource that China desires.

Because of the nature of the trade relationships, many have accused China of engaging in neo-imperialism. China has been highly sensitive to these charges. In December 2011, *China Daily*, the largest English newspaper published in China, printed an article defending China from what it saw as an indirect accusation by Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State, accuses China of "new colonialism."⁵² China is not the only one defending the nature of their trade with African nations; both sides of these trade deals are defending them. In 2010, Jacob Zuma, President of South Africa, when visiting China, dismissed the claims that China was engaging in "new colonialism."⁵³

So why does China, despite international criticisms, engage in trade relationships like the ones with Angola and Zambia as outlined in this paper? As we saw earlier the Chinese economy is based on its exports and in order to supply its massive industries with the needed natural resources to keep its economy growing it has looked abroad. Within the Chinese Communist Party economic growth is of vital importance for political legitimacy of the Party.

Political legitimization is vital to the survival of a modern nation. In his book "*Communism: A Very Short Introduction*" Leslie Holmes, Professor and former President of the Australasian Association for Communist and Post-Communist studies, links the fall of many Communist states to a lack of

51 Gondwe. "China Eyes Zambian."

52 Hu Yinan, "China has No Colonial Designs on Africa," *China Daily*, December 9, 2001. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/china/2011-12/09/content_14235821.

53 "Zuma Rejects Criticism on China's African Policy," *China Daily*, August 15, 2010, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-08/25/content_11203429.htm.

political legitimacy.⁵⁴

Looking at German sociologist Max Weber's theories of political legitimization we see that nations legitimize themselves in three different ways; traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational.⁵⁵ Although these seem distant and different they can often form hybrid systems; we can see this in Great Britain with a traditional monarchy and a parliamentary democracy.

Looking first at traditional forms of political legitimization, which would be monarchical and ancient customs, with the overthrow of the last Qing emperor in 1912 and the Cultural Revolution, which attempted to remove China's ancient customs, we can see China's Communist regime has little going for it in this category.⁵⁶

Charismatic legitimization is legitimacy based on a charismatic leader. This was China's legitimization during the leadership of Mao Zedong, but with the death of Mao this is no longer the case. The last form of political legitimization according to Max Weber is legal-rational. In this form of legitimacy the rule of law rules and no one is above the law.⁵⁷ But within the People's Republic of China, there exist separate legal procedures for members of the Chinese Communist party.

Looking through Weber's theories on how a nation legitimizes itself, traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational, it would seem that the Communist Regime has run out of room and according to Weber the Communist party in China is illegitimate. However, according to T. H. Rigby, an Australian political theorist, Communist regimes legitimize themselves differently than traditional governments. Communist regimes legitimize their rule on a goal-rational legitimization. That is to say that the goal is Communism and that the Party knows how to achieve this.⁵⁸ This, of course, depends on the people's acceptance that the goal of society is Communism.

Another method to legitimize Communist regimes that Leslie Holmes offers in his book is system performance.⁵⁹ This could, along with other variables, easily explain why the Chinese regime survived while many other communist states, such as the USSR, didn't. From 1979 to 2007 the Chinese economy was growing at an average rate of 9.8 percent,⁶⁰ but along with the rest of the world in 2008 the Chinese economy slowed and the Chinese trade surplus

54 Leslie Holmes, *Communism: A Very Short Introduction*. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009).

55 Holmes, *Communism*.

56 Holmes, *Communism*.

57 Holmes, *Communism*.

58 Holmes, *Communism*.

59 Holmes, *Communism*.

60 Robert Sutter, *US-Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 193.

dropped by nearly one hundred billion dollars.⁶¹

Despite a nearly 600 billion dollar stimulus in 2008, in the years since then the Chinese economy has been slowing down.⁶² In 2011, the Chinese economic growth was 9.2 percent⁶³ and in the first quarter of 2012 growth is down to 8.2 percent.⁶⁴ This reduction in China's economic growth has led many to worry if China will be capable of dealing with its growing urbanization problem.

At the end of 2011 Chinese urban population surpassed the 50 percent mark and is expected to reach 70 percent by 2030. This a massive rate of urbanization with each percent point representing thirteen million people, totaling 260 million new urban inhabitants by 2030.⁶⁵ So, maintaining economic growth is essential to providing infrastructure, water, and jobs for these people. However, if the economy were to decline too much it could cause unrest among these millions of people looking to move to the cities and share in the Chinese economic boom.

Opinions differ as to how low growth rates have to fall before the Chinese economy gets into serious trouble, with some estimates as high as 7 percent and some as low as 5 percent.⁶⁶ However, as the World Bank is projecting a growth rate of 8.6 percent in the coming 2013 year it seems that, for the moment the Communist regime, is safe.

By examining the developments of the Chinese economy through the Mao era, the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, the natural resources of China, their trade network and trade relationship with Africa and two key African trading partners, and of course how their economic imperialism and we see that their economic performance is vital to their political legitimacy. Despite their desperate need to gather resources to further industrialization, economic growth, and to meet the needs of their growing urban population, China's economy and leaders seem prepared to meet their challenges, but only time will tell.



61 Dreyer, *China's Political System*, 171.

62 "China Profile-Timeline," *BBC News*, March 18, 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13017882>.

63 "Q&A: Is China heading for a hard or soft landing?" *BBC News*, April 12, 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17686843>.

64 "China's Economic Growth Dips to 8.1% in the First Quarter." *BBC News*, April 12, 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17686247>.

65 "China's Urban Population to Reach 70% By '30," *China Daily*, April 3, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2012-04/03/content_14974978.htm.

66 "Q&A: Is China heading for a hard or soft landing?"

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In the summer of 2013, Anthony studied in Korea and in the summer of 2014 he will study in China. He hopes to teach English in China in 2016 and attend graduate school in east Asian studies.



REVIEWS

Stirring the Pot: A History of African Cuisine. By James C. McCann. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009. 213 pp. \$26.95 (paper).

Review by Molly Blackburn

In *Stirring the Pot: A History of African Cuisine*, James C. McCann discusses the fascinating mix of ingredients and techniques employed in cooking throughout Africa, while emphasizing the diversity of culture and cuisine throughout the continent. He discusses the key ingredients available in different regions and how staple foods changed over time. For example, maize was once an exotic vegetable that was not often used on the West African coast, but by the 1700s it became the dominant starch used there. After discussing the components of African meals McCann took a more regional view of African cuisine, describing how different regional (or in Ethiopia's case, national) cuisines came about. He describes in great detail the importance of Queen Taytu Bitul's elaborate feast in Addis Ababa in 1887 in creating not only Ethiopia's national cuisine, but its national identity. Finally, he writes about African influences on the meals of other cultures in the African Diaspora, such as the Creole cooking in Louisiana and African American "soul food" of the 1960s.

Though McCann's scope is vast, several important themes run throughout his work which apply to all of Africa. He emphasized often the role of women in African cooking: because almost all cooking was done domestically, it was typically done by women, and the recipes were really oral traditions that women passed down from generation to generation. In *Stirring the Pot*, McCann often compares the stuffy, quantified African recipes found in Western cookbooks to other "recipes" shared by real African women who used much more vague measurements, leaving much to the cook's own taste. Queen Taytu, who knew a great deal about the kinds of food prepared and eaten in different parts of her country, greatly valued the cultural mortar of food. She felt that creating a national cuisine was crucial in engendering an Ethiopian sense of identity.

This is an embodiment of McCann's other major theme, that food is an important facet of all cultures throughout Africa. In other words, "food helps define who we are" (p. 10). In addition to recipes and first-hand materials on Queen Taytu and her feast, McCann used descriptions of African food from Western visitors in centuries past. There was not much of the latter for him to work with, and the source material he found often had a major Western skew. However, he was able to balance it all quite well with more current anthropological work on African food.

At times, because there is so much diversity in Africa, it is easy to get lost in particulars when reading McCann's book, especially if one has a limited knowledge of African history and geography. However, the general themes of the book are clear throughout, especially his message about the importance of food in culture. McCann presents his ideas by starting with the important ingredients and how they came to each region, then discussing the use of those ingredients in specific African regions, and then moving forward through time, covering how African regional foods have blended together and influenced other cultures as Africans have been displaced. The theme of women's involvement in cooking is not explicit throughout, but it is still present in his use of oral recipes as source material. In addition, one of the most interesting parts of the book is when McCann discusses the resistance in several African regions toward the commercialization of food. When men made and sold food on the streets of Ethiopia, it never compared to a mother's cooking, which required more time and a wider selection of ingredients. Here we see that when food was not produced by a matriarch, it lost cultural value to many Africans. There was also cultural resistance to the idea of restaurants in Ethiopia: free hospitality toward strangers, including offering food, was so important to their culture that the idea of selling food for profit confused and repelled them. Restaurants that did exist did not serve the national cuisine, and were only attended by foreigners and local elites.

Stirring the Pot is a fascinating and informative work on African cuisine. The amount of detail he acquired on where in Africa certain ingredients were used and how they were used is amazing, and surprisingly, this detail is presented in an interesting way. He successfully brings together a large variety of sources, including recipes, which are not often thought of as historical evidence. McCann's attempt to compare Ethiopian, West African coastal, and other African cuisines in such detail is distinct from any other work on African food, all of which may focus on one staple food, one region, or may even try to uniformly blend all the regional cuisines together. McCann's work is very important, because it helps correct preconceptions in the West of there being just one primitive culture throughout Africa. In reality, there are many diverse traditions in each of the regions McCann discusses, which is evident in their

meals. At times these traditions are in direct opposition to Western culture in their resistance to commercialization, but that to me is evidence of their power. I would recommend this book to any educated person, especially someone with a bit of background knowledge on the culture, geography, and history of Africa.



Molly Blackburn is a junior at NKU majoring in History with minors in English and Honors. She is currently working on her Honors capstone project on the history of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, focusing on the Cincinnati area in the 20th century. She has been involved in the national service fraternity Alpha Phi Omega as well as various other clubs at NKU. As a Peer Coach in Norse Advising, she enjoys helping undeclared freshmen make a smooth transition from high school to college. She plans on later attending graduate school in Counseling or Social Work.

REVIEWS



Holy Bishops in Late Antiquity: The Nature of Christian Leadership in an Age of Transition. By Claudia Rapp. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005. 346 pp. \$31.95 (paper).

Review by Matthew Chalfant

This work concentrates on the transition period from the Roman world to the Medieval world from around 300-600 A.D. At the end of the period the Roman world teetered on the brink of chaos as barbarian tribes overran the provinces and the Empire was accosted internally by civil wars, plague and famines. In the midst of this crisis of national security emerged the leaders of the recently persecuted Christian community. When the response from the emperor to the provinces was to fend for themselves it was the Christian leaders who became the replacements for the absent imperial officials in the West. But was the transition so abrupt?

Claudia Rapp argues that the process by which Christian bishops became civic leaders was a gradual one that grew over the centuries. Rapp rebukes the historians of the past, including Gibbons, for their insistence on separating the Roman civil sphere from the Roman religious sphere. She urges that the only way to better understand the transition from the Classical world to the Medieval world is to “rid ourselves of the anachronistic baggage of a supposed secular-religious dichotomy.” The line between civic and religious roles was often blurred. The church and civil administration existed within the same socio-political framework of the empire and so it is not unusual that one finds the same terminology in both. Clemency, fairness, virtuous, “most pious,” “most God-beloved,” were terms applied to both civic and religious leaders.

One of the central themes is that there are three types of religious authority: Spiritual authority, a gift of the Holy Spirit upon God’s chosen; Ascetic authority, which comes from self denial and is open to anyone; and Pragmatic authority, which comes from influencing others and is restricted to those with the means to be influential. It was that latter on which the bishop relied for

his authority. Christian leaders were quick to take on civic roles as their followers interacted with the government as law abiding citizens of Rome. The bishop acted as patron in his city; someone who could “injure his enemies and be useful to his friends.” Bishops protected citizens from corrupt governors, ransomed captives from brigands and pirates, granted asylum from civil authorities, and served alongside severely reduced curia as trustees ensuring that benefactor’s donations were used according to strictly specified requests. To enforce his authority the bishop had at his disposal rhetoric, social networking connections, and the power of excommunication.

Rapp reminds the reader that in Late Antiquity being a bishop was not an honorary position. It entailed hard work which not everyone was prepared to accept. She sites how Synesius hesitated for several months before accepting the episcopate and how Theodore, a desert monk, was forced to accept the office and had to make administrative decisions, compete with avaricious civil officials.

Rapp goes on to debunk one of the most iconic images of Late Antiquity: the supposed favoring of Christians by Constantine. She argues that the Christians were not the only group to gain legal status, that certain privileges given to bishops were temporary and for the emperor’s convenience, and that other privileges, such as the manumitting of slaves and arbitrating civil disputes, were already well established practices. Constantine, it would seem, was merely codifying practices which already existed and which took some of the workload off of his civil administration.

By the end the 4th century the *curiales* and imperial senators were becoming Christians. Even slaves could be legally invested as bishops by the law of Justinian but Rapp argues that those not of noble class were actually *sacerdos* or *hierius*: priests, not bishops. A bishop’s palace mirrored a noble’s mansion, equipped with a private bath. Rapp states that in the 4th century many students at Christian schools had no intention of entering the ranks of the clergy. By the 6th century, however, the office of bishop had become a coveted career for the nobility to aspire to.

One major aspect of the subject is absent from this otherwise impeccable work. There is almost no mention of the bishops in the barbarian successor states. The ability of the bishops to retain the Roman heritage in the midst of an extreme political shift is something that should have been explored by the author. Otherwise this is a well organized and comprehensive analysis of the dual role of bishops in the later Roman Empire and is well suited for students of the early Church or of Late Antiquity.



Matthew Chalfant is a recent graduate of Northern Kentucky University. Under the supervision of Dr. William Landon, he received his BA in History, minoring in Renaissance and Medieval Studies. He has presented research at several Phi Alpha Theta conferences regarding diverse topics on Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages. He has traveled throughout Central Europe to explore medieval cities, study primary sources, and better understand the subject to which he has devoted his studies. He plans to hone his knowledge of post-Roman Europe at the Institute for Medieval Studies at the University of Leeds. Loyal supporter of the turbulent Lupo regime. Current whereabouts unknown.

To the Ends of the Earth