

Perspectives
in
HISTORY

ALPHA BETA PHI
CHAPTER
PHI ALPHA THETA

JOURNAL OF THE ALPHA BETA PHI
CHAPTER OF PHI ALPHA THETA

Perspectives
in
HISTORY

EDITOR

Elaine M. Richardson

ASSISTANT EDITORS

David P. Anstead
John Prescott Kappas

ADVISOR

James A. Ramage

Perspectives in History is a semi-annual publication of the Alpha Beta Phi Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta. Manuscripts are welcome from students and faculty.

Send all articles, essays and book reviews to:

Northern Kentucky University
History/Geography Department
Highland Heights, KY 41076

© 1987 Northern Kentucky University

CONTENTS

Perspectives In History

Vol. III No. 1, FALL, 1987

ARTICLES

- 1 The English Sojourn of Peter the Great.....Grover C. Wilson
- 11 Henry Kissinger and the Policy of
Detente: 1969-1977.....Jeff Lanz
- 19 The Conflict between French Quebec and
English Canada, 1960-1980Tiffanie Lamont

CHAPTER REPORT

- 29 Letter from the President/Editor
- 31 Officers
- 33 Members

The English Sojourn of Peter the Great

by Grover C. Wilson

Womanizer, drunkard, blasphemer, and suspected murderer--such a rakehell was Peter I, revolutionary Czar of Russia, 1682-1725. Life was rarely quiet around this man; he was always rushing into new projects, many of which he never finished. The imposing Peter stood six feet, eight inches and weighed two hundred thirty pounds. Having immense physical might and stamina, he delighted in performing feats of strength. Frequently, Peter would roll silver plates into tubes or straighten horseshoes with his bare hands. He could kill a man with a single blow. Some historians even suspect that during a vague conspiracy against his throne, Peter murdered his own imprisoned son. Nevertheless, Peter loved life and all that it provided. He regularly engaged in extended bouts of debauchery, surrounded by a group of friends called the Jolly Company. These revelers organized yet another troupe, "The All-Joking, All-Drunken Synod of Fools and Jesters," who mocked the church and its officials. One might expect such escapades to exact their toll, but Peter would always emerge refreshed and ready for a day of hard work. Moreover, Peter could not be long without a woman; hence, one was usually kept available, even during State trips. Such was the man who pushed Russia, kicking and screaming, out of the Middle Ages into the modern period.

This paper examines briefly the English leg of the Great Embassy, a large assemblage in which the Czar conducted his first European tour, from March 9, 1697 to August 25, 1698. During this time, Peter learned to admire his hosts and their way of life. The English sojourn greatly influenced the Czar, nurturing his efforts for modernizing Russia. He returned home to demand similar progress for his own country. There are questions about Peter's visit to England which should be asked. Why did he go? What did he do? Whom did he meet? What did Englishmen think of the Czar? How did the journey affect Peter, Russia, and England? This study suggests answers to these questions.

By the late seventeenth century, the gap between Russia and the West was immeasurable. Russia remained rooted in the Middle Ages, while Western nations explored new worlds and made great strides in science, music, art, and literature. The Sun King, Louis XIV, ruled France in all his glory; the Dutch forged ahead in technology; and England's prosperity seemed unlimited. To Peter, Russia must adopt Western habit or remain mired in the past.¹

Harboring great dreams for his nation, the Russian ruler realized that his own lack of learning was disadvantageous for Russia. To further his education, Peter resolved to visit the West and learn what he could, especially about shipbuilding.²

Because Peter hated formality and ceremony, he planned to conceal his identity within

Grover C. Wilson is a member of Upsilon-Upsilon Chapter at Cumberland College, Williamsburg, Kentucky.

the Great Embassy. In the company he would be listed as an assistant and travel incognito as Corporal Peter Mikhailov. The avowed purposes of the trip were to seek additional allies in the Turkish wars, 1687-1713, and to discuss commercial ties with interested parties.³

The Czar's original destination was Holland, which boasted a major shipbuilding industry. But after several months in Amsterdam, Peter wearied of the Dutch and their hit-or-miss methods of building ships. Therefore, Peter listened attentively when an English sea captain told him that in England complete blueprints were drafted prior to a vessel's construction and scientific principles were utilized. Peter began to entertain the notion of an English sojourn.⁴

Shortly afterward, the Czar received news from London that William III, King of England and Stadholder of the United Provinces, had decided to present him with the *Royal Transport*, a royal yacht. The two rulers had earlier become friends while holding discussions in Holland, and William wished to cement their relationship. The King planned to have the yacht delivered to the Czar in Rotterdam in a few months because the vessel needed refitting.⁵

News of the King's magnificent gift reinforced Peter's desire to see England, and he sent a dispatch to William requesting to visit that country. Thereupon, William ordered several men-of-war and yachts, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir David Mitchell, to Holland to escort the Czar to England.⁶

At the time of Peter's visit, London was one of the most important cities in Europe, and without doubt, the metropolis dominated England. In fact, one of ten Englishmen lived in London. The city was one of contrasts. Spectators enjoyed bull-baiting, bear-baiting, and cockfighting. Hangings and whippings attracted large crowds. Many people, however, appreciated the more civilized aspects of the city. The city's skyline, guided by the hands of Sir Christopher Wren, one of the world's greatest architects, took on a distinctive shape and was renowned for its beauty. Hundreds of coffee houses served as centers for public debates, and intellectuals discussed such topics as business, politics, religion, literature, and science.⁷

In such a stimulative environment, the Czar's visit naturally created much curiosity and talk. With all the rampant speculation, it is hardly surprising that most Englishmen held this "scruffy giant" in low esteem and considered him a despot.⁸

Peter's eccentricities did little to improve his image. The Czar, dressed in sailor's clothes, went about England belching, passing gas, and picking his nose as the need arose. One observer commented that "blowing one's nose with one's hand must be the height of fashion in Moscow if the Czar himself goes in for it."⁹ Peter also had physical peculiarities. When he walked, those beside him had to be aware of his wildly swinging arms. When excited or absorbed in thought, a neurological disorder caused the Czar's head to shake and spasms to distort his face. It is not surprising that proper Englishmen were alternately amused and scandalized by his behavior.¹⁰

Docking in London on January 11, 1698, Peter went straight to his lodging. As he requested, the house was modest. More importantly, it was located on the waterfront and had a private entrance which opened to the Thames river.¹¹

Because Peter so guarded his privacy, King William did not personally call on the Czar until two days after Peter arrived. The King came incognito, accompanied only by

three friends. It was a short visit. The asthmatic William could not tolerate the stale, tobacco-laden air in the tiny bedroom where Peter received him.¹²

Uninvited guests in particular, were made to feel unwelcome at Peter's lodgings. For instance, when the Earl of Macclesfield called on Peter while he was dining, the Czar promptly left the table, complaining he could not eat in peace. He went upstairs to his bedroom, and locked the door. When other visitors also irritated Peter, he ordered his servants to admit only those with personal invitations.¹³

The Czar looked forward, however, to his visits with Thomas Osborne, the Marquis of Camarthen and designer of the *Royal Transport*. Peter's new friend was a man of similar tastes; both men enjoyed ships, women, practical jokes, and drinking. In fact, Osborne introduced Peter to what would become his favorite drink, brandy laced with peppers. Mostly, the two men discussed nautical matters, during which Osborne furnished the Czar with some practical advice on how to establish a modern navy. Peter and Osborne remained lifelong friends.¹⁴

In his quest for knowledge, Peter visited the Royal Observatory at Greenwich four times. The Czar enjoyed watching the astronomer make his observations. Peter was especially interested in talking to mathematicians at the Observatory. He made two special trips to do so. The Czar knew that Russia needed mathematical principles to survive in the modern world.¹⁵

Also, Peter frequently toured the Tower of London, a large complex which housed an arsenal, a zoo, a museum, and the Royal Mint. The English boasted the most advanced coinage system in Europe. Peter spent hours at the mint studying its operation. Two years later, he based his reform of Russian money on the English system.¹⁶

Not all of the Czar's time was spent trying to absorb Western knowledge. He often wandered about London in search of amusement. Once, Peter enjoyed watching a bear-fight and a cockfight.¹⁷

The theatre proved to be another source of entertainment. One reason Peter enjoyed it so much was that he liked viewing the beautiful actresses prance about on stage. One of the prettiest was Mrs. Laetitia Cross, whom the Czar persuaded to live with him for the duration of his stay in England.¹⁸

Peter enjoyed himself in London, but he wanted to spend some time "below bridge" in that part of the Thames which lay below London Bridge, where ships were constructed. Since the Royal Shipyard was at Deptford, only four miles from London, the Czar moved there for his nautical studies. Peter found suitable new quarters at Sayes Court. The magnificent estate which lay next to the shipyard, was owned by the renowned diarist, John Evelyn.¹⁹

The Czar went to Deptford to work, and work he did. Peter served his apprenticeship under Sir Anthony Dean, one of the greatest naval architects in the seventeenth century. The two men reviewed blueprints of ships, and Peter learned the basic principles of the plans. Characteristically, the Czar had to be involved in everything, and he labored as hard as any employee at the yard. Peter did have one complaint. In a letter to a friend in Moscow, the Czar bemoaned the lack of time available for drinking, because he was too busy working.²⁰

Nevertheless, the Czar did find time to drink and carouse. After working hard at the shipyard all day, Peter and the other Muscovites relieved the tension with their English

friends. Sayes Court became an amusement park where boisterous fun abounded. In addition to the drunken orgies at the mansion, Peter so often frequented a tavern that the proprietor renamed the establishment Czar of Muscovy. Peter once took a notion to visit the Redoubt, the local house of ill repute. But when he got there he found it had just been raided and six constables were barring the door. Disappointed, the Czar wandered off and got drunk.²¹

As could be expected, Evelyn's house servant at Sayes Court had little respect for Peter or his party. In a note to Evelyn, the servant complained:

There is a house full of people, and right nasty. The Czar lies next your library, and dines in the parlour next your study. He dines at ten o'clock and six at night, is very seldom at home a whole day, very often in the King's Yard, or by water, dressed in several dresses. The King is expected here this day; the best parlour is pretty clean for him to be entertained in. The King pays for all he has.²²

When the King did come to see Peter, the visit did not go well. William inadvertently sat in a chair claimed by the Czar's pet monkey. Defending his usurped territory, the primate angrily attacked the King. After the disturbed animal was pulled from the embattled monarch, Peter apologized profusely for the monkey's indiscretion. Thereafter, the Czar kept his pet in check when company came calling.²³

Peter had always shown a willingness to discuss religion. This led religious leaders to think they might convert him. In England, two such men were Gilbert Burnet, Bishop of Salisbury, and William Penn, a Quaker. Putting their thoughts into action, they went separately to see the Czar.

Burnet was the first to visit Peter. The Czar enjoyed the initial meeting, and thereafter, regularly held lengthy discussions with Burnet on a number of subjects. While Peter listened respectively to the discourses of Burnet, he was not as interested in the nuances of church doctrine as he was in the "Divine-Right-of-Kings" theory. In all likelihood, it was the first time that Peter had encountered concepts that established the king as supreme over the church and that religious leaders should stay out of politics. Peter later introduced these revolutionary ideas into Russia, resulting in far-reaching consequences.²⁴

From his time spent with the Czar, Burnet formed a not altogether favorable opinion of the Russian ruler. The bishop characterized him as short-tempered and brutal.²⁵ Penn did not call on Peter until one month later.

The high point of Peter's English sojourn must have been when he was presented with the *Royal Transport*. However, all had not gone smoothly in getting the ship outfitted and ready for the Czar's use. In early February, Peter and Osborne went to Deptford to inspect the vessel. Evidently, the ship was unsatisfactory. A few days later the King put Osborne in charge of the ship's restoration, giving him total authority to make the yacht suitable.²⁶

Besides readying the *Royal Transport*, Osborne also organized a sham naval engagement at Portsmouth for Peter's benefit. Excitedly, Peter requested that no dignitaries be present. The Czar eagerly anticipated watching the mock battle, and he wanted absolutely no distractions.²⁷

When all was ready, Peter and an entourage of twenty-one left for Portsmouth. It was

a two-day journey and on their way the group stopped over at an inn. The innkeeper was astonished to learn how much the Russians could eat and drink. For supper the entourage ate five ribs of beef, a sheep, three-fourths of a lamb, a shoulder and a loin of veal, eight pullets, and eight rabbits. They drank forty-two bottles of wine, undetermined gallons of beer, and for a nightcap they drank six quarts of mulled sack, warmed wine containing sugar and spices. The next morning before breakfast, Peter and his fellow feasters had seven dozen eggs and salad sent to their quarters. When the travelers went to breakfast, they ate one-half a sheep, nineteen pounds of lamb, ten pullets, and twelve chickens. At this sitting only three quarts of brandy were consumed. After eating and drinking their fill, the refreshed travelers went on their way.²⁸

At Portsmouth, Peter inspected the one hundred gun *Royal William* and the ninety-six gun *Association*, on which he then sailed when the fleet crossed the Solent. After crossing the narrow channel, the fleet dropped anchor off the Isle of Wight and awaited favorable winds.²⁹

When conditions were finally suitable for the exercise to commence, the fleet sailed for the open sea. Attention was paid to every detail. Sand was even sprinkled on the decks so as to prevent the sailors from slipping in the blood which would have been spilt had the battle been in earnest. Peter was beside himself with excitement as he watched the thirty magnificent warships maneuvering into position, belching fire and smoke as they fired their powerful broadsides. He was determined to send such a fleet against the Turks. When the mock hostilities ended, the participants sailed back to Portsmouth.³⁰

Returning to London, Peter observed William conduct a session of Parliament. Having heard the debate, Peter declared to his companions that, while he could not accept such limitations to his own power, it was good to hear subjects speaking freely and truthfully to their King. When the Czar saw William approve a land tax to raise some 1.5 million pounds, he was astonished. Peter complained that it took him a year to extract half that amount in Russia. Nevertheless, the Russian ruler preferred absolutism.³¹

The Czar's visit to Parliament also created much merriment. Peter "had a great dislike to being looked at, ... [so] he was placed in a gutter upon the house-top, to peep in at the window, where he made so ridiculous a figure, that neither king nor people could forbear laughing; which obliged him to retire sooner than he intended."³² One wag said he had seen two kings that day: one on a roof and one on a throne.

Back at Deptford the next day, Peter received William Penn, who brought several books for the Czar. Peter graciously accepted the literature and later read it with much interest. In a frank conversation, the two discussed politics and religion. According to Penn, the protection of citizen's rights necessitated constitutional governance with limitations on power. Peter regarded such restraints on rulers as foolish. He could not understand the pacifism of the Quaker faith. If a nation had no army or navy, it stood in danger of being conquered; Peter thought that power emerged from a gun barrel. The Czar postulated that any man who would not bear arms for his country was useless. But Penn, holding human life sacred, rejected war and stressed peace and education. Despite differing viewpoints, their meeting went well, and each party went away impressed by the other.³³

Indeed, Peter may have persuaded Penn to change his views on bearing arms. Heretofore, Penn had opposed the draft, but after meeting with the Czar, he began to

argue its advantages. Likewise, Peter was moved to attend services on a regular basis at the modest Quaker meeting house in Deptford. The experience stayed with Peter, and a year later he avowed that anyone who could live according to the Quaker doctrine would be happy.³⁴

Despite his busy schedule, Peter sought qualified men who might be interested in serving Russia. One prospect was Captain John Perry, a hydraulics engineer. Peter had learned that the man in charge of connecting the Volga and the Don Rivers by canal had fled Russia. Captain Perry was recommended to replace him. Professor Andrew Fregharson, master mathematician at the University of Aberdeen, came highly recommended and was hired to establish a School of Mathematics and Navigation in Moscow. In all, some sixty professionals were engaged for service in Russia.³⁵

While in England, Peter had discussed a proposal to import tobacco into Russia, and as his sojourn drew to an end, he finally concluded a deal with Osborne. The Czar's determination to assert his will over the clergy was one of the reasons he agreed to a tobacco monopoly. The church had always forbidden its use, and Peter considered it a way to loosen the church's grip on his subjects. Another reason for allowing the importation of tobacco into Russia was that the Czar was in need of money. Maintaining the embassy in style, recruiting personnel, and buying equipment consumed enormous sums. Moscow repeatedly had to send additional funds. Consequently, just before leaving England for Holland, Peter accepted Osborne's offer to pay 12,000 pounds immediately and to remit a tariff for the exclusive right to import tobacco into Russia.³⁶

After more than three months in England, Peter was finally satisfied that he had accomplished as much as he could and made ready to return to Holland. Peter thanked William for his magnanimous hospitality and distributed several guineas amongst the servants whom the King had assigned him. After Peter gave William a jewel reputedly worth 10,000 pounds the two rulers took leave of each other, and the Czar embarked for Holland on April 21, 1698.³⁷

In Holland, Peter learned that his Austrian ally was considering Turkish proposals for a peace conference and he rushed to Vienna. While in the Austrian capital, the Czar received a dispatch that the *Streltsi*, royal musketeers, were in revolt in Russia. Peter left immediately for his homeland and was halfway across Poland when he learned that the rebellion had been crushed.³⁸

His mind now at ease, Peter decided to stop at Rawa, Poland, to visit with Augustus II. The two rulers were instant friends: both enjoyed drinking bouts; both loved women; and both were energetic giants. Not surprisingly, Peter considered Augustus the finest prince in all Europe and agreed to the Polish King's plan for an anti-Swedish league. At the end of two weeks, the Czar took leave of his new friend and returned to Russia.³⁹

Once home, Peter plunged immediately into the task of reforming his country. He commenced by snipping off beard after beard because he found them obvious examples of Russian backwardness; most westerners were clean shaven. Technical schools were opened and readers enjoyed their first national newspaper. Greatly impressed by the prosperity brought about by mercantilism in Europe, Peter decided to introduce the system to his own country. International trade flourished, especially with England. In addition to building a formidable navy, the Czar reorganized the government and strengthened the army. There was little that Peter left unchanged.⁴⁰

Unfortunately for Russia, Peter did not have a deep perception of what western society actually entailed. He saw and understood only the technology that was before him. Peter did not realize that centuries of cultural advancement underscored European development. The Russian people understood western ways even less than did the Czar. As much as ninety-five percent of the population actively or passively opposed Peter's modernization programs. Most Russians were satisfied with the status quo.⁴¹

Despite facing opposition, Peter forced his wishes upon Russia. The canals proved successful, and the technical schools eventually ranked among the world's best. While promoting internal reform, Peter led the reorganized army and the new navy to ultimate victory over the Swedes in 1721. Considering the opposition, it is remarkable that the seeds of reformation, planted during the western trip, bore fruit at all. Indeed, centuries later, Peter's reforms still affect Russia.

Likewise, the Great Embassy affected the West. Westerners had caught a glimpse of Russia. The country seemed less distant and foreboding and contact between the two cultures increased. In terms of world trade and power, the trip coincided with the ascent of the English and the descent of the Dutch. Part of that change in position can be attributed to shifts in Russian trade favoring England. Russia was a source of cheap raw materials, and during his western tour, Peter had come to favor the English over the Dutch. The trip also signaled the decline of another world power, Sweden. Augustus had persuaded Peter that the time was right to attack Sweden using the means acquired during the Great Embassy. By later defeating Sweden, a country known for its military might, Russia proved herself a world power; never again could she be ignored. Perhaps that was the real impact of the Great Embassy and Peter the Great's English sojourn.

Endnotes

- ¹ Robert K. Massie, *Peter the Great: His Life and World* (New York, 1980), 162-163, 164.
- ² Warren Walsh, ed., *Readings in Russian History*, 3 vols. (Kingsport, Tenn., 1963), 175.
- ³ Sergei Platonov, *History of Russia* (New York, 1929), 215; Walsh, 175-176; Vasilii Kluchevsky, *Peter the Great*, trans., L. Archibald (New York, 1958), 24.
- ⁴ Cyrian Bridge, ed., *History of the Russian Fleet During the Reign of Peter the Great By a Contemporary Englishman, 1724* (London, 1899) xiv; Kasimierz Waliszewski, *Peter the Great* (New York, 1897), 93; Alfred Rambaud, *History of Russia, From Earliest Times to 1882*, 3 vols. (Boston, 1880) II, 37.
- ⁵ Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of William III*, January 1 - December 31, 292, 296, 297, 298; John Perry, *The State of Russia Under the Present Tsar* (London, 1716; reprint ed., London, 1967), 167; W.F. Ryan, "Peter the Great's English Yacht: Admiral Lord Carmarthen and the Russian Tobacco Monopoly," *Mariner's Mirror* 69 (1983), 68.
- ⁶ *State Papers*, 1697, 518; Ian Grey, *Peter the Great: Emperor of All Russia* (Philadelphia, 1960), 112.
- ⁷ Massie, 203, 204, 205.
- ⁸ M.S. Anderson, *Britains Discovery of Russia, 1553-1815* (London, 1958), 36-37; Henri and Barbara van der Zee, *William and Mary* (London, 1973), 435.
- ⁹ van der Zee, 427.
- ¹⁰ James Mavor, *An Economic History of Russia*, 2 vols. (New York, 1914), I, 101; Virginia Cowles, *The Romanovs* (New York, 1971), 33.
- ¹¹ Great Britain, Public Record Office, *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reign of William III*, January 1-December 31, 1698, 24.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, 28-29, 30; Narcissus Luttrell, *A Brief Relation of State Affairs from September 1678 to April 1714*, 6 vols. (Oxford, 1857), IV, 331; Peter Putnam, *Peter, the Revolutionary Tsar* (New York, 1973), 114-115.
- ¹³ Luttrell, 332; Ian Grey, "Peter the Great in England," *History Today*, (April, 1956), 227; Leo Loewenson, "Some Details of Peter the Great's Stay in England in 1698: Neglected English Material," *Slavonic and East European Review* 40 (1962), 435.
- ¹⁴ Perry, 163-164; Grey, *Peter: Emperor of Russia*, 119; Putnam, 111; Bernard Pool, "Peter the Great on the Thames," *Mariner's Mirror*, 59 (1973), 11-12.
- ¹⁵ Loewenson, 440-441.
- ¹⁶ Perry, 165; Loewenson, 441.
- ¹⁷ Constantin de Grunwald, *Peter the Great* (London, 1956), 90-91.
- ¹⁸ Luttrell, 332-349; Waliszewski, 94-95.
- ¹⁹ *State Papers*, 1698, 78; Nathan Dews, *The History of Deptford in the Counties of Kent and Surrey*, Thamesmead Histories, vol. 3 (London, 2nd ed., 1884, reprinted ed., 1971), 9; John Evelyn, *The Diary of John Evelyn*, ed., Austin Dobson, 3 vols. (London, 1906), 3, 334-335.
- ²⁰ Perry, 164-165; Dews, 182-183; Waliszewski, 95, 96.

- ²¹ Dews, 183; Christopher Marsden, *Palmyra of the North: The First Days of St. Petersburg* (London, 1942), 33; John D. Bergamini, *The Tragic Dynasty: A History of the Romanovs* (New York, 1969), 101, 102.
- ²² Evelyn, III, 335.
- ²³ Marsden, 33.
- ²⁴ J. Cracraft, *The Church Reform of Peter the Great* (London, 1971), 28-29, 32-33, 36, 37.
- ²⁵ Gilbert Burnet, *Bishop Burnet's History of His Own Time; From the Restoration of King Charles II to the Conclusion of the Treaty of Peace at Utrecht, in the Reign of Queen Anne*, 4 vols. (London, 1815), III, 283, 284.
- ²⁶ Luttrell, 342; *State Papers*, 1698, 108.
- ²⁷ Luttrell, 332; Rambaud, 38.
- ²⁸ Marsden, 34; Stephen Graham, *Peter the Great* (New York, 1929), 96.
- ²⁹ Grey, "Peter in England," 232.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, 223; Andrew Brown, *Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby and Duke of Leeds, 1632-1712*, 3 vols. (Glasgow, 1944-1951), I, 543; Massie, 214; Putnam, 113; Grey, *Emperor of Russia*, 121.
- ³¹ *State Papers*, 1698, 173; Massie, 214; Graham, 97.
- ³² Alex de Jonge, *Fire and Water: A Life of Peter the Great* (New York, 1980), 116-117.
- ³³ Thomas Clarkson, *Memoirs of the Public and Private Life of William Penn, Who Settled the State of Pennsylvania, and Founded the City of Philadelphia*, 2 vols. (Dover, N.H., 1827), II, 64; Hans Fantel, *William Penn: Apostle of Dissent* (New York, 1974), 233-234.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*, Dews, 183.
- ³⁵ Perry, 1-2, 4, 165, 168; Massie, 213; Rambaud, 38.
- ³⁶ *State Papers*, 1698, 207; Massie, 211-212; Ryan, 80; Thomas Macaulay, *The History of England: To the Death of William III*, 4 vols. (London, 1967) IV, 386.
- ³⁷ Luttrell, 370, 372; *State Papers*, 1698, 205; Marsden, 34; Loewenson, 439.
- ³⁸ Putnam, 117; M.S. Anderson, *Peter the Great* (London, 1978), 44.
- ³⁹ Massie, 231; L.J. Oliva, *Russia in the Era of Peter the Great* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969), 49.
- ⁴⁰ Johann Georg Korb, *Diary of an Austrian Secretary of Legation at the Court of Tsar Peter the Great*, trans. Count MacDonnell (London, 1968), 155; Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime* (New York, 1974), 208, Henry Moscow, *Russia under the Czars* (New York, 1962), 85, 88, W. Kirchner, *Commercial Relations between Russia and Europe, 1400-1800* (Oxford, 1962), 135, 136.
- ⁴¹ Robert Wallace, *Rise of Russia* (New York, 1967), 157.



Henry Kissinger and the Policy of Détente: 1969-1977

by Jeff Lanz

The fact that Henry Kissinger should even assert himself as a proponent of détente is significant. As a professor at Harvard in 1957, Kissinger had criticized the idea of "peaceful coexistence" numerous times. He remarked that the Soviet Union would merely consider détente to be "the best means to subvert the existing structure by means other than all-out-war." As long as the Soviet military arsenal had not achieved parity with that of the United States, it was the Soviet Union's best interest to contain "provocation below the level which might produce a final showdown."¹

What, then, prompted Kissinger to adopt such a course, and what were the principles and goals of Kissinger's détente? Kissinger chose the policy of détente for numerous reasons. The "flawed" policy of containment focused on the military balance of power not on the negotiating stance. The Soviet Union was able to delay negotiations until they had an advantage in the negotiations because of expansion or territorial conquests. Kissinger wanted the United States and the Soviet Union to proceed to the bargaining table before any movement occurred or at the precise time a difficulty "reared its ugly head." The complexities of military technology made it difficult to comprehend a balance of power and made it difficult to utilize containment as a deterrent. Kissinger also believed that containment was an out-of-place policy when it came to dealing with a power which was founded on an ideology.²

Kissinger not only believed the above reasons sufficient enough to justify a policy change, but stated that détente was an imperative. In his "Speech to the Pilgrims of Great Britain," in December of 1973, Kissinger argued that "[d]étente is an imperative. In a world shadowed by the danger of nuclear holocaust, there is no rational alternative to the pursuit of relaxation of tensions."³ This is quite different from the Kissinger who in 1957 wrote:

Wherever peace -- conceived of as the avoidance of war -- has been the primary objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community. Whenever the international order has acknowledged that certain principles could not be compromised even for the sake of peace, stability based on an equilibrium of forces was at least conceivable.⁴

An analysis of Kissinger and his policy of détente must include first a discussion of the tools which were embodied and were used to implement the policy. Following that will be a discussion of specific areas in which détente has been used to illustrate the policy's effectiveness or ineffectiveness.

Kissinger's policy of détente indicates that he indeed recognized the importance of pursuing, through the now supplanted term of "peaceful co-existence" a change which would preserve the United States position. He established a set of "tools" to help implement this new policy. These tools basically numbered five: a belief in mutual advantage, the use of linkage, the idea of the "rules of the game," the recognition of military parity,

and an attempt at domestic control. A true understanding of Kissinger's détente cannot be reached without a discussion of each of these five basic tenets.

The first and probably the strongest of the tools of détente was a belief in mutual advantage, which is frequently explained with the analogy of a "web enmeshment." Kissinger knew that the Soviet Union would have no interest in entering into a "relaxation of tensions" unless they had something to gain. He saw the necessity of stabilizing and directing the growing Soviet power toward useful, non-dangerous purposes. An important facet of his policy of détente, then, was to "enmesh" the power of the Soviet Union in a web of commitments which would be both advantageous and "constraining". They would be restricted to making only those commitments which the United States approved. If Soviets would be made to feel that the world of détente was much more advantageous than the world of confrontation, they would make valid efforts to preserve it.⁵ Both countries would also have to honor a pledge not to seek unilateral advantage.⁶

Kissinger's concept of linkage was also important to his détente policy. The idea of linkage was to gain bargaining leverage by linking the importance of one matter with the importance of another, thereby forcing a trade-off. Kissinger best explained his linkage concept in a Senate Department release on October 15, 1974, when he said:

Our approach proceeds from the conviction that, in moving forward across a wide spectrum of negotiations, progress in one area adds momentum to progress in other areas. If we succeed, then no agreement stands alone as an isolated accomplishment vulnerable to the next crisis. We did not invent the interrelationship between issues expressed in the so-called linkage concept; it was a reality because of the range of problems and areas in which the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union impinge on each other.⁷

In other words, in order to get something you have to be willing to give something. The use of linkage gave Kissinger a way to implement rewards and punishments. If both countries could compromise on the issues to be discussed, talks would proceed smoothly. Talks would stall, however, if one country tried to "compartmentalize" a problem, or isolate it from any other issue, as the Soviet Union often did.

The "rules of the game" concept of détente was crucial to Kissinger's strategy, and surprisingly similar in its ideas to that of the concept of "spheres of influence." Kissinger's idea was to set guidelines for political competition and conduct. A mutual understanding of objectives and goals, both internally and on the periphery, should be reached.⁸ A parallel concern of Kissinger's in this regard was to ensure that if a crisis occurred it could be managed properly. The faults of the Soviet political system made it much more likely that in the event of an internal or regional crisis, the Soviet Union might engage in military conflict or expansion to divert criticism and encourage Soviet feelings of nationality. Kissinger believed that a balanced world order could not allow such occurrences. He also realized the importance of tempering any emergence of nationalism in Eastern Europe for fear of Soviet expansion into that area; likewise, he wanted Russia to avoid interference in Western Europe and Latin America.⁹

Kissinger saw the primary goal of détente as reduction of the possibility of nuclear war. For this reason, not only was the prevention of regional conflicts or expansion important, but equally important was the need to recognize military parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. This strategy was especially important in luring the

Soviet leaders to the bargaining table. It has already been shown that in his earlier writing Kissinger believed that the Soviet Union had already achieved parity in the number of available nuclear weapons and was making progress towards qualitative parity. He knew that it would be easier to get the Soviet leadership to consider arms limitation talks and other issues if they viewed themselves as equals.

The final important concept of détente, that of domestic control, tells a great deal only about how the policy of détente was to occur or be implemented in the United States, but also about Kissinger himself. Kissinger, like Nixon, seemed to distrust the way the bureaucracy and administration of the government functioned. He simply had little faith in their performance. For this reason, détente could only be encouraged domestically in three ways. The policy would be successful provided that Congress and the American public did not interfere in its progress. A program of domestic surveillance (i.e. wiretaps, etc.) would have to be adopted to prevent failure of the policy due to leaks. A great deal of domestic support for the policy was also necessary considering the active role that the country was playing in global affairs. If the American public was not behind an active foreign policy, it would be hard to justify it to our allies.¹⁰

The summit and strategic arms limitations treaty (SALT) talks between the United States and the Soviet Union provide an example of détente in a practical sense. The prelude to the Moscow summit of 1972 was itself composed of a series of attempted linkages by both sides attempting to achieve stronger bargaining leverage. The first significant attempt at linkage occurred in the January, 1971, meeting between Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin. Dobrynin, trying to "set the table: in Russia's favor, suggested that the willingness of the United States to discuss negotiations concerning the Berlin question might prompt the Soviet Union to consider the possibilities of a summit. In his memoirs, however, Kissinger claimed that he had been holding out on an agreement on the Berlin affair until the Soviet Union agreed to a summit. A stalemate resulted from this meeting.¹¹ Finally, on October 12, 1971, the Soviet Union agreed to a summit in Moscow for the latter half of May 1972.

As a result of all the discussions and bargaining in Moscow, four decisions were made which would determine the future of American-Soviet relations in détente. Of course, many cultural and scientific as well as trade agreements were made in Moscow, including a grain deal which was concluded in September of 1972. Three other agreements were perhaps more important. One was a charter of "Basic Principles" which defined general guidelines and suggestions for conduct during the détente period.

The most fruitful, yet somewhat mediocre, agreements of the Moscow summit came as a result of the strategic arms talks. Kissinger has stated that his main objectives for arms negotiations were:

- (1) to break the momentum of ever-increasing levels of armaments;
- (2) to control certain qualitative aspects--particularly MIRV's (Multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle);
- (3) to moderate the pace of new deployments; and
- (4) ultimately to achieve reductions in force levels.¹²

Two treaties emerged from the talks on strategic arms: the ABM Treaty and the "Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to Strategic Offensive Arms." To put it in more understandable language, the ABM, or anti-ballistic missile treaty simply

stated that neither country would deploy such a system in its defense. The treaty also placed a limit of two on the number of sites that a nation could have for those missiles, and the sites could only be used for defense of the area.¹³ The interim agreement was a more narrow achievement, as it merely imposed a ceiling on the numbers of strategic offensive missile launchers, and reduced only slightly the number of Soviet ICBM's (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles).¹⁴

The summit and SALT talks did not, in the final analysis, represent great achievements for the policy of Kissinger's *détente*, and many criticisms have been leveled at what was considered to be the ushering in of the era of *détente*. Theodore Draper, in an article entitled "Détente," related the concept of parity to the SALT agreements. He believed that the agreements reached at the summit were agreements of quantitative parity. Such an agreement was achievable, he said, due to the fact that, "both sides had reached a point of diminishing returns which made mere increase in numbers exorbitantly wasteful." The race for arms superiority, he stated, had taken a direction toward a concern with quality (i.e. accuracy).¹⁵ This crucial *détente* idea of military parity, then, was only being half met--they may have achieved parity in numbers but parity did not exist in quality.

Perhaps a greater fault was that the agreements of Moscow were blatantly violated in the arms race that evolved over the next few years. Continued deployment of powerful ICBM's pushed the United States to begin implanting MIRV warheads in older missiles, as well as to consider strategic programs for the future, including the B-1 bomber and cruise missiles. This regeneration of the arms race prevented any substantial agreement from being achieved during SALT II. The perceived loss of American superiority as a result of the Moscow summit caused the United States Senate to reluctantly ratify the SALT II agreements. Kissinger, with what was then perceived as the first major positive contribution of the policy of *détente*, had just participated in proceedings signifying not only the beginning but the eventual downfall of this era of relaxed tensions. Moreover, at that very time, a far more serious crisis for *détente* and for the world was emerging--the conflict between the Arab and Israeli peoples.

The Arab-Israeli War in October, 1973 was perhaps the greatest challenge to Kissinger's policy of *détente*. Almost all the concepts embodied in the policy played a part: linkage, mutual advantage (vs. unilateral advantage), and even the charter of "Basic Principles." It even produced a showdown that resulted in a temporary return to confrontation.

When the war first began, neither major power took a dominant role. The Soviets continued some airlifted shipments to Egypt, but on a very limited scale. As the war progressed, the Soviet Union increased its shipments due to a misconception of the political climate of the United States. The Soviets considered Watergate a golden opportunity to regain lost influence in the region. They hoped to become the dominate force in the Mideast and spread the seeds of anti-imperialism, greatly in violation of the idea of mutual advantage.¹⁶ The United States, called on by Golda Meir to assert itself, began shipping arms and supplies to Israel. Both powers were now helping to escalate the confrontation, another violation of the aims of *détente*.¹⁷ Linkage is illustrated by the attempts to achieve a cease-fire. Early in the war, when it did not appear that Egypt would be able to achieve a victory, the Soviet Union tried to get Egypt to agree to a cease-fire. When Egypt began to assert itself more powerfully, the Soviet Union "rescinded" its calls for cease-fire.

In attempting to link the cease-fire with the corresponding periods of military superiority of its "client," the Soviet Union tried to obtain a greater bargaining position.

The Soviet Union, however, was not the only world power attempting to gain an advantage from the situation. Kissinger spoke of emerging United States' aims regarding the Mideast: "From the outset, I was determined to use the war to start a peace process."¹⁸ Kissinger's idea of its implementation was that we "...could begin our peace process with the Arabs on the proposition that we had stopped the Israeli advance and with the Israelis on the basis that we had been steadfastly at their side in the crisis."¹⁹

A concerted cease-fire was finally orchestrated between the two powers on October 18, 1973, demonstrating that the United States and the Soviet Union were still willing to sacrifice the interests of their regional clients to maintain the structure of détente. Unfortunately, the cease-fire did not last. Raymond Garthoff, in his book *Détente and Confrontation*, believes that the blame for the failed cease-fire may lie partly on Kissinger. He quotes an informed Israeli account of Kissinger as having said to the Israeli leadership, "Well, in Vietnam the cease-fire didn't go into effect at the exact time that was agreed on."²⁰ In his own memoirs, he wrote that after having been told of the continued fighting, "I also had a sinking feeling that I might have emboldened them; in Israel, to gain their support, I had indicated that I would understand if there was a few hours 'slippage' in the cease-fire deadline while I was flying home."²¹

Israeli expansion was indeed the cause of the cease-fire breakdown. The Israeli Army was able to completely encircle the Egyptian Third Army Corps. Brezhnev then demanded that the Soviet Union and the United States send in a joint peace-keeping force under United Nations auspices.²² Kissinger felt that this was too risky and would re-entrench the Soviet Union in the area where, having unilaterally strengthened America's position, he had no desire for them to be. Brezhnev, in startling anger, informed Nixon that if the United States did not help to enforce an end to this war, the Soviet Union would pursue a culmination of the conflict unilaterally. Kissinger understood the implications to détente in that threat and, faced with his policy of détente crumbling away, raised the stakes by putting the entire country on nuclear alert (DEFCON 3).²³ The conflict immediately died down, and a United Nations emergency force was able to impose a cease-fire accepted by all.

What were the consequences of this conflict on détente? Unilateral advantages were clearly pursued by both the United States and the Soviet Union in attempting to gain a foothold and a position of authority in the Middle East, a violation of the Basic Principles Charter. Linkage was used to pursue these ends as well. The "Rules of the Game" were broken in that the crisis was not effectively managed by either side, and that the crisis almost resulted in a nuclear conflict. Domestic discontent, because of perceived Soviet misbehavior, led to the first wide-spread criticism of the policy of détente. The Soviet Union came out of the war with an advantage--it fostered an "anti-imperialist" Arab Front and helped precipitate the oil embargo against the United States by numerous Mideast countries angered by American shipments to Israel during the war and by the declaration of nuclear alert. What, then, caused the failure of the policy of détente?

In his memoirs, Kissinger elaborated on this in great detail. He discussed four points, relating to Vietnam, Watergate, public opinion, and Congress, which he believed led to the fall of détente. Vietnam caused the United States to turn away from foreign involve-

ment, which led to increased Soviet expansion.²⁴ Kissinger emphasized the difficulty with generating a positive public opinion for his policy of détente because, "...the dual concept of containment and co-existence, of maintaining the balance of power while exploring a more positive future, has no automatic consensus behind it." The liberal base of the population, with its emphasis on sprinkling relations with goodwill, took objection to deterrence, calling it "peace in the abstract." The conservative base of the population, with its constant struggle of good versus evil, took objection to co-existence, preferring to keep the "anti-Communist" label.²⁵ It was the third point, the problem of Watergate, which Kissinger believed led to the inability to coordinate public opinion. Kissinger claimed that,

... a normal Nixon presidency would have managed to attain symmetry between the twin pillars of containment and coexistence. Nixon would have been able to demonstrate to the conservatives that détente was a means of conduct the ideological contest, not a resignation from it. And he could have handled the liberal pressures by rallying a majority of moderates behind his policy of settling concrete issues. He could then have used his demonstrated commitment to peace to marshal the free peoples of the Alliance behind a new approach to defense.²⁶

As to the last factor, Kissinger placed a great blame for détente's lack of success on Congress. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment of 1974 which refused most favored nation status and limited trade to the Soviet Union because of the failure to link it to a signed agreement regarding Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, left Kissinger particularly bitter.

I believe the policy of détente failed from a combination of all of these, and a few other things as well. The policy of détente, following so closely on the heels of the policy of containment, was asking too much of the American public. In essence, détente wanted America to pursue open and friendly negotiations with a country it had been taught to despise. Many people were unable to deal with such a quick change. Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser to Jimmy Carter, emphasized ideological issues. In his memoirs, Brzezinski wrote,

... I felt strongly that in the U.S.-Soviet competition the appeal of America as a free society could become an important asset, and I saw in human rights an opportunity to put the Soviet Union ideologically on the defensive.²⁷

A failure to use or undertake more collaborative measures was also important. Perhaps if the two countries had pursued more negotiations along the lines of SALT, a firmer base of commitments to détente would have emerged. The United States may also have been too hesitant in recognizing political as well as military parity. It was important to the Soviet Union to be recognized as having achieved parity in all areas. A real code of conduct might also have been helpful. Kissinger himself had indicated his virtual disregard for the Charter of Basic Principles. And I believe that a great amount of confusion surrounding the achievement of military superiority emerged as the result of a weak SALT I treaty.

In view of all this, I believe one must agree that although the policy was pursued with the right objectives in mind, it never produced the outcomes befitting a superior piece of foreign policy.

Endnotes

- ¹ Theodore Draper, "Détente," *Commentary*, No. 57 (June, 1974), 30.
- ² Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, 1979), 62.
- ³ Henry Kissinger, "Speech to the Pilgrims of Great Britain," *Department of State Bulletin* (December 31, 1973), 779, as quoted in G. Warrent Nutter. *Kissinger's Grand Design* (Washington, D.C., 1975), 10.
- ⁴ Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich and Restoration of Peace, 1812-1822* (Boston, 1957), 1, as quoted in Nutter, 11.
- ⁵ Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington D.C., 1985), 30.
- ⁶ *Garthoff*, 34.
- ⁷ Henry Kissinger, "Détente with the Soviet Union: The Reality of Competition and the Imperative of Cooperation," *Department of State Bulletin*, No. 71 (October 14, 1974), 508.
- ⁸ *Garthoff*, 33.
- ⁹ Kenneth Jowitt, "Images of Détente and the Soviet Political Order," *Policy Papers in International Affairs*, No. 1 (Berkely, 1977), 6.
- ¹⁰ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston, 1982), 131.
- ¹¹ Kissinger, *White House Years*, 833.
- ¹² Kissinger, "Détente," 513.
- ¹³ Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972).
- ¹⁴ Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972).
- ¹⁵ Draper, 37.
- ¹⁶ Della W. Sheldon, ed., *Dimensions of Détente* (New York, 1978), 102.
- ¹⁷ Robert S. Litwak, *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976* (London, 1984), 160.
- ¹⁸ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 468.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 487.
- ²⁰ *Garthoff*, 372.
- ²¹ Kissinger, *White House Years*, 569.
- ²² *Garthoff*, 374.
- ²³ *Garthoff*, 377-379.
- ²⁴ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 235.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, 239.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, 245.
- ²⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981* (New York, 1983), 149.



The Conflict Between French Quebec and English Canada, 1960-1980

by *Tiffanie Lamont*

Americans have, in the past, referred to Canada as the “good neighbor to the north”¹ and, in less complimentary terms, as “gray Canada.”² A closer study of the country reveals that Canada, far from being a bland, tranquil giant, is a government and a nation which has found itself facing complex problems including challenges to its legitimacy and its unity. These problems, instead of abating as Canada became increasingly urbanized and wealthy, became more urgent. From 1960 to 1980, Canada’s federal government at Ottawa encountered challenges to its economic and social policies and to its very legitimacy as a ruling body. Several of the ten Canadian provinces, especially those of western Canada and the Atlantic provinces, had conflicts with the federal government. Quebec was the most vocal and organized challenger.

Ottawa’s problems with Quebec stem from the fact that over eighty percent of Quebec’s population is French. Thus Quebec, surrounded by English-speaking people in the rest of Canada, as well as in the United States, believed that its rights and values were often overlooked by the federal government. Quebecers believed that the government attempted only to serve the anglophone (English-speaking) majority. For this reason, the French in Quebec felt compelled to constantly strive for a government which considered their needs as important as those of English-speaking Canadians. If this was not possible, then they wanted self-government.

Why was the support of Quebec crucial to the rest of Canada? First, Canada, to survive as a nation, needed a sense of national unity and identity. Clearly Quebec was a source of ethnic, cultural, economic, and political division. Furthermore, Canada’s institutions were weakened when their legitimacy was questioned. It was especially threatening when their authority was challenged by Quebec, Canada’s largest province.³

It is the purpose of this paper to study briefly the origins of Quebec’s dissatisfaction with Canada’s federal government. Furthermore, this study will explore the nature of the “Quebec problem”⁴ as well as the federal and provincial government’s attempts to deal with it. Special focus will be from the years of Quebec’s “Quiet Revolution”⁵ of the early 1960s to the referendum of May, 1980. To understand the nature of the problems during these years one must first understand their origins. The beginning of the Quebec problem lies in its earliest history.

In 1534, French explorer Jacques Cartier was commissioned by Francis I to journey to North America. During three voyages, Cartier explored the Gulf of St. Lawrence as well as the sites of present-day Montreal and Quebec. In 1608, another Frenchman, Samuel de Champlain, founded the first settlement at Quebec; its location on the St. Lawrence made it an excellent base from which to carry on a fur trade, the chief enterprise of the French who first settled in North America.⁶ Thus began Canada⁷ as a series of French settlements along the St. Lawrence. From 1754 to 1763 France fought England

Tiffanie Lamont is a member of Iota Omega Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta at Centre College.

in the Anglo-French (French and Indian) War. Quebec fell at the Battle of the Plains of Abraham in 1759. In 1763, by the Treaty of Paris, Britain obtained all of France's North American continental territory east of the Mississippi.⁸ Britain's victory was significant because the British were now faced with a new task: "... to rule a people their equals in culture, but alien in speech and religion, and with a deep sense of the superiority of their social system to that of their new masters."⁹ In an effort to gain the support of the French inhabitants in Canada, Britain passed the Quebec Act in 1774. Its provisions extended the boundaries of French Canada allowing French Catholics to hold office, restored French civil law while maintaining British criminal law,¹⁰ and recognized both English and French as official languages.¹¹

Britain faced another problem in its governance of Canada after the American Revolution. Approximately 8,000 Loyalists, supporters of Britain in the war, left America and settled in Quebec. These alien settlers were resented by the French inhabitants of Quebec, especially as the Loyalists demanded equality with the French.¹² For this reason, Britain passed the Constitutional Act of 1791. It divided Quebec into Upper Canada with a mostly English-speaking, Protestant population, and Lower Canada, whose people were for the most part French-speaking Catholics. Although the British hoped to eventually assimilate the French population of Lower Canada into their institutions, they found instead that the two cultures became increasingly distinct. In 1839, John Lambton, the Earl of Durham, in his report on affairs in Upper and Lower Canada, concluded that the two should be united to strengthen each of their economies. Thus, in 1840 the Canadas were united. Then, in 1867, four colonies, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and the Canadas, were united under the British North America (BNA) Act as the Dominion of Canada. The BNA Act provided for a division of powers between the federal government and the provinces.

The central government was specifically endowed with important functions in taxation, trade, commerce, transportation and finance...the provinces were assigned major responsibilities only in matters where local autonomy was thought desirable, such as education, the social services and civil law. One principle objective was to give protections to minorities such as the French-Canadians of Quebec."¹³

Conflicts between the English and French in Canada continued into the twentieth century. French-Canadians opposed Canada's involvement in British wars, including the Boer War in South Africa in 1899. Furthermore, during World War I, Canada's federal government pledged its wholehearted support of Britain. Quebec's French population bitterly opposed this commitment even though France was Britain's ally in the war.¹⁴ French-Canadians did not feel that their ties and obligations to France were as strong as those of Anglo-Canadians to Britain.

In World War II, Canada's federal government again supported Britain and ordered conscription. While eighty percent of the Canadians outside Quebec favored this action, seventy-two percent of Quebec's population opposed it.¹⁵

Thus, from the time of its initial conquest of French Canada, Britain faced the problem of trying to maintain a balance between the rights of its French-Catholic population in Quebec and those of the rest of Canada, largely English and Protestant. Conversely, the people of Quebec found themselves struggling to maintain their heritage--

their culture, religion, and values--under the domination of a foreign people which had little understanding of that heritage.

What aspects of French-Canadian society distinguished it from the Anglo-Canadian population? First, the role of the Catholic Church was important in early Quebec.¹⁶ The Church had significant control over local affairs, government, and education. Controlling education was important to the Church because it was a means of preserving French culture and values by instilling them in children as they grew up. Anglo-Canadians, on the other hand, tended to support a secular society including secular education.¹⁷

Furthermore, the French were by tradition a rural, agrarian people. For this reason, British, Americans, and Anglo-Canadians tended to dominate the development of business, urbanization, industrialization and other features of modernization which occurred in Quebec City and Montreal in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.¹⁸ As the economy of Quebec expanded French-Canadians as a group either were not involved or held lower-paying, lower-status jobs. They rarely occupied management or other high-level positions.¹⁹

Clearly disparities developed not only between Quebec's rural areas and cities but also within cities such as Montreal and Quebec City and between Quebec and the rest of Canada. Economic studies of Quebec revealed that of the ten Canadian provinces,²⁰ Quebec, Canada's oldest and largest province, consistently had the lowest incomes and housing standards and the highest unemployment rate, despite its modernization.

Quebec's voters recognized the need for change in the province; in 1960, the Liberal Party, under the leadership of Jean Lesage, came to power in Quebec.²¹ The party immediately began to initiate various reforms in the political structure of Quebec. Through these reforms Lesage sought to accommodate the political structure as well as the French themselves to the changes that had already taken place in Quebec's increasingly urban, industrial economy. Lesage, by initiating the reforms which constituted this Quiet Revolution, sought to meet the needs of three groups of Quebecers, each of which was discontented with the current situation in its province. First, the industrial working class was dissatisfied with the clergy, which as a stronghold of rural, traditional values, could no longer minister to or understand the needs of the urban worker. Quebec's education system, which was largely church-controlled, did not provide French workers with sufficient training for them to advance socially, economically, or educationally. As a consequence, few Quebecers attended universities. Second, the francophone businesses could not compete with larger, stronger, wealthier British, American, and Anglo-Canadian businesses in Quebec. Finally, the traditional French middle class, composed of professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and intellectuals began to realize that the traditional establishments were no longer capable of coping with the problems of the industrial workers or the members of the francophone business community. They feared that if certain aspects of French culture were not changed to deal with these problems, these groups would be attracted to anglophone values.²² By initiating certain reforms Lesage sought to strengthen feelings of unity among all French-Canadians.

Through the changes his party advocated, Lesage also intended to strengthen the role of the state in the economy. For instance, he expanded the civil service, nationalized Quebec's power companies, and initiated the eventual socialization of medicine. He developed social programs in the area of welfare and education. He established the

Ministry of Education to bring the quality of education up to the level of that of the rest of Canada. This was also the first step in secularizing education. By establishing the Ministry of the Cultural Affairs, Lesage sought to strengthen the identity of French-Canadians by renewing Quebec's ties to France. In other words, Lesage hoped to convey to Quebec's francophones that change could be beneficial and that the state rather than the Church should be the center of Quebec's identity.²³

The Quiet Revolution, however, was not as successful as Lesage and his Liberal Party had hoped it would be. The provincial government did not maintain sufficient support or guidance of the programs it initiated. It did not provide overall, long-range regulation or direction of the economy. Thus, some of Quebec's population felt that more drastic measures were necessary. Others believed that the reforms of the Quiet Revolution represented an abandonment of French culture and a strengthening of Anglo-Canadian values and ideals. Out of these contrasting views grew two responses. Those who advocated extreme actions began to channel their energy into political parties which favored independence for Quebec.²⁴ Others, in a reaction against the reforms of the Liberal Party, sought to re-establish and strengthen the traditional culture and institutions of Quebec. In 1966, the Union Nationale, the agrarian, Catholic, conservative political party which preceded the Liberal Party in office, was voted back into power.²⁵

Despite continued opposition to change by some, the Liberal Party's Quiet Revolution had set the process of change in motion. More importantly, it had made both the national and provincial governments aware of the need for further study of the economic and social status of the French in Quebec. In 1963, the Royal Commission of Bilingualism and Biculturalism was established by the federal government,

...to inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races.²⁶

The findings of this commission, published in 1969, revealed that the Frenchman in Quebec consistently ranked lowest in terms of income and job status. The French-speaking worker's income was, on the average, thirty-five percent lower than that of an English-speaking worker. Anglophones, who made up only seven percent of the job force in Quebec, held eighty percent of the top jobs in manufacturing. Furthermore, foreigners and English-Canadians owned seven and four times more businesses respectively than French-Canadians, and French-owned businesses were invariably smaller ones.²⁷

Quebec's Union Nationale government established the Commission of Inquiry on the Position of the French Language and on Language Rights in Quebec (the Gendron Commission) in 1968. Its purpose was much the same as that of the 1963 Royal Commission. In its report, published in late 1972, the Commission concluded that

...the domain of the French language is...characterized by inferior duties, small enterprises, low incomes, and low levels of education. The domain of the English language is the exact opposite, that of superior duties involving initiative and command, and large enterprises, and high levels of education and income.²⁸

The reports of these two commissions showed that the position of French-Canadians

in Quebec was far below that of Anglo-Canadians and because of this disparity, the status of Quebec was inferior to that of the rest of Canada. Clearly changes were necessary but there was no consensus concerning particular policies. Eventually three distinct patterns of thought emerged among those who advocated change. The Liberal Party actually tended to be relatively conservative favoring cultural sovereignty for Quebec though not necessarily economic or political sovereignty. Its members instead advocated capitalism, foreign investment, and the continuation of a strong federal government.²⁹

At the other end of the spectrum, more militant, radical separatist groups developed. These groups had no uniform, clearly-defined ideology but nonetheless shared certain beliefs. They thought that the francophone workers of Quebec were exploited by English-Canadians and Americans.³⁰ Therefore, one of their goals was to liberate Quebec politically from an oppressive federal government and to liberate its workers economically and socially.

A member of the Liberal Party, former journalist René Lévesque, represented the third pattern of thought that emerged in the 1960s. He concluded that Quebec, as a member of the Canadian federation, could never be strong enough to defend its rights. Lévesque believed that only an independent Quebec could effectively protect its interests and guide its development. Thus, in 1967, he resigned from the Liberal Party and in 1968 founded the Parti Québécois.³¹ This party steadily gained support until, in 1976, it won seventy-one of the 110 seats in the Quebec National Assembly and forty-one percent of the popular vote. Lévesque became the premier of Quebec.³²

Immediately following its election to office, the party began to develop laws to protect the rights of francophones in Quebec. In 1977, the Quebec National Assembly passed Law 101, the Charter of the French Language. Among its provisions was that French would be the language used in the legislature and courts of Quebec.³³ Furthermore, the terms of the Charter restricted the use of English in education. French was to be the language of health and social services as well as of all forms of advertisement. Finally, French would be spoken at all levels of business. This bill, to some, seemed extreme in its measures. It was itself discriminatory toward English-speakers, they argued, and it placed them in the very position that the French had been before. After the Charter was passed, the anglophone population in Quebec decreased by 11.8 percent. Furthermore, one hundred major businesses whose main offices were in Montreal left Quebec. As a result, 14,000 Quebecers lost their jobs.³⁴

Another problem the Parti Québécois sought to deal with was the fundamental dissatisfaction of Quebecers with the province's relationship to the federal government. A survey of Quebec's population in 1978 and 1979 showed that only fifteen percent favored the existing constitution. On the other hand, seventy-two percent opposed independence for Quebec.³⁵ Quebec's government found itself in a difficult position, how to institute enough change to really make a difference without completely severing its ties to the federal government? In November, 1979, the Parti Québécois set forth its ideas in a "white paper"³⁶ entitled *Quebec-Canada: A New Deal*. The heart of the proposal was a concept called sovereignty-association. By sovereignty, the leaders of the Parti Québécois meant that Quebec would make its own laws and levy its own taxes.

At the same time Quebec would retain its economic association with Canada through a treaty which would allow the movement of people and goods between Quebec and

Canada without customs barriers. Furthermore, Quebec would continue to use the Canadian dollar as its unit of currency. Also, Quebec would join North America and North Atlantic defense alliances.³⁷ Finally, four Quebec-Canada agencies would be established to maintain this economic association.³⁸

One month after the release of the Parti Québécois's "white paper," Lévesque announced that there would be a referendum in Quebec in the spring of 1980. The referendum question was this:

The Government of Quebec had made public its proposal to negotiate a new agreement with the rest of Canada based on the equality of nations.

This agreement would enable Quebec to acquire exclusive power to make its laws, levy its taxes, and establish relations abroad--in other words, sovereignty--and at the same time to maintain with Canada an economic association including a common currency.

No change in political status resulting from these negotiations will be effected without approval by the people through another referendum.

On these terms, do you agree to give the Government of Quebec the mandate to negotiate the proposed agreement between Quebec and Canada?³⁹

The Liberal party, led by Claude Ryan, responded to the "white paper" by issuing, in January, 1980, a "beige paper"⁴⁰ entitled *A New Canadian Federation*. In this document, Ryan advocated the protection of basic language rights of francophones. He also favored increasing provincial power, especially in cultural affairs. Finally, he called for the abolition of the Canadian Senate where Quebecers believed they were insufficiently represented and the establishment of a Federal Council, in which Quebec would be guaranteed twenty-five percent of the seats.⁴¹ This council as a representative body of the provinces, would have substantial control over them but would also regulate the power of the federal government.⁴² Lévesque condemned this proposal. He believed it still left too much power to the federal government.

In the referendum election, the supporters of sovereignty-association suffered a disappointing setback. Of the Quebecers who voted, 59.5 percent were against giving the provincial government the power to negotiate its status with the federal government, 49.5 percent were in favor. Over ninety percent of the Anglo-Canadians in Quebec opposed the proposal, as did, surprisingly, fifty-five percent of the francophones.⁴³

Why did the Quebecers, if they were indeed dissatisfied with their current status, reject the proposal of the Parti Québécois? First, the language of the proposal was vague in its implication. Were Quebecers, by voting in favor of the proposal, actually voting for the eventual separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada? Furthermore, it was unclear exactly how the economic association of Quebec with Canada would be maintained. In fact, why should economic policy be separated from political policy, or other aspects of provincial government?⁴⁴

If any consensus existed among the people of Quebec at all, it was that change of some sort was necessary if the province was to continue as a member of the Canadian federation. Before the federal government could make any progress toward solving the problems of Quebec, it has to recognize, constitutionally, that French-Canadians were a distinct people, with a different language and set of values from English Canada, and had to be accepted as such.⁴⁵ No government could force them to become Anglo-

Canadian; to do so would surely increase resentments and perhaps create a more volatile situation. At the same time the rights of anglophones and other minority groups in the province had to be respected.⁴⁶

Was independence, an option which many believed to be the only solution to the Quebec problem, a viable or desirable alternative to the province's present status within the Canadian federation? The leaders of Quebec, in considering this option, had to decide

...whether they believe that the benefits outweigh the costs. In converting the decision into the crude cost-benefit analysis, [they]...must think of much more than mere economic or material benefits. The psychic, cultural, social and political dimensions are equally important.⁴⁷

In many ways, "Canada is a better country than it would have been if Quebec had not been a part of it."⁴⁸ It is true that its language, values, and traditions, different from those of anglophone Canada, were a source of division. At the same time these differences made "... for a richer, more varied, more open, and in the final analysis, more creative society..."⁴⁹ Furthermore, these were several reasons that not just the rest of Canada but also Quebec itself would benefit from remaining within the Canadian confederation.

First, there was relative indifference outside Canada to Quebec's peculiar problems. Thus, Quebec as an independent nation would probably not have received much sympathy, understanding, or most importantly, support from countries outside Canada. Furthermore, many Quebecers expected to enjoy entirely friendly relations with the rest of Canada if Quebec achieved independence. These groups, however, underestimated Canadian nationalism. This sentiment may have been low relative to Quebec's nationalism, but it existed nonetheless. Quebec's separation from Canada might have created hostility and bitterness among English-Canadians, making an effective economic alliance between Quebec and the other provinces impossible.⁵⁰

The Quebec problem could not simply go away, its foundations lay deep in the history of the province. Britain, from its earliest days as conqueror of French Canada, made noble efforts to respect the rights of the French. The terms of the Quebec Act of 1774, for instance, are among the most generous ever imposed on a conquered people. On the other hand, the British also made somewhat less noble attempts to assimilate the French into British culture. Clearly, the potential for agreement and mutually beneficial relations between the French and the English existed in the spirit of documents like the Quebec Act. A disappointing feature of Quebec's history is that this early promise did not materialize. It was destroyed by later documents such as the Durham Report of 1839 and the federal government's Conscriptioin Acts during World War I and World War II.

Although the federal government's difficulties with Quebec were most evident, the government also faced increasingly vocal challenges from its Atlantic provinces. Ottawa had a difficult time dealing with this area's ongoing economic struggles. Furthermore, the western provinces often felt that the federal government at Ottawa was too far away to truly understand their unique needs and problems. Some groups in provinces of each of these areas had seriously considered options beyond that of remaining in the Confederation.⁵¹

The future of Quebec is important to Canada's existence as a nation. Its problems run far deeper than those of an isolated ethnic and cultural conflict. Its economic and

political problems represent a broader set of challenges which Canada may face from each of its provinces in the years to come.

Endnotes

¹ Elliot J. Feldman and Neil Nevitte, eds., *The Future of North America: Canada, The United States, and Quebec Nationalism* (Cambridge, 1979), 15.

² Feldman and Nevitte, 15.

³ Kenneth McRoberts and Dale Posgate, *Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis* (Toronto, 1976, 1-2)

⁴ S.C. Berkowitz and Robert K. Logan, *Canada's Third Option* (Toronto, 1979), 17.

⁵ René Lévesque, *My Québec*, trans. Gaynor Fitzpatrick (Toronto, 1979), 17.

⁶ *Kenneth McNaught, The Pelican History of Canada* (New York, 1983), 21-23.

⁷ There are two different theories concerning the origin of the word "Canada." Several seventeenth and eighteenth century legends contend that Spaniards explored Canada before the French arrived there. According to these legends, the Spaniards used the words "aca nada," or "nothing here," when they found no gold or silver there. The savages that the Spaniards encountered, so the legend goes, began to use these words, "Aca nada." They repeated them to the French, who began using the words as the name for the land they explored. However, there is no evidence of Spanish exploration in Canada, so this theory is probably no more than a legend. Another theory, holds that Canada is a form of an Iroquoiz word "Kannata," meaning "a village," or "a collection of dwellings." This theory is the more plausible one of the two. George Bryce, *A short History of the Canadian People* (New York, 1914), 17-18.

⁸ France retained the small fishing islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon near Newfoundland. G.S. Graham, *Canada*, British Empire History Series (London, 1950), 64.

⁹ George M. Wrong, *The Canadians: The Story of a People* (New York, 1938), 195.

¹⁰ British civil and criminal law had been established under the terms of the Treaty of Paris of 1763. *Quebec...a Glance*, Life in Quebec Series (Quebec, 1980), 2.

¹¹ McNaught, 49.

¹² Graham, 90.

¹³ Graham, 136-37.

¹⁴ Graham, 157.

¹⁵ *Quebec...a Glance*, 2.

¹⁶ Montreal, for instance, was established as a mission in 1642 by two devout Jesuits, the Sieur de Maissonneuve and Jean Mansene. "Montreal is, perhaps, the only large city in the world that owes its foundations to Christian missions." Graham, 21.

¹⁷ McRoberts and Posgate, 20-22.

¹⁸ Indeed, this trend has continued into the later years of the twentieth centuries.

Foreign control [mostly American] accounts for approximately 60% of all manufacturing companies, 70% of all mining enterprises, 99% of petroleum refining, 80% of the oil and gas industry...80% of the chemical industry, three-quarters of electrical apparatus and so on. Walter Gordon, "Canadian Independence," in Feldman and Nevitte, 74.

¹⁹ McRoberts and Posgate, 35.

²⁰ Except the Maritime provinces, those along the Atlantic coast: Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Prince Edward Island. McRoberts and Posgate, 40.

²¹ Following the death of Maurice Duplessis in 1959, the Union Nationale, traditional and pro-clerical, was voted out of office in Quebec's 1960 election. J. Bartlett Brebner, *Canada: A Modern History* (Ann Arbor, 1970), 544.

²² William D. Coleman, *The Independence Movement in Quebec, 1954-1980* (Toronto, 1984), 212-213.

²³ Denis Monière, *Ideologies in Quebec: The Historical Development*, trans. Richard Howard (Toronto, 1981), 252-257.

²⁴ Coleman, 217.

²⁵ Monière, 258.

²⁶ Brebner, 548.

²⁷ Monière, 230-231.

²⁸ Coleman, from the Gendron Commission *Report I* (Quebec, 1972), 77.

²⁹ Monière, 291.

³⁰ For statistics concerning American domination and industry in Quebec, see note 25.

³¹ John Saywell, *The Rise of the Parti Québécois, 1967-1976* (Toronto, 1977), 11.

³² Saywell, 167.

³³ In 1979, Canada's Supreme Court ruled that this part of the Charter was unconstitutional. Sherrill, 136.

³⁴ Mordecai Richier, "Quebec: Language Problems," *The Atlantic*, June, 1983, 16.

³⁵ Sherrill, 136.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Lévesque, xii.

³⁸ Louis Balthazar, "Quebec at the Hour of Choice," in *Entering the Eighties: Canada in Crisis*, ed. R. Kenneth Carty and W. Peter Ward (Toronto, 1980), 69.

³⁹ Sherrill, 136-137.

⁴⁰ Sherrill, 137.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Balthazar, 71.

⁴³ Sherrill, 137-138.

⁴⁴ Balthazar, 69-70.

⁴⁵ Balthazar, 73-74.

⁴⁶ Balthazar, 74-75.

⁴⁷ John Meisel, "J'ai le gout du Quebec but I like Canada: Reflections of an Ambivalent Man," in *Must Canada Fail?* ed. Richard Simeon (Montreal, 1977), 292.

⁴⁸ Meisel, 292.

⁴⁹ Meisel, 293.

⁵⁰ Meisel, 297.

⁵¹ Berkowitz and Logan, 1-3.



Letter from the President/Editor

This has been an exciting year for Alpha Beta Phi members. As you know, 1987 marked the 200th anniversary of our nation's Constitution. In commemoration, our chapter passed out copies of the Constitution to faculty members and the student body during the University's celebration held 17 September 1987. It was encouraging that the two hundred copies quickly disappeared.

Continuing the celebration, Alpha Beta Phi sponsored two lectures. Dr. Leon Boothe, President of Northern Kentucky University, delivered the first lecture on "The Constitution and Foreign Policy." Our second guest lecture was presented by Dr. Robert Hawkes who spoke on "George Mason and the Constitution." Both presentations were well received.

On 24 November 1987, our chapter sponsored a display of original Civil War gear and a mini reenactment of camp life during this period. Two history students, Wiley Jones and John Sarver, performed the reenactment, answered questions, and showed a video of the Battle of Shiloh. Both gentlemen are members of a reenactment company of the 13th Ohio Infantry Regiment.

Mr. Andrew O. Lutes, an alumnus and former secretary to Alpha Beta Phi chapter, was chosen as a delegate to represent our chapter at the National Convention held in Washington, D.C. Mr. Lutes delivered the paper "The Sinking of the ARA *General Belgrano*" which was also published in a previous edition of *Perspectives in History*.

There are those to whom our chapter is most grateful and without whose help, publication of this journal would be extremely difficult. We wish to thank Amelia A. Maldonado for her editing assistance. Endless thanks to Ms. Shirley Raleigh who does everything from typing journal material to sending memos. Lastly, but certainly not least, we wish to express our deepest appreciation to Dr. W. Michael Ryan, History and Geography department chairman, who provided us with a staff assistant and who continues to lend his fullest support to our chapter.

Respectively,

Elaine M. Richardson
President/Editor



**Officers
of
Alpha Beta Phi
Chapter
1987-1988**

President	Elaine M. Richardson
Vice-President	Edna L. Stracener
Secretary	Linda Kay Hon
Treasurer	John Prescott Kappas
Historian	David P. Anstead
Faculty Advisor	James A. Ramage





Charter Student Members

Joy M. Baker
Ann C. Cahill
John P. DeMarcus, Jr.
Scott K. Fowler
Bennie W. Good
Matthew W. Hornsby
Kenneth E. Hughes
Shonda S. Kinman
Douglas K. Meyer, Jr.
Grace M. Murimi
Dick Wolfe

Christopher P. Burns
David R. Caudill, Jr.
Daniel M. Driscoll
Mark K. Gilvin
Joseph S. Guilyard
Todd P. Huff
Jeffrey Junto
Andrew O. Lutes
S. Wayne Moreland
Elaine M. Richardson
Rudiger F. Wolfe

Members Initiated

April 15, 1986

David P. Anstead
Richard T. Dedman
James R. Eilers
Michael P. Holliday
Betty R. Letscher
Darlene S. Miller
Linda M. Ruh

Joseph T. Shields
Harold A. Stephens
Shelley L. Stephenson
Deborah S. Trego
Edwin L. Vardiman
Shawn T. Young

New Members

April 14, 1987

Kristen H. Breen
Laura A. Butcher
Lynn David
Cheryl L. Grinninger
Linda Kay Hon
Judith F. Hutchison

John Prescott Kappas
Martha Pelfrey
Julie Ann Prewitt
Edna L. Stracener
Verna L. Vardiman

Faculty

Michael C. C. Adams
Lawrence R. Borne
John P. DeMarcus
J. Merle Nickell
W. Michael Ryan
Louis R. Thomas
H. Lew Wallace
Michael H. Washington

Leon E. Boothe
James C. Claypool
Tripta Desai
James A. Ramage
W. Frank Steely
Robert C. Vitz
Richard E. Ward
Jeffrey C. Williams



This publication was prepared by Northern Kentucky University and printed with state funds (KRS 57.375). Northern Kentucky University is an Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Institution. 08L047